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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the relationship between individual citizens and
an administrative agency of the state, the Department of Health and
Social Security. Drawing on a definition of administrative justice as
. those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for
the acceptability of its decisions" (Mashaw, 'Bureaucratic Justice',
1983), an analytical framework is developed which serves not only a
descriptive, but also an evaluative and normative function. The
argument is made that administrative justice fundamentally comprises
the elements of accuracy and fairness (fairness itself comprising the
elements of promptness, impartiality, participation and account¬
ability). An analysis of a generalised notion of decision-making, as
the combination of information (or evidence) collection and the
application of a set of ' decision criteria', is presented. Three
types of 'decision criteria' frequently used within a framework of
statutory legal rules in the provision of welfare services, ie case-
law, administrative rules and professional knowledge, are used as the
bases for three ideal-type decision-making systems.
The empirical part of the thesis utilises this analytical framework in
an examination of the administration by the Department of Health and
Social Security of two social security benefits, industrial disable¬
ment benefit and mobility allowance. This choice of benefits allows
comparisons to be made between the diverse organisational arrangements
adopted for each of them, and between the parallel systems of adjudi¬
cation used for the deliberation of the separate lay and medical
questions which form their eligibility criteria. A number of possible
reforms which would enhance the achievement of administrative justice
in relation to the social security system in general, and to the
administration of industrial disablement benefit and mobility
allowance in particular, emerge from the empirical analysis.
The thesis concludes with a reappraisal and confirmation of the
validity of the theoretical development of administrative justice
which has been presented, and of its utility as an analytical tool for
evaluating current and prospective arrangements for administering
social security. The suggestion is made finally that the relevance
and usefulness of administrative justice should extend beyond social
security not only into other areas of public adminstration, but also
to the private sphere in the relationships between individual citizens
and organisations of the private sector.
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CHAPTER 1 - ADVANCING THE FRONT LINE: A RATIONALE FOR STUDYING ROUTINE
DECISION-MAKING
1 - Introduction
. . structuring and controlling a system of administrative
action that can also claim to provide 'justice' is a very
subtle enterprise."
(J. L. Mashaw, 1983, p. 17)
This study was prompted by a simple question: within the vast,
bureaucratic edifice of the Department of Health and Social Security
(DHSS) how are individual decisions made on claims for social
security*13 benefits? However, an answer which merely described how
decisions are made, edifying though this might be, would be of only
limited value in the context of a social security system that is
constantly subject to change in both its substantive content and its
methods of administration. Of greater long-term relevance would be an
analysis which also considered how, in general, decisions ought to be
made, an approach which demands the use of normative theorising. In
response, this thesis develops a normative framework around the
concept of administrative justice, and uses it as an analytical tool
in an empirical evaluation of the performance of the DHSS in its
administration of two specific social security benefits: industrial
disablement benefit (IDB), intended for those who are injured or who
contract certain prescribed diseases at work, and mobility allowance.
intended to compensate people whose physical disability limits their
ability to walk.
The study of decision-making within the DHSS, as the brief review of
social security research will show later, has attracted comparatively
little in the way of academic interest in this country. However, in
this introductory chapter I will argue that, given the size and scope
of the social security system, such a study is both necessary and
- 2 -
important. The chapt.er continues by arguing the need for a normative
framework within which to conduct an analysis of social security
administration, and concludes with an outline of the structure of the
remainder of the thesis.
2 - Social security and the scope of academic research
Social security is important. At any one time virtually everyone in
the country is in contact with the system in some way, either as a
direct recipient (for example, of a retirement pension, or
unemployment benefit), as an indirect beneficiary (for example, a
child whose parent receives child benefit) or as a contributor to the
Exchequer and the National Insurance Fund (which between them finance
the payment of benefits) through the tax and national insurance
systems. It is one of the earliest of social welfare provisions to
have been extensively enshrined in legislation*25 this century and
formed one of the pillars of the putative "Welfare State" created by
the post-war Labour Government to deal with what Beveridge identified
as "the giant of Want". *35
A cursory glance at the size and scope of the system can only partly
convey its pervasiveness in the modern state. Social Security is the
main instrument of social policy through which the problem of poverty
is addressed; the 30+ distinct benefits catering for contingencies
such as unemployment, sickness, maternity and disability, for the
inevitability of old age and death, and for the burdens imposed by
raising a family. In 1984/5*"15 the total amount dispensed in benefits
was approximately £38 billion (about £100 million every day)
representing 30% of all public expenditure. Sixteen million new
claims were dealt, with drawing where necessary on the 52 million
records maintained at the DHSS's Central Office in Newcastle. About
115,000 officials administered the system, of whom over 80,000 were
civil servants of the DHSS. At any one time over 9 million people
- 3 -
were receiving a retirement pension, over 1 million unemployment
benefit, 4te million supplementary benefit, nearly 7 million families
were collecting child benefit in respect of 12te million children, and
just under 5 million were receiving either a rent rebate or allowance
under the housing benefit provisions.
As these statistics demonstrate, social security is important not only
for the individual recipients of benefit payments, which for many
people will be their main or sole source of income, but also for the
government which must finance the system from the limited resources
available in the public expenditure budget,
Despite its importance social security has remained something of a
poor relation in the academic study of social policy in this country.
This is not to deny a large body of scholarship on the subject (see
0'Higgins & Partington, 1986), some of which will be noted later, but
the contrast with other areas of social policy is quite stark; while
institutes, research centres and university appointments in, for
example, health, education and housing policy and practice abound, one
would search the British academic landscape in vain for a Social
Security Research Unit, or a chair in Social Security.
Although a poor relation of some other areas of social policy, aspects
of social security have attracted consistent interest and generated a
healthy literature. The history and development of social security
policy have been explored by, inter alia, Gilbert, 1966; Fraser, 1973;
and Ogus, 1982; whilst the evolution of schemes of social assistance,
ie National Assistance and its successor, supplementary benefit, has
attracted even greater interest from, for example, Webb, 1975; Deacon
and Bradshaw, 1983; Walker, 1983; Donnison, 1982; and Beltram, 1984.
And continuing in this tradition, the latest incarnation of social
assistance, Income Support (and the Social Fund) has already generated
its own corpus of study in advance of its implementation in April 1988
(see, for example, Berthoud, 1985; Partington, 1986; Bradshaw, 1987).
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However, the amount of empirical research on social security is far
more modest (Adler, 1985). Furthermore, much of this has
understandably concentrated on the impact of social security on the
financial circumstances of specific groups of the population, and on
the labour market. <S3
A large proportion of empirical research has been devoted to the
examining the mechanisms for the resolution of disputes between
claimants and the DHSS within the social security appeals network.
This comprises the Social Security Appeal Tribunal (SSAT) system
(which in 1984 subsumed the previously separate systems of
Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals (SBATs), and National Insurance
Local Tribunals (NILTs)), and the Medical Appeal Tribunal (MAT)
syst em.
A major study of the operation of NILTs was carried out in the 1970s
(Bell et al, 1974, 1975a). It recommended, inter alia, the provision
of more advisory and representation facilities for appellants, and
advocated the need for more competent and better trained tribunal
members. In contrast, the SBAT system generated a large literature,
much of it critical. <e3 Criticisms^3 included structural weaknesses
and the ambiguous relationship between SBATs and the DHSS (Herman,
1972), 'grossly inadequate' decision-making (Lewis, 1973), and the
failure of SBATs to meet the Franks Committee criteria of openness,
fairness and impartiality (Lister, 1974; Adler, Burns & Johnson,
1976). The comprehensive review of social security tribunals carried
out by Professor Bell on behalf of the DHSS upheld many of these
criticisms, emphasising the lack of a consistent approach to the
exercise of discretion and the wide variation in the quality of SBAT
chairmen (Bell, 1975b). Criticism of the tribunal arrangements formed
part of a wider concern about the viability of the supplementary
benefit scheme and the acceptability of its more discretionary
elements (Donnison, 1976; Supplementary Benefits Commission Annual
Reports). The reform of supplementary benefit in 1980, gave the
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scheme a firm statutory foundation, replaced the wide discretionary
powers of the Supplementary Benefits Commission and its officials with
detailed regulations approved by Parliament, and led to changes in
SBATs which brought them in line with the more legalistic structure
and operation of the NILTs. The merging of the two systems in 1984
then became a logical administrative manoeuvre (Bradley, 1985; Mesher,
1983; Harris, 1983).
Other aspects of the relationship between individuals and the social
security system have been addressed either directly or indirectly in
the course of research. The problem of potentially eligible claimants
not claiming benefits has been explored by, inter alia, Kerr (1984) in
relation to supplementary pensions, Corden (1981) in relation to
family income supplement, and Beltram (1984) in relation to
supplementary benefit. Claimants' knowledge of social security and
their views on the DHSS, on stigma and fraud, and on the adequacy of
benefits were surveyed by Briggs and Rees (1980) and more recently in
relation to the single payments provisions of supplementary benefit
legislation by Berthoud (1984). The abuse of social security and the
backlash of 'scroungerphobia' that it creates have been examined in
Moore (1981), Golding & Middleton (1982) and Franey (1983).
The organisation and administration of social security, however, have
attracted little interest, Of recent origin are the explanatory
articles by Warner (1984a, 1984b) on the reorganisation of the
internal structure of the DHSS and the flow of information within it,
and 0'Higgins' critique (1984) of the 'Operational Strategy', the
DHSS's massive programme to computerise the social security system.
Likewise, there have been few studies of the routine interaction
between the individual and the DHSS at what might be called, in the
military metaphor often favoured by the Civil Service, the 'front
line' . Those that do exist have been almost exclusively concerned
with supplementary benefit; where reference has been made to the
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administration of other benefits this has usually been only for
purposes of comparison. There have been no studies of the
administration of other social security benefits in their own right.
The most relevant of the few studies that have been undertaken in the
last twenty years or so are examined in the next section.
3 - The paucity of social research at the "front-line" of social
security
Whilst the DHSS does carry out its own research, the results are
primarily intended for internal monitoring and evaluation purposes or
for assessing policy options, and are generally not published or made
available to the public.
Of non-DHSS research into aspects of the administration of social
security is perhaps the most noticeable feature its paucity. Adler
(1985) suggests that one of the main reasons for this is the dominant
position of the DHSS<S>. Social security is the direct responsibility
of a central government department; unlike many welfare provisions
(such as health, education, housing and social work) there is no
external agency to implement policy. As a result, policy-related
research is concentrated within the DHSS itself and is rarely
published. Furthermore with implementation of social security policy
being the direct responsibility of a department under the Secretary of
State for Social Services, it becomes a particularly sensitive area of
government activity. Criticism cannot be deflected onto, for example,
health authorities, or local authority housing, education, social work
and social services departments, and hence becomes especially
unwelcome. So, since social research is by its nature a critical
exercise, this dislike of criticism generates a concomitant dislike of
social research. Another result of the central position of the DHSS
is that training for social security officials (who are generalist
civil servants) is undertaken internally - there is no professional
organisation concerned with the education of its members (unlike for
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professionals in health, social work or housing administration). The■
overall result is that a massive, complex government department has
remained largely opaque to outside scrutiny.
The few external studies that have been carried out reveal the
diversity of potential research opportunities that remain untapped.
They also demonstrate the relative importance of the ex-DHSS civil
servant in providing insights into front-line activity; of the works
discussed in this section, those by Hill (1969), Laurance <1980), and
Beltram (1984) are written with the advantage of the insider's
practical experience. But whilst insiders' views are particularly
illuminating they also serve to underline the lack of penetration into
the area by external researchers.
Hill's seminal article (1969) combines description of his experience
of working in a National Assistance office in the early 1960s with an
analysis of how the social security legislation then current allowed
officials to' use (and sometimes abuse) the discretion granted them.
The picture emerged of a workforce which struggled to operate a
complex system under the combined pressures of a heavy workload and
public hostility. Their task was made more difficult by gaps in the
legislation which often obliged officials to make decisions based on
their own interpretation of government policy but which also allowed
them to impose their own values in making decisions. Some officials,
according to Hill, welcomed this opportunity to distribute social
security according to their own views of which claimants were
' deserving' and which ' undeserving' .
The intrusion of personal values in the treatment of supplementary
benefit claimants is also identified by, for example, Laurance (1980),
Beltram (1984) and Howe (1985), and in the series of studies by the
Policy Studies Institute (PSI) into the operation and effects of the
Single Payment regulations (Berthoud, 1984). A recurrent fear raised
in these studies is that the personal values and prejudices of
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individual social security officials will influence their decisions.
Hill, Laurance and Howe all provide instances of this occurring, but
by their nature (ie each being based on one local office only) these
studies cannot speculate with any confidence on the extent of the
problem. In contrast, Working Paper ' B* in the PSI series, analyses
the responses of 170 DHSS supplementary benefit officers in 50 offices
to a questionnaire about their attitudes and concludes that,
"There is not evidence in support of the hypothesis that
staff attitudes determine rates of single payments; it can
hardly be claimed that the data constitutes evidence to
refute that hypothesis either." (Berthoud, 1984, p. B43)
Kay (Scottish Consumer Council, 1985) also notes a prevailing sense of
distrust of the claimant by officials that is identified in other
studies which, she argues, spills over into the routine contacts
between claimants and staff at the social security office counter and,
combined with the often poor physical conditions of DHSS offices,
generates an atmosphere of hostility and unpleasantness exacerbating
the already difficult relationship between them.
For these writers the central problem, through which the personal
values and prejudices of officials manifest themselves, is discretion,
whether it is intended, ie a power vested in officials to tailor their
decisions to meet the needs of the claimant in his or her particular
circumstances, or is merely generated by the nature of legislative and
administrative rules in which it is impracticable to encompass all the
possible personal circumstances of claimants.
A novel (and unique) study by Coleman for the Child Poverty Action
Group (Coleman, 1970) examined the internal management of letters of
appeal from claimants, the majority of which were disposed of admini¬
stratively without progressing to an appeal tribunal. The statistical
analysis of a full year's appeals was valuable not only for the
insights it provided but also for the questions it raised. For
example, Coleman found that 367# of appeals resulted in amendment
- 9 -
either by the DHSS or by an appeal tribunal, a statistic that could be
interpreted as reflecting a sensitive appeals mechanism or providing a
disturbing commentary upon the poor quality of initial decision¬
making. Over fifteen years later part of Coleman's conclusion remains
a pertinent observation:
"...the administrative process itself, and its problems,
both require and are worthy of greater attention than they
traditionally receive." (p. 14)
Unless there is some as yet unforeseen movement towards a more open
style of government, the opportunities for conducting research into
the administration of the DHSS (and many other government departments
and agencies) are likely to remain few. At the time that this
research was conducted this unpromising position was exacerbated by
the high political profile of social security generated by the series
of reviews instigated by the then Secretary of State, Norman Fowler,
which rendered external research (and particularly its potential for
embarrassing criticism) all the more precarious. C9:>
4 - Why studying the front line is important
". . . great importance must be attached to consistently good
decision-making by the authority responsible for decisions
of first instance. An appeal system cannot take the place
of good quality first-tier decision-making..."
(Bell et al, 1974, p. 309)
Having identified a gap in our understanding of the workings of the
social security system, the question is then raised of how important
it is to attempt to fill it. It is hoped that in retrospect this
thesis will have demonstrated its importance, but in prospect I would
argue thus: the size and importance of the social security system has
already been demonstrated; from their different perspectives both the
government and the individual claimant have an interest in the
legislation of social security being implemented effectively and
efficiently, the government wishing to ensure that only those who are
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entitled to receive benefits actually receive them, and then at a cost
which it considers acceptable, and the individual claimant concerned
that he receives his full entitlements under the law and without
unnecessary delay. When considered in this light it is clear that
concentrating research on the appeals system contributes little to
establishing whether these ends are achieved. *103 The vast majority
of social security decision-making is undertaken at the level of the
initial decision of a claim not at the tribunal level (in 1985, for
example, fewer than 0.5% of all social security claims were considered
by an appeal tribunalc11J). If we want to ensure that the social
security system is working as we would wish, then it is to the level
of the initial decision that we must look.
Partly because of the legal nature of decisions about social security
benefits, analysts of the tribunal system have sought to ensure that
some of the safeguards of judicial trials are reflected in the
structure and procedures of tribunals. It is therefore surprising to
find that this concern has not been extended to the level of the
initial decision which is as much based on statutory provisions as the
decision of a tribunal. One explanation of this difference could
appeal to 'interest theory' (Harlow and Rawlings, 1984, pp.80-82)
which maintains that the extent of the safeguards provided for an
individual in an administrative process should reflect the impact of
the decision that emerges from it. However, it could be argued, that
far from being relatively insignificant, benefit decisions have a
potentially large impact upon many of the recipients. Campbell (1978)
adopts this position, after noting that in some welfare settings, for
example those which may involve a loss of liberty, judicial safeguards
are built into decision-making procedures, c1
"Similar safeguards do not seem ... to be thought necessary
where the decisions to be made by the state concern not the
loss of liberty but the loss of benefit or personal
assistance, and yet the interests of individuals may be just
as significantly affected by the failure of the state to
provide a welfare benefit as by the exercise of its powers
of compulsion over the individual."
(Campbell, 1978, p. 70)
At this stage one objection must be met, ie that of the irrelevance of
a study which is concerned primarily with the procedures of social
security and not its substance, a criticism succinctly captured in
Zucker's challenge "what happens when the decision process is just but
the outcome is not?" (Zucker, 1985). The warning is implicit in the
question that satisfaction with sound and fair procedures should not
be confused with approval of the outcomes of those procedures. A
further criticism arises not from conflating outcome and substance
with process but from keeping them separate. It has been argued that
the substantive rights of individuals are not always enhanced by
increasing their procedural safeguards (Handler, 1966; Prosser 1977),
ie what a welfare applicant receives at the culmination of the process
will not necessarily be affected by the process itself. Furthermore,
as Prosser (1977) has argued, enhanced procedural rights ensuring
greater fairness and equity may also grant, by association, the
symbolic appearance of fairness and equity to the substantive outcomes
themselves thus deflecting critical appraisal of those outcomes. The
reason that criticisms arise from opposite viewpoints is that in
practice procedure and substance are closely linked; as Galligan
(1986a) writes,
". . . the object of procedures is to realise a given object,
and so in this sense procedures are instrumental to
outcomes. " (p. 138)
So, whilst it may be true that increasing procedural rights does not
necessarily improve substantive outcomes, it is equally true that it
may do so where they enable a welfare recipient to obtain his full
entitlements. Some welfare benefits and services may not be
considered generous but if the intended recipient cannot exercise his
rights to them then he is doubly disadvantaged. If greater procedural
- 12 -
rights can ensure that he receives his entitlement, then his welfare
is increased even if his substantive entitlements are not.
It is the distinction between substantive outcomes and procedural
rights that provides both a defence of a study that deliberately
restricts itself to procedural issues and an indication of its
limitations as a tool with which to analyse the content or substance
of welfare policies (see Adler & Asquith, 1981, pp.16-18). If
procedural rights increase a recipient's welfare then that should be
justification enough for seeking their improvement, but the message to
be drawn from the criticisms of Handler and Prosser is that such an
aim should not be allowed to overshadow the necessary parallel task of
subjecting to scrutiny the substantive content of welfare benefits and
services. And in practice the two may complement each other if
increased awareness and involvement by individuals and their
representatives in the process of welfare delivery also increases
their awareness and knowledge of what the substantive provisions are.
If the process is above reproach but the outcome is still perceived as
unfair in some way then some useful purpose will have been served.
The conclusion must be that procedural and substantive issues are not,
and should not be imputed to be, in competition with each other.
Furthermore, process and substance can be separated analytically and
be studied individually without implying that they do not interact.
5 - The need for theory
In identifying as an important area of research the administration of
social security at the 'front line' we are faced with a further set of
questions which resolve themselves into two distinct groups. Firstly,
we are concerned specifically with the detail of how decisions are
made in practice. Explanation, therefore, relies on the tools of
descriptive analysis. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly we. need
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to know how to evaluate what we find, to be able to judge whether what
happens is what we want to happen, ie what ought to happen.
Description alone cannot provide the answers, what is required is a
normative theory of the relationship between the individual citizen
and administrative agencies of the state. It is an approach that
Prosser (1982) endorses in his argument for a new, critical stance
towards the theory of public law:
"(theory)... should not only describe and explain the
operation of stat'e institutions but should also provide the
means for an effective critique of them and point the way
for their future development." (p. 2)
A normative theory of the relations between the administrative
agencies of the state and the individual is little developed in the
British literature. The most comprehensive effort has come instead
from the USA in Mashaw's 'Bureaucratic Justice' (1983) in which he
takes the notion of administrative justice which had previously been
used fairly loosely, to encompass the means by which individuals could
seek redress against state agencies against whom they held a
grievance, and develops it to embrace the more important (ie in the
pursuit of mass justice) element of the initial encounter between
agency and individual.
In chapter 2 Mashaw's innovative thesis is taken as the starting point
for a theoretical investigation of administrative justice and the
nature of decision-making which informs the empirical investigation
into the administration of industrial disablement benefit and mobility
allowance later.
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6 - Necessary diffidence: avoiding the lure of over-ambitious
generalisations
For mainly pragmatic reasons (discussed in chapter 3), the empirical
element of this study is concerned with the examination of only one
part of the social security system, ie a description and evaluation of
the administration of industrial disablement benefit and mobility
allowance. The validity of such an approach has been argued, but
conversely we must also be clear about its limitations. Firstly,
administrative justice, as its adjectival-nominative construction
indicates is a qualified notion of justice, ie one form of a wider
concept of justice, a particular manifestation of justice in the
context of a defined set of social relations (ie between state and
individual). Administrative justice can therefore be considered, as
other notions such as 'social' or 'distributive' justice can also be
considered, a kind of 'sub-set' of the formal and abstract concept of
justice. As such administrative justice both draws on the wider
concept for its formulation and can also contribute to its
development.
Secondly, it must be admitted that any normative theory will be based
on necessarily subjective foundations, not fixed, provable prop¬
ositions. There is, therefore, no fundamental theory of justice that
awaits discovery and hence no definitive conception of administrative
justice, each must be based ultimately on moral beliefs or principles
which cannot be, as MacCormick (1977) points out, "the result of a
chain of logical reasoning."
If we are to accept the development of an argument that is based on a
normative theory, then that normative theory and its ultimate
principles must be laid bare and found to be convincing. Kamenka
(1978) sets out how a normative set of ideas must be judged,
"It is to be judged by its internal coherence and logical
consistency, by the truth of its associated empirical claims
and its relation to relevant empirical material that it may
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or may not take up and, in the last resort, by its relation
and that of its consequences and implications to our own
beliefs." (p. 12)
Chapter 2 will adopt this approach in the examination of Mashaw's
analysis of administrative justice. And, of course, it is a test
which the subsequent development of Mashaw must also satisfy.
A third limitation stems from a development of theory which draws upon
a concomitant empirical study (a technique drawing on the notion of
'grounded theory' expounded by Glaser and Strauss <1967)). The
problem of this approach is one of extrapolating the analysis beyond
the boundaries of the empirical material. A concept of administrative
justice, however, concerned as it is with the relationship between
state administrative agencies and individuals, should be relevant for
all such relationships regardless of the type of agency involved or
the type of policy it implements. In this study a distinct part (ie
industrial disablement benefit and mobility allowance) of a
specialised social programme (ie the provision of social security),
operated by a specific kind of state agency <ie one dispensing welfare
benefits) forms the empirical focus for enquiry. The temptation to
claim any wider relevance (even to the rest of the social security
programme) should therefore be treated with caution. This is not to
suggest that a formulation of the concept of administrative justice
grounded in an examination of the administration of industrial
disablement benefit and mobility allowance will have no relevance for
the administration of other social security benefits (on the contrary,
it certainly should have) or the administration of other social
services, but to warn against too great a claim being made for its
general applicability. One could make an analogy here with
statistical tests of significance and say that whilst we may have a
confidence level of 997. for the relevance of the theoretical analysis
to industrial disablement benefit and mobility allowance, this level
drops to say 957. for the rest of social security, and drops lower for
other social services, and so on. It is only by further empirical
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study that the analysis of administrative justice offered here can be
strengthened, changed or discarded; this study can only claim to be a
beginning.
7 - The structure of the thesis
The subsequent six chapters of this thesis fall into three groups.
Chapters 2-4 provide the necessary prelude to an empirical analysis
of social security administration with a theoretical development of
administrative justice (chapter 2), a discussion of the methodology
adopted for the empirical investigation (chapter 3) and a discussion
of the organisation of the DHSS and its internal distribution of
decision-making responsibilities (chapter 4). Chapters 5 and 6
present the empirical analysis of the administration of industrial
injuries benefit and mobility allowance respectively. Finally,
chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the study.
Based on Mashaw' s seminal analysis (1983), chapter 2 develops the
concept of administrative justice into a normative framework within
which to conduct empirical research. Firstly, Mashaw's theoretical
ideas are summarised and a critique of them offered. Following this
an analysis of a generalised process of decision-making is presented
separating out the two distinct phases of the operation, the
collection of information or evidence on which to base a decision, and
the subsequent application of the relevant 'decision criteria'
(whether they are constituted in statute or case-law, internal
administrative rules, or derived from some other source, such as a
body of professional knowledge or the personal value system of an
individual decision-maker). Based on the critique of Mashaw and the
analysis of decision-making, the concept of administrative justice is
then reformulated as a normative, evaluative tool with which to
examine decision-making by welfare-providing agencies.
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Chapter 3 describes the formal system of 'adjudication' used within
the social security system as a means of producing (supposedly)
independent decisions. The different arrangements for lay and medical
adjudication are then described. A brief section describes the
present organisation of the DHSS, and the place of two bodies external
to the adjudication system, the Office of the Chief Adjudication
Officer and the Office of the President of Social Security Appeal
Tribunals, is discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the
meaning of adjudication as a distinct form of decision-making, which
draws the important conclusion that it forms only part of the total
process which produces a decision on a social security claim, thus
requiring that a study of social security decision-making in practice
must look beyond the 'official' adjudication arrangements. Finally,
the chapter relates the general demands of administrative justice
(identified in chapter 2 in relation to welfare-providing agencies)
more specifically to the social security system.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology adopted for the empirical part of
the study. The use of 'multiple strategies' in social research is
discussed and the case is put for the adoption of such an approach
involving a mixture of semi-structured interviews with DHSS officials,
an examination of internal and publicly available documents, and
scrutiny of a sample of casepapers. A breakdown of the interview
sample is given, followed by a note on how the data collected from
such diverse sources was analysed. An appendix to the thesis
reproduces the interview schedules which were used.
Chapter 5 links the earlier theoretical analysis to an examination of
the administration of decision-making on initial claims for industrial
disablement benefit. Part I introduces the legislation of industrial
injuries and the distribution of decision-making responsibilities
within the DHSS. In part II the formal arrangements for making
decisions on lay and medical questions arising from a claim are
compared with decision-making in practice, drawing on the extensive
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interview material gathered from a sample of those officials who have
a significant bearing on the process. In part III an assessment is
made of the extent to which the demands of administrative justice are
either promoted or retarded in the routine assessment of claims for
industrial disablement benefit.
Chapter 6 on mobility allowance follows a similar pattern to
chapter 5. The legislation and allocation of decision-making respon¬
sibilities are described followed by an analysis of the lay and
medical inputs to the decision-making process, Finally, mobility
allowance decision-making is evaluated against the demands of
administrative justice.
Chapter 7 presents a discussion of the conclusions that can be drawn
from the theoretical and empirical analyses. One important measure of
the effectiveness of a normative theory, as Prosser has argued (see
p. 13), is its ability to point the way for future development. The
chapter, therefore, discusses what that direction for future
development might be, and suggests some of the possibilities that
could increase the chances of achieving administrative justice in the
administration of the social security system in general, and of
industrial disablement benefit and mobility allowance in particular.
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the contribution made to
the development of the concept of administrative justice, and its
place in a critical, normative theory of the relationship between
state agencies and individuals.
As mentioned earlier, social security is subject to constant review
and change in both its substantive legislative content and in its
working practices (whether rooted, for example, in developments in
technology or the pursuit of greater efficiency in administration).
The evaluation presented here, therefore, can only be a 'snapshot', a
picture of the administrative arrangements pertaining at the time the
fieldwork was undertaken between February and September 1986. The
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relevant legislation in force then was primarily the major consol¬
idating Act of the 1970s, the Social Security Act 1975 and its train
of Statutory Instruments, plus the various statutory amendments up to
but not including the Social Security Act 1986 which introduced
changes to the law of both industrial injuries and mobility allowance.
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CHAPTER 2 - ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND WELFARE DECISION-MAKING
. it is unfair for officials to act except on the basis
of a general public theory that will constrain them to
consistency, provide a public standard for testing or
debating or predicting what they do, and not allow appeals
to unique intuitions that might mask prejudice or self-
interest in particular cases. "
(Dworkin, 1977, pp. 162-3)
Part I - INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies of the welfare state fall into two broad
categories: one group will be concerned to regulate the activities of
individuals and public and private organisations in specifically
demarcated areas (for example, the Health and Safety Executive, HM
Customs and Excise, Local Authority Trading Standards Departments),
whereas the second group provide some kind of service to the public
(for example, the NHS, local authority Social Work and Social Services
Departments, the DHSS)C',>. Whilst a general theory of administrative
justice should apply to both categories, this chapter will be
concerned primarily with the second group in order to develop a
theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the administration
of the DHSS as a welfare-providing agency. C2:>
Welfare administrative systems are primarily mechanisms for
distributing society's scarce welfare resources. Within the context
of the post-war welfare state this task is undertaken mainly by
agencies of the state, whose responsibilities, duties and powers are
defined in Acts of Parliament and elaborated in Statutory Instruments.
It is within this legal framework that the concept of administrative
justice has meaning, being concerned with the relations between state
agencies and individuals who are affected by welfare legislation.
This concern with administrative justice is prompted by the general
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desire for individuals to be treated fairly and equitably by a state
apparatus which has expanded consistently over the last two centuries
to impinge upon virtually every aspect of social life.
Until recently, as explained in chapter 1, the main thrust of studies
of administrative justice has been the capacity of individual citizens
to hold state officials to account for their decisions. Hence
discussion has centred on the methods adopted to ensure that
individuals are able to have their complaints heard by an independent
body and, where appropriate, obtain redress. The concern with admini¬
strative tribunals has a long pedigree, including the important early
contribution of Robson, and the major reports from Donoughmore and
Franks*33- A more recent concern has been with the actions, not of
tribunals, but of the officials whose decisions give rise initially to
the need for grievance and redress procedures. In a social security
context this interest has been manifested in this country most
noticeably in the debate on discretion which was at its most lively
and potent in the 1970s in relation to supplementary benefits, but
which has relevance for a variety of welfare settings. CA3
The two debates, over appellate procedures and the operation of
discretion in welfare delivery, are closely linked at a practical
level but have lacked a common conceptual and theoretical framework.
An important contribution towards filling this gap is Mashaw's*S3
Bureaucratic Justice (Mashaw, 1983) in which he examines the concept
of administrative justice and questions its meaning for an admini¬
strative agency responsible for implementing a welfare programme. His
task as he saw it was to re-orient debate away from a preoccupation
with appeals mechanisms (which he called 'external' administrative
law) towards the administrative agencies themselves, and to ask
questions about the operation of an 'internal' administrative law
which guides their routine activities. If such an internal
administrative law could be identified then it could be utilised as a
set of normative standards to promote the fair and equitable treatment
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of individuals in their dealings with state welfare agencies.
Mashaw's work was seminal in theorising about administrative justice
but is not, and was not intended to be, definitive. Rather, it
invited further development. For a study of the social security
system in this country, such development must, as Ogus (1987) points
out in his review of 'Bureaucratic Justice', "fit the British context"
(p. 315).
The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise Mashaw's theory-building,
to identify its strengths and weaknesses and to develop the insights
it contributes to an analysis of administrative justice which can
provide a normative framework for the examination and evaluation of
front-line decision-making.
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Part II - MASHAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
1 - The Mashaw Thesis
Mashaw1 s inquiry, conducted in the United States, developed from an
examination of a large body of literature critical of the Social
Security Administration's (SSA) implementation of the Disability
Insurance Program (DIP), which makes benefit payments to disabled
claimants who satisfy a series of occupational, medical and vocational
conditions, and promotes rehabilitation schemes to enable these
claimants to re-enter the labour market. From this literature he
identified three main strands of criticism which viewed the DIP'S
adjudicatory function in divergent ways.
One strand criticises the SSA for failing to manage the assessment of
claims in ways which ensure predictable and consistent outcomes. A
second strand takes the view that the DIP has a paternalistic and
therapeutic purpose which demands service for claimants from various
professional disciplines. Hence, the bureaucratic decision-making
process of the SSA is criticised for failing to provide a role for
professional judgement or to adapt to a service orientation. The
third perspective is more 'legalistic' and is concerned primarily with
the capacity of claimants to assert and defend their rights to
disability benefits. Hence the emphasis is on hearings and appeals
mechanisms*7' and their inability or failure to provide the essential
elements of judicial trials.
Having identified these lines of criticism Mashaw poses the question
of why such a pattern should exist and whether there are any
characteristics which unify each perspective. His answer has three
main elements:
"First, these criticisms reflect distinct conceptual models
of administrative justice. Second, each of the models is
coherent and attractive. But third, the models, whilst not
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mutually exclusive, are highly competitive; the internal
logic of any one of them tends to drive the characteristics
of the others from the field as it works itself out in
concrete situations." (Mashaw, 1983, p. 23)
Mashaw then introduces a definition of administrative justice which is
not only pleasingly succinct but also important, since it forms the
basis of his whole analysis. For Mashaw, the ' justice' of an admini¬
strative system means,
"... those qualities of a decision process that provide
arguments for the acceptability of its decisions." (Mashaw,
1983, pp. 24-25)
ie the decisions which emerge from a decision-making system will be
considered acceptable by the recipients or those responsible for the
system if they display certain characteristics, these providing what
Mashaw calls the 'justice argument' for that system. Three types of
justice argument are suggested, each deriving from one of the three
strands of criticism identified in the scrutiny of the critical
literature. These justice arguments, which form the basis of
different conceptualisations of administrative justice are:
"(i) that decisions should be accurate and efficient
realisations of the legislative will; (ii) that decisions
should provide appropriate support or therapy from the
perspective of relevant professional cultures; and (iii)
that decisions should be fairly arrived at when assessed in
the light of traditional processes for determining
individual entitlements." (Mashaw, 1983, p. 25)
From this intuitive basis grounded in his own empirical analysis of
the SSA, Mashaw posits three models or ' ideal types' <s> of admini¬
strative justice which he calls Bureaucratic Rationality, Professional
Treatment, and Moral Judgement.
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(a) Bureaucratic Rationality
Under the US Social Security Act the task of Disability Insurance is
to pay disability benefits to eligible claimants. Hence the admin¬
istrative goal should be a system for deciding true and false claims
at least possible cost, ie decision-making should be accurate and
cost-effective. The emphasis is factual and technocratic; individual
decision-makers must deal with the facts that determine the
eligibility of a claim and managers must develop the cheapest
appropriate mechanisms for this to be achieved. Questions of values
or preference should be the responsibility of policy-makers to decide
and hence should play no part in initial decision-making by low-level
of ficials.
The type of organisation needed for the task of information collection
and assessment on a large scale would exhibit the familiar character¬
istics of the bureaucratic enterprise, for example, selection and
training of personnel, a hierarchical system of delegation,
accountability and control based on clearly-defined codes of
instruction etc. So, from this perspective,
". . . administrative justice is accurate decision-making
carried on through processes appropriately rationalised to
take account of costs. " (Mashaw, 1983, p. 26)
Bureaucratic Rationality claims legitimacy from its concern with
implementing a socially desirable programme whilst using as few of
society's resources as necessary.
(b) Professional Treatment
The administrative system of the Disability Insurance Program seen
from a Professional Treatment perspective should reflect that, as
Mashaw suggests, "the goal of the professional is to serve the client"
(1983, p.26), ie it should be explicitly client-oriented;
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"it would seek to provide those services ... that the client
needed to improve his well-being and perhaps regain his
self-sufficiency." (Mashaw, 1983, p. 27)
Whilst information is still collected in such a model, and standard¬
ised procedures used,
"the incompleteness of facts, the singularity of individual
contexts and the ultimately intuitive nature of judgement
are recognised, if not exalted. " (Mashaw, 1983, p. 27)
Using the basic techniques of personal examination and counselling,
concern for the individual's overall circumstances would override
strict adherence to any rules for deciding eligibility, an approach
Mashaw calls 'holistic'.
An administrative system designed to provide professional treatment
would be concerned with assigning the appropriate staff to deal with
individual needs and requirements. The norms of professional culture
would dominate rules, hierarchical controls and efficiency consider¬
ations. The model finds its legitimacy in its principal aim of
helping the client, and in the personal relationship between client
and professional.
"Justice lies in having the appropriate professional
judgement applied to one's particular situation in the
context of a service relationship. " (Mashaw, 1983, p. 29;
original emphasis)
(c) Moral Judgement
"The traditional goal of the adjudicatory process is to
resolve disputes about rights, about the allocation of
benefits and burdens." (Mashaw, 1983, p. 29)
This is the essence of the Moral Judgement model which Mashaw suggests
finds its most familiar manifestations in civil and criminal trials.
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But the adjudicatory process does not just seek to ascertain facts and
apply law (which Bureaucratic Rationality does as well) it has to make
judgements about worth and preference, in short, about values. Hence,
decision-making from this perspective is "value-defining" (Mashaw,
1983, p.29), ie when interests and values conflict the question to be
decided is not only what the ' truth' of a situation is, but whose
interests and values are to be preferred. So, the central issue in
adjudicating cases is,
". . . the deservingness of some or all of the parties in the
context of certain events, transactions or relationships
that give rise to a claim. " (Mashaw, 1983, p. 30)
This demands a neutral decision-maker, ie someone,
". . . not previously connected with the relevant parties or
events in ways that would impair the exercise of independent
judgement on the evidence and arguments presented. "
(Mashaw, 1983, p. 30)
Mashaw's discussion focuses on traditional examples of dispute
resolution to illustrate the Moral Judgement model but asserts that an
adversarial setting is not necessarily an integral part, other
non-adversary (or inquisitorial) hearings may also conform to the
model. The important point, he concludes, is that,
"... the 'justice' of this model inheres in its promise of a
full and equal opportunity to obtain one's entitlements.
Its authority rests on neutral development and application
of common moral principles within the contexts giving rise
to entitlement claims." (Mashaw, 1983, p. 31)
<d) The models compared
Mashaw provides a useful summary in tabular form of the defining
characteristics (or 'dimensions') of his models (Mashaw, 1983, p. 31).
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This table will be referred to frequently throughout the remainder of
this chapter; it is mostly self-explanatory, although the 'dimension'
of 'Structure or Organisation' perhaps needs clarification. At first
sight the inclusion under this heading of 'hierarchical', 'inter¬
personal' and ' independent' appears puzzling since they do not seem to
be comparable characteristics. 'Hierarchical' seems to describe an
organisational structure of the line management type comprising a
hierarchy of superior and subordinate staff. 'Interpersonal', on the
other hand, seems to refer to an aspect of the relationship between
the provider and the prospective recipient of a service and says
nothing about the organisational structure, just as 'hierarchical'
says nothing about provider-client relationships. And 'independent',
in Mashaw's discussion of Moral Judgement, appears to refer to the
special circumstance where the decision-maker is independent of two
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parties involved in a dispute (even though Mashaw notes that such an
occasion need not necessarily be adversarial).
The categorisation used by Mashaw makes more sense, however, if we
consider the terms in some way descriptive of the place of decision¬
makers in relation to the relevant administrative agency. Bureau¬
cratic decision-makers are part of a hierarchical organisation such
that they are responsible for their decisions to a superior within
that organisation (who presumably can legitimately direct or alter the
decisions of the initial decision-makers). In contrast the adjudi¬
cation of the Moral Judgement model is autonomous and independent.
Adjudicators are solely responsible for their decisions, and although
there may be some external means by which those decisions may be
changed, they cannot be directed in what decision to make. Profess¬
ional decision-makers are also autonomous like independent
adjudicators, but need not remain similarly 'independent'; they may
involve the service recipient in making decisions and, where
appropriate draw other colleagues into the process.
Having developed his models, Mashaw uses them as analytical tools to
explain the development and evaluate the performance of the SSA in its
implementation of the Disability Insurance Program. An important
aspect of Mashaw's thesis is that the models are 'competitive'. He
does not mean by this that they are mutually exclusive in the sense
that the existence of one denies or prevents the existence of the
others in an administrative system. The effect of this competition
is, he argues, more that if a conscious effort is made to promote one
model then the others will be diminished in importance but not
necessarily in direct proportion, ie an increase in Bureaucratic
Rationality of 'X' would not necessarily lead to a corresponding loss
of 'X' in Professional Treatment or Moral Judgement. Indeed one of
his conclusions, that an injection of Bureaucratic Rationality would
increase the overall justice of the Disability Insurance Program,
rests partly upon this assertion. This notion of 'competition'
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between the models as well as the underlying justification for each
will be explored in a critique of Mashaw later in the chapter.
However, since this critique is based mainly upon Mashaw's own
definition of administrative justice I wish initially to examine this
definition in some detail.
2 - Defining administrative justice
(a) Probing Mashaw's definition of administrative justice
It was noted earlier that Mashaw's definition of administrative
justice as:
"... those qualities of a decision process that provide
arguments for the acceptability of its decisions." (Mashaw,
1983, pp.24-25)
is very persuasive. The apparent simplicity of this definition,
however, conceals a depth of complexity which can be explored by
considering a number of questions raised by the wording of the
definition itself. The first of these concerns Mashaw's emphasis on
the process of decision-making rather than the substance. This
emphasis was discussed in chapter 1 (see pp. 11-12) and found to be
convincing. The second question concerns the 'acceptability' of
decisions. If acceptability is a yardstick of administrative justice
then the question of 'acceptable to whom?' is raised - the service
recipients? the decision-makers? the wider society? Having tackled
these questions we have the basis for a critique of Mashaw which will
allow us to address the question which is the crux of a definition of
administrative justice: can we identify the 'qualities' that a welfare
agency should embody in order for its decisions to be considered
acceptable?
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<b) For whom must the decision process be 'acceptable'?
Clearly there is more than one possible response to this question. If
the answer is 'the individual citizen' then the qualities required of
the decision process will be different from those had the answer been
the management of the administrative agency, or the front-line
official, or the government of the day, or the public or the media.
For individuals, having their needs or entitlements fully met will be
their main demand from a welfare system, but for the relevant admini¬
strative agency or the government this will represent only part of
their concerns. An example which is relevant for the scrutiny of
Mashaw models of administrative justice later is the pursuit of
efficiency by administrative agencies. Efficiency is not of direct
relevance to individual citizens in securing their entitlements or
meeting their needs, but for a government pursuing a particular public
expenditure policy it is of central importance since money devoted to
one service or part of the economy cannot be used elsewhere (in
economists' terms there is an 'opportunity cost' to welfare admin¬
istration). Hence, the task of achieving social justice (in the sense
of a fair and equitable distribution of benefits and burdens between
citizens) requires a government to impose expenditure limitations on
all administrative agencies (not only those providing welfare
services). If unlimited resources were devoted, say, to the accurate
determination of social security claims then, given the finite
resources available to the government, injustices could result, for
example, for the homeless family who cannot be housed or for the
patient who cannot be supplied with a replacement hip. Trade-offs
are inevitable, but must appeal for resolution not to considerations
of administrative justice but to the principles of other conceptions
of justice, such as social or distributive justice.
The position adopted in this thesis is that the issues raised by the
concept of administrative justice will be addressed from the
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perspective of the individual citizen; this follows the approach of,
inter alia, Davis (1971) and Mashaw (1974, 1983). However, this
approach can be criticised for ignoring the processes of policy-making
which provide the substantive rules which delimit the decision-making
behaviour of front-line officials. *10> The answer to this line of
criticism is to recall the process versus substance debate earlier*11:1
and argue that administrative justice, analysed from the perspective
of the individual citizen does not preclude or attempt to reduce the
importance of decisions about the substantive content of welfare
policies. Rather it focuses on an area of public administration which
perhaps does not receive as much attention as policy analyses but
which, for the individual, may be far more relevant in securing or
improving his or her substantive welfare (at least in the short-term).
However, this is not to lose sight of the wider demands of government
which will be translated into specific aims and objectives for the
administrative agency (such as efficiency, a positive public image, or
the detection of fraud). The rationale for these demands is not
always easy to pinpoint; they may reflect, for example, a government's
desire to secure the equitable treatment of citizens, or a wish to
pursue other (explicit or otherwise) social, economic or political
ends (such as social control, lower public expenditure, or the
enhancement of its electoral appeal). Such demands and pressures are
an undeniable influence on administrative agencies and will ultimately
filter through the organisation to have some effect on the treatment
of the individual. Hence they are important for a study of admin¬
istrative justice from the perspective of the individual citizen
requiring that such external demands (which Mashaw calls 'exogenous'
goals (1983, p. 60-61) and their effects should form part of the
empirical analysis. However, how the anticipated competition between
administrative justice and other external demands should be resolved
lies beyond the analytical framework adopted for this study.
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3 - A Critique of Mashaw
Partly because the analysis and evaluation of the Disability Insurance
Program, which form the major part of 'Bureaucratic Justice', rests
upon Mashaw's development of alternative models of administrative
justice, and partly because the work has been heralded as a seminal
study in administrative justice'125, it is essential that Mashaw's
theorising is carefully and critically examined. The purpose of this
critique, whilst acknowledging the contribution of Mashaw in alerting
administrative lawyers and social scientists to the need to turn their
attention to the 'internal' law of administration, is to indicate that
there are a number of questions prompted by his thesis which will
repay close scrutiny.
When Mashaw elaborates his three models of administrative justice he
is effectively saying that there are three different types of justice
that administrative agencies are capable of providing. These exhibit
features sufficiently distinct from each other to render them
competitive. As coherent descriptive models Bureaucratic Rationality,
Professional Treatment and Moral Judgement are plausible and
convincing, but the claim is also made for them that they are also
normative models. This claim, however, I see as only partly
satisfied. Mashaw's model building follows the pattern of, firstly,
identifying familiar ways in which decision-making is organised
(subsumed in the 'dimensions' of organisation or structure and
cognitive technique). Taking Bureaucratic Rationality as an example,
he identifies the bureaucratic mode of operations with its
hierarchical organisational structure and emphasis on the mass
processing of information as a means of decision-making. The second
step is to seek the justification for a particular set of decision¬
making arrangements, which he calls the justice argument. Continuing
with the example of Bureaucratic Rationality, Mashaw suggests that the
justice argument for bureaucracies is that they hold the promise (if
not the absolute guarantee) of accurate and efficient decision-making.
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Having reached this point the argument is made that bureaucracies
ought to provide accuracy and efficiency and that we can judge their
performance against these criteria. This, therefore, is the normative
element of Bureaucratic Rationality. However, this line of develop¬
ment fails to identify whether this is all that Bureaucratic
Rationality ought to provide, ie perhaps there are other features
which bureaucracies ought to exhibit before the claim can be made that
they provide administrative justice.
One way of addressing this problem is to rephrase Mashaw's definition
of administrative justice as an explicitly normative question thus:
what are all the qualities that a decision process ought to display in
order for its decisions to be considered acceptable? Whilst Mashaw
does not confront this question directly, an examination of the
proffered justice argument for each of his models does help identify
an answer.
<a) Examining the 'justice arguments'
In Mashaw's tabular representation of his models, he posits the two
distinct 'dimensions' of legitimating values and primary goals.
However, it is not always clear from Mashaw's own discussion how these
are to be distinguished from each other. For example, Mashaw states
(1983, p. 26 and p.31) that the legitimating force behind the Bureau¬
cratic Rationality model is its promise of the accurate and efficient
implementation of a social programme, whilst later he describes its
'principal goals' as 'rationality and efficiency' (1983, p.214). And
similarly 'service' features as both a legitimating value (1983, p.31)
and a primary goal of Professional Treatment (1983, p.26), It appears
that to separate out distinct legitimating values and primary goals is
both confusing and unnecessary. One way of overcoming the confusion
is to simplify Mashaw's models by conflating these two dimensions to
reveal the main justice arguments underpinning each model. The main
justice arguments of Bureaucratic Rationality (see above, p. 26) are
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now seen to comprise accuracy and efficiency, ie we accept the
decisions of an administrative agency based on this model because they
are produced accurately and efficiently. For Professional Treatment
the justice argument is service, ie we accept decisions because they
are intended to improve our personal circumstances, and increase our
well-being. The decisions of a system based on Moral Judgement are
acceptable because they emerge from a process in which the traditional
elements of a 'fair trial' are present.
The question that now arises is whether these justice arguments are
sufficient to convince us that administrative agencies based on each
do provide administrative justice; the models tell us what each has to
offer but not if this all that they ought to offer. To answer this an
exploration of these reformulated justice arguments is necessary.
Ef ficiencv
Mashaw argues that one of the promises of bureaucracy is 'efficiency'.
However, there appears to be a case against its inclusion in the
justice arguments for Bureaucratic Rationality. One objection is that
Mashaw fails to supply an explanation of how the strand of criticism
of the DIP which he summarises as the failure to produce 'predictable
and consistent outcomes' <1983, p. 22) leads to the inclusion of
efficiency as a defining characteristic of the model. No logical line
of argument connects the two.
Whilst accepting that a bureaucratic organisation will almost
invariably pursue efficiency in its activities, the same would also be
true of any organisation (for example, one providing a professional
service); it is difficult to see how the efficiency of an organisation
(which itself is open to differing interpretations, although the
implication in Mashaw is that it means decision-making at the least
possible cost) provides any argument for the acceptability of its
decisions. A service-providing agency producing predictable and
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consistent decisions need not also produce them at any particular cost
in order to claim that its decisions are just; it is rare that anyone
complains that a trial involving expensive counsel produces unjust
decisions merely on the basis of the high costs incurred (although, of
course, the process may be considered to be unfair if the cost of
achieving a just decision bears disproportionately on one of the
parties involved). Efficiency may be a desirable objective but it is
not a 'justice argument'; indeed an agency trying to act efficiently
may, as Mashaw himself points out, have to make trade-offs between
costs and correctness. It is difficult to see how consumers given
incorrect decisions denying them the services or benefits to which
they are entitled or which they need, will be convinced of the justice
of the system. And the argument that a number (presumably small) of
incorrect decisions is the price that must be paid for a low-cost
administration is unlikely to persuade them otherwise.
The conclusion must be that when considered from the individual
citizen's perspective, 'efficiency' can have no place in any justice
argument for a particular method of administering a welfare service.
However, to dismiss cost considerations from an analysis of
administrative justice may appear to divorce the discussion from the
real world. My answer would be that questions of costs, resources and
efficiency are not irrelevant to a discussion of administrative
justice, rather that they should be addressed as organisational
constraints within which a welfare system must operate, and as
potential barriers to the achievement of administrative justice for
the individual. They should not find a place amongst the defining
characteristics of any one model of administrative justice.
Accuracy
The argument that we should accept the decisions of a bureaucratic
organisation because they are accurate is an overwhelming one (whether
or not they are in practice is, of course, an empirical question).
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However, the decision-makers relevant to Mashaw's other two models,
professionals and independent adjudicators, are surely just as much
expected to produce 'accurate' decisions as the officials of a
bureaucratic organisation. Indeed, in what Mashaw (1983, p.26) calls
the 'queen of professions', medicine, making a 'wrong' decision could
have the most catastrophic consequences for an individual, such that
'accuracy' might be considered a more appropriate goal than 'service'.
It is important here to be sure of what we mean by ' accuracy' in a
professional context since it might be presumed to differ in nature
from accuracy in a bureaucratic context. A possible definition of an
accurate professional decision is one which provides a complete and
correct assessment of an individual's circumstances, and the choice of
an appropriate response to them.
In the case of independent adjudicators, there is surely a similar
expectation that 'accurate' decisions will emerge from the decision¬
making process. Indeed, where the model is adopted for appeal
hearings (one of Mashaw's examples, and applicable to the system of
administrative tribunals in Britain) there is the assumption that
previous 'wrong' decisions will be rectified.4133
When Mashaw assigns accuracy to only the Bureaucratic Rationality
model of administrative justice, there is the implication that it is
not a defining characteristic of either Professional Treatment or
Moral Judgement. The discussion above argues that, on the contrary,
'accuracy' should also be the promise of the professional or the
independent adjudicator.
Service
The notion of 'service', particularly in Mashaw's discussion of
Professional Treatment (pp 26-29), is not explored in any depth, but
rather there is the implied uncritical assumption that because
'service' is, per se, a 'good thing' then any decision process that
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can lay a claim to this virtuous attribute has a concomitant argument
for the acceptability of its decisions. I do not wish to imply here
that service is, a bad thing, but rather to question whether it is
sufficient as the basis for a claim to administrative justice. To
turn the question around we can ask what it is that the individual
should want from a professional decision process? Given the arcane
nature of a great deal (though not all) of a body of professional
knowledge, the answer might be that what is fundamentally desired is
an appropriate response to our individual circumstances. What Mashaw
is suggesting is that because of the service relationship between
decision-makers and clients, this is virtually axiomatic.
Yet this assumption has potentially undesirable side effects (from an
administrative justice perspective); the acceptance of the decisions
of professionals without challenge, merely because they are putatively
in clients' interests offers professionals the opportunity to avoid
having to demonstrate that their decisions were indeed an appropriate
response, and the opportunity of hiding behind the "mystery and
charisma" of their office (Mashaw, 1983, p.38).
An attempt to rid the Professional Treatment model of its somewhat
value-laden legitimating value might be to suggest an alternative
justice argument; viz. that the decisions of a professional decision-
process are acceptable because they demonstrate an accurate assessment
of an individual's circumstances and an appropriate response to them
in the light of the current state of professional knowledge. Which
is, of course, our definition of accuracy in a professional context
noted above.
Fairness
In contrast to the Moral Judgement model, which claims 'fairness' as a
legitimating value, there is no explicit promise of fairness in the
Bureaucratic Rationality and Professional Treatment models, nor any
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discussion of what 'fairness' might mean in a bureaucratic or
professional context. The argument below, which forms the crux of
this exploration of Mashaw's models of administrative justice, is that
'fairness' should also form part of the normative demands of admini¬
strative systems based on bureaucratic or professional principles.
Whilst, according to Mashaw, the Moral Judgement model promises
fairness, I have argued above that it should also promise accurate
decision-making. And by implication it does, since the essential
elements of a 'fair trial' are designed to produce the right outcome
in what might be a complex set of circumstances. The justice
argument, of Moral Judgement, therefore, might be extended to include
accuracy, ie by invoking traditional practices of adjudication,
acceptable decisions result because the fairness of those practices
ensure a high level of accuracy.
(b) Distilling the essence of administrative justice
So far, I have reinterpreted Mashaw's models to elaborate what I see
as the valid justice arguments behind each. If we now return to the
question posed earlier of what qualities an administrative system
ought to display, a clear proposition emerges, which can be summarised
in the normative statement: the qualities that a decision process
ought to exhibit, which provide arguments for the acceptability of its
decisions, are the ability to provide accurate decisions and the
ability to produce them in a manner which is fair.
(c) The contribution of 'organisation' and 'cognitive technique'
Having examined, and reformulated, Mashaw's dimensions of legitimating
values and primary goals, I wish to return briefly to the remaining
two dimensions, 'organisation or structure' and 'cognitive technique',
which I see, not as direct justice arguments (for example, decisions
are not acceptable purely because they emerge from a hierarchical
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organisation or because the decision-maker is independent) but as
contributors to the relevant main justice arguments. Imposing this
interpretation on Mashaw's models, therefore, suggests that a hier¬
archical organisation utilising information processing as its main
cognitive technique promotes accurate decisions by its ability to
maintain control over decision-making through supervising and checking
decisions from which the need to make intuitive judgements has been
excluded. So, we accept bureaucracies, not per se, but because as one
form of organisational structure, they promise accurate decisions.
Similarly, interpersonal working relationships and the use of profess¬
ional knowledge promote accurate professional decision-making. And in
the Moral Judgement model the independent status of the decision-maker
using traditional adjudicatory techniques promises accuracy and
fairness.
Although Mashaw's Moral Judgement model, as I have interpreted it,
does hold the promise of accuracy and fairness, I am not suggesting
that its elements (or 'dimensions') should be preferred above other
forms of organisation or cognitive technique. One argument of this
chapter is that administrative justice is not prescriptive in this way
but that many forms of organisational arrangements may be capable of
satisfying its demands.
From the argument that each model should be able to meet the normative
demands of both accuracy and fairness to satisfy fully the achievement
of administrative justice, a number of theoretical and empirical
challenges emerges: how does a service-providing agency organised on
bureaucratic, professional or independent adjudicatory principles
respond in theory to the demands of accuracy and fairness; and how,




This analysis of Mashaw's theorising has attempted to provide an
answer to the question (raised by his definition of administrative
justice) of the requisite qualities of a decision-making process that
lead us to accept its decisions. I have contended that Mashaw himself
does not confront the question directly but rather posits three modes
of decision-making and expounds a distinctive justice argument for
each. The argument of this chapter, on the other hand, is that there
are common qualities (of accuracy and fairness) which form normative
demands upon administrative agencies, and that if an agency wishes to
claim a 'justice argument' for its operations, then it must satisfy
both these demands. The implication of the analysis so far is that
accuracy and fairness are flexible concepts; within the three
approaches to decision-making identified they may have contextualised
meanings which display important differences. To develop further (and
as a prelude to an elaboration of the concepts of accuracy and
fairness), I wish to examine the approaches to decision-making
underpinning Mashaw's three models. These approaches constitute an
element of three types of 'decision-making system' within which
different types of 'decision criteria' are adopted as the means of
producing decisions. Part III addresses these issues.
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Part III - DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES; DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS
One of the strengths of Mashaw's analysis is his identification of
three distinct approaches to the organisation of welfare decision¬
making. Within each of these approaches it has already been suggested
that the meanings of accuracy and fairness may display important
differences. The purpose of this section is to elaborate three ideal
type models of decision-making systems based on these approaches,
which I will call 'legal' (based on the Moral Judgement model),
'administrative' (drawing on Bureaucratic Rationality) and 'profess¬
ional' (drawing on Professional Treatment).
1 - Decision-making processes
In the analysis which follows I wish to draw some clear distinctions
between what I see as analytically separate elements which together
comprise a total decision-making system. The essential constituent
parts of a decision-making system are:
(1) one or more decision-making processes
(2) an organisational environment within which each decision¬
making process takes place
By 'decision-making process' I mean the application of some set of
'decision criteria' * to a collection of information or evidence.
The distinction is analytical only; in practice the decision-making
process takes place within an organisational environment which will
itself be shaped partly by that process. Since this thesis is
primarily concerned with the practice of decision-making, the notion
of a decision-making process needs to be elaborated.
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(a) The nature of decision-making
"Each phase in making a particular decision is itself a
complex decision-making process. . . There are wheels within
wheels within wheels. "
(Herbert A. Simon, 1960, p. 3)
In the discussion which follows I wish to suggest that all decision¬
making can be characterised by a generalised notion of the physical
and mental activities which are undertaken by a decision-maker in
producing a decision. I will call this generalised notion a
'decision-making process'. which should be not confused with Mashaw's
notion of 'decision process' which forms part of his definition of
administrative justice.
As mentioned above, a decision-making process can be defined as the
application of some set of 'decision criteria' to a collection of
information or evidence. This should not be seen as a unitary
process, however, the collection of information is in itself a
separate and preliminary activity to the application of decision
criteria. The two stages of a decision process can be represented
thus:
(1) information collection =» a body of evidence
(2) evidence + decision criteria s decision
Recognising the dual nature of the decision-making process is
important since if our definition of administrative justice includes
the desirable characteristics of the total process then each stage
individually must also exhibit those characteristics.
Although 'evidence' and 'decision criteria' can be distinguished for
analytical purposes, in practice they may be closely linked since the
relevant evidence to be collected will be in part determined by the
decision criteria. So, the decision criteria may not only provide the
means of translating the evidence into a decision, but also act as a
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kind of filter by defining what evidence the decision-maker is to
consider (and possibly what to ignore). As formulated it can be seen
that this generalised notion can encompass all three cognitive
techniques from Mashaw's models; information processing, application
of professional knowledge, and contextual interpretation are all
alternative means of applying decision criteria to a body of evidence.
(b) A typology of decision criteria
In welfare decision-making there appear to be several kinds of
decision criteria that are adopted as the formal means of making
decisions: statute law, case-law, administrative rules <,S), and
professional knowledge. In practice, however, there is another type
of decision criterion which is relevant, although it is not sanctioned
as a legitimate basis on which to make decisions, viz. a set of values
or moral principles personal to a decision-maker.
Statute law, case-law and administrative rules share the similarity
that they are essentially artificial constructs, ie they are
formulated or constructed by some authoritative body or person. c ,s;>
Statute law (including primary legislation and Statutory Instruments)
comprise a set of rules which have a special status within a legal
system, conferring rights, duties, obligations, privileges etc. that
can be enforced through a system of courts and ultimately by coercive
measures. However vague or problematic they may sometimes be in
practice, they have the advantage of being in written, publicly
available form. Case-law refers to the legally binding precedents,
interpretations etc. created by judges in Courts of law (or by
specifically designated adjudicators, such as the corps of Social
Security Commissioners), and which augments statutory legal rules.
Administrative rules, in contrast, consist of those rules not
contained in statutes but which have been devised within the law to
enable those agencies responsible for some form of welfare provision
to fulfil their primary function of allocating that benefit or service
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as the legislation intended. Baldwin and Houghton <1986) have
suggested a typology of administrative rules'175 which includes all
rules, guidance, policy documents etc that are issued or used by an
agency as a means of enabling it to produce decisions or take action
in particular circumstances. Administrative rules are, in effect,
additional substantive decision criteria to the relevant statutory
legal rules. These rules aredistinct from those which determine the
process by which a decision is made, ie procedural rules.
Statutory or administrative rule-makers can amend or rescind the rules
as they see fit, but unless the 'rules' allow, the decision-makers
have no such option. For them the decision criteria are in effect
given or fixed at the point of making an individual decision. Case-
law is different in that, although it can still be thought of as an
artificial construct, it provides additional decision criteria to
statute law actually in the process of making a decision.
Professional knowledge, in contrast, is held to be a body of known
phenomena and relationships, more discovered than created and
therefore enjoying an existence independent of the decision¬
makers. ' 1 35 Professional knowledge constitutes a set of decision
criteria and is only liable to change in the light of further
discovery. Again, for the individual decision-maker, it will be fixed
when a decision is required.
Personal value systems comprise a set of normative attitudes and
beliefs which are neither discoverable phenomena nor the construct of
an authoritative body. They are not fixed in the sense used above for
rules or for professional knowledge, but, being personal to the
individual decision-maker (whatever influences have shaped them) can
be invoked or changed whenever he or she chooses.
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(b) Formal decision criteria: rules and professional knowledge
Of the formal decision criteria, I wish to distinguish between those
which comprise essentially a system of rules, ie statutory law, case-
law and administrative rules, from those which comprise a body of
professional knowledge. In a 'rules-based decision-making process'
the outcome is prescribed by rules, whereas in a 'professional
knowledge based decision-making process' professional knowledge is
mobilised to respond to the particular circumstances of the
individual. This difference is similar to the distinction between
formalistic and purposive legal reasoning made by Unger (1976).
Formalistic reasoning is the,
"... mere invocation of rules and the deduction of
conclusions from them ..." (p. 154)
Reasoning is purposive, however, when,
". . . the decision about how to apply a rule depends on a
judgement of how most effectively to achieve the purposes
ascribed to the rule." (p. 154)
Whilst acknowledging the point that Unger is arguing that rules can be
treated in either a formalistic or purposive way, I wish to refer to
rules in a more restricted sense in this discussion of ideal types of
decision-making. I will make the assumption that rules are intended
to produce an outcome by their application to a body of evidence, and
are hence essentially formalistic in nature, c 19:1 whilst professional
knowledge is used to identify a desired outcome (or purpose) and to
translate that outcome into a means for achieving it, and is therefore
essentially purposive.
The rationale of the rules-based decision-making process is to produce
a decision based on the rules whatever the effect of that decision -
there is no other underlying objective to the process (this contrasts
with the professional knowledge based process where the rationale is,
as Mashaw suggests, orientated towards the requirements of the
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individual citizen). The overall purpose of a rule is assumed to have
been assimilated within it.
Having collected the evidence in the ideal-type rules-based decision¬
making process there is a single operation of applying the relevant
decision criteria thus producing a decision. However, employing
professional knowledge (again after the evidence has been collected)
is characterised by a two-stage operation. In the first stage
professional knowledge will be applied to the body of evidence to
produce a definition of the individual's situation. This could be
called the 'diagnosis' stage and produces an intermediate decision
which might be the only decision of an individual decision-maker if,
for example, he passes the case to another professional for the second
stage. Stage two is intended to produce a ' response' to that
diagnosis for which decision-makers will draw further upon their
professional knowledge. The whole process can be likened to a
problem-solving exercise where first the problem needs to be defined
before a solution can be proposed. Although such a model finds
familiar manifestations in, for example, medicine and social work, it
would be wrong to characterise the professional knowledge based
decision-making process as exclusively dealing with ' problems' ;
approaching a solicitor for advice on how best to organise one's
financial affairs would fit equally well into the model. The
rationale is to seek some desired change in the individual's
situation; the decision that emerges from the professional knowledge
based process is how to achieve that change and by definition should
be in the individual's interest. So, the generalised notion of a
decision-making process adapted to a system based on professional
knowledge would appear thus:
(1) information collection => body of evidence
(2A) evidence + decision criteria (professional knowledge)
=3 intermediate decision ('diagnosis')
(2B) evidence (diagnosis) + decision criteria (professional knowledge)
=» action to be taken (final decision)
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(c) Informal decision criteria: value systems
In the public provision of welfare with which this study is concerned
it is the formal models of decision-making that are adopted primarily
as the means of allocating welfare. In the private sphere, however,
the value system of an individual may play a large part in personal
decision-making (although formal considerations may still be
relevant); for example, decisions about whether to care for an elderly
relative at home, or whether to contribute financially to a friend or
neighbour in need. The importance of these value systems for the
public sphere is that they may impinge upon or undermine the formal
processes. This is particularly relevant where the formal decision
criteria are not adequately defined to produce a decision in all
circumstances, or where the organisational environment allows personal
value systems to intrude unchecked. Prejudice, bias and victimisation
can be the result although it is also possible that the individual
citizen may benefit from preferential treatment or a sympathetic
bending of the rules.
2 - Decision-making systems
In this analysis several types of formal decision criteria have been
examined. Three alternative means are possible: case-law,
administrative rules and professional knowledge. Since administrative
justice concerns the relations between individuals and the
administrative agents of the state, and since those agents only exist
as creations of the state, ie they have been legislated into existence
by Acts of Parliament, then regardless of the mechanism chosen for the
point of delivery there will always be a legislative framework within
which welfare agencies must constrain their activities (ie remain
intra vires). However within this framework there will remain what
Mashaw calls a 'gigantic policy space' (1983, p. 9), which must be
filled by some mechanism designed to produce individual decisions.
Basing a decision-making system on each of these and their
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relationship with an organisational environment, three different ideal
types or 'models' of a decision-making system emerge.
Figure 2. 2 illustrates the relationship in the legal model of a
decision-making system based on case-law. The diagram shows, for
illustrative purposes, three tiers in the decision-making system but
there may be more; the essential point is that each tier is separate
and that each decision-making process is carried out within a separate
organisational environment connected by rights of appeal, defined
themselves in the statutory legal rules. The decision-making
processes may themselves be very similar, but are hierarchical in the
sense that a decision from one tier may be overturned or superseded by
the tier above.
FIGURE 2.2 - The legal model of a decision-making system
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The distinguishing feature of the administrative model of a decision¬
making system is its unitary organisational environment. There may
still be a hierarchy of decision-making processes subsumed within it,
but these represent tiers of internal administrative review, not the
external and independent appeals structure of the legal model. Figure
2. 3 illustrates this.





















The professional model is different again, in place of an independent
appeal or internal administrative review, non-hierarchical
- 51 -
professional peer review characterises the model; In effect consumers
have a choice between decisions; if they are dissatisfied with an
initial decision they are free to seek a 'second opinion', which may
be sought within the same organisational environment or pursued
elsewhere. There is no hierarchy of decision-making systems, however,
a decision from one decision-making system only supersedes another in
the sense that the recipient of the decision accepts it in preference
to an earlier one.








These three models of a decision-making system are presented as ideal
types; they do not purport to describe the structure of decision¬
making within a practising welfare agency which may exhibit elements
of two or all three types.
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Part IV - ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE REVISITED
Having established the alternative models of decision-making based on
the distinct decision criteria of case-law, administrative rules, and
professional knowledge, operating within a framework of statutory
legal rules, we can return to the problem of what constitutes the
'qualities' of a decision-making system, which make its decisions
acceptable. The broad answer when approached from the perspective of
the individual citizen was that administrative agencies should promise
and provide accuracy and fairness.
For individual citizens, probably the most important aspect of their
dealings with an administrative agency is the substantive decisions
that they receive. Since this decision will emerge from one of the
decision-making processes within a decision-making system I will argue
that the primary demand of administrative justice is that a decision¬
making process produces accurate decisions, ie the right ones in the
individual's circumstances. The secondary demand, therefore, will be
that the individual must be satisfied that he is treated fairly in the
decision-making process. 'Fairness' is something of a vague notion
but, as I will elaborate later in this section, it comprises four
elements: promptness, in reaching a decision, impartialitv on the part
of the decision-maker, participation of the individual in the
decision-making process, and accountability for the decision to the
individual. <20:>
Accuracy refers to the substantive outcome of a decision-making
process, whilst fairness refers to the process itself. As demands of
administrative justice, they are both relevant to all tiers of the
hierarchy of decision-making processes within a decision-making
system. The empirical element of this study, however, is concerned
principally with the first tier of the DHSS decision-making system; an
assessment of whether higher tiers conform to the tenets of admini¬
strative justice must therefore remain unexplored in this thesis.
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The two demands of accuracy and fairness are closely linked since,
although fair treatment is a demand in its own right, it can also be
seen as a means of promoting and demonstrating accuracy. To take the
analysis further I will expand upon what 'accuracy' and 'fairness'
mean for the legal, administrative and professional models of a
decision-making system.
1 - Accuracy
Mashaw provides a useful definition of accuracy in relation to social
security when he describes it as:
"... the correspondence of the substantive outcome of an
adjudication with the true facts of the claimant's situation
and with an appropriate application of the relevant legal
rules to those facts." (1974, p. 774)
This definition illustrates well how an 'accurate' decision relies on
the two activities of the decision-making process, ie the collection
of information and the application of the decision criteria, in this
instance legal rules. It would apply equally well, mutatis mutandis,
to a decision-making process based on administrative rules or profess¬
ional knowledge. For example, in the provision of medical treatment
an ' accurate' decision will mean the response most appropriate to a
patient's condition in the light of his symptoms and the current state
of medical knowledge.
The decision-making process must therefore be designed in such a way
as to elicit the true facts. In the administrative model there is
likely to be some definition, within the framework of statutory legal
rules and within the administrative rules themselves, of what evidence
is to be considered relevant (the 'evidence criteria'); hence the
process of information collection must ensure that all that is
relevant is in practice collected. In a professional knowledge based
system the emphasis will be on decision-makers (ie professionals) to
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elicit all the necessary evidence based on their professional
knowledge and experience; there will be no precise definition of what
will be relevant. Similarly, in the legal system based on case-law,
evidential requirements will not necessarily be specified, but be open
to the interpretations of any parties involved in the decision-making
process.
It is essential, therefore, that those acting as decision-makers
are competent to carry out the task of decision-making, ie they must
have the requisite ability, knowledge and skills to be able to produce
accurate decisions. The organisation, therefore, has a responsibility
for selecting people with sufficient basic ability (for example,
literacy and numeracy), and training them in the knowledge and skills
necessary for the task. Thereafter it must check and maintain the
decision-makers' competence by monitoring their work and keeping their
knowledge up-to-date.
Whatever the information collected and the decision criteria in
question decision-makers will require a certain amount of time in
which to apply the latter to the former. This may be a matter of
seconds if, say, it is deciding the age of a potential recipient or a
matter of hours if it entails assimilating a complex mass of evidence
and decision criteria. The amount of time that decision-makers have
for the task will be partly (and probably significantly) influenced by
the organisational environment in which they work. If they are
allocated less than adequate time, then more inaccurate decisions will
result as short-cuts are taken (for example, incomplete information
collection, superficial scrutiny of the evidence, or uncritical
application of the decision criteria) in the attempt to clear
workloads.
Accuracy cannot be achieved by ill-trained staff operating with
insufficient resources to perform the job. Since decisions emerge
from a decision-making process operating within an organisational
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environment the responsibility for producing accurate decisions rests
partly with the decision-makers and partly with the organisation.
However, there will not necessarily be only one organisational
environment that can be designed to make accurate decisions; in
practice there could be many. What is important is that each
organisational environment recognises and responds to the demand that
it produces accurate decisions. <21J
2 - Fairness
'Fair treatment' as the second general demand of administrative
justice on a decision-making system will comprise four elements:
(a) Promptness - requiring that individuals receive prompt
decisions
(b) Impartiality - requiring that decision-makers do not allow
feelings of bias or prejudice to impinge
upon the decision-making process
(c) Participation - requiring that individuals are given every
opportunity to take an active role in the
process and in particular present all the
evidence they wish to support their
positions, and respond to evidence supplied
by others
(d) Accountability - requiring that individuals receive a
comprehensible explanation of the decision¬
making process and of the final decisions
reached
As mentioned earlier, fairness is not only a demand of administrative
justice per se but can also promote accuracy, in that impartiality,
participation and accountability support the search for the 'true
facts' and the appropriate application of the decision criteria which
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lie at the heart of Mashaw's definition of accuracy. Furthermore,
each of these may themselves promote and support each other (for
example, accountable decision-making might encourage the decision¬
maker to be impartial and to seek the participation of the service
recipient). Promptness, however, must be treated differently; it is
an important demand in its own right but if too great an emphasis is
attached to it then impartiality, participation and accountability can
be undermined as short-cuts are taken, as a consequence of which
accuracy also becomes vulnerable. The four elements of fairness are
treated more fully below.
(a) Promptness
The question of the time taken to produce a decision is fraught with
difficulties and probably incapable of satisfactory resolution. As a
starting point, the maxim quoted by Nonet (1969, p.211) has a simple
and persuasive force: "Justice delayed is justice denied". This
would be axiomatic if the delay in providing a welfare service is,
say, a period of years. But if the 'delay' is a matter of months or
weeks, can one automatically say that justice is being denied? If a
decision on a social assistance benefit is delayed by weeks or months
then this would probably be considered a denial of justice since it
may represent for the claimant his or her only source of income, a
long wait for which will probably cause hardship and possibly harm.
But a decision that relied on the accretion of evidence over a period
of time (as, say, in the diagnosis of certain illnesses) may
unavoidably be 'delayed' and may, if made earlier (ie on less than the
complete evidence), be potentially harmful. In such circumstances the
long wait for a decision would probably be considered acceptable. The
question can only be decided on grounds of 'reasonableness* which in
some cases can appropriately be translated into substantive time
limits but in other cases not.
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A possible interpretation of Nonet's maxim is that a decision should
be made as soon as possible and without delay, where 'delay' implies
an interval of time where the case is receiving no positive attention
either within the administrative agency or outside. Again, though,
avoiding delay applies both to the collection of information and the
application of the decision criteria, and it is frequently in the
former activity that most delay, as defined above, actually occurs.
Waiting for a reply to an enquiry sent to an employer, awaiting the
results of a pathology laboratory test, or awaiting a psychiatric
report cannot, therefore, be considered a delay on the part of the
decision-maker; having the case lying idly on a desk without making
the necessary enquiries, or after the required information has been
received does constitute an unproductive period and thus can be
considered delay.
(b) Impartiality
The essence of the demand that the decision-making process is
conducted impartially is that all sentiments of bias or prejudice on
the part of the decision-maker must have no bearing on the decision
arrived at (Robson, 1928, p. 214; Franks, 1957, para. 24), And since
bias and prejudice are manifestations of an individual's value system
we can say that it is the exclusion of that value system that is
required, The difficulty in this has been recognised by Robson:
"Continuous mental effort to suppress or exclude rigidly all
subjective considerations of an emotional kind tends ... to
create methods of reasoning that are 'artificial' in the
sense that they demand an unnatural objectivity and the
suppression of a large number of important instincts."
<1928, p. 214)
Although Robson and Franks were both concerned with rules-based
systems their strictures are equally applicable in a professional
context. Nevertheless, since one of the characteristics of a
professional knowledge based system is that it seeks ultimately to
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benefit the recipient there is a place for a sympathetic treatment of
the individual in the sense that the purpose of the decision-making
process is to benefit or help the recipient in some way. Hence,
impartiality must be seen as a fairly narrow notion concerned with the
exclusion of bias and not extended to the entirely appropriate
feelings of sympathy by a professional worker for an individual's
circumstances.
Bias and prejudice can intrude at all stages of the decision-making
process; for example, in the collection of information, in the sifting
of the evidence, in the application of the decision criteria, or in
the personal treatment of the individual. One response to this
phenomenon would be to design the decision and evidence criteria in
such a way that value systems are squeezed out. Other methods relate
more to the elements of participation and accountability, ie since
bias seems to flourish in dark, secluded areas it can be thwarted by
imposing an open approach of involving individuals in the decision¬
making process and explaining to them the basis of decisions taken.
(c) Participation
"In one way or another one constantly confronts the claim
that the dignity and self-respect of the individual can be
protected only through processes of government, and
particularly processes of adjudication, in which there is
adequate participation by affected interests."
<Mashaw, 1983, p. 95)
Whilst it is in this sense that participation in the decision-making
process is a demand of administrative justice in its own right, it is
also desirable in a more functional sense as a means of promoting
accuracy. If we consider Mashaw's definition of accuracy we can see
that eliciting the 'true facts' of a case is a prerequisite for
accurate decision-making. So, the difficulties encountered in the
decision-making process over the evidence, such as incomplete, unclear
or contradictory evidence (see below, p.71) can be overcome in part
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through the active involvement of the individual service recipient in
the information collection stage since he or she is likely to be the
principal source of that information. The individual will often be in
a vulnerable position since he or she may not understand fully the
requirements of the decision-maker or the significance of certain
pieces of evidence, and hence may unintentionally give unhelpful or
misleading answers to enquiries about evidence. Participation in the
process should therefore not only ensure a higher quality of evidence
on which to base a decision but also serve to convince individuals
that a decision is accurate in their particular circumstances (ie
increase the 'acceptability of the decision process').
Ganz (1974) admirably sums up the importance of participation in her
conclusions to analysis of planning mechanisms, but they are equally
applicable to welfare decision-making systems.
"It is necessary to involve people more directly in
decision-making if their active co-operation rather than
passive resistance is to be enlisted. There is more scope
for this in the process leading up to a decision than at the
level of decision-making itself. Open consultation enables
the individual to have his point of view considered and
weighed against other considerations." (p. 112)
(d) Accountability
Like participation, accountability, as a demand of administrative
justice, serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it is desirable, per se,
that individuals understand why certain decisions have been taken
about them in order that they can be convinced of their acceptability.
And secondly, if decision-makers carry out the decision-making process
in the knowledge that they must account for their decisions, then they
will be encouraged to be diligent and assiduous in the task. Robson
(1928, pp. 208-210) has admirably captured the importance of
accountability.
"The obligation to give reasons for the conclusion may have
an important influence, not only in persuading those who are
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affected by the decision that it is a just and reasonable
one, but also in developing the mental capacity and sense of
fairness of the adjudicator."
"There is a lack of conviction, an apparent arbitrariness,
about a decision which is unsupported by an account of the
reasoning process on which it was based. . . "
"The reasons, like the decisions, may be good or they may be
bad, the premises from which the argument starts may be
false or true, the influences unwarranted and cause confused
with effect; but the obligation to evolve a chain of
reasoning which must stand the strain of criticism and
discussion, is desirable from the point of view of promoting
a sense of the judicial spirit in the adjudicator no less
than in imparting certainty into the body of the law. "
As with the other elements of administrative justice there is nothing
startling or new about articulating accountability as a desirable
feature of a decision-making process. Yet thirty years after Robson,
the Franks Committee felt the need to reiterate the importance of
giving reasons for decisions in its discussion of 'openness' in the
operation of administrative tribunals:
. . openness appears to us to require the publicity of the
proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning
underlying the decisions..." (1957, para 42)
"... a decision is apt to be better if the reasons for it
have been set out in writing because the reasons are then
more likely to have been properly thought out." (para 351)
Nonet also argues strongly for the need for accountability where a
decision is not self-evident but must rely on choices made by the
decision-maker (ie where discretion must be exercised).
"Accountability to rules does not necessarily reduce
discretion; rather it disciplines its exercise by imposing
on the decider a duty to establish a reasoned relation
between his judgement and recognised authoritative
standards." (1969, p.236)
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The argument for accountability is reinforced strongly in an
unreported Commissioner's decision, CA 1/72, quoted by Lister (1974,
p. 30),
. . in an administrative quasi-judicial decision the
minimum requirement must at least be that the claimant
looking at the decision should be able to discern on the
face of it the reasons why the evidence has failed to
satisfy the authority; ... a decision based, and only based,
on a conclusion that the total effect of the evidence fails
to satisfy, without reasons being given for reaching that
conclusion, will in many cases be no adequate decision at
all."
The case for accountability need not be laboured further. However,
the analysis of decision-making presented earlier suggests that the
demands of accountability should be satisfied not only for the final
decision but also for the information collection stage of the process,
ie individuals should receive explanations why certain information is
required (or is to be considered irrelevant) and what use will be made
of it.
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Part V - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN WELFARE DECISION-MAKING
1 - Decision criteria at the macro-level of a welfare service
From the analysis so far we can say that at the point of delivery a
welfare service may be provided according to one of three decision¬
making processes based on either case-law, administrative rules, or
professional knowledge operating within a framework of statutory legal
rules. Which of these will be adopted for the delivery may in part be
directed by the nature of that service but also by other, political
considerations. In practice, of course, the choice of delivery is
often a mix of two or all three types. For example, the desired
allocation of welfare may be achieved primarily by giving defined
groups of people legal rights which may be progressively elaborated in
case-law (as in most of social security), by delegating the allocation
principles to an agency (such as the allocation of housing by local
authorities) or by passing responsibility to an occupational group who
can exercise their professional competence (as in health care
delivery).
A statutory framework rarely, if ever, exhausts all the possible
combinations of decision criteria and evidence, nor prevents
ambiguities in either. There will always remain a 'policy space'
(Mashaw, 1983, p.9) within the framework from which substantive
decisions must be made about how individuals receive a particular
welfare service. To adopt a pictorial representation (with
acknowledgement to Dworkin's doughnut metaphor'22*) we could say that
the policy space is the area inside an outer ring representing a
legislative framework (the primary legislation) within which a service
is to be administered.
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FIGURE 2. 5 - The welfare system 'doughnut'
primary legislation
policy space
The total area of the doughnut (outer ring plus policy space)
represents the circumstances within which decisions concerning the
allocation of welfare will take place. A decision may emerge from the
outer band, ie when primary legislation provides all the necessary
criteria on which to base a decision, but if that is not the case then
it will fall within the hole in the centre of the ring. If Figure 2.5
was drawn to scale for a particular welfare service, the outer band
might be relatively thin (an example might be health care delivery) or
relatively broad (as in, for example, the provision of social
security) and as a result the 'policy space* may be respectively large
or small. The problem for the architects of a welfare service is how
to ensure that decisions emerge from the policy space in accordance
with its overall objectives. To develop this discussion further I
wish to examine ways in which the policy space is filled in practice,
ie follow how a mixture of case-law, administrative rules, and
professional knowledge can all operate within the space, rather than
pursue the development of the 'pure' ideal types. In either a rules-
based or professional knowledge based system there is almost
invariably a need for secondary legislation (for example, regulations
contained in Statutory Instruments), which can be thought of, pursuing
the doughnut metaphor, as an inner ring of further statutory legal
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rules within the outer band of primary legislation. And indeed there
may be a body of sub-delegated rules within this ring (for example,
where a Government Minister is empowered by primary or secondary
legislation to make them). In practice, welfare provision will often
combine the two; indeed since all public welfare provision is
administered within some form of legislative framework all profess¬
ional knowledge based systems will be an admixture. The modified
Dworkinian doughnut, therefore, assumes a rather un-doughnut
configuration as the policy space becomes successively smaller as more
layers of decision criteria are added in the policy-making process, as
Figure 2.6 below illustrates. The outer rings of legislative rules
are by no means fixed or static but may change over time either
through further legislative rule-making or by the effect of case-law
which may impose a particular interpretation of a rule (thereby
limiting the choices of a decision-maker and hence the policy space).






In the ideal type of the legal decision-making system, the policy space
should progressively be filled case-law created by authorised
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adjudicators exercising their legitimate legal discretion. But whilst
case-law may limit the size of the policy space, it may also be
filled, in an actual administrative agency, by the adoption of a set
of administrative rules, constructed by the agency itself, or
alternatively, the nature of the service might dictate that
administrative rules are inappropriate and that decisions should be
made according to professional knowledge. (And a further combination
might comprise professional knowledge operating within some set of
administrative rules. ) Where decisions are allowed to emerge
according to professional knowledge we can say that an area of
professional discretion exists. In contrast, where professional
knowledge is not involved there may still be a residual policy space
bounded by successive layers of legal and administrative rules which
we might consider the area of administrative discretion. <Z3:> The
alternative strategies will therefore produce distinctive versions of
Figure 2.6 (see figure 2.7 below).
(NB for the sake of clarity primary, secondary and sub-delegated
legislation have been subsumed in the outer band of 'legal framework')







2 - Discretion: the inevitability of making choices'2*3
Within the literature of administrative law and social policy there are
numerous analyses of the concept and practice of discretion. <2S3 It is
an important, though seemingly elusive, concept and central to a
consideration of administrative justice. At a high level of generality
the definition formulated by K. C. Davis (1971) has been influential and
has formed the starting point for many examinations of discretion; it is
enduring in its clarity and comprehensiveness. <:ZS3
"A public official has discretion whenever the effective
limits of his power leave him free to make a choice among
possible courses of action or inaction,"
Whilst this sentence forms the core of Davis's definition of discretion
(and is usually cited in isolation) there is an equally cogent
observation which follows,
"Discretion is not limited to substantive choices but
extends to procedures, methods, forms, timing, degrees of
emphasis, and many other subsidiary factors."
(1971, p. 4)
Endorsing Davis's definition does not mean that one necessarily also
embraces his commitment to reducing 'unnecessary' discretion by means of
"confining, structuring and checking" it. It is possible to come away
from Davis's analysis (as Baldwin and Hawkins (1984) warn) with the
impression that discretion is, per se, a bad thing and the source of a
great deal of injustice. This is perhaps unfortunate since it burdens
discretion with strong pejorative connotations which can be hard to
shed, '273 and which detract from its positive aspects (Titmuss, 1971).
Whether the existence of discretion is a problem and, if so, how far it
can be resolved by identifying, as Davis suggests, the right balance
between rules and discretion is not the main concern here, Rather, I
wish to establish how discretion arises in welfare decision-making and
its consequences for decision-makers and clients.
Davis's definition clearly emphasises that a central characteristic of
discretion is choice. But what has failed to satisfy later analysts is
that a definition which is so broad encompasses virtually all decision¬
making since it is rare that making a decision does not involve some
element of choice. However, I would argue that the generality of the
definition is not a weakness but its initial strength, allowing the
possibility of developing a some kind of typology of different forms of
discretion. Particularly important is Dworkin1s (1977) differentiation
between 'strong' discretion and his two senses of 'weak' discretion.
'Strong' discretion exists, argues Dworkin, where a decision-maker has
no standards to apply in making a decision but must to an extent
construct his own. This contrasts with the situation where standards do
exist but nevertheless require some element of judgement or interpret¬
ation by the decision-maker, which is Dworkin's first sense of 'weak'
discretion. The other form of 'weak' discretion occurs when an official
has the final authority for making a decision which thereafter cannot be
altered or set aside by another official. Whilst this second 'weak'
sense of discretion is not frequently found in the provision of welfare
services (since most decisions are reviewable'23') the first 'weak'
sense and the strong sense of discretion offer a useful insight into the
different manifestations of the concept. C23>
Bull (1980) makes another useful distinction, between 'agency' and
'officer' discretion, the former referring to the discretion exercised
by an administrative agency in directing and advising its officials, and
the latter to the activities of the officials themselves. As an example
of the confusion that often surrounds a discussion of discretion, one
can cite Bull's attempt to divide these activities of officials into
discretionary action on the one hand and the exercise of judgement on
the other. Interpreting rigid rules and taking decisions in areas where
it is deemed inappropriate to have such rules Bull considers to be two
activities which necessitate the use of 1udgement. In contrast,
departing from those rules in exceptional circumstances he considers the
use of discretion. To take a Dworkinian view, however, interpreting
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rigid rules would clearly require the exercise of 'weak' discretion, and
making decisions in the absence of rules would require 'strong' disc¬
retion. The confusion between discretion and judgement is not just one
of semantic nicety since the prescriptions offered by commentators often
depend upon how they define or categorise certain official behaviour;
somehow exercising one's judgement is seen as more acceptable than the
exercise of discretion with its negative connotations of manipulation,
exploitation, arbitrariness, uncertainty and intrusiveness (Goodin,
1985). In this thesis, however, I do not wish to make a clear
distinction between discretion and judgement, since however one chooses
to define them, they both involve the necessity of making choices.
Therefore, any discussion of the problems inherent in the process of
making choices should subsume problems of 'discretion' and 'judgement'.
Nevertheless, it is still acknowledged that there is a powerful rhetoric
associated with discretion and judgement, such that how 'making choices'
is labelled is important in influencing responses to it.
Since discretion is a product of the need for administrative agencies to
make decisions, it is implicit that an official empowered to make
choices about an individual's welfare has a degree of power vested in
him or her over that individual. C30> Galligan (1986) embraces this
notion in his attempt to identify a 'central sense' of discretion
adopted by officials, in response to what he sees as previous failures
to define discretion with any analytical precision (and here he includes
Dworkin's strong/weak distinction). As he writes,
"A central sense of discretionary power may be put as
follows: discretion, as a way of characterising a type of
power in respect of certain courses of action, is most at
home in referring to powers delegated within a system of
authority to an official or set of officials, where they
have some significant scope for settling the reasons and
standards according to which that power is to be exercised,
and for applying them in the making of specific decisions."
(p. 21)
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However, Galligan further notes that there are two other stages to
decision-making apart from the settling of standards to be applied. A
prior stage is the finding of facts and the final stage is the
application of the settled standards to those facts. Both these stages
involve imprecise and variable processes which may lead accordingly to
variable conclusions. The autonomy concomitant with this uncertainty
Galligan calls 'discretion in application'.
Although it appears that there is some similarity between Galligan's
'central sense' and Dworkin's 'strong' discretion and likewise with
their respective 'discretion in application' and 'weak' discretion, the
two analyses combined do suggest a potentially profitable way forward in
the analysis of social security decision-making in practice. Firstly,
it is clearly possible to postulate different categories of discretion
(following Dworkin) which will exhibit varying characteristics; secondly
a decision-making process frequently does comprise (following Galligan)
analytically separate phases (although they may be blurred in practice)
at which different types of discretion have more relevance. Partly
because of the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of discretion and
partly because of its pejorative connotations, I wish to place the
emphasis in the remainder of this thesis, not on discretion but on
choice in decision-making. As Davis points out, choice of alternative
courses of action occurs at all stages of the decision-making process
not just at the end when choices about outcomes may be required (which
is perhaps most often referred to as discretion) but in selecting the
evidence to consider, interpreting possibly confusing, conflicting or
incomplete evidence, deciding which decision criteria to apply etc. Why
it is important to concentrate attention on this large range of choices
is that they all have a potentially significant bearing on the outcome
of the whole process; what might seem to be a minor decision early on
(for example, not to check a piece of evidence) may have an unantici¬
pated and crucial bearing later. If there has been a negative side
effect of analyses of discretion in theory and in practice, it has been
to direct attention away from the entirety of a decision-making process
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and on to the final phase, the choice between outcomes. One aim of this
thesis is to illustrate how important it is to redress this balance.
So, by drawing on the insights of Dworkin and Galligan, and by adopting
Davis's definition of discretion and particularly its emphasis on
choice. we have a possible method of exploring the prima facie
complexity of social security decision-making at the front line, ie of
examining the elements of the process empirically and identifying where
choices (or 'officer discretion' in Bull's terms) are necessary, the
nature of those choices, who makes them, and how they are made.
3 - Decision criteria and choice at the micro-level of individual
decisions
It can be seen that the most useful exploration of administrative
justice in the social security system will necessitate consideration, at
the micro-level of individual decisions, of the operation of statutory
legal rules, case-law, administrative rules and professional knowledge
(and, by implication, administrative or professional discretion). Only
then, by aggregating the results of this exercise can any conclusions be
drawn about the whole system. The next stage of the analysis,
therefore, will be to examine the decision-making process more closely
and identify where choices arise.
Returning to the generalised notion of the decision-making process as
the collection of evidence and the application of decision criteria we
can see how areas of discretion emerge. Both the decision criteria and
the evidence can either be clear, with no ambiguity, or unclear in some
way and hence necessitating, to some degree, interpretation (ie making a
choice between possible different meanings of the decision criteria).
In general, figure 2.8 illustrates the possible outcomes for the
decision-maker of being confronted with clear or unclear evidence and
decision criteria. This interaction between the evidence and the
decision criteria will apply equally to decision-making process based on
statutory legal rules, cpase-law, administrative rules or professional
knowledge.
FIGURE 2. 8 - The interaction between the decision criteria and evidence



















If we consider a rules-based decision-making process certain features
of decision-making in practice can be identified. In box (2) several
explanations may be proffered for problems with the evidence; the
evidence itself may be difficult to interpret, it may be incomplete, it
may be contradictory in some way, or it may be of doubtful veracity.
Thus the decision-maker will be faced with a series of questions about
what exactly constitutes the evidence on which to base a decision. C31 '
In box (3) the decision criteria may specifically present the decision¬
maker with choices to select from, or alternatively the criteria may be
difficult to interpret or capable of different interpretations. In box
(4) decision-making is at its most uncertain, exhibiting problems from
both boxes (2) and (3). It is only in box <1) where discretion can be
considered to be eliminated, where a clear rule applied to clear
evidence produces an unequivocal answer (an example might be where the
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decision criterion is the age of a person which can be decided by
reference to a birth certif icate). c32;'
For a professional knowledge based decision-making process problems will
arise in a similar way from the interaction of unclear evidence and
decision criteria. Box (2) represents problems such as the difficulties
in the interpretation of symptoms presented to a medical practitioner or
social worker (ie problems of 'diagnosis'). Box (3) represents
difficulties in the interpretation of the current professional knowledge
(ie problems of 'response' or 'treatment'). In box (4) both kinds of
difficulty may be involved presenting the professional with problems of
both diagnosis and response, whilst in box (1) the opposite occurs where
the current state of professional knowledge indicates a clear response
to a clear body of evidence (or 'symptoms').
If we turn again to the modified Dworkinian doughnut as the represent¬
ation of a single decision-making process (and not of a welfare service
in toto) what is happening in boxes (2), (3) and <4) for both rules-
based and professional knowledge based decision-making processes is that
the outer bands surrounding the areas of administrative discretion and
professional discretion respectively do not provide the decision-maker
with the necessary criteria on which to base a decision. The decision¬
maker must therefore appeal to other sources to assist him in making a
decision. <33> In the case of social security administration there is a
well-established structure for providing advice and guidance to
decision-makers in areas of uncertainty or doubt (as well as informal
systems comprising networks of associates); however, where these fail
(or are ignored) the decision-maker is forced (or chooses) to refer to
something outside this official system. It is at this point that the
value system of the decision-maker is most likely to intrude, in effect
providing a further set of decision criteria unintended by the
architects of the welfare service or the administrative agency. And
because each decision-maker will have his own value system comprising a
unique mixture of attitudes, beliefs, preferences etc. it is when this
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stage is reached in the decision-making process that making choices (or
using discretion) inevitably attracts the charges of arbitrariness,
uncertainty, exploitation etc.
In contrast, box (1) presents no problems for the decision-maker, with
the happy conjunction of clear evidence and decision criteria. <3A:> And
unless some errors have entered into the information gathering process
then accuracy is assured. In effect, one might argue that no particular
skills of decision-making are required at all in box (1) since there are
no evidential problems or difficulties with the decision criteria. The
decision-making task could equally well be accomplished by a computer.
4 - Summary
It has been argued that there are two fundamental ways in which a
decision-making process can be carried out in a welfare context, viz.
via a formalistic system based on rules or a purposive system based on
professional knowledge. The distinction was made between those rules
which have statutory authority, those developed as case-law by
authorised adjudicators, and those constructed intra vires by the
relevant administrative agency to enable it to carry out its primary
function of implementing welfare policy. Two basic patterns of
legitimate welfare delivery therefore emerge; decisions can be produced
by a combination of statutory legal rules, case-law, administrative
rules and either professional or administrative discretion. Within each
type of system, the uncertainties inherent in decision criteria and
evidence result in the inevitability that decision-makers will be forced
into the practice of making choices.
- 74 -
Part VI - CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to develop an analysis of administrative
justice building upon the insights provided by Mashaw.
The process of decision-making has been separated into its two
essential elements of evidence and decision criteria and their
interaction studied to identify how discretion (in the sense of
'choices') arises, By adopting Mashaw's definition of administrative
justice, though not using directly the models that he develops from
it, the abstract decision-making process is posited as one element of
a ' decision-making system' which also embraces an organisational
environment. Three such decision-making systems are presented as
ideal types, each based on a different set of decision criteria which
operates within a framework of statutory legal rules, viz. case-law,
administrative rules, and professional knowledge. Finally, the
qualities that administrative justice demands of the decision-making
system as a whole and of the decision-making process in particular
have been examined.
The outcome of this analysis can be summarised as follows. Admin¬
istrative justice is achieved if an accurate decision is produced
promptly by a process in which the client has participated to ensure
that all relevant information has been collected, and the decision¬
maker has applied the relevant decision criteria in an impartial
manner, and that, at the end of the process, the decision-maker
demonstrates his or her accountability by issuing a full explanation
of the relation between the evidence, the decision criteria and the
decision.
Whilst it may be admitted that this normative framework (like all
normative theorising) has necessarily been developed from what
MacCormick describes as 'unprovable propositions' (see ch. 1, p. 14)
- 75 -
the same claim can perhaps be made for the elements of accuracy and
fairness that Wade (1963) makes for the Franks Committee's endorsement
of openness, fairness and impartiality as desirable criteria for
administrative tribunals to adopt. As he writes,
"These are not legal technicalities. They sum up the
ordinary citizen's feelings for justice and fair play..."
Cp.71)
The analysis of administrative justice presented here provides a
framework within which the operations of the DHSS in their admin¬
istration of industrial disablement benefit and mobility allowance can
be studied. Before this can commence, however, chapter 3 provides an
introduction to the decision-making arrangements of the social
security system, and chapter 4 explains the methods adopted for the
empirical part of the study.
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CHAPTER 3 - AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING
Part I - INTRODUCTION
As a prelude to the examination in detail of the operation of the
administration of industrial disablement benefit and mobility
allowance this chapter will spend some time describing and analysing
the decision-making system from which individual decisions on social
security claims emerge.
The present structure of social security adjudication dates from April
1984 with the implementation of the relevant parts of the Health and
Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983 (the
HASSASSA Act) which amended earlier legislation dealing with
adjudication arrangements, ie the Social Security Act 1975 and the
Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, The HASSASSA Act was the latest in a
series of developments stretching back some twenty years which have
been intended in part to introduce greater legality into parts of the
social security system (especially supplementary benefit) and to move
towards the rationalisation of the diffuse arrangements for producing
decisions on claims for different benefits.
Whilst, with one or two exceptions,*13 these new arrangements apply to
all benefits, no specific references will be made in this chapter to
supplementary benefit or unemployment benefit since, in practice,
decisions on these benefits are dealt with either by a separate part
of a DHSS local office (in the case of supplementary benefit) or by
officials of the Department of Employment (for unemployment benefit).
Instead discussion will concentrate on the benefits chosen as the
focus for this study, mobility allowance and industrial disablement
benefit.
- 77 -
Part II will examine the structures of decision-making within the
social security system and in particular the dual systems of lay and
medical adjudication. This will include a brief consideration of the
Office of the Chief Adjudication Officer (OCAO), the statutory body
separate from the DHSS which is responsible for giving advice and
guidance to adjudication officers, and for monitoring the standard of
their decisions; and the Office of the President of Social Security
Appeal Tribunals and Medical Appeal Tribunals (more conveniently known
as OPSSAT) which deals with the administration of the appeal tribunal
system. Deciding a social security claim is not always carried out
entirely within the adjudication system, certain questions are
designated for the Secretary of State (for Social Services) to decide.
Hence, the reasons for this separation of decision-making duties and
the relationship between the Secretary of State and the adjudication
system will be examined. Part III describes briefly the organisa¬
tional environment of social security decision-making, ie the size and
structure of the DHSS. Part IV of the chapter will examine more
closely the meaning of 'adjudication' and its place within the total
decision-making process before discussing how the decision-making
arrangements relate to the demands of administrative justice
identified in chapter 2.
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Part II - THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM
In order to receive a social security benefit a claimant must be able
to satisfy the eligibility conditions for that benefit. Failure to
satisfy any one of these would lead to the failure of the whole claim.
Deciding on a claim therefore is not a single, unitary exercise; the
final outcome of a claim is more exactly an aggregate decision
consisting of a series of what might be called sub-decisions, ie the
decisions made on each of the individual conditions to be satisfied.
These sub-decisions can be divided into two types, lay and medical,
each of which has a distinct decision-making system.
Decisions on claims emerge from the formal 'adjudication system'.
This comprises three tiers, called the 'independent statutory
authorities', whose duties and responsibilities are contained in
social security legislation. <2S On the lay side the first tier
comprises adjudication officers who make the initial decisions. The
second tier consists of Social Security Appeal Tribunals (SSATs) who
decide cases where an appeal against the original decision has been
made. The medical equivalents of these are the Adjudicating Medical
Practitioner (AMP) and the Medical Appeal Tribunal (MAT) respectively.
At the third tier the two systems merge; the Social Security
Commissioners decide certain cases within their jurisdiction (ie those
in which a point of law is at issue) on appeal from either of the
tribunals. All three tiers act independently of the DHSS in that the
Department has no say in the substance of the decisions being made.
The DHSS does, however, have a responsibility for the implementation
of social security legislation and hence its relationship with the
statutory authorities is an important, albeit sometimes confused, one;
it will be explored further later in the chapter.
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The adjudication system can be represented thus:
Social Security Commissioners
Social Security Appeal Tribunals Medical Appeal Tribunals
Adjudication Officers Adjudicating Medical
Practitioners
FIGURE 3. 1 The social security adjudication system
The independent statutory authorities are responsible for deciding
claims and questions put before them*33, ie they must, on the
information that is presented to them regarding a particular claim,
take a decision on whether the requirements of the legislation are
satisfied.
1 - Lay Adjudication
<a) The Adjudication Officer
The adjudication officer, as an independent official, decides claims
and questions that are put to him in accordance with the current
statute law (Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments) and case-
law. He is not responsible to the DHSS nor to the Secretary of State
for the substance of his decisions. If an adjudication officer is in
difficulty deciding a particular case, or is in doubt about some
aspect of the legislation he may call upon the services of the Chief
Adjudication Officer (CAO) who is statutorily appointed to provide
advice and guidance to adjudication officers and is also responsible
for monitoring their standards of adjudication. The CAO is discussed
more fully below.
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<b) The Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT)
If a claimant is dissatisfied with the decision of an adjudication
officer he may ask for his case to be heard by the second of the three
tiers of the adjudication system, the SSAT, The tribunal system has
attracted a comparatively large amount of critical attention over the
past fifteen or so years and partly as a result has been subjected to
a series of reforms. At present an SSAT comprises a legally-qualified
chairman and two other members. These are drawn from two separate
panels, one for Chairmen and the other for lay members, compiled
respectively by the Lord Chancellor (or, in Scotland, the Lord
President of the Court of Session) and by the President of SSATs and
MATs. Like the adjudication officer the SSAT must only concern itself
with applying current statute and case-law to the evidence presented
to it; governmental or DHSS policies should play no part in its
considerations. Whilst the SSAT is primarily intended to provide a
possible remedy for aggrieved claimants, adjudication officers can
refer cases to it for an initial decision if, for any reason, they
feel unable to make one themselves.
<c) The Social Security Commissioners
The third tier in the three-tier system comprises the Social Security
Commissioners who must be barristers (or advocates in Scotland), or
solicitors of at least ten years' standing. They decide cases that
have been appealed by either the claimant or the adjudication officer
after an SSAT has given its decision. Their decisions create the
case-law of social security and the more important of them are
'reported' , ie they are published and distributed to all three tiers
of the adjudication system as well as being available to the
public. <s> Under certain circumstances (ie on a point of law only)
there lies a further right of appeal to the Court of Appeal (the Court
of Session in Scotland).
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2 - Medical Adjudication
(a) The Adjudicating Medical Practitioner (AMP)
Members of the medical profession play a variety of roles in the
administration of the social security system. <e> They may act in an
advisory capacity in giving their professional opinion on the
diagnosis of a claimant's condition (for example, to confirm that a
claimant is suffering from one of the diseases prescribed in relation
to industrial disablement benefit), or to support a claimant's
contention that he is unfit for work (by issuing a medical
certificate). Alternatively, they may act in an adjudicatory capacity
as AMPs appointed by the Secretary of State, to make decisions on
cases that have been put before them. The adjudication questions that
are to be decided by AMPs are specified in the legislation and
typically cover an assessment of a claimant's disability (according to
a scale of percentage points) for the purposes of industrial
disablement benefit and its related additions (such as special
hardship allowance), and also severe disablement allowance. c7' In
most cases the AMP will act alone (often referred to as a 'single
doctor Board') but occasionally, in cases which are so specified in
legislation, the Board must comprise two AMPs. <33
Unlike the lay side of adjudication there is no advice and guidance
structure designed to assist an AMP in difficulties, neither is there
an independent organisation comparable to the OCAO which has a
responsibility for monitoring standards of adjudication. Training of
new AMPs (and keeping existing AMPs abreast of new developments) is
undertaken by full-time medical staff of the DHSS located in the
Regional and Central offices. Advice on the Industrial Injuries (II)
scheme is available in the II Handbook but there is no comparable
document for doctors when acting in an advisory role in relation to
other benefits. Medical adjudication (and some advisory assessments)
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are either carried out in one of the 100+ Medical Boarding Centres
throughout the country or, occasionally, in the claimant's own home.
<b) The Medical Appeal Tribunal
An aggrieved claimant has a right of appeal to an MAT against the
adjudicatory decisions of AMPs. An MAT comprises a legally-qualified
chairman and two medical members who must be of consultant status.
Their decision on medical assessments is final but an appeal can be
made to the Social Security Commissioner on a point of law,
(c) The Social Security Commissioners
The Social Security Commissioners serve the same function in relation
to medical adjudication as they do to lay adjudication, ie
establishing the case-law of social security by deciding individual
cases submitted to them by aggrieved claimants or by adjudication
of f icers.
3 - The Office of the Chief Adjudication Officer, (OCAO)
The OCAO, formed by the amalgamation of the Offices of the Chief
Supplementary Benefits Officer and the Chief Insurance Officer in
lgSi*35, is concerned only with first tier lay adjudication. It has
three main functions: to report on the standards of adjudication to
the Secretary of State and to keep under review the operation of
adjudication and matters connected with it (for which purpose it
operates a monitoring system), to provide advice and guidance to
adjudication officers, and to prepare submissions for the Social
Security Commissioners in cases where a claimant has appealed against
a decision of either an SSAT or MAT. (DHSS, 1985e)
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OCAO is situated in Southampton, and in mid-1986 employed 180 staff
(all of whom are DHSS civil servants) under the Chief Adjudication
Officer. The majority of the work in one of the advice sections each
dealing with a different benefit or group of benefits. Another
section administers the adjudication monitoring system.
Each advice section provides advice and guidance to individual
adjudication officers on the interpretation of social security
legislation. As general assistance, OCAO publishes the * S* Manual on
supplementary benefit legislation and the Insurance Officers Guide
(I0G) which covers all the other benefits; these are continually
updated to take account of recent case-law, new regulations or
responses to new difficulties. * 103 In addition each section will
advise on individual cases which have been submitted to them from
local offices. In the DHSS Central Offices at North Fylde and
Newcastle, the OCAO advice system is augmented by Principal
Adjudication Officer (PAO) sections which also provide advice to
adjudication officers.*113
The formal advice structure for the individual adjudication officer is
completed by his immediate superior in the local or central office,
the Higher Executive Officer (HEO). The whole structure is intended
to maintain the independent status of adjudication.
The monitoring section has the responsibility for preparing the Annual
Report of the CAO on standards of adjudication which is submitted to
the Secretary of State. In 1986, the section comprised two teams who
between them visited 42 local offices and the two Central Offices each
year to assess standards of adjudication; their reports form the basis
of the Annual Report. However, this is only the apex of the
monitoring system; in each of the seven Regional Offices there are two
or three teams who, although not OCAO staff, carry out monitoring
visits on the CAO's behalf. Using the same techniques and criteria as
the Southampton teams they will visit every local office in their
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Region every two years and submit a copy of their report to OCAO. The
lowest tier of the monitoring system are the HEOs who carry out a
routine, systematic check of adjudication officer decisions in the
local office.
As a 'matter concerned with the adjudication system' the training of
adjudication officers has come under the scrutiny of the CAO since it
is an important influence on standards of adjudication. OCAO,
therefore, vets all training material used by the various DHSS
Training Centres throughout the country, as well as the contents of
the self-instruction packages used for training within local offices.
4 - The Office of the President of SSATs and MATs, <OPSSAT)
OPSSAT was created in 1983 in response to the need (or desire) to
reinforce the independent status of adjudication by taking over from
the DHSS the administration of the appeal tribunals system. Headed by
a senior judge appointed by the Lord Chancellor, OPSSAT is organised
according to a presidential system similar to that adopted for other
administrative tribunals. *12:1 As well as being responsible for the
management of SSATs and MATs, OPSSAT also has a responsibility for
training tribunal chairmen and members, and for ensuring that they
have access to appropriate social security texts. To assist him in
his duties the President has seven Regional Chairmen of Tribunals to
whom he can delegate appropriate duties.
The rationale behind the presidential system is to remove any direct
and obvious link between social security tribunals and the DHSS, and
to concentrate experience and expertise relevant to both types of
tribunal (Robson, 1979).
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5 - The role of the Secretary of State in decision-making
Whilst I have described the formal adjudication system above this does
not comprise the whole decision-making process. Although adjudication
officers and AMPs take the majority of decisions on social security
claims, there are certain questions defined in the primary or
secondary legislation for the Secretary of State to decide. In
practice, these questions will be delegated to an official of the
DHSS. Such officials may also act as adjudication officers but in
their capacity of representative of the Secretary of State are not
part of the formal adjudication system. A claimant dissatisfied with
a decision made by the Secretary of State does not have recourse to
the normal social security appeals machinery. Instead he must make a
case to the local office, or the Secretary of State himself. Alter¬
natively he may, on a point of law only, contest the decision in the
ordinary courts. Secretary of State decisions lie outwith the
jurisdiction of the formal adjudication monitoring system operated by
the OCAO.
Why there is this division between the adjudication officer and the
Secretary of State in making certain decisions is unclear; Ogus and
Barendt discuss the position with reference to decisions concerning
National Insurance contribution conditions, which are made by the
Secretary of State:
"There has never been any substantial argument for
allocating these decisions to the Secretary of State, rather
than the statutory authorities. It may be that there are
some practical reasons as regards decisions on whether a
claimant has satisfied the relevant contribution conditions.
But it is not clear why the statutory authorities should not
decide the related question whether a claimant should
contribute as an employed or self-employed person. This
involves difficult issues of law and fact which are suitable
for a tribunal. Broader policy decisions in this area can,
of course, be taken by the Secretary of State under his
power to make regulations concerning the categorisation of
earners. Nor is there any obvious reason why entitlement to
the constant attendance and exceptionally severe disablement
allowances^35 should be decided by him, while for other
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additional allowances this is determined by the statutory
authorities." (1982, p. 585)
The Secretary of State's role in decision-making is not limited to
taking specific decisions as directed by the legislation. Since it
has been a long-established principle that adjudication officers
decide cases on the papers put before them and that they should have
very little, and preferably no, direct contact with the claimant,
(intended to preserve the adjudication officer's independence and
impartiality) the task of accumulating the information on which an
adjudication officer can apply statute and case-law is undertaken by a
Departmental official on behalf of the Secretary of State.
Accordingly, it is the DHSS which designs forms and procedures
necessary to elicit the relevant information. This stage of the
decision-making process will be described and analysed in more detail
in the subsequent chapters on industrial disablement benefit and
mobility allowance.
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Part III - THE ORGANISATION OF THE DHSS
The DHSS employs in the region of 90,000 civil servants*most of
whom are engaged in the administration of the social security system.
81,000 social security staff work in local, regional and central
offices and the London Headquarters. These staff are divided
approximately as follows:
TABLE 3.1 - Social Security staff working in Local, Regional and
Central Offices
Local Offices 60,600
Regional and other offices 4,800
Newcastle Central Office and
North Fylde Central Office 13,200
Other Computer Centres 600
HQ 1,800
Source: DHSS, 1985c, p. Ill*15'
As the figures above show the bulk of social security work of the DHSS
is handled in the local offices where supplementary benefit, some
maternity benefits, sickness and invalidity benefits, and the benefits
of the Industrial Injuries scheme are administered. Of those employed
in local offices the majority are engaged on the administration of
supplementary benefit (38,000). Of the remainder 13,000 administer
National Insurance (NI) benefits, 6,000 work on the collection of
National Insurance contributions, and most of the rest undertake
management functions. To complete the picture there are some 26,000
Department of Employment officials who work on unemployment benefit,
7,800 local authority staff engaged on housing benefit administration
and 740 Inland Revenue officials working on contributions (DHSS,
1985c, p. 111).
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A network of over 500 local offi-ces covers Great Britain, divided into
seven administrative Regions: London (South), London (North), Wales
and the South West, North, North West, Midlands, and Scotland.
1 - The Local Office
Although a few local offices deal only with either supplementary
benefit or National Insurance benefits, the vast majority administers
both and are now termed 'Integrated Local Offices' (ILOs). (All the
offices visited in this study were ILOs.) However, within each ILO
the work of the supplementary benefit and National Insurance sides of
the office are still for the most part separate and distinct with
little movement of staff between the two. Typically, two-thirds of
the staff will work on supplementary benefit and the remaining one-
third on National Insurance work (including contributions). The staff
engaged on the latter work are commonly known as the 'CB side' (from
Contributory Benefits), a title that originally distinguished them
from the staff administering the means-tested supplementary benefit.
It is now somewhat out-of-date given the increase in the range of non-
contributory benefits introduced in the last twenty years (such as
mobility allowance, attendance allowance and invalid care allowance).
The organisation of the CB side will vary according to the size of the
office and the type of locality it serves. For example, the area
covered by one inner city office visited generated very little
industrial disablement benefit work which therefore required only one
or two staff; in contrast, an office serving a coal mining district
required nearly fifteen staff. Despite these variations the
organisation of the CB side of the office does typically follow a
pattern. An HEO will be responsible for a number of sections dealing
with industrial disablement benefit, long term benefits (or 'LTB' -
mainly retirement pensions), short term benefits (or 'STB' - mainly
sickness payments) and contributions work. Each LTB and STB section
will require adjudication decisions to be made on every claim and
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hence one or more officers of the Local Officer I (LOI) grade*163 will
be appointed as adjudication officers to make decisions on certain
benefits. The remainder of each section will comprise mainly Local
Officer lis (LOIIs) who will process claims, ie receive and check
claim forms as they arrive in the office, send out routine enquiries
for information, attend to claimants visiting the office, carry out
interviews, and notify and pay claimants. In addition, clerical
assistants will perform such basic clerical tasks as copying inform¬
ation into casepapers, locating and putting away files etc. LOIIs and
clerical assistants are employees of the DHSS and act on behalf of the
Secretary of State; they have no independent status. Supervision of
the clerical staff iscarried out by an LOI responsible to the HEO.
The post of supervisor *17-3 is again a Secretary of State role; it is
sometimes a full-time post but more frequently combined with that of
adjudication officer such that a single individual can find himself
supervising a section and also taking adjudication decisions for
it. <1S3 The contributions section comprises a number of inspectors,
whose task is to ensure that the contribution requirements of
legislation are satisfied by individuals (especially the self-
employed) and by employers.
The organisation of the CB side can be illustrated using the following
hypothetical example:
Manager
HEO (CB) (Supplementary Benefit side)
AO/Supervisor AO/Supervisor AO/Supervisor Contribution
j | Inspectors
I 1 I 1
Dis. Ben. LTB LTB STB STB
Section Section Section Section Section
FIGURE 3. 2 - The Organisation of the CB side of a local office
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The HEO is primarily a manager responsible for the smooth and
efficient running of the CB side, but he is also designated an
adjudication officer (and known by the somewhat unwieldy abbreviation
HEO/AO). In this latter role he has a number of duties to perform
which are independent of his managerial function (carried out on
behalf of the Secretary of State); he must carry out a number of
'adjudication checks' each week as part of the adjudication monitoring
system to ensure that adjudication standards are satisfactory; he must
supervise and coordinate the training of adjudication officers and be
able to advise them on adjudication in general, or in relation to
particular cases; and he must disseminate new guidance issued by the
Chief Adjudication Officer. As an adjudication officer the HEO/AO can
make adjudication decisions if necessary but he cannot instruct his
staff to make particular decisions nor can he override any of their
decisions. The manager of the office has no official adjudication
function; he is not an adjudication officer but he does have a
legitimate concern with the attainment of satisfactory levels of
performance in all aspects of the office's activities, including
adj udication.
2 - The Regional Office
The seven Regional Offices of the DHSS are primarily administrative
bodies designed to ensure the efficient implementation of social
security legislation and policy and the smooth running of the network
of over 500 local offices.
Each Region is headed by a Controller and a Deputy. Beneath them are
a number of Assistant Controllers, who have responsibilities for
specific aspects of the organisation's work, and a number of Group
Managers who will have overall responsibility for the management of a
group of local offices. The exact differentiation of duties and
arrangement of the management hierarchy will vary from Region to
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Region but as an example the following is the organisation chart for



















































FIGURE 3. 3 - The Organisation of a DHSS Regional Office
Prior to the establishment of OCAO in 1984 the Regional Office
provided a source of advice and guidance to local offices through the
Regional Principal Adjudication Officer (PAO) and his staff. However,
in line with the recent trend towards strengthening the independent
status of adjudication this task was transferred to the OCAO.
Nevertheless, PAO Sections continue in existence as part of the
adjudication monitoring system acting as agents of the CAO. They also
act as channels of communication between OCAO and local offices.
Regional Medical Officers, responsible to the DHSS Chief Medical
Officer, are also housed in Regional Offices. They and their staffs
carry out a number of tasks connected with medical adjudication
including the selection and training of AMPs, and of medical
practitioners specifically retained to provide advisory medical
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reports to assist in decision-making on benefits such as mobility
allowance and attendance allowance. They also monitor the standards
of decision-making of AMPs.
3 - The Central Offices
The major tasks of the Newcastle Central Office are the maintenance of
all National Insurance contributions records, the payment of
retirement pensions and widow's pensions, and the administration of
child benefit. As such the office is only peripheral to this study.
The North Fylde Central Office (NFCO) deals with the administration of
war pensions, attendance allowance, mobility allowance, invalid care
allowance and family income supplement. c19* NFCO houses the Mobility
Allowance Unit (MAU) which is responsible for the processing of all
mobility allowance claims regardless of where the claimant lives. A
Senior Medical Officer (and his staff of Medical Officers) at NFCO to
give advice on medical aspects of mobility allowance to adjudication
officers and to monitor the standards of the medical reports submitted
by medical practitioners. Like Regional Medical Officers they are
responsible to the Chief Medical Officer of the DHSS. The Mobility
Allowance Unit is discussed fully in chapter 6.
4 - DHSS Headquarters
The London HQ of the DHSS is the apex of the organisation. It is
divided into branches responsible for specific tasks required for the
running of a large, bureaucratic operation, in addition to which are a
number of policy branches which advise Ministers on social security
policy and are responsible for drafting proposed legislative changes.
Political control of the DHSS is held by the Secretary of State for
Social Services; in relation to social security he is usually assisted
by a Minister of State for Social Security and at least one Undei—
Secretary of State.
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Part II - SOCIAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
1 - The Meaning of Adjudication
There is an inherent problem in an examination of social security
decision-making caused by the term 'adjudication'. Whilst it has been
adopted as an official (and legal) description of what the independent
statutory authorities do in making decisions on claims and questions
put to them, it is also used more generally to describe the process
that the judiciary adopt in deciding between the competing claims of
parties in litigation. The two views can be compatible (for example,
when applied to tribunals level) but at the first tier of decision¬
making the absence of a dispute (and hence competing parties) has led
some to suggest that 'adjudication' is an inappropriate term with
which to describe the activities of adjudication officers. Citing
Lord Diplock, <20J Ogus and Barendt write of the adjudication officer:
"His duties have been characterised as 'administrative' in
that he is not adjudicating between the contentions of the
claimant and those of the Department or any other party"
(1982, p.586)
Mashaw, however, takes a wider view of the term; referring to the
American social security system he writes:
" 'Adjudication' encompasses any determination of eligi¬
bility or amount of benefits at any stage of a social
welfare claims process." (1974, p.774)
When one considers that social security officials, as much as judges,
are making decisions in accordance with statute and case-law and that,
although there may not be competing parties involved at the first
tier, there will probably be competing decisions to choose between,
then 'adjudication' in Mashaw's wider sense seems a justifiable
extension of the term.
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However, Mashaw's definition also implies that any person involved in
eligibility determinations is 'adjudicating' and hence in the context
of the British social security system this would include not only
adjudication officers but also any individual making a decision (or,
rather, a sub-decision) which contributes to the final, aggregate
decision on a claim. Such a conclusion seems not unreasonable but
there are also drawbacks in calling all decision-making on sub-
decisions 'adjudication'. I will prefer to reserve the term to the
process of decision-making where the decision criteria are statute and
case law. Hence one can talk of Secretary of State adjudication in a
comparable sense to adjudication by adjudication officers, SSATs, etc.
The decision-making process does not only comprise adjudication
however, but all stages in the processing of a claim from its
submission to the DHSS to the receipt of the final decision by the
claimant. The adjudication officer's part in this is reflected in the
following version of what adjudication entails (taken from a DHSS
training manual issued to new adjudication officers):
"An adjudication officer should reach a decision by: -
1. Examining the evidence
2. Determining the facts
3. Applying the law
All evidence should be examined carefully and if necessary
the Secretary of State should be asked to obtain further
information. The evidence should then be weighed and the
facts established to the adjudication officer's satisfaction
on the balance of probability. The law is then applied to
these facts and the decision given."
The place of adjudication in the total decision-making process can be
illustrated by a diagrammatic representation overleaf (in the form of
a flow-chart) of the process, where Secretary of State duties appear
on the left of the page and adjudication officer duties on the right.
Figure 3. 4 could apply equally well, mutatis mutandis, to each sub-
decision within a claims process as to the final aggregate decision.
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FIGURE 3. 4 - A simplified representation of the social security
decision-making process
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The diagram has been deliberately simplified as much as possible to
show the key elements in the process. In practice even such a routine
operation as the collection of essential additional information (which
may be necessary, for example, because a claim form is incomplete)
involves a number of decisions on the part of the Secretary of State's
representative <ie usually a clerical officer). For example,
decisions may have to be made about the time and effort which should
be committed to the collection of further evidence, what sources to
will try, or whether to cross-check evidence that is suspected of
being incorrect for some reason.
The total decision-making process, therefore, includes a number of
separate operations of which adjudication is only one. In the chapter
which consider the administration of industrial disablement benefit
and mobility allowance, the examination of the decision-making process
will consider all the elements so far identified and not restrict
itself to the formal adjudication system.
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2 - The Demands of Administrative Justice
This final section relates the demands of administrative justice,
identified in chapter 2 in the context of welfare delivery services in
general, specifically to the social security system. This will entail
considering what these demands mean in practical terms for the lay and
medical aspects of the administration of social security, and
identifying those features of the system which are particularly
concerned with them. This will serve as a more detailed introduction
to an examination of the administration of industrial disablement
benefit and mobility allowance and administrative justice.
(a) Accuracy
Mashaw's definition (regarding US welfare claims) quoted earlier bears
repetition; accuracy, he writes, is
"... the correspondence of the substantive outcome of an
adjudication with the true facts of a claimant's situation
and with an appropriate application of the relevant legal
rules to those facts." (1974, p. 774)
It is a careful definition which takes as its starting point the
substantive outcome (ie a decision) and asks whether it corresponds
with the 'true facts' of the case rather than starting with the facts
and asking what decision must follow from them, an approach which
would imply that there should be only one right answer which the
decision-maker must strive to find. In contrast Mashaw's formulation
does not rule out the possibility of more than one answer being
' accurate'.
This does not imply that every time a decision has to be made there is
a variety of possible 'accurate' outcomes. When the decision criteria
and evidence are both cleai—cut then it is likely that there is only
one decision which could be considered accurate. However, as chapters
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5 and 6 will demonstrate, decision-makers are frequently faced with
making decisions based on unclear decision criteria and evidence which
do not necessarily allow of an unequivocal answer being reached. In
such circumstances, social security case-law has established that,
"The onus of proof is on the claimant, and the standard is
the balance of probabilities." (Ogus and Barendt, 1982,
p.300; citing R(I) 12/62)
The Insurance Officer's Guide (IOG) explains how the 'balance of
probabilities' is to be applied in practice.
"The test of balance of probabilities means that if the
established facts give rise to conflicting inferences of
equal degrees of probability, so that the choice between
them is a mere matter of conjecture, then the claimant fails
to discharge the onus of proof and his claim must fail; he
is not entitled to 'the benefit of the doubt'." (IOG, Pt V,
para. 5037)
Two aspects of the decision-making system are designed to promote
accuracy: the training programme for adjudication officers and medical
practitioners (acting either as AMPs or the providers of specialist
medical reports), and the advice and guidance arrangements. The
trainee adjudication officer spends thirteen weeks in the local (or
central) office on a combination of teaching from a training officer,
self-instruction using the specially-prepared training packages, and
working with experienced staff. In this way knowledge of the
appropriate benefits and the procedures relating to them are gained.
After some months of carrying out adjudication officer duties the new
incumbent will normally be sent on an Initial Adjudication Course held
at one of the DHSS training centres throughout the country (or within
a Central Office) where the principles and techniques of adjudication
are reinforced and provisions common to a number of benefits (for
example, how to deal with claims which are submitted late) are
discussed. This initial course can be supplemented by later
attendance at one of the specialist modules which deal with the
complexities of one particular benefit. Advice and guidance, either
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in the IOG or from OCAO, seek to ensure that adjudication officers
comply with social security law when either the evidence available or
the law itself creates problems for them. Training for AMPs has a
similar aim: to equip the doctor with the requisite knowledge and
skills to enable him or her to undertake medical adjudication, but
follows a different pattern. Guidance documents are supplied to the
tyro AMP who will then work with an experienced boarding doctor until
judged proficient to act as a 'single-doctor board'.
Whilst the training and advice arrangements are designed to promote an
accurate decision before it is made, two elements of the social
security decision-making system which are particularly concerned with
accuracy after a decision has been made, viz. the appeals hierarchy
and the adjudication monitoring system. The appeals system is
primarily concerned with providing a means of redress for the
aggrieved claimant by re-hearing individual cases and substituting a
fresh decision where it is considered that an incorrect decision has
been made. But since an SSAT or MAT will normally only be considering
cases that are brought before it by claimants it acts in a reactive
rather than proactive manner. The contribution of tribunals to the
prompt ion of accuracy at the first tier will, therefore, be indirect.
For a lay adjudication officer, preparing and presenting an appeal
consumes a large amount of staff time and having a decision overturned
can reflect badly on an adjudication officer's original decision. The
best way, therefore, to avoid both of these is to ensure that
decisions are accurate in the first place.
On the other hand, the monitoring system operated by the OCAO is
designed positively to promote accuracy as well as providing a
retrospective examination of standards for the Secretary of State.
However, once an OCAO or a Regional monitoring team has reported its
assessment no further action is taken by them, ie if a team finds an
error it will bring it to the attention of local management, which is
responsible for the standard of work within the office, the team
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itself has no power to revise that decision. The OCAO and Regional
monitoring teams visit local offices and examine about 100 cases, some
chosen randomly from amongst categories specified by the CAO and some
chosen by local management as presenting particular difficulties.
They assess accuracy by adopting a Mashaw type approach, ie it is
recognised that for one set of evidence or facts there is not
necessarily a unique correct answer. They will therefore not make a
judgement that a decision is wrong but will identify what they see as
a deficiency in the process of adjudication and, in their terms,
'raise an adjudication comment' on the point, The process which a
monitoring team is required to follow is laid down in the first Annual
Report of the CAO:
"In looking at a selected decision the officer should first
consider whether all the evidence necessary to decide the
question was before the adjudication officer. If it was
not, this in itself justifies a comment.
If all the evidence needed was before the adjudication
officer, the following questions should be considered in
relation to the decision:
(a) Was the decision. whether to award, disallow,
disqualify or review, justified on the evidence?
(b) Was the correct decision used, ie was the decision
given on the correct grounds?
(c) Did the decision relate to the correct period?
(d) If the decision specified a rate or amount of benefit,
whether awarded, offset or calculated as overpaid, was this
figure correct?
(e) Was there any other major factor which throws doubt on
the correctness of the decision?
If the decision fails any of these tests a comment to the
adjudication officer is required."
(DHSS, 1985e, Appendix 7, p. 67)
Scrutiny of medical adjudication decisions is subject to no such
elaborate arrangements. This is not to suggest that it is not treated
seriously within the DHSS, a considerable proportion of the time of
Medical Officers in Regional Offices is spent in carrying out post-
board checks on the assessments of AMPs (and similarly Medical
Officers in Mobility Allowance Unit check a proportion of medical
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reports - supplied for the purpose of making mobility allowance
decisions). However, there is no equivalent overseer of medical
adjudication comparable to the CAO, and certainly no annual report of
the standards of decision-making made to Parliament.
As mentioned earlier, within each Central Office and local office the
immediate superior of the adjudication officer, the HEO/AO, also
carries out routine adjudication checks in order to maintain standards
and identify where improvements in performance are required.
The social security decision-making system therefore contains several
elements designed either to promote or to check accuracy. In the
separate chapters on industrial disablement benefit and mobility
allowance they will be discussed in greater detail and an assessment
will be made of how accuracy is affected by each of them.
(b) Fairness
Promptness
Having one's claim dealt with promptly is an obviously desirable
feature of the decision-making system and may be essential when social
security is a person's only source of income. However, trying to
define exactly what 'prompt' means is problematic. Mashaw's attempt
to define a 'timely' decision is a useful start,
"That a decision is 'timely' simply means that it was made
within a reasonable or a statutorily prescribed period of
time after presentation of a claim." (1974, p. 775)
However, if we look to primary legislation in this country we find
that although a time limit for the processing of claims is prescribed,
the wording of the statute limits its usefulness. Section 99(1) of
the Social Security Act 1975 reads:
"An insurance officer to whom a claim or question is
submitted ... shall take it into consideration and, so far
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as practicable, dispose of it ... within 14 days of its
submission to him. "
There are several reasons why this is not particularly useful;
firstly, it is concerned with only part of the decision-making
process, ie f ormal adjudication; it ignores the time that a claim
spends with the Secretary of State before it is 1 presented' to the
adjudication officer or AMP for a decision, and the time afterwards
when it is passed back to the Secretary of State for promulgation and
payment. Secondly, the phrase 'so far as practicable' is open to such
wide interpretation that virtually any delay could be explained away
by invoking' it. As will be seen particularly with industrial
disablement benefit and occasionally with mobility allowance,
adjudication officers and AMPs are frequently forced to seek further
information, which can add weeks if not months to the decision-making
process making the 14 day target virtually meaningless. And thirdly,
even 14 days can be an unacceptably long time in processing a benefit
where it is the only source of income. In effect the 14 day target
has fallen into disuse as the Department has adopted, where it is
practicable, its own targets for performance in clearing cases which
also incorporates the time spent in collecting information. *213
Although it may seem that there are few incentives to timely decision¬
making there are powerful organisational and individual pressures (at
least on the adjudication officer) operating to secure a steady if not
necessarily a fast turnover of cases. Clearly, the organisation has
an interest in reducing the time taken to reach decisions, since it
may, as a result, be able to employ fewer staff. Furthermore, the
provision of a quicker service could be expected to result in fewer
complaints from the public (a powerful force on a politically-
sensitive organisation such as the DHSS). Similarly, individual
decision-makers will be keen to get through their work as quickly as
possible to avoid a large backlog of outstanding cases; they too will
be concerned to cut down the number of complaints and enquiries which
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take up time and therefore hamper their adjudication or supervisory
dut ies.
The danger of emphasising the speedy clearance of cases is that the
other demands of administrative justice may suffer or be sacrificed.
This is particularly so for the quality of decisions where there is
often a trade-off between speed and accuracy, a trade-off which is
ultimately left to the adjudication officer to make.
AMPs are not subject to such pressure; they will be routinely assigned
a list of five or six cases per half-day session, at the end of which
they will complete the relevant medical assessments. Their work,
therefore, arrives in a controlled flow and is not subject to sudden
influxes of claims, or to an accumulated backlog of cases.
Impartiality
The essence of impartiality is the elimination of sentiments of bias
or prejudice. Impartiality as a demand of administrative justice on
the social security decision-making process means, therefore, that
these sentiments are minimised if not squeezed out altogether. But to
suggest how this might be done we need to ask what kinds of bias or
prejudice are likely and what their sources are. Since the main
actors in the decision-making process are adjudication officers and
AMPs, and the DHSS, the two most important sources are the personal
perceptions and value systems of decision-makers and the
organisational interests of the Department.
The response to the possibility of undue Departmental influence has
been to establish adjudication as independent of the DHSS. This means
that in making decisions on claims the only responsibility of
adjudication officers and AMPs is to comply with statute and case-law;
they have no obligation or responsibility for their decisions to the
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DHSS. For adjudication officers, however, their independence is
bounded, since they are both civil servants employed within the DHSS
(where they are likely to spend the whole of their careers) and are
physically located within DHSS offices. Furthermore, in practice they
may be required to undertake both independent adjudication duties, and
duties on behalf of the Secretary of State. Such an arrangement
therefore leads to the possibility of Departmental influences
undermining the independent status of adjudication. In theory, AMPs
should be immune from such potential influence since they are not
salaried employees of the DHSS, but are engaged as independent
contractors. In practice, however, their relationship with Regional
Office Medical Officers opens a channel through which the concerns of
the Department can be brought to bear upon them.
The response to the potential problem of individual bias from an
adjudication officer against (or indeed in favour of) a claimant has
been the advice from the CAO (in the I0G) that where possible the
adjudication officer should refrain from personal contact with the
claimant. The full text of the relevant paragraph reads,
"There is no legal bar to the interview of the claimant by
the insurance officer, but this should be avoided wherever
possible." (I0G, Pt I, para. 65)
A frequent explanation of the rationale behind the advice to maintain
some distance between the adjudication officer and the claimant is
that it would be unsatisfactory if a claimant appealed against a
decision and then came upon the adjudication officer (in the capacity
of presenting officer) before an SSAT, The presenting officer attends
the tribunal not as the representative of the DHSS but as ' amicus
curiae' to assist the tribunal by explaining the decision in question
without adopting the position of defending it as correct. Hence, the
argument runs, if the adjudication officer has interviewed the
claimant previously then this neutral amicus curiae role is
undermined. There are clearly advantages and disadvantages of
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adjudication officers maintaining their distance from the claimant but
the argument above is undermined by the fact that few adjudication
officers actually present their own cases at appeal tribunals.
Instead there tend to be specialist presenting officers in local
offices, or one presenting officer to cover several offices on a rota
basis; and for the Mobility Allowance Unit there is no question of
adjudication officers travelling the country from Blackpool in order
to present appeals (although they may attend tribunals in the
immediate vicinity). This doctrine of keeping a distance form the
claimant cannot, of course, be extended to AMPs who always, as a
matter of obvious necessity, come into contact with the claimant,
Of course it is not necessary to have face to face contact with the
claimant to allow bias or prejudice to influence decision-making.
Deciding a case 'on the papers' alone is no guarantee of impartiality.
Eliminating, or even identifying bias at this stage is difficult;
nevertheless, the monitoring system is at least designed to ensure
that the substantive outcome of a claim is reasonable.
One last comment remains to be made in relation to 'impartiality'.
Independence as a response to the potentially undesirable intrusion of
DHSS values seems reasonable, but it begs ' the question of why it
should apply only to adjudication by adjudication officers and not
adjudication by the Secretary of State. There seems no logical answer
to this. One could perhaps suggest (as Ogus and Barendt do in the
quotation cited earlier) that some issues may fall naturally to the
Secretary of State to decide in preference to the statutory
authorities but this does not seem to be supported by any hard
evidence. Indeed it is a truism to say that Secretary of State
decision-making cannot be independent of the DHSS, so the question of




Participation by the claimant at appeal is an integral feature of
second tier decision-making; not only are aggrieved claimants allowed
to present a case to an SSAT or MAT, but they are also encouraged to
attend the hearing and participate in person or via a representative
(or both). There is evidence that claimants are more likely to
receive a favourable judgement if they actually attend, and even
better if represented at the tribunal (Bradley, 1985, p.449), which
implies that the opportunity for claimants to explain and expand upon
the evidence promotes a decision based on more of the 'true facts'
than with first tier adjudication, ie a more accurate decision. Such
sentiments, however, do not appear to extend to the lower tier of lay
decision-making. Here, information collection is carried out mainly
by post using pro-forma letters of enquiry. Personal contact is only
instigated by the Department when information proves difficult to
collect or there is some uncertainty surrounding the information
already collected.
So, participation in the lay decision-making process at the first tier
is limited. Claimants may supply any information they wish, but this
will be collected using the forms designed by the DHSS. Infrequently
they may be asked to attend for interview, and claimants can always
request an interview themselves. However, even then they are unlikely
to see the adjudication officer who will make a decision on the claim
(ie in accordance with IOG advice) but a member of the clerical staff.
On medical questions claimants always come face-to-face with an AMP or
EMP, thus providing an opportunity for their greater participation in
information collection. How much use is made of this opportunity by
medical practitioners to involve claimants will be explored in
chapters 5 and 6.
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Accountability
It was argued in chapter 2 that accountability, in the sense of the
giving of comprehensible explanations should apply equally to both
elements of the decision-making process, the collection of information
and the application of the decision criteria. At present, however,
the claimant will receive in most cases only a formal notification of
the substance of the adjudication officer's or AMP's decision which
will quote the relevant legislation. However, quoting that the
requirements of subsection this or section that of such and such an
Act have not been satisfied does not explain to the claimant why the
adjudication officer or AMP reached a particular decision. Further¬
more, the procedures operating at present do not place any obligation
on adjudication officers or AMPs to explain why certain information is
required and what use will be made of it.
On lay questions contact with the claimant is restricted to the
collection of information and the notification of the final decision,
functions which fall entirely to the Secretary of State, and not to
the adjudication officer, to perform. The CAO, therefore, has no
responsibility for carrying out any scrutiny of these parts of the
decision-making process. And whilst it is clear that the DHSS
complies with its minimum responsibility of informing claimants of the
decisions of adjudication officers, quoting the relevant legislation,
any further explanation to them will stem largely from local practice
or from the personal inclination of individual adjudication officers.
Similarly, the amount of explanation afforded the claimant at a
medical examination will depend upon the individual approach of the
AMP or other medical practitioner carrying out an examination on
behalf of the DHSS.
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Part V - SUMMARY
This chapter has prepared the ground for the empirically-based
analysis of the administration of industrial disablement benefit and
mobility allowance by describing, firstly, the formal adjudication
system and its place within the total social security decision-making
system, secondly the organisational environment within which decision¬
making operates, and thirdly by relating the general demands of
administrative justice specifically to the social security system.
Initially one might be left with the impression that whilst the
demands of accuracy and, to a lesser extent, impartiality and prompt¬
ness are reasonably well-reflected in the formal decision-making
arrangements, comparatively little heed is taken of the requirements
of participation and accountability. Whether this is a true
reflection will emerge from the empirical data presented in chapters 5
and 6, after the methodology adopted to collect the data has been
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY
Part I - INTRODUCTION
"... researchers need to ... approach substantive and
theoretical problems with a range of methods that are
appropriate for their problems,"
(Burgess, 1984, p. 143)
"... the conduct, analysis and reporting of qualitative
research requires a blend of imagination, flexibility,
receptivity, discipline and hard work that enables the
researcher to process the information as objectively as
possible while making his or her own contribution to the
analysis and synthesis of data. "
(Morton-Williams, 1985, p. 42)
This study is essentially socio-legal in nature, falling within the
characterisation of socio-legal studies suggested by Partington<1
"Socio-legal studies may ... be broadly characterised as
being concerned with attempts at understanding the modes of
creation of law, the operation of that law, and the impact
of law upon society. "
The relevance of this for a methodological discussion is that it
emphasises that the socio-legal study should be seen as something
different from both the more mainstream sociological enquiry and also
the exposition of black-letter law traditional in legal texts. But
although different, similarities remain. Certainly an understanding
of the minutiae of social security law and its interpretation by the
Courts and Commissioners is essential. But this alone will not
explain how officials implement statute and case-law when faced with
actual cases in the routine practice of their work; for this an appeal
to the data collection techniques of qualitative sociology, such as
participant observation, semi-structured interviewing etc, is more
appropriate. The practice of using these techniques is well-
documented in, inter alia, Bogdan and Taylor (1975), Schatzman and
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Strauss (1973), Schuman and Presser (1981), Burgess (1982 and 1984)
and Walker (1985), all of which have proved useful in the design of
this research. But in comparison with the literature on how to
collect qualitative data there is relatively little on how to analyse
it. Two exceptions are analytic induction developed initially by
Znaniecki (1934) and the 'grounded theory' method of Glaser and
Strauss (1967). Whilst drawing on these sources, this chapter is
concerned with identifying a methodology particularly suited to socio-
legal enquiry. (This is not to imply that there is a single 'socio-
legal method' waiting to be discovered, a very positivist notion.) As
the discipline of socio-legal studies matures further, it may emerge
that a distinctive socio-legal methodology may emerge but at this
stage what is needed of the researcher, as Morton-Williams (1985)
suggests above, is "imagination and flexibility" to find the most
'appropriate' selection of methods from whatever the source.
The use of methods rather than a single method is now well-established
as one of the ground rules of qualitative research, designed to combat
the problems of potential bias that can originate from relying on only
one method or data source. The term 'triangulation' (borrowed from
psychology) is frequently used to describe this approach. The term
need not, however, be restricted to method but, as Denzin (1970)
suggests, be applied equally to data (for example, across time or
place), the investigator (ie employing more than one researcher), or
theory (ie using more than one theory to approach the data).
The idea of ' triangulation' whether under that name or one of its
variants such as 'combined operations' (Stacey, 1969), 'mixed
strategies' (Douglas, 1976), or 'multiple strategies' (Burgess, 1984)
is very persuasive. The results of any subsequent analysis will
surely be the more robust for the data being collected from a number
of sources or having a number of minds or theoretical approaches
applied to it.
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The quotation from Burgess at the head of this chapter notes that the
researcher will be faced with both theoretical and substantive
problems. This raises the question of whether different methods are
required as a response to each or whether the methods that are adopted
will be expected to address both. For Glaser and Strauss (1967)
theory emerges from (or is 'grounded' in) empirical research but,
among the critics of grounded theory Rose (quoted in Burgess, 1984,
p. 181) questions "whether theory construction is intimately linked to
field research". There can be no absolute answer; theory can be
developed away from empirical enquiry or be inextricably linked with
it. Or be somewhere in between. Mashaw's description of his
development of the concept of administrative justice as "in part
empirical and in part intuitive and analytic" (1983, p. 17) perhaps
gives the best hint on the way to proceed.
As the introductory chapter explained, there was an initial desire to
answer a simple, but, in view of the number of individuals dependent
upon social security payments, important question: "how is an initial
decision on a social security claim made by the DHSS?", a question
previously only partially addressed in the literature. Linked with
this substantive enquiry was the question prompted by a reading of
Mashaw's 'Bureaucratic Justice' (1983) of whether the concept of
administrative justice, either in his formulation or some version of
it, had any relevance in the analysis of the first, empirical
quest ion.
The strength of using the concept of administrative justice in such an
analysis is that it not only assists an explanation of how decisions
are made, but also provides a normative framework for evaluating an
existing organisation's practices and performance, and for suggesting
how these might be improved, ie it addresses the question of how
decisions ought to be made.
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So conceived, this project resolved itself into two separate (but
linked) phases; if the concept of administrative justice was to be
used as a tool with which to explore the social security decision¬
making system, then it firstly had to be defined (and, if necessary,
refined). How this was done and with what results comprise the
substance of the previous chapter. The subject of the current
chapter, in contrast, deals with how these theoretical deliberations
were translated into a methodology for the empirical stage of the
project, examining the operation of social security law in practice.
This second phase, regardless of the flexibility or imagination of the
researcher, was inevitably subjected to the eternal constraining
factors of time, money and access. Some of these were known initially
whilst others emerged later. Also, whilst some were relatively fixed,
others changed, or at least were susceptible to change. The choice of
methodology adopted, therefore, must be understood not only as an
appropriate 'technical' response to the research issues, but also in
the context of the constraints on the project.
While the theoretical and substantive concerns of the project were
relatively clear, but still very wide, at the outset, decisions were
needed on the nature and extent of the related fieldwork. 'Decision¬
making in social security' had to be restricted to something
manageable within the initial resource constraints noted above. The
practical concerns of the Department limited the extent of the
fieldwork to a study of the administration of industrial disablement
benefit and mobility allowance.
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Part II - THE STRATEGY FOR DATA COLLECTION
The use of 'multiple strategies' has been particularly evident in the
relatively few studies into the operation of administrative law. A
few of the more relevant of these reveal a range of methodologies each
adapted to suit the particular objectives (and resources) of the study
in question.
In Coleman's novel and successful study (1970) of the internal review
of supplementary benefit decisions, supplementary benefit officers
completed standardised questionnaires about the outcomes (and the
reasons for them) of all appealed decisions in the country for a
period of twelve months, and yielded data suitable for quantitative
analysis.
More recently, the ambitious integrated series of studies by the
Policy Studies Institute (Berthoud, 1984) into the effects of the 1980
supplementary benefit reforms adopted a wide range of survey,
observation, and interview techniques in order to explore families'
needs and budgeting strategies, claimants' knowledge of the social
security system, the conduct of DHSS staff, and the relationship
between the state, its agents and the claimants.
Howe's study (1985) of the enduring 'deserving/undeserving'
distinction adopted by supplementary benefit officers in a local DHSS
office in Northern Ireland used (i) observation techniques for
recording staff/claimant encounters and the activities of staff at
work, (ii) 'talks' with staff, (iii) interviews with claimants, and
(iv) scrutiny of Departmental documents. From the data derived from
these methods Howe draws plausible conclusions about the
' deserving/undeserving' issue.
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Multiple strategies have also been used in recent studies of the
activities of regulatory, rather than welfare, agencies. Richardson
et al (1982) and Hawkins (1984), in two studies of water authorities
and the control of pollution, both combine participant observation
with informal interviews and documentary analysis. Such techniques
were considered to be the most appropriate for the collection of data
from agency staff who spent much of their time on field visits and in
direct contact with the 'dischargers' of pollution.
Studies of administrative action are more common in the USA and here
also we find a range of methodological approaches employed. In the
classic early study of Blau (1963) into the dynamics of bureaucracy,
documentary analysis, interviews and sophisticated observation
techniques were combined to provide a powerful analysis of the
functions and dysfunctions of the interaction between the structural
features of an organisation and the informal networks that develop
within it.
Nonet's (1969) seminal study of institutional change (how the
Industrial Accidents Commission (IAC) of California adapted itself to
the changing demands placed upon it, and its changing relationship
with the claimant) makes extensive use of archival material
supplemented where possible with interviews of older employees, to
explore the IAC's early development; observation of administrative
proceedings; and interviews with the relevant actors in the process
(IAC members and officials, lawyers, union officials etc) for more
contemporary data.
Kagan (1978), in his study of the price and wage freeze legislation of
the Nixon administration, was able, as a practising lawyer in the
Office of Economic Protection, to utilise fully the technique of
participant observation which he supplemented with a quantitative
analysis of the agency's records.
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Bardach and Kagan's (1982) interest in the operation of state
regulatory agencies was pursued using lengthy and open-ended
interviews with inspectors from a wide range of agencies, accompanying
them on field visits, relevant documentary analysis, and by holding a
two-day workshop of all those involved.
The American studies cited above display a great awareness of the
importance of explaining the methods used in constructing a piece of
social research. (The British studies by Berthoud (1984), Richardson
et al (1982), and Hawkins (1984) are similarly mindful of the need to
discuss their methodologies.) The unfortunate exception to this
healthy trend is Mashaw's "Bureaucratic Justice' which provides
nothing comparable. However, mention is. made of "interviewing and
observation" at the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the state
disability determination services over a period of thirty days
"pestering". Clearly, also, Mashaw has made extensive use of
governmental statistical and other reports, and SSA internal
document at ion.
Studies of the operation of tribunals have also adopted a varied
methodology. Adler, Burns and Johnson (1976) in their comparison of
Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals and National Insurance Local
Tribunals (ie before they were incorporated in the single Social
Security Appeal Tribunal system) combined documentary analysis of
tribunal casepapers with what might be called 'structured
observation', ie the use of a series of questions to be answered by
observers rather than a tabula rasa approach of recording everything
and anything to be sifted later. Significantly, the observer
questionnaire was constructed using the Franks Committee criteria of
'openness, fairness and impartiality' as guiding principles*2'.
Lister's (1974) study of the adequacy of the supplementary benefit
appeals apparatus in the London area similarly drew on Franks to
provide evaluative criteria. Postal questionnaires to tribunal
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chairmen and members, observation at hearings, and the experiences of
Child Poverty Action Group and Citizens Rights Office members provided
the raw data for analysis.
In a comparable study of social security hearings in the USA by Mashaw
et al (1978), resources clearly allowed a more ambitious and extensive
trawl of sources. Mashaw reports,
"... an exhaustive review of the literature, ... an
intensive investigation of four ... hearing offices
(including review of documents, observations of hearings and
lengthy interviews with Administrative Law Judges, staff
personnel, claimants, claimants' representatives, and expert
witnesses), and a statistical analysis of a random sample of
disability hearing records. . . " (p.xix)
This brief review of the methods adopted in a variety of studies of
administrative behaviour presents a range of responses to the problem
of how to conduct the collection of data. Studies such as Mashaw et
al, and Bardach and Kagan perhaps present one end of a continuum of
possible approaches, ie an appeal to virtually every technique
currently available to the social scientist. Stretching behind this
extreme comes the bulk of more limited studies displaying varying
degrees of scope and sophistication. This is not to imply that the
all-encompassing methodologies of Bardach and Kagan (and like studies)
produce results superior to the rest; each must be judged against its
own theoretical and substantive concerns, the only proper test being
whether the methods are appropriate and sufficient to tackle the aims
of the research. For example, Mashaw in 'Bureaucratic Justice'
clearly accomplishes his task of generating theory and using it to
suggest possible reforms in disability benefit administration with
seemingly a much less ambitious data collection programme than his
earlier study of appeal tribunals.
These studies provide useful (and mostly reassuring) insights into the
design of a methodology for this project. The brief review presented
above might suggest that the technique of participant observation is
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well-suited to studies of administrative activity. However, one of the
constraints agreed with the DHSS was to forgo the use of observation
techniques. In retrospect, though, this proved far less of a
hindrance than might have been expected. Part of the reason for this
lies in the nature of decision-making itself. Kagan, in his earlier
study puts the point admirably:
"The process of a legal decision in an administrative agency
is not easily susceptible to pure observation. It takes
place at desks, in offices, in occasional conferences and
telephone conversations, and in hurried conversations in
corridors. The participants spend a great deal of time
studying documents. To a very great extent, the process
takes place in people's heads." (1978, p. 185)
A projected study along the lines of Blau's investigation of the
internal functioning of an organisation would have been severely
hampered by a veto on observing officials at work, but as the main
focus of the research was now firmly established as decision-making,
techniques were needed more to elicit what went on 'inside people's
heads'. Clearly, interviewing would be the principal source of
information, but the opportunity also existed to examine internal
local office documents and claimant casepapers. However, an
introductory month spent in an Edinburgh local office had indicated
that a visual examination of casepapers would not be sufficient in
many cases (particularly disallowances) to provide an explanation of
why an individual decision had been made, Also it was clear that the
complexity of social security legislation would prove a hindrance in
appreciating fully the particular treatment of a case. The decision
was taken, therefore, to use casepapers as the basis of a discussion
with adjudication officers to explore further pertinent issues raised
in the interviews.
The range of internal documents for which access was granted included
both published and unpublished DHSS material. Published sources
included the social security statutes and secondary legislation,
Commissioners' decisions and reports from the Chief Adjudication
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Officer. In addition permission was given to study the procedural
codes (ie internal DHSS operating manuals), the advisory Insurance
Officer's Guide and its amendments, monitoring reports for individual
offices, statistical returns and the occasional internal study report.
This section has attempted to explain how the broad data collection
strategy came to comprise the three 'multiple strategies' of
interviewing DHSS staff, conducting a casepaper study, and analysing
internal DHSS documents. From here the design of the methodology
turned from broad strategy to questions of detail.
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Part III - FROM BROAD STRATEGY TO DETAIL: ASKING THE RIGHT PEOPLE THE
RIGHT QUESTIONS
Having arrived at a strategy for data collection, more detailed
questions arose; specifically who to interview, how many, and from
where in the UK, and similarly, how many casepapers to examine and
what information to extract.
1 - The Interview Sample
(a) Who to interview
Adopting Glaser and Strauss's criterion of 'theoretical purpose and
relevance' (1967, p.45) for deciding which groups of lay and medical
officials to interview it was decided to include representatives of
all those within the DHSS who had an important bearing, direct or
indirect, on the production of an initial decision on a claim. The
list on the lay side was formidable:
(1) the relevant adjudication officers
(2) local office disablement benefit clerks (as collectors of
inf ormation)
(3) the relevant office HEO/AOs (in the roles of manager,
monitor, trainer, and advice-giver)
(4) local office managers (given his scope for influencing the
internal organisation and structure of adjudication)
(5) Regional monitoring teams
(6) DHSS training staff
(7) OCAO staff (as both advice-givers and monitors)
(8) DHSS Medical Officers (as advice-givers on medical issues)
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On the medical side the cast of characters was more limited:
(1) Adjudicating Medical Practitioners (AMPs) (for disablement
benefit decision-making)
(2) Examining Medical Practitioners (EMPs) (as providers of
medical reports on mobility allowance)
(3) DHSS medical officers (as managers, advice-givers and
monitors)
Certain omissions from these lists should be explained. Firstly, the
claimant; this is a conscious omission since the whole motivation for
this study was to pursue research within the organisation, and hence
it was felt important to devote what resources were available to this
end. Secondly, it is clear that the higher echelons of management in
the Regional Offices and at HQ, plus the political masters of the
whole enterprise do have an influence on initial decision-making via
the production of primary and secondary legislation, and in the broad
policy decisions taken on the administration of the Department. Their
omission is based on their remoteness from the 'front line' (and
because their decisions and actions will be mediated through the
office manager, who was included in the sample). More mundanely, the
limitation of the time available for field visits was also relevant;
it was seen as important to interview as many as the primary actors
identified in the lists above, such that the sacrifice of the more
remote actors was considered justifiable. Thirdly, members of SSATs
and MATs, and the Social Security Commissioners were omitted from the
sample. The reason for this decision again rested partly on resource
considerations, but was also because their influence on initial
decision-making was indirect, ie as a by-product of their decisions.
How tribunal members or the Commissioners reached their decisions and
how they approached adjudication was, therefore, not directly relevant
to the activities of adjudication officers, disablement benefit
clerks, AMPs, EMPs etc.
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<b) How many, and where
A frequent criticism of research which relies in part or totally on
qualitative methods is that the results obtained will be unrepresent¬
ative of the total population from which the sample was drawn. Whilst
such criticism cannot be ignored it is often based on a mistaken idea
of the nature of qualitative work. Much qualitative research is not
concerned with hypothesis testing but with ethnographic description or
with theory generation. Only if the researcher is intending to draw
general conclusions about a defined population should he or she be
concerned with rigorous sampling techniques. To take a germane
example, OCAO sample 42 of the 500 or so local offices in England,
Scotland and Wales every year since this figure gives the DHSS the
necessary confidence that the results obtained are indeed
representative of all local offices. However, as Morton-Williams
argues,
"... the rigorous sampling procedures used in quantitative
research are inappropriate to the nature and scale of
qualitative work." <1985, p. 30)
Also, whilst quantitative methods may indicate the likelihood of
phenomena being related in some way (for example, by x2 tests,
t-tests, rank correlation tests etc. ) they are not useful for
identifying the causes of such relationships (this criticism, of
course, lies at the heart of the critique of positivist sociology, ie
that social phenomena can only be explained adequately in terms of the
meaning that they hold for the actors involved). Choosing a sample
for qualitative research therefore does not concern itself primarily
with the achievement of representativeness in a statistical sense but
rather with what Morton-Williams call purposiveness. C3:> ie,
". . . rather than taking a random cross section of the
population to be studied, small numbers of people with
specific characteristics, behaviour or experience are
selected to facilitate broad comparisons between certain
groups that the researcher thinks likely to be important."
(1985, p. 30)
- 122 -
Given the nature of this project, therefore, it was considered
inappropriate to seek a statistically representative sample but, in
order to have some confidence in the results, a wide variety of
respondents should be drawn from as many different locations as
possible. The final sample was negotiated with the relevant lay and
medical officials at HQ and the Regional Offices.
(c) The local office sample
For administrative purposes the UK is divided into seven Regions by
the DHSS. Agreement was reached with HQ to visit five local offices
in each of four Regions: Scotland, London South, the North East, and
Wales and the South West. Scotland was chosen so that travelling
costs could be minimised, and London South because disablement benefit
was centralised in three outstations (a unique arrangement). The
remaining two were suggested by HQ but were entirely suitable since
they contained the types of industrial area which could be expected to
produce a wide range of disablement benefit claims. Negotiation then
moved to the Regional level, where it had been agreed with HQ, the
final decision on which offices should be visited would be taken;
local offices are frequently involved in internal Departmental checks,
visits and studies which are inevitably disruptive of some degree to
the normal running of the office, and hence each Regional Office was
concerned to spread the load of these interruptions and not over¬
burden a single office. This limitation proved no obstacle in
practice. In response to the request that the five offices chosen
should include offices of varying sizes, representing a range of
industrial demography, Regional Offices were always co-operative.
(For the London South Region the choice of the three outstations was
automatic. )
Towards the end of the third Regional visit it was decided (with the
endorsement of both academic supervisors and the Research Branch of
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the DHSS) that the fieldwork up to then had furnished as much
empirical data as (i) was needed to pursue a satisfactory empirical
analysis, and (ii) there would be time to analyse. The stage of
'theoretical saturat ion'C"1:> had been reached. It was thought that the
month or so that it would have required to collect another 35
interviews from the fourth Region (to add to the 130+ already
collected) could be better spent in analysing the large amount of data
accumulated. Accordingly the Wales and the South West Region was
dropped from the study.
Table 4.1 gives a list of the offices visited, their internal
organisation (ie the total number of staff employed and the number
engaged on contributory benefit (CB) duties), and a brief summary of
their industrial demography.
TABLE 4. 1 - The Local Offices in the Study
Local Office No. of Staff Industrial profile
(Region in (CB in
brackets)* brackets)
Cowdenbeath (S) 72 (16)
Dundee East (S) 193 (65)
Edinburgh North 132 (30)
(S)
Glasgow City (S) 153 (50)
Perth (S) 113 (38)
Dewsbury (NE) 170 (58)
Formerly coal mining; only workshops
remain. High unemployment (30%)
Mainly inner city residential. Residual
jute industry; formerly shipbuilding.
Growth of light industry (electronics).
Formerly shipbuilding and dock¬
yards, now mainly residential.
Business and commercial centre of city,
A few small clothing firms. No industry.
Mainly rural (2,500 sq. miles); agri¬
culture, tourism. Little light industry;
food processing.
West Yorkshire conurbation. Chemical
works only heavy industry. Former
woollen industry.
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Doncaster West 183 (61)
(NE)
Rural areas to North and East. Heavy
industry (coal, steel, railways).
Rotherhara South 200 (66)
(NE)
Coal and steel industries (though much
reduced). Large centres of population
surrounded by rural areas.
Wallsend (NE) 94 (26) Major employers are Tyne shipyards. All
other heavy industry has disappeared.
Small trading estate of light industry.
Otherwise residential.
York (NE) 194 (64) Mixed urban/rural. Large employers:
chocolate manufacturers, British Rail,
Ministry of Defence and large modern coal
mine at Selby.
Aldershot (LS) 77 (35)* Mainly rural. Shipyards in Southampton;
naval dockyards at Portsmouth. Wide¬
spread light industry. SW London.
Broadstairs (LS) 75 (32) + Rural/small town mix. Kent coalfield;
farming; little light industry. SE London
Hastings (LS) 196 (21)* Rural/small town mix. Tourism;
light industry.
some
* S = Scotland; NE = North East; LS = London South
t London South Offices have only CB staff, the figure in brackets
refers, therefore, to the disablement benefit staff.
t Hastings also acts as an integrated local office (ie housing
supplementary benefit and pensions staff)
From the thirteen local offices visited, seventy staff were
interviewed. Table 4.2 gives a breakdown of these.




Dis. Ben. Clerks 14
TOTAL 70
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<d) The Regional and Central Offices Sample
The Regional offices in Edinburgh, Leeds and Sutton were visited.
Staff interviewed were as follows:




In the Mobility Allowance Unit at NFCO a total of 21 staff were
interviewed from all sections dealing with the full range of
administrative duties. Also interviewed were the Controller and
Deputy Controller of NFCO who are managerially responsible for the
5000+ staff who administer mobility allowance, attendance allowance,
family income supplement, war pensions etc. Table 4.4 gives a
breakdown of these (the function of each section is described in
chapter 6).
TABLE 4.4 - Interview respondents from the Mobility Allowance Unit
Administration 3




Homes and Motability 2
PAO Section 1
Medical Branch, M7 1
Controller/Deputy Controller 2
TOTAL 21
At the Nottingham Training Centre a different approach was adopted.
As well as interviews with the Head of the training section and two of
the training officers it was possible to sit in on one of the Initial
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Adjudication Courses (for new adjudication officers) for a week,
observing and talking to the participants.
The visit to the OCAO comprised interviews with the Chief Adjudication
Officer and eight of his staff engaged in advice and monitoring
functions for both mobility allowance and industrial disablement
benefit. The Principal Medical Officer responsible for medical advice
on the Industrial Injuries scheme (including compilation of the
Industrial Injuries Handbook for AMPs) was also interviewed.
(e) The Medical Sample
Medical Practitioners acting as AMPs (for disablement benefit) or EMPs
(for Mobility Allowance) are employed as independent contractors by
the DHSS on a sessional basis; in contrast to their medical colleagues
in the Regional and Central offices, they are not DHSS civil servants.
Their co-operation with this study, therefore, was on an individual,
voluntary basis. The Senior Medical Officers (SMOs) in the Regional
Offices assisted in choosing and approaching suitable medical
' practitioners to interview. It was decided to interview five doctors
in each Region (admittedly a somewhat arbitrary figure but based on
considerations of time and financial resources). Letters were sent to
the selected doctors explaining the aims of the study and seeking
their co-operation. All sixteen who were approached agreed to be
interviewed (the London South SMO sent six names, rather than the five
requested). The five from Scotland came from Edinburgh and Glasgow,
the North Eastern five from Leeds, and the London South contingent
from Reading and Balham.
- 127 -
(f) The Sample - A Summary
Table 4.5 gives a summary of the officials interviewed in the course
of this study. They are divided between lay and medical staff and
according to their relation to the task of adjudicating on claims.
TABLE 4. 5 - The Complete Sample
Lay Medical TOTAL
Purely managerial staff 18 18
Staff directly involved in the
adjudication of claims 38 16 54
Staff with combined managerial and
indirect adjudicatory functions*"5 16 4 20
Staff indirectly involved with
the adjudication of claims**55 26 4 30
Clerical staff 14 14
TOTALS 112 24 136
(a) includes HEO/AOs and Regional Office medical staff
(b) includes staff engaged on advisory and monitoring duties
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2 - Details of Data Collection
(a) Interviews
In constructing the interview schedules for the various groups of
staff identified as relevant for this study two related principles
were adhered to throughout. Firstly, that the questions should
address the issues raised by the discussion of administrative justice,
and in particular, should provide qualitative data on how the demands
of administrative justice (accuracy and fairness) were affected by <i)
the structuring of the DHSS organisation, and (ii) the personal
influences of the individual actors in the decision process. And
secondly, that this exploration of the operation of the law in
practice, should be pursued by collecting the respondents' own
accounts of their roles in the determination of a claim for benefit,
With these two principles in mind a semi-structured interview
technique seemed the most appropriate, ie using a schedule which asked
specific, yet open-ended questions allowing the respondent the time
and freedom to develop his or her own answers, and the interviewer the
opportunity to pursue interesting strands or clarify vague or
contradictory responses. A series of draft schedules was constructed
and piloted in three local offices in Scotland in January 1986 prior
to the start of the main part of the fieldwork in the February.
The schedules were constructed around a core number of questions which
were of necessity specifically tailored to reflect the respondent's
role in the decision-making process (hence, for example, the schedule
for disablement benefit clerks bears little resemblance to that used
for the Chief Adjudication Officer or for AMPs). A full set of
schedules is attached as an appendix but a brief summary of them may
be useful. Common to all interviews were the sections on biographical
details, ie age, sex, years of service in DHSS, in present post,
career history; and the final question giving the respondent carte
blanche to add any comments on any aspect of their work.
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Where appropriate questions were asked on the following topics:
(i) the central functions and tasks of the respondent's post
(ii) the nature of adjudication
(iii) the use and effectiveness of advice channels
(iv) the use and effectiveness of the monitoring arrangements
(v) the influence of the appeals system
(vi) the experience and effectiveness of training
(vii) the involvement of the claimant in decision-making
(viii) accountability to the claimant
<ix) specific problems arising from industrial disablement
benefit/mobility allowance decision-making
(x) the notion and practice of centralised decision-making
Staff in managerial posts were questioned about the staffing
arrangements of their part of the organisation and local office
managers provided background information on the geographical and
industrial areas served by their offices.
(b) Casepapers
As explained earlier the purpose behind an examination of casepapers
was to explore further issues raised in interviews and to be able to
cite later some actual examples of how decision-making was carried
out. With this in mind cases were not chosen randomly, instead the
adjudication officer was asked to select recent cases (so that recall
of the case would be fresh), one from each of the following
categories, which would provide illustrations of how they approached
the making of a decision on a claim:
- a straightforward industrial accident case
- a straightforward prescribed disease case
- a problematic industrial accident case
- a problematic prescribed disease case
- a special hardship allowance case
- an appealed case
These categories were not, of course, mutually exclusive. Quite often
an accident case involved a later claim for special hardship allowance
(possibly followed by an appeal). In some offices it was not possible
in the time to examine cases from all six categories (particularly
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where there was a large number of adjudication officers to interview),
whilst in some of the smaller offices enthusiastic adjudication
officers produced, and discussed, up to eleven cases. In total 71
cases were examined allowing discussion on decision-making on 38
industrial accidents <27 straightforward/11 problematic), 27
prescribed diseases (11/16), 30 SHA cases (6/24), and 18 appealed
cases.
From these cases the following information was extracted (either from
the papers themselves or the adjudication officer, but usually both):
- the factual details of the case (the 'story');
- the nature of the evidence involved, problems arising, and the
adjudication officer's response;
- how the evidence was considered in relation to the relevant parts
of the legislation, problems arising, and adjudication officer's
response;
- the use of advice (from the I0G, HEO, 0CA0, or elsewhere);
- the time taken to deal with the case;
- the level of explanation given to the claimant.
The object of examining casepapers was modest - to elicit illustrative
examples of decision-making in practice - but was nonetheless
extremely useful. Several cases will be quoted in the following two
chapters.
3 - Postscript: A note on the conduct of field visits
Following the selection of the Regions to be included in the study,
DHSS HQ wrote to Regional Controllers enclosing a brief outline to the
project. This was in turn sent to the Managers of the selected local
offices in each Region. I subsequently wrote to each Manager
explaining in more detail what I would require from the local office
staff during my visit, and offering to meet (either on arrival or
before if necessary) any staff representatives or trade union
officials. In the event this offer was only taken up in one of the
thirteen offices visited (although in one other office two trade union
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representatives attended the initial meeting with the staff (see
below)).
In early discussions with HQ it was agreed that, since the relevant
personnel in each office would normally only total four (Manager, HEO,
adjudication officer, disablement benefit clerk), two days should be
sufficient to gather the material required from interviews and
casepapers. The plan of the two days followed a familiar pattern. On
arrival, after an initial meeting with the Manager, I held (at my
request) a meeting of all those staff involved, however remotely, in
the determination of disablement benefit claims. In a few of the
smaller offices this was a small gathering (ie the minimum four
identified earlier) whilst in the larger offices and in the benefit
offices of the London South Region double figures were more the norm.
At this meeting I took the opportunity of explaining who I was, where
I came from, how the project originated, its aims, the programme of
field visits, and the nature of the final product. I then opened
myself to questions on any aspect of the work. After one or two such
meetings it became clear that my status vis-a-vis the DHSS was an
important issue. This arose partly from a natural distrust on the
part of many staff of any project carried out with the sanction of HQ
which they construed as yet another attempt to reduce the size of the
Civil Service. But also there was a current policy idea circulating
around the Department concerning the possible establishment of
1 Regional Disablement Centres' (RDCs) designed to assume the decision¬
making responsibilities for all benefits for the disabled (including
therefore industrial disablement benefit). Hence it was assumed (not
unnaturally perhaps) that I was in some way linked to this and had
been commissioned by the Department. My explanation that I was
completely independent of the Department and in no way connected with
the RDC initiative seemed to be accepted, but I took pains thereafter
to explain my position fully and clearly in the introductory meeting
in each local office in order to pre-empt any anxiety or suspicion,
and to emphasise the confidentiality with which all their answers
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would be treated. The final part of the meeting was spent arranging a
timetable for the interviews and briefing the adjudication officer on
the casepaper study which was always held at the end of the two days
in order to allow the adjudication officer sufficient time to select
suitable cases.
For the most part interviews were conducted using a tape recorder for
later transcription or, if the respondent requested, notes were taken
instead and written up soon afterwards. Interviews typically lasted
for one hour.
In essence the visits to Regional Offices, Medical Boarding Centres,
NFCO, OCAO, and the Nottingham Training Centre followed the same basic
pattern of initial meeting (where appropriate) followed by individual
interviews.
Part IV - ANALYSIS: MAKING SENSE OF THE DATA
"In many ways this is the truly creative part of the work -
it entails brooding and reflecting upon mounds of data for
long periods of time until it 'makes sense' and 'feels
right', and key ideas and themes flow from it. It also is
the hardest process to describe..."
(Plummer, 1983, p, 99)
Preparing the data for analysis was relatively straightforward. The
interview tapes and notes were transcribed onto a microcomputer disc
followed by . a standard 'scissors and paste' endeavour (much
facilitated by the the data handling powers of the computer). In this
way all the responses to a single question were collected together
relatively simply.
From the accumulated data certain factual information about the
organisational arrangements for decision-making could be extracted
giving a picture of the response of the DHSS as a state agency to its
legal duty to administer social security benefits. Such background
material was essential for placing the activities and behaviour of the
individuals involved in the decision-making process in an
institutional and organisational context.
The analysis of how decisions are made was approached by posing a
series of questions prompted by the analysis of administrative justice
and of the decision-making process, discussed in chapter 2. For
example, what does accuracy mean in the context of a mobility
allowance decision? what are the relative weights of the two phases of
decision-making process (evidence collection and application of the
decision criteria)? which actors in the process have the greatest
influence on the final outcome of a claim? etc. In the attempt to
provide answers to these questions all three main sources of data
(interviews, casepapers and documents) were used.
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The data were primarily qualitative, the use of open-ended questions
sacrificing the opportunity to perform statistical analyses of
interviewee responses. This, as Hedges argues, should not be
considered a weakness of qualitative research:
"Analysis of qualitative data is essentially non-numerical.
There may be occasions where the researcher should actually
tot up the numbers of people who said different things for
his own illumination, but it will rarely be proper to quote
such numbers in the report, and certainly not in such a way
as to make them seem like mathematically reliable
statistics." (1985, p. 88)
Morton-Williams also argues that any criticism that qualitative
research is devalued by the lack of numerical analysis, is misplaced,
and puts the case strongly for the use of interviewees' own words in
any analysis.
"The researcher will be mainly concerned to identify and
describe the range of behaviour and opinions rather than to
indicate whether people feel strongly or how many hold each
view. In all cases the description of beliefs, attitudes
and motivations should be supported by evidence in the form
of verbatim quotations from the interviews or discussions."
(1985, p.41)
The presentation of the results of the empirical study of industrial
disablement benefit and mobility allowance in chapters 5 and 6 makes
extensive use of verbatim quotations. As Hedges points out,
"... (quotations) often convey the tone and quality of
people's thoughts better than the researcher's own
descriptions." (1985, p. 90)
However, this technique was not chosen merely to enliven the text; the
quotations are valuable in "defining, supporting, or elaborating the
researcher's interpretation of events" (Walker 1985, p. 193). They
also serve, as Morton-Williams argues, the useful function of,
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"... an essential corrective to false impressions that may
be formed during the reading of the transcripts." (1985,
p. 41)
In selecting the quotations to be used in the text, I have tried to
avoid the over-exposure of the articulate or garrulous members of the
interview sample, but have drawn widely from the 136 transcripts. In
order to maintain the anonymity of the individual respondents,
quotations are only identified by the appropriate job title and a
number signifying either the appropriate local office (#1 - #13) or
Region (#1 - #3).
Whilst numerical analysis of qualitative research interview data is
mostly inappropriate this does not imply that it should be completely
eschewed. In the spirit of 'triangulation' or 'mixed strategies',
numerical data were gathered from either published sources or internal
documents where it was thought that this would enhance the overall
analysis. The numerical data presented in the following chapters is
mainly descriptive; where statistical testing has been possible and
seen as appropriate this has been carried out using the data handling
capabilities of the AMSTAT 2 computer software package.
Part V - CONCLUSION
This chapter has described and accounted for the particular blend of
data collection and analysis techniques adopted for a study which has
been deliberately socio-legal in nature. In addition to the
inevitable constraints of time and money the project has had to
confront and respond to a series of limitations imposed on access to
DHSS staff and documents. Whilst these have been frustrating and
time-consuming they have not meant that the overall aims of the
research (ie to answer the question of how decisions on social
security claims are made, and to develop the concept of administrative
justice as a normative analytical tool) have had to be abandoned. On
the contrary they have felicitously opened up the possibility of
studying decision-making in a range of organisational settings, and
also the chance of applying the analytical framework to decision¬
making by medical practitioners.
The results of the endeavour are presented in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5 - INDUSTRIAL DISABLEMENT BENEFIT
Part I - BACKGROUND
1 - The Evolution of the Industrial Injuries Scheme
The social security system in Britain should not be considered a
static entity; it has grown and contracted (though mostly grown) in
response to a complex matrix of economic, social and political press¬
ures such that in the late 1980s over thirty benefits exist each with
its rationale, specific rules, and administrative structure adapted to
meet particular requirements and expediencies. It is only in the last
ten years or so that any serious effort has been made to rationalise
the administration of social security in the sense of identifying, and
treating similarly, the common elements of the various benefits.
Hence, the introduction of the unified system of independent adjud¬
ication described in chapter 3 and on a smaller scale, for example,
the adoption of a common approach to overpayments of benefit. *13 Such
developments though are recent, making a blanket analysis of the
social security system a problematic exercise as the comparison
between industrial disablement benefit and mobility allowance in this
and the next chapter will illustrate.
Whilst mobility allowance is in its comparative infancy, industrial
disablement benefit is one of the more venerable benefits. <2> Its
direct antecedent is the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 which
introduced for the first time the recognisable elements of an
Industrial Injuries scheme, still familiar after 90 years. However,
the Workmen's Compensation Act itself has its own history which,
indirectly, is still relevant today. The Act gave a limited number of
manual workers employed in dangerous occupations rights to lump sum
compensatory payments from their employers if they suffered injury
from an accident arising, in the words of the Act, "out of and in the
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course of employment". Before 1897 the injured worker had to rely on
the common law of negligence for any kind of remedy, which involved
the costly and difficult exercise of proving that the employer was to
blame for the accident. The Workmen's Compensation Act was an import¬
ant advance, therefore, in dispensing with this inequitable burden on
the accident victim. Nevertheless, the employer was still responsible
for paying compensation and hence an adversarial mode of settlement
was maintained as the employers, or more usually their insurance
companies with whom they insured themselves against such payments,
sought to minimise the sums they paid out in compensation.
Over the next forty years, until the outbreak of the Second World War,
the principles of the 1897 Act were extended, principally in the
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 which brought within the scope of
the scheme all manual workers and certain non-manual workers, and made
compensation payable to victims of certain prescribed diseases and
injuries. But in essence the scheme retained its fundamental basis.
During this time though there were growing criticisms concerning the
operation of the scheme, in particular, of the sometimes unscrupulous
practices of insurance companies in putting pressure on injured
workers to accept low settlements. A Royal Commission was established
in 1938 to review the scheme but the outbreak of the war prevented it
from completing its work. However, Sir William Beveridge assumed the
task in his comprehensive review of social insurance and produced
recommendations for the reform of the Industrial Injuries scheme in
his Report. c3:1 The whole basis of compensation for industrial
injuries was considered to be inappropriate and undesirable, and he
recommended that the insurance companies and the courts should be
removed from the determination and administration of payments.
Instead the state should operate a contributions-based scheme
comprising a short-term benefit ('disability benefit' to run for 13
weeks), a longei—term benefit for those still incapacitated after 13
weeks (the 'industrial pension' based on the employee's previous
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earnings), and a benefit payable to the widow and other dependants in
the case of death (called the 'industrial grant').
Beveridge's overall thrust was accepted by the post-war Labour
Government whose philosophy is admirably caught in a quotation from
the then Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison:
"I do not want the workman's position to be that he should
have to claim from his employer or the employer's insurance
company and that he should have to have an argument with
them. I want him to have certain social rights conferred
upon him because of his injury. I want him to go to a
public office to state his claim, and I want the officer at
that office not to regard the workman as someone with whom
he must contend and whom he must resist. I want the
officer's attitude to be that he has been called upon to
administer the law and regulations fairly. I want him,
therefore, to give the workman all the help he can and also
freely to meet the arguments of the trade union officer and
help him in any way that may be desirable. " (quoted in
Brown, 1982, p.27)
However, on the detail of a reformed scheme there was considerable
departure from Beveridge. In the subsequent 1944 White Paper a more
complex series of benefits was proposed: a short-term 'industrial
injuries allowance' which was similar to the Beveridge notion, plus a
long-term 'industrial pension' (based not on earnings but an assess¬
ment of the disability suffered by the worker'43) and an 'industrial
death benefit' (along the lines of the 'industrial grant') formed the
core of the scheme. These could be supplemented by additional
benefits aimed at particular groups of claimants; the hospital
treatment allowance could be claimed by workers hospitalised by their
industrial injury, an unemployability supplement was available for
those rendered unemployable by injury, and a constant attendance
allowance for those assessed at 100% disablement and who needed
frequent attention from another person.
The House of Commons debate which followed centred around benefit
levels and the intention to abandon any notion of an earnings-related
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element to the scheme. As a result the National Insurance (Industrial
Injuries) Act 1946 contained changes from the White Paper: the gap
between benefit rates for industrial and non-industrial caused illness
and disability was increased, the short-term benefit (now to be called
industrial injury benefit) was increased and made payable for 26
instead of 13 weeks, and the appeal system was widened. <s:> However,
an earnings-related addition, whilst coming into effect at the same
time as the other provisions, was not added until the last minute;
this was the 'special hardship allowance' for those whose earning
capacity had been impaired by their injury. <G5
The 1946 Act came into operation in 1948 at the same time as the
National Insurance Act 1946 and the National Health Act 1946 which
established the National Health Service. For the next thirty to
thirty-five years the 1946 scheme remained largely unchanged (although
another additional benefit, the 'exceptionally severe disablement
allowance' , was introduced in 1965 intended to assist those, as the
name suggests, with particularly severe disabilities'75). However,
the legal foundation of the scheme was assumed by the consolidating
Social Security Act 1975. The scheme received a qualified seal of
approval from the 1978 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Personal Injury (the Pearson Commission) which,
whilst recommending extensions to existing provisions (for example, by
the addition of a number of new prescribed diseases), endorsed the
scheme as having "stood the test of time". Criticisms in the 1980s
have centred around the failure of the scheme to compensate adequately
those seriously disabled compared with those with only minor
conditions; <3> the high cost of administering the scheme which does
not now offer (due to relative changes in benefit rates) much greater
payments than other sickness schemes; <3;> and the inequity of
discriminating against equally disabled people whose condition is
derived from other, non-work related causes. '105
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Whilst the empirical part of this study was being undertaken in the
Spring and Summer of 1986, the only significant result of these
criticisms had been the abolition of the short-term injury benefit in
1982, c 11 3 The changes to the scheme introduced by the 1986 Social
Security Act were then only the subject of rumour and speculation. In
mid-1986 therefore the scheme comprised industrial death benefit and
the long-term industrial disablement benefit (payable after 90 days
from the date of the accident or the onset of the prescribed disease)
plus its additions, special hardship allowance, unemployability
supplement, constant attendance allowance, hospital treatment
allowance and exceptionally severe disablement allowance.
2 - The Legislation
This chapter is primarily concerned with the administration of
industrial disablement benefit itself rather than its additions or
industrial death benefit. However, in the course of collecting the
empirical data the difficulties inherent in making special hardship
allowance (SHA) decisions were repeatedly mentioned by adjudication
officers, HEOs, Regional Office staff and OCAO staff. The following
analysis, therefore, also considers SHA decision-making. In
consequence this section deals only with the relevant parts of the
legislation before the 1986 Social Security Act dealing with disable¬
ment benefit and SHA; these are contained mainly in the Social
Security Act 1975. (Unless otherwise specified, references to
legislation in this section will refer to the 1975 Act.)
Entitlement to the range of industrial injuries benefits is primarily
based on satisfying one of two qualifying conditions, the first
relating to accidents, the second to prescribed diseases and injuries.
Section 50(1) of the 1975 Act lays down the basic test to be satisfied
for industrial accidents:
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"... where an employed earner suffers personal injury
caused after 4th July 1948 by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment, being employed
earner's employment, there shall be payable to... him
the industrial injuries benefits specified..."
This section still retains some of the wording of the 1897 Workmen's
Compensation Act, ie "out of and in the course of employment...",
although it was acknowledged to be troublesome as far back as 1920
when the Holman Gregory Reportc12> noted that "... no other form of
words has ever given rise to such a body of litigation" (quoted in
Brown, 1982, p.76). Section 50(1) contains a number of conditions
which must be satisfied; there must be, firstly, personal injury:
secondly, there must have been an accident which caused the injury,
and thirdly, the accident must have arisen out of and in course of
employment, (How these questions are determined will be considered
in Parts II and III of this chapter). It is the difficulty in the
exact interpretation of the law here that has accounted for a wealth
of case law since 1948 and has led to the series of provisions in the
1975 Act designed to deal with some of the more common problems.
Section 51 elaborates the meaning of 'employed earner's employment';
s.52 specifies the eligibility of an accident victim who was acting in
breach of regulations; s. 53 seeks to explain how people involved in
accidents while travelling should be treated; s.54 deals with
accidents occurring whilst an employee is responding to a real or
supposed emergency; and s. 55 deals with accidents arising from
skylarking.
The alternative route to eligibility for the range of industrial
injuries benefits is for a worker to establish that he is suffering
from a prescribed disease or injury caused by a prescribed occupation.
Section 76(1) of the 1975 Act states the conditions to be satisfied:
"... there should be payable, in respect of a person who has
been in employed earner's employment ... such benefits ...
in respect of any prescribed disease or personal injury ...
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being a disease or injury due to the nature of that
employment and developed after 4th July 1948,"
As with accident cases there are three separate tests to be satisfied
by a claimant. Firstly, he or she must be suffering from a prescribed
disease, secondly, that prescribed disease must be prescribed in
relation to his or her employment, and thirdly, the disease must have
been caused by his or her employment. In most cases if the first two
conditions are satisfied then there is a presumption that the third is
also satisfied. However, there are exceptions to this general rule.
For example, for the presumption to apply in the case of occupational
deafness then the claimant must prove that he or she has worked in the
prescribed occupation at some stage during the five years preceding a
claim and that on aggregate that he or she has worked for at least ten
years in that occupation. *13>
The Secretary of State has the responsibility for determining which
diseases and injuries should be prescribed and in relation to which
occupation. Section 76(2) spells out his powers:
"A disease or injury may be be prescribed in relation to any
employed earners employment if the Secretary of State is
satisfied that -
a) it ought to be treated, having regard to its causes and
incidence and any other relevant considerations, as a risk
of their occupations and not as a risk common to all
persons; and
b) it is such that, in the absence of special circum¬
stances, the attribution of particular cases to the nature
of the employment can be established or presumed with
reasonable certainty."
The list of prescribed diseases has been amended as new occupations
have been established, as industrial processes have changed or
knowledge of the aetiology of diseases has improved; for example,
occupational deafness was added in 1973, occupational asthma in 1982,
and vibration white finger in 1985. In 1985 the various regulations
were consolidated in the Social Security (Industrial Injuries)
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(Prescribed Diseases) Regulations (SI 1985/967) and the various
diseases and injuries reclassified into four separate groups covering
conditions due to physical agents (group A), conditions due to bio¬
logical agents (group B), conditions due to chemical agents (group C)
and miscellaneous conditions (group D). Thus, for example, PD A10 is
occupational deafness, PD B8 viral hepatitis, PD C18 poisoning by
cadmium, and PD D1 pneumoconiosis.
To be entitled to a disablement gratuity or pension (the two forms of
disablement benefit) a claimant must show that:
"... he suffers as the result of the relevant accident from
loss of physical or mental faculty such that the assessed
extent of the resulting disablement amounts to not less than
17,." (section 57(1))
For an assessment of between 1% and 19% inclusive, a disablement
gratuity (ie a lump sum) is payable, for assessments of 20% and above
a weekly disablement pension is paid (s.57(5) and (6)). The act of
assessing the extent of disablement is therefore a vital stage and a
schedule to the 1975 Act is devoted to how this should be carried out:
"... the extent of disablement shall be assessed, by
reference to the disabilities incurred by the claimant as a
result of the relevant loss of faculty..." (Schedule 8,
para. 1)
The disabilities to be taken into account should be all those that
have arisen from an accident which the claimant has suffered "as
compared with a person of the same age and sex whose physical and
mental condition is normal" (para 1(a)). No other factors (such as
economic or social circumstances) are to be considered (para 1(c)).
Paragraph 4 of Schedule 8 allows the assessment to be made for a
limited period (a 'provisional' award), for a specified period after
which the award will cease, or for life (both of which are called
'final' awards). Paragraph 5 notes that awards over 20% can only be
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made in multiples of 10 such that, if an assessment is made that is
not a multiple of 10, then it will be rounded up or down accordingly.
The actual level of assessment is either dictated by or guided by
Schedule 2 to the Social Security (General Benefit) Regulations 1982
(SI 1982/1408). For some fifty-five disablements there is a
prescribed percentage assessment; for example, the loss of a thumb is
rated at 30%, loss of index finger at 14%, loss of two phalanges of
the index finger at 11%. For some the description is extremely
precise, for example, amputation below the knee with stump of between
9 and 13 centimetres is assessed at 50% disablement, whilst for other
conditions the medical authorities must make their assessment by
comparing the relevant disablement with the scheduled assessments and
coming to a reasonable figure.
The most important of the additions to disablement benefit is the
special hardship allowance (SHA). It is designed to assist those
whose earnings have been impaired by their disablement. Section 60(1)
of the 1975 Act sets out the details:
"The weekly rate of a disablement pension shall ... be
increased . . . if, as the result of the relevant loss of
faculty the beneficiary -
(a) is incapable, and likely to remain permanently
incapable, of following his regular occupation; and
(b) is incapable of following employment of an equivalent
standard which is suitable in his case, or if as the result
of the relevant loss of faculty the beneficiary is, and has
at all times since the end of the period of ninety days . . .
incapable of following that occupation or any such
employment. "
Section 60(2) seeks to clarify some of the terms in s.60(1):
"(a) the reference to a person's regular occupation is to be
taken as not including any subsidiary occupation of his;
(b) the reference to employment of an equivalent standard
is to be taken as not including employment other than
employed earner's employment;
and in assessing the standard of remuneration in any
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employment, including a person's regular occupation, regard
is to be had to his reasonable prospects of advancement. "
However, this subsection needs clarification of its own in sub¬
section (3):
"For the purposes of this section, a person's regular
occupation is to be treated as extending to and including
employment in the capacities to which the persons in that
occupation (or a class or description of them to which he
belonged at the time of the relevant accident) are in the
normal course advanced, and to which, if he had continued to
follow that occupation without having suffered the relevant
loss of faculty, he would have had at least the normal
prospects of advancement; and so long as he is, as a result
of the relevant loss of faculty, deprived in whole or in
part of those prospects, he is to be treated as incapable of
following that occupation,"
The amount of SHA, up to a prescribed maximum, is determined in
accordance with s. 60(6):
"... the amount ... shall be determined by reference to the
beneficiary's probable standard of remuneration during the
period for which it is granted in the employed earner's
employments, if any, which are suitable in his case and
which he is capable of following as compared with that in
his regular occupation. . . "
The plethora of qualitative and hypothetical judgements that are
required to be made by s. 60 are the cause of innumerable problems for
the independent statutory authorities in their determination of
entitlement and of the amount of benefit payable. Parts II and III of
this chapter will explore these in detail.
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3 - Some Illustrative Statistics
The major source of published statistics on the Industrial Injuries
scheme is the annual 'Social Security Statistics' produced by the
DHSS, which first appeared in 1972, It is a peculiarly unhelpful
document in many respects and in particular leaves many gaps, or only
presents a partial picture, in its treatment of industrial
injuries. c3 Nevertheless, this section will draw upon these tables
to give an indication, as far as is possible, of the scope and
coverage of disablement benefit and special hardship allowance.
TABLE 5.1 - Number of Industrial Disablement Benefit assessments made
per year (in thousands)
Gratuities < ml Pensions<b)
accidents P.D.s accidents P. D. s
1966 247 9 29 2
1971 203 9 21 2
1976 168 6 16 3
1978 170 6 15 2
1979 163 6 14 2
1980 151 5 12 3
1981 136 5 10 2
1982 130 4 9 1
1983 118 4 10 2
1984 117 4 10 4
1985 117 5 8 2
Sources: Social Security Statistics, 1986 and 1987, Table 21. 10
(a) lump s urn gratuities are made for assessments of between 1% and 19%
(b) weekly pensions are payable f or assessments of 20% and over
The figures in Table 5. 1 show how the incidence of industrial
accidents and prescribed diseases has declined over the last twenty
years. This fall can probably be attributed to a combination of
causes, such as the decline in traditional heavy industries, c 153 the
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use of safer working practices, and the introduction of wider safety
legislation (in particular the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974).
Gratuities are, by definition, one-off payments, but pensions are
payable on a weekly and continuing basis. Table 5.2 shows the number
of recipients of a disability pension and shows a gradual trend
downwards.
TABLE 5. 2 - Number of Disability Pensions current at 30th September
(in thousands)
Sources: Social Security Statistics 1986 and 1987, Table 21.30
The importance of the special hardship allowance noted in the previous
section is shown by the large number in receipt of this benefit in
Table 5. 3, which also demonstrates how the level of disablement may be






















TABLE 5. 3 - SHA current at 30th September (in thousands)
disablement of disablement of total^5
1% - 19% 20% or more
1966 n/a n/a 137
1971 78 64 144
1976 85 58 145
1978 89 58 149
1979 90 57 148
1980 90 56 147
1981 90 55 146
1982 91 53 144
1983 93 52 145
1984 94 52 145
1985 96 50 147
Sources: Social Security Statistics 1971-1987, Table 21,42
(a) rounding of figures has resulted in the total not necessarily
matching the figures in the other two columns
Whilst the published figures illustrate the number of beneficiaries of
disablement benefit and SHA they do not properly show how the burden
of work that they generate is distributed throughout the country. In
practice there are extremely large differences in the number of
industrial injury cases prcessed by individual local offices. This is
partly due to the size of the offices and their catchment areas
(particularly the relevant industrial geography), and partly to
organisational influences (such as the partial centralisation of
disablement benefit adjudication in the London South region). Table
5.4 shows the differential workloads in the thirteen offices visited
in this study.
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TABLE 5. 4 - Illustrative Local Office workloads for the six months,
August 1985 to January 1986
Region Office Accidentc 313 Dis. Ben. SHA Total
decisions decisions decisions
Scot land Cowdenbeath 103 147 311 561
Dundee (E) 72 74 81 227
Perth 62 44 73 179
Edinburgh (N) 44 60 51 155
Glasgow (City) 20 23 14 57
North East Doncaster (W) 349 469 803 1621
Rotherham (S) 326 463 505 1294
York 245 225 114 584
Dewsbury 177 162 120 459
Wallsend 97 159 100 356
London (S) Broadst airs 287 1244 1760 3291
Hastings 383 574 1215 2172
Aldershot 245 1612 2318 3930
Source: Specially prepared tables supplied by each office (1986)
(a) accident decisions are made separately from disablement benefit
decisions
Table 5.4 clearly shows how SHA decision-making generates far more
work than is perhaps suggested by the published statistics. This is
primarily due to the frequent reassessments of earnings and hypo¬
thetical earnings that need to be made on SHA awards which are
typically for one or two years only (although occasionally they are
made for periods as long as six years). The table also shows that
some offices handle large numbers of claims, whilst for others it is
only be a minor part of their work. Clearly the three Benefit Offices
in London South, which deal only with disablement benefit and sickness
benefit, have the greatest throughput, but others such as the
Doncaster and Rotherham offices, situated as they are in the mining
and industrial areas of South Yorkshire, also handle large numbers.
These compare starkly with, for example, the Glasgow (City) office
whose catchment area comprises an inner city area of residential
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dwellings and business premises. One might expect that the offices
handling the greatest number of cases would have a different
experience of the difficulties involved with disablement benefit work
than, say, Glasgow (City) and the other smaller offices; whether this
is the case will be explored further in Part II of this chapter.
4 - The Distribution of decision-making within the DHSS
The adjudication on claims for disablement benefit and special
hardship allowance (and the other additions) is, in most Regions, the
responsibility of the local office. Within each, the size of the
disablement benefit section will vary according to the workload
generated by the relevant catchment area. Thus, small offices such as
Cowdenbeath and Wallsend, which cover industrial areas, have a
comparatively large disablement benefit section. In contrast, a large
office may have little disablement benefit work; for example, the
mostly inner-city residential and business areas covered by the
Glasgow (City) office produce few disablement benefit claims.
The one exception to this pattern is the London South Region where
adjudication on disablement benefit (and sickness benefit) has been
concentrated since 1984 in three 'Benefit Offices' (BOs) in Aldershot,
Broadstairs, and Hastings. The 'outstations', as they are called,
were created in the 1970s to administer sickness benefit for the
Region to relieve pressure on DHSS offices in London where recruitment
was proving difficult. When statutory sick pay (SSP) was introduced,
however, the workload of the outstations dropped dramatically. The
problem of what to do with the now superfluous staff was solved not by
redeploying or sacking them but by adding disablement benefit to their
responsibilities. Disablement benefit was chosen because within the
largely non-industrial South East of England it was a small-scale
benefit spread thinly among the local offices, and hence prone to a
lower standard of administration than other benefits.
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Part II - THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DISABLEMENT BENEFIT
DECISION-MAKING
1 - The Formal Arrangements
Industrial disablement benefit is one of the well-established National
Insurance benefits whose decision-making arrangements have been
considered to have stood the test of time, so much so that they were
used as a model for the administration of the reformed Supplementary
Benefits scheme in 1980. As with all social security benefits which
incorporate some notion of disability in their eligibility criteria,
there are separate medical and lay questions to be addressed. Partly
for administrative reasons, decision-making is organised so that as
many of the lay questions are considered initially in order that the
expense of convening a medical board or of obtaining a medical report
is not incurred on those cases which will be rejected for failing to
meet one of the lay requirements.
The two alternative routes to disablement benefit, ie by suffering an
industrial accident or by contracting a prescribed disease,
necessitate slightly different decision-making arrangements. The
first stage in accident cases is to establish whether or not an
industrial accident within the meaning of the legislation has irr'taken
place; only if it has can the claimant proceed with a claim for
disablement benefit. Making an 'accident decision' is therefore a
discrete process within the local office since such decisions can be
made in isolation from any other social security considerations.
Indeed a claimant has an entitlement under s. 107(2) of the 1975 Act to
have the accident question determined separately. There are two main
instances where this is usually invoked. Firstly, it will have been
noted from the section on the legislation that a claimant is not bound
by any time limits on making a claim for disablement benefit; as long
as he can prove personal injury from an accident that happened after
4th July 1948 then he has a valid claim. The effect of this in
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practice is that many claimants wish to establish as soon after they
have had an accident at work that it can be classified as industrial,
not perhaps because they wish to claim any social security benefit
immediately but rather as a safeguard for the future in case they
develop any disabling condition in later years which may incapacitate
them or affect their earnings potential. For this reason many Trades
Unions in certain industries encourage workers to register even what
may seem at the time the most trivial of incidents. The second reason
for seeking to register an industrial accident is that s.50(A) of the
1975 Act allows claimants with inadequate National Insurance
contribution records to claim sickness benefit to be eligible for the
benefit nonetheless if the relevant period away from work was due to
an industrial accident.
If it is established that an industrial accident has occurred then the
claimant can proceed with a claim for disablement benefit. The next
set of criteria which must be satisfied is medical in nature and
defined in s. 108(1) of the 1975 Act as comprising 'disablement
questions'; it reads:
"(1) In relation to industrial injuries benefit and severe
disablement allowance the ' disablement questions' are the
questions -
(a) in relation to industrial injuries benefit whether the
relevant accident has resulted in a loss of faculty;
(b) in relation to both benefits at what degree the extent
of disablement resulting from a loss of faculty is to
be assessed, and what period is to be taken into
account by the assessment."
The responsibility for deciding the disablement questions lies with
the adjudicating medical authorities (s. 108(2)), defined as either a
single doctor acting in the capacity of an adjudicating medical
practitioner (AMP), or two such doctors acting as a medical board, or
a medical appeal tribunal (MAT).
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The arrangements for deciding claims to disablement benefit as a
result of a prescribed disease are slightly different, though there
are again both lay and medical criteria to be satisfied. The lay
questions are collectively called the 'prescription test' and are
considered by the local office adjudication officer, ie on the
evidence presented to him he must decide whether the claimant's
employment matches the specification of the relevant prescribed
occupation in the Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed
Diseases) Regulations 1985. If the prescription test is satisfied the
adjudicating medical authorities (in practice a medical board in the
first instance) will consider the 'diagnostic test', ie whether the
claimant is actually suffering from the prescribed disease or injury
as he claims. This invariably requires a report from an authority in
the field (usually a hospital consultant) which can be considered by
the adjudication officer; alternatively, the decision can be referred
to a medical board. If the diagnostic test is satisfied then the
board will consider the extent of disablement in accordance with
s. 108(1)(b) cited above. In cases involving pneumoconiosis, byssin-
osis or asbestosis the diagnostic test and disablement assessment are
initiated immediately a claim is received because of the poor prog¬
nosis for claimants suffering from these usually fatal conditions.
Otherwise the prescription test is considered and decided before any
medical enquiries are undertaken (this is an administrative arrange¬
ment, the legislation does not prescribe the order in which lay and
medical decisions are considered).
Whilst the final outcome of a claim for disablement benefit, whether
due to an industrial accident or prescribed disease, is a mixture of
lay and medical adjudication decisions, the determination of entitle¬
ment to SHA (and the amount of benefit) is wholly a lay respons¬
ibility. However, in all cases medical advice will be sought of a
medical board as to the claimant's capacity for continuing in his
regular or an equivalent occupation. Since disablement benefit and
SHA are often claimed together, this assessment is frequently carried
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out at the same time as the disablement questions are being
considered. However, a claimant may not know immediately the effect
of his condition on his working ability and so claim SHA at a later
date, thus necessitating a separate examination. On all the lay
questions discussed above (the accident decision, prescription test,
SHA entitlement) an aggrieved claimant has the right of appeal to an
SSAT, whilst on the disablement questions he may appeal to an MAT. On
points of law, further appeal lies to the Social Security Commissioner
(on the medical content of industrial disablement benefit decisions
the MAT is the final arbiter).
(a) The claiming process
An application to register an accident at work as an industrial
accident is made by the claimant on DHSS form BI 95. In the local
office it is received by a clerical officer who will initiate
enquiries in order that the adjudication officer will have sufficient
evidence on which to make a decision. An enquiry to the claimant's
employer is automatically sent using a standard form (BI 76) and in
most cases some further information is required of the claimant. The
replies are scrutinised by the clerk who may decide to pursue a
further enquiry if, for example, a question has not been answered, or
seek the advice of the supervisor as to whether sufficient information
has been accumulated.
If an industrial accident is confirmed, the claimant is sent a form
(BI 100A) on which to claim disablement benefit. If it has been
completed correctly the clerk forwards the papers to the Regional
Office (or Central Office in Scotland) where the Medical Boarding
Section will arrange for the claimant to be examined and assessed by
one or more AMPs. The results of the AMP or board's examination are
sent (on form BI 118) via the Regional Office to the local office
where the final decision on the whole claim is formally made by the
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adjudication officer. Finally, the claimant is advised of the
out come.
To claim disablement benefit because of a prescribed disease the
claimant must complete a general claim form (BI 100B) or one of the
specialised series of forms for specific conditions (for example, for
occupational deafness, or for occupational asthma). Again enquiries
will be made of the employer (on form BI 77 or one of its specialised
equivalents). On all prescribed diseases the next step is always the
acquisition of a consultant's report on which the diagnostic questions
can be decided which this is obtained via the Regional Medical Officer
or one of his staff. The process thereafter is the same as that for
claims based on industrial accidents.
SHA claims are made by the claimant to the local office. The papers
are forwarded to the Regional Office to arrange a medical board and
the results returned to the local office. When claimants have been
assessed as being incapable of following their regular occupations but
capable of 'suitable alternative employment' they will be invited into
the local office to discuss the occupations that they may be capable
of pursuing. The disablement benefit clerk will endeavour to secure
their agreement on at least one 'suitable alternative employment'.
When this has been agreed the clerk will investigate the earnings in
the claimant's regular occupation (from an employer, where there is
one) and earnings in the agreed alternative(s) from appropriate local
employers. When the level of SHA has been calculated from the
available evidence the claimant is notified of the decision. The
diagram on the following page illustrates the progression of a claim
through the system.
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FIGURE 5. 1 - The disablement benefit and SHA decision-making processes
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2 -Decision-making in practice: the lay questions
(a) Industrial Accidents
In deciding whether or not an accident at work qualifies as an
industrial accident under the 1975 Act, the adjudication officer needs
only to consider one subsection of the legislation, s.50(1) quoted
earlier. In practice he will be looking for three conditions to be
satisfied, ie that the claimant has (a) suffered personal injury,
caused (b) by an accident, which (c) arose 'out of and in the course
of his employment'. These conditions have generated a plethora of
Commissioners' decisions*1e> and court rulings since the 1897
Workmen's Compensation Act. Although there is now a wealth of case-
law to assist adjudication officers in the legal interpretation of
s.50(1), deciding whether an industrial accident has taken place can
still be fraught with difficulties.
In short, the adjudication officer will be looking for evidence that
some sort of incident (or series of incidents) ,mas taken place which
caused an injury to the claimant (however minor), and that such an
incident occurred during working hours in a normal place of work
whilst doing something connected with the work. The problems that
frequently arise are derived partly from the law and partly from
difficulties with the content or nature of the evidence.
Before the statutory criteria can be applied the adjudication officer
must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence on which to
adjudicate. However, for some reason the evidence may be incomplete,
it may be unsupported (for example, the adjudication officer may only
have the claimant's uncorroborated account of events), or it may be
contradictory in some way, (sometimes a claimant's evidence will lack
consistency or the evidence from several sources, perhaps witnesses,
may not concur). The BI 95 form completed by the claimant is often
the first source of problems; despite the often difficult inter-
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pretation of statutory provisions the claimant is given only half a
dozen lines in which to respond to the question 'What were you doing
at the time C of the accident] and how did the accident happen?'. <17>
As a result the quality of the initial evidence from the claimant can
sometimes be poor and this will frequently necessitate further
enquiries. The following summaries of actual case-notes illustrate
the difficulties that can confront the adjudication officer.
Case #1 - A problem of unsupported evidence
A miner walking back to the lift from the coal face along the
uneven surface of the pit floor claimed that he slipped and fell
injuring his leg and foot. There were no witnesses. However,
the claimant had reported the incident which was recorded in the
pit's accident report book, which was sufficient to persuade the
adjudication officer that an industrial accident had taken place.
When faced with problems in the evidence the adjudication officer must
make his decision from whatever choices are available, on the 'balance
of probabilities', ie he must weigh each piece of evidence and decide
if it is likely to be true and, if it is, whether or not it is in
favour of the claimant.
Case #2 - A problem of conflicting evidence
An oil rig worker claimed an industrial accident had taken place
when he struck his shovel into a grating and strained his
abdominal muscles. The claimant's application was received in
April 1985 although the incident, which he stated had been
reported to his employer, was alleged to have taken place on
September 19th, 1984. The BI 76 was returned by the employers
stating that they had no knowledge of such an incident and that
it had not been reported. The claimant was informed of this
reply and asked to supply the names of any witnesses who could
support his account. At this stage the claimant requested an
interview with the local office at which he said that he had been
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told by his employer that a record had been made of the incident
although he admitted that he had not seen it himself; he also
gave the name and address of a witness who was subsequently asked
to supply his version of events. A further enquiry was made of
the employers noting the claimant's response, the reply to which
restated that as far as they were concerned the incident had not
taken place; furthermore they noted that the day before the
alleged incident they had a staff record that the claimant had
complained of abdominal and chest pains. The putative witness
replied that he had no recollection of such an incident. (The
adjudication officer decided that the evidence collected was
sufficiently against the claimant to justify disallowing the
claim. )
There is no prescribed time limit within which an industrial accident
must be registered, though a claim is usually made soon after an
alleged incident. The next case illustrates the circumstances in
which a claim can be made long after the accident and the problems
that this can cause.
Case #3 - A problem of old, cold evidence
In November 1985 a policeman made a claim for disablement benefit
because of an accident which he alleged on the BI 95 occurred in
the 'mid-70s" when his neck was injured whilst restraining a
drunk. The adjudication officer tried to ascertain greater
details of the incident in order to determine whether an
industrial accident had taken place and if so when. Fortunately
for the policeman he unearthed his notebook of the time and
supplied the adjudication officer with a copy of his own record
of the incident. Furthermore, he was able to track down a copy
of the Station Incident Book which recorded the tussle between
the claimant and the alleged offender but had no record of any
injury incurred (by either party). However, the name of another
officer who was present at the time was recorded and he was
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subsequently asked to give his recollection of the incident
(which it had now been established took place in 1977). Not
surprisingly this witness's memory of the incident was a little
vague and although he could recall the encounter he could not
confirm that the claimant had been injured at the time. At this
point there was no more evidence that the adjudication officer
could even attempt to find, a decision had to be made on what was
available. He decided that since there was no doubt that the
alleged incident did take place and that it was entirely likely
that a neck injury could be sustained in a tussle, plus the fact
that the claimant was, as a policeman, considered a reliable
witness, then an industrial accident had taken place.
Problems with the interpretation of the law revolve principally around
the phrase 'out of and in the course of employment'. In the following
example the evidence was perfectly clear, the claimant's account was
supported by his employer and corroborated by a witness.
Case #4 - A problem of interpreting 'out of and in the course of, etc*
An engineering worker was walking across the yard of the factory
where he normally worked on his way to an interview for promotion
within the same firm. He tripped in a small pothole and
sustained a broken ankle. The question for the adjudication
officer to determine, therefore, was whether the accident
happened 'out of and in the course of employment', ie whether
walking to an interview could be considered to fall within the
scope of this phrase. Had the claimant been seeking a job with
another employer on premises elsewhere the adjudication officer
conjectured that he would have disallowed the claim. But in this
case he concluded that such activity was in the interests of the
claimant's employer (who had encouraged the claimant's
application for the post) and hence satisfied the condition.
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Another similar example illustrates how difficulties with the law can
be exacerbated by problems connected with the evidence.
Case #5 - A problem of interpreting both the law and the evidence
A lorry driver was sleeping overnight in his cab away from home.
During the night he was attacked and sustained serious head
injuries. The brain damage which he suffered prevented him from
supplying any evidence directly. The only evidence available,
therefore, apart from the man's injuries, was indirectly from the
assailants themselves. However, at their subsequent trial they
claimed in their defence that they had been provoked and attacked
initially by the claimant. That an incident had taken place was
not in any doubt but it was not clear to the adjudication officer
that sleeping in the cab of a lorry was 'out of and in the course
of employment' since the driver was officially off-duty at the
time and not being paid. However, it was confirmed by the
employer that it was an accepted practice that drivers slept with
their vehicles (where they could provide at least some protection
for the lorry's load) and kept their overnight expenses. The
adjudication officer, therefore, accepted that the driver was
acting in the interests of the employer and allowed the claim.
Despite the difficulties that can arise with accident decision-making,
most adjudication officers interviewed responded that the majority of
claims were straightforward. One commented:
"Generally speaking, about 807. of accident cases consist
mainly of a report by an employer and a declaration by a
claimant, which together allow me to come to a decision. "
(Adjudication Officer, Office #2)
The implication here is that around 207. of the cases of this
adjudication officer require additional evidence, which reinforces the
importance of the information stage of the decision-making process.
This importance will be emphasised further in the following discussion
of prescribed diseases decision-making.
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(b) Prescribed Diseases and Injuries
There are fifty-four prescribed diseases and industrial injuries
listed in the Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed
Diseases) Regulations 1985, each accompanied by a description of the
relevant prescribed occupation (a few of which apply to more than one
disease). For adjudication officers, however, the bulk of their work
in this area will be dominated by a small number of prescribed
diseases, namely dermatitis (PD D5), tenosynovitis (PD A8) and
occupational deafness (PD A10) which between them account for 90% of
awards'1S> (and if four other common conditions are added, ie cramp to
the hand or forearm, beat hand, beat knee (housemaid's knee) and beat
elbow (tennis elbow), the figure is increased to 98%), Of all the
prescribed diseases discussed with adjudication officers occupational
deafness was considered by almost all of them to present the most
problems.
Occupational deafness
The eligibility criteria for occupational deafness are arguably the
most complex of all prescribed diseases. The reasons for this lie in
the intention behind the regulations. Damage to hearing caused by
exposure to noise at work has long been recognised as a risk in some
industries, but a deterioration in a person's hearing is also a normal
feature of ageing for most of the population.'13' The prescription
test is therefore designed to identify industrially-caused deafness;
hence, the regulations specify a range of frequencies over which
hearing loss must have occurred, '2°» and a comprehensive list of
machinery and the circumstances in which it must have been used.
There is also the requirement that exposure must have lasted for at
least 10 years,'21' the last exposure being not more than five years
before a claim is submitted. The adjudication officer, therefore,
needs information on the claimant's work, the machinery used, the
physical characteristics of the workplace, the type of exposure
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endured and, in order to satisfy the five and ten years tests, the
claimant's employment record. This is formidable in itself but one
must also remember that some of this information will relate to
periods many years beforehand (and because of the ten year test, some
of it will always be at least 10 years old). And it is possible that
information from as far back as 1948 will be relevant (and sometimes
crucial). The most common problem for adjudication officers was
incomplete information. For example, in some skilled professions it
is quite common for workers to be employed on temporary contracts
interspersed with short periods of unemployment, as the following
case-note illustrates.
Case #6 - A problem of incomplete information
A joiner made his living by working in the shipyards of North
East England. The nature of shipbuilding is such that joiners
and carpenters are only employed during specific phases (ie
fitting out) and not throughout the whole of the construction of
the ship. Workers therefore tend to move from yard to yard as
work becomes available. Joinery per se is not a particularly
noisy activity but the claimant was exposed to the usual, high-
level noise of the shipyard which would bring him within the
scope of the regulations. The claimant had worked for forty
years since 1944 and listed 120 spells of employment in that time
with a large number of employers (though not all in the yards).
So, the task of collecting enough information to satisfy the ten
year test was hampered firstly, by the need to aggregate a large
number of short periods of employment, secondly, by the long
period which had elapsed since some of them (which meant that
employers did not have the records of his time with them), and
thirdly, by the closure of many of the firms that the claimant
had worked for (as the shipbuilding industry has declined since
the war). After four months of enquiry the adjudication officer
had confirmation of only 5!£ years relevant employment and was
forced to reject the claim.
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As in the case above, to satisfy part of the prescription test it is
not necessary for the claimant to have worked with the relevant
machinery or equipment himself but merely to have been 'wholly or
mainly in the vicinity of' the prescribed machinery. Before the
adjudication officer grapples with the legal complexities inherent in
this phrase he must gather evidence concerning how far the claimant
worked away from the machinery and whether there were any intervening
obstructions which may have afforded him some protection. For work
carried out many years previously this can prove extremely difficult
and often impossible to obtain. Recourse frequently has to be made to
colleagues of the claimant to supply their personal recollections of
working conditions. Prescription is also partly based on the type of
equipment or machinery that caused the relevant noise. Hence the
adjudication officer needs to know what tools etc. the claimant worked
with (or near), which again can be extremely difficult to collect; the
claimant may not know exactly what he was using or how to describe it,
or alternatively it may be obsolete.
Wider problems of evidence on prescribed diseases
Even when evidence is. supplied by the claimant there is often doubt
over its validity. Some adjudication officers commented that they did
not always trust the replies of employers or the claimant's workmates.
This was put down to a variety of innocent reasons (for example,
ignorance, confusion caused by official forms) and more ulterior
motives (for example, collusion between work colleagues, fear of civil
action against the employer).
"Occupational deafness has caused most problems; for
example, with replies from employers not answering the
questions properly. I think this is due to them considering
different aspects to us when dealing with a common law
claim; they seem to think we will want the same sort of
information, but we don't." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #7)
"On one case I remember the employer had answered 'Yes' to a
question whereas I knew they didn't work with that kind of
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material. I telephoned the employer to make sure and they
eventually rang back to say that the answer was wrong. "
(Disablement Benefit Clerk, Office #6)
"Using witnesses is difficult because they may be in
cahoots; we would prefer to go to managers or foremen
because they are more trustworthy." (ex-Adjudication
Officer, Office #1)
Adjudication officers may also experience difficulty with under¬
standing the evidence that is provided since much of it will be of a
technical nature regarding industrial processes, machinery and
subst ances.
"Sometimes you feel ... that you are not really qualified to
make a decision; you can keep going back to the employer for
more details, but it is not much use if in the end you don't
understand the information that you have collected."
(Adjudication Officer, Office #12)
"... on some of the poisoning cases it is very difficult to
find out if, say, a printing ink that a man has been working
with contains the requisite chemicals, which may have
several different descriptive names." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #6)
The information problems of adjudication officers were summed up in a
comment of a member of one of regional monitoring teams:
"The problems for adjudication officers are not really
adiudication problems; they relate more to the information;
they know what they want but can't get it. " (Monitoring
team member, Region #2)
Many adjudication officers felt that though difficult, collecting
adequate information on which to decide a prescription test was a
challenging part of the work and there were frequent examples of
painstaking research on their part. Local libraries are visited,
trips are arranged to local factories, works and mines in order to
gain some first-hand appreciation of the jobs that claimants
undertake, and personal contacts are exploited. For some adjudication
officers and clerks their local knowledge was a considerable asset (as
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the quote from the disablement benefit clerk above illustrates).
"I do use my accrued knowledge of engineering and
shipbuilding, and I have no hesitation in approaching
friends to ask about the duties of particular jobs if I feel
it will assist in deciding a case." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #9)
"I was brought up in a mining village and have been down a
coal mine which gave me more of an understanding of what is
involved, the type of work they do and the conditions they
work in." (Adjudication Officer, Office #7)
As with decision-making on industrial accidents, the majority of
problems with prescribed diseases concern the collection and inter¬
pretation of the evidence. Many adjudication officers and disablement
benefit clerks pursue this element of the decision-making process with
diligence, but this reliance on personal initiative suggests that a
claimant may be (unknowingly) disadvantaged where, for some reason,
such initiative is lacking.
<c) Special Hardship Allowance'23'
There are two elements to special hardship allowance decision-making.
Firstly, entitlement to the allowance must be established by
satisfying one of the two conditions in s.60(1) of the Social Security
Act 1975 (quoted on p.145). Secondly, once this has been
established, the amount of special hardship allowance payable must be
calculated in accordance with the other relevant subsections of s, 50.
The first element causes some problems for adjudication officers but
greater difficulties arise in the attempt to quantify the amount.
The main problem with establishing entitlement arises from a conflict
of medical evidence confronting the adjudication officer. A hypo¬
thetical example, but one which is common in practice, will serve to
illustrate this. A man is injured at work and receives a medical
certificate from his General Practitioner (GP) to the effect that he
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should refrain from any work for a certain period. The condition
persists for over 90 days and the man claims and receives a disable¬
ment benefit. He then claims special hardship allowance and is seen
again by a medical board. On examination the board confirms that the
man is indeed incapable of following his regular occupation, but is
capable of some kind of employment nevertheless. (This typically
arises when a man with a manual job sustains, say, a back injury which
prevents him from lifting or standing for long periods, but is
considered capable of a job that only involves sitting down. ) In
effect the adjudication officer is faced with evidence from the GP
that the second condition of entitlement is satisfied but has contrary
evidence from the medical board. This dilemma is not one which
the adjudication officer is competent to resolve and in practice the
case is referred to the Regional Medical Officer who will advise on
the case or seek a third opinion from the Divisional Medical Officer
of the Regional Medical Service of the DHSS; <:2S;' the adjudication
officer is thus effectively relieved of the burden of decision-making.
The problems of quantifying the benefit are largely evidential.
However, since the essence of the calculation is a comparison between
the situation of the claimant in his regular occupation before, and
his situation after his industrial accident (or the onset of his
prescribed disease) there is the occasional problem of deciding what
the regular occupation actually is. But this is now comparatively
rare given the accumulated case-law of the past 40 years.
The problems for the adjudication officer are threefold; establishing
the claimant's pre-accident earnings in his regular occupation;
deciding a suitable alternative employment where this is relevant; and
deciding the post-accident earnings, either where the claimant has
found further employment or in a hypothetical sense where the claimant
has no work. In practice the bulk of this work falls on the disable¬
ment benefit clerk, since collecting the required information is
partly a routine matter of sending forms or letters of enquiry to
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local employers or the Job Centre, and partly a matter of interviewing
the claimant (from which the adjudication officer is discouraged in
the Insurance Officers' Guide (see chapter 3, p. 104),
Where an accident has been recent and a first claim for special
hardship allowance is made, then establishing regular occupation
earnings is usually straightforward. However, since special hardship
allowance is subject to frequent reviews (usually every 1 or 2
years'27"') a claimant's regular occupation may disappear or the firm
that he worked which supplied the original figures may have closed
down. In such cases clerks will have to use a number of ploys in
order to obtain some figures. They may write to another firm which
employs workers doing similar work to the claimant's regular
occupation; they may contact the local Job Centre; or they may contact
a trade union to obtain the 'union rate' for the job. If all these
fail, as they may when a job becomes obsolete (one example quoted was
that of skilled stone-cutter, a manual trade, which has been replaced
by machine cutting), then the last year's figure may simply be updated
in accordance with the general trend in wage increases.
An infrequent but difficult problem with regular occupational earnings
stems from the entitlement of the claimant to have included in the
calculation a recognition of 'his reasonable prospects of advancement'
(see Social Security Act 1975, s.60(3)). One case will illustrate the
problems:
Case #7 - A problem of 'reasonable prospects of advancement'
A young man's regular occupation was as a professional rugby
league player. As not infrequently happens in the sport he was
injured and forced to retire from the game; he was 20. Problems
arose with a reassessment of his award several years later when
his club was promoted and he claimed that his regular occupation
earnings would have increased as a first division player (he also
added that had it not been for his injury he would have been
- 170 -
playing for England) and hence his special hardship allowance
should be increased. The England claim was dismissed as wishful
thinking (unfortunately for the claimant, the adjudication
officer was a follower of the sport and assessed the claimant's
potential a little less favourably) but it was accepted that his
regular occupation earnings would, had he retained his place,
have increased.
The second problem area is establishing what a 'suitable alternative
employment' for the claimant might be. A regional office employee
summed up the difficulty:
"Special hardship allowance is a problem because much of it
isn't based on hard facts but on supposition or crystal ball
gazing; that is, what a claimant might be able to do, if. he
could do a job. It's all open to debate." (Monitoring team
member, Region #3)
To decide a suitable alternative employment the claimant is usually
called in for an interview. The clerk will take a brief employment
and educational history and, on the basis of this and the medical
report (which gives a note of the claimant's disabling condition), try
to agree with the claimant what alternative employment he or she could
do. It is not often straightforward, as one clerk explained,
"...we get the person in and get them to agree to a job they
could do. More often than not they've no idea what they can
do. So we narrow it down. We say ' OK, you have a back
injury so lifting is out, how about a job sitting down. . . '
etc." (Disablement benefit clerk, Office #2)
The claimant 'having no idea' about alternative occupations was a
common experience of disability benefit clerks. Most had to make
suggestions to the claimant and for this purpose each had his or her
own individual list of alternatives, but common amongst them were car
park attendant, lift operator and supermarket cashier. These were put
to claimants regardless of their previous occupation since few
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apparently would deny that they could do, ie were physically capable
of doing, such work. <2S>
In cases where the claimant steadfastly refuses to agree to a suitable
alternative employment the advice of the Disablement Resettlement
Officer at the Job Centre is usually sought, by asking what, in their
opinion, a person with particular physical limitations might be
capable of doing. A further attempt may then be made to get the
claimant to agree a suitable alternative employment but ultimately the
adjudication officer can, and must, make a decision without such
consent.
When a suitable alternative employment, or possibly several, has been
agreed the clerk will try to collect information on the appropriate
wage levels and will have recourse to all the methods noted in
relation to finding earnings figures for the claimant's regular
occupation. The occasional additional difficulty arose here though of
private employers not replying to requests for details of their wage
levels.
<d) Summary
Nearly forty years have elapsed since the inception of the National
Insurance Industrial Injuries provisions and in that time many of its
legal complexities have emerged and, to an extent, been clarified,
either in amending legislation or by case-law. It is, therefore,
usually the more recent changes that cause the most difficulties in
interpretation. However, for the front-line officials dealing with
the thousands of claims for accident decisions, disablement benefit,
and special hardship allowance the overwhelming problems are concerned
with information collection, problems which stem ultimately from the
demands made by the legislation. As this section has shown (and as
further sections will reinforce) adjudication officers are often
forced to ' satisfice' , ie make a decision that enough time and money
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have been expended in collecting the evidence and that although
further enquiries could be made, a decision ought to be taken.
"... if you're not satisfied that you've got enough
information to make a decision then you must continue till
you are satisfied. But sometimes you reach a point where
you've gone so far that you think: I can't drag this out any
longer I'll have to make a decision on what information I've
got," (Adjudication Officer, Office #1)
It was a position that most adjudication officers found uncomfortable,
particularly in the London South Region where they have to rely on
local offices to conduct interviews on their behalf.
"... on some cases you realise that it is going to take
another several weeks to sort it out so you tend to, I
wouldn't say make assumptions, but to make the best use of
what you have got, because you know that if you do send it
back you'11 either get something illegible or they won't
understand it." (Adjudication Officer, Office #13)
"You have to adjudicate on the information available to you;
if you had more time and more resources you could probably
collect more information, which may not lead to a different
decision, but it might, You sometimes feel that there is
more information out there which you just cannot get your
hands on." (Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
On top of the difficulties with the evidence, there were also
problematic phrases and words within the legislation, a few of which
have been discussed in this section (for example, 'out of and in the
course of. . . ' , and ' wholly or mainly in the vicinity of. . . ' ). The
next section turns to medical decision-making, and highlights an
additional range of problems for lay and medical staff alike.
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3 - Decision-making in practice - the medical questions
Medical practitioners perform two distinct roles in relation to the
two benefits under discussion in this chapter. Firstly, as
adjudicating medical practitioners (AMPs), they decide the loss of
faculty suffered by the claimant as a result of his or her accident or
prescribed disease, and then quantify in a percentage figure the
disablement that results. The final figure, which will determine the
level of pension or size of gratuity payable, is arrived at by making
a deduction (or 'offset') for any pre-existing conditions which affect
the disability, and taking into account other, unrelated conditions
which render the claimant more disabled than he would have been had he
suffered the accident as a normal healthy person. This is work of a
distinctly medico-legal nature, ie the decision criteria are statutory
legal rules which draw simultaneously on the professional medical
knowledge of the AMP. Secondly, they act as advisers on special
hardship allowance claims where they will be asked for an opinion on
whether a claimant's disability impairs the capacity to carry out paid
work in either his or her regular, or some alternative, occupation.
In an advisory capacity on special hardship allowance, AMPs are merely
asked to complete form BI 118 on which he must reply to a number of
relatively straightforward questions about the claimant's ability to
work. None of the 16 AMPs interviewed expressed any difficulty with
this assessment. Most of them had been, or were, practising GPs and
hence making judgements about people's ability to work formed a
routine part of their work. As one remarked:
"It is usually fairly clear to a doctor whether someone is
completely incapable of working. For the rest, there is
normally something that they can do, so the answer to the
question on the form about being capable of employment is
usually 'yes'." (AMP, Region #2)
Another commented:
- 174 -
"It is very often a stupid question. -There is virtually no-
one who is not capable of some remunerative employment,
especially as it is not part of our remit to consider the
employment circumstances of that particular individual or
the area in which he lives." (AMP, Region #1)
Deciding the medical questions on disablement benefit is very
different, however. The time at which the fieldwork was undertaken
was somewhat unusual, but particularly instructive for being so. If
the research had been carried out some two years earlier this section
would probably have recorded a similar problem-free picture that
prevails in special hardship allowance decision-making, ie the
procedure and method of assessment had been honed over the years to a
fairly automatic action on the part of AMPs. The form that they were
required to complete had been largely unchanged for many years,
requiring them to record the relevant loss of faculty (ie the loss of
faculty that resulted directly from the relevant accident or
prescribed disease) and an assessment of the disablement suffered by
the claimant.
However, it had come to the attention of the DHSS shortly before the
commencement of the fieldwork that the process of making an
assessment of disablement was at fault, since at no point on the
BI 118 medical report form was there any connection made between the
the relevant loss of faculty and the disablement. Coincidentally, the
DHSS solicitors had notified the Department that AMPs were also
failing to take account of aspects of the claimant's physical
condition that might result in a greater disablement being suffered as
a result of the relevant loss of faculty than was produced by the
relevant loss of faculty alone. These two developments prompted a
reappraisal of disablement benefit adjudication and the implementation
of a revised process which makes for greater demands on the legal
element of the medico-legal practice of adjudication. The new
procedure is designed to demonstrate clearly the connection between
the claimant's injury, and his total disablement, taking into account
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factors not directly concerned with an industrial injury or prescribed
disease.
In the past it had been the practice of AMPs to make a record of the
claimant's injury or injuries and to compare this with the prescribed
list of assessments in schedule 2 of the Social Security (General
Benefit) Regulations 1982 (SI 1982/1408). For the most part, making a
percentage assessment was considered to be fairly straightforward.
"After thirty years you have a pretty good built-in computer
telling you what assessments should be. Occasionally,
though, you get the one where it does not seem to fit
immediately into your previous pattern ' of assessments. "
(AMP, Region #2)
The only conditions that were mentioned as causing any regular
difficulty were back injuries, and the types of head injury that
resulted in psychological damage to the claimant.
"The most difficult to assess, even after years of
experience, are head injuries, by which I mean the resulting
psychological effects. In fact any injury affecting the
nervous system can be hard." (AMP, Region #3)
"The most difficult to assess are low back pain, but this
applies equally to the out-patient clinic as the medical
boarding centre, ie having to decide how much is true
pathology and how much is overreaction by the claimant.
Also head injuries, complaining of post-concussion syndrome,
headaches, forgetfulness, that sort of thing; you cannot put
your finger on anything." (AMP, Region #2)
The element of legal decision-making was therefore minimal; making a
clinical judgement was followed in most cases by a fairly mechanistic
comparison with a table of prescribed percentage assessments. And if
this assessment had been affected by a condition either before or
after the accident or onset of the prescribed condition then an
'offset' was made, ie a deduction of the appropriate percentage. This
contrasts starkly with the new requirements which, at the time the
fieldwork was being carried out, were not yet fully implemented,
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although all the AMPs interviewed had experienced the changes in
training sessions and trials of a new BI 118 medical report form.
Paragraph 1 of schedule 8 to the 1975 Social Security Act requires
that:
"the extent of the disablement should be assessed, by
reference to the disabilities incurred by the claimant as a
result of the relevant loss of faculty..."
A close reading of this sentence reveals that there are at least three
elements, forming a logical progression, (or four in the case of
accidents) to making a percentage assessment of disablement. Firstly,
there must be a relevant loss of faculty (and for accidents an
identifiable injury to cause it) which must cause a disability or
disabilities, which in turn results in a disablement. A DHSS training
handout explains the distinction between these terms as follows: c30:>
"Loss of faculty - this is something which the Act envisages
as resulting from the injury and from which in turn, there
results some disability. It may perhaps be best described
as a loss of power or function of an organ of the body.
Loss of faculty includes disfigurement. It is not in itself
a disability but it is a cause, actual or potential, of one
or more disabilities. . .
Relevant loss of faculty - This means the loss of faculty
resulting from the relevant injury.
Disability - this means the inability, total or partial, to
perform a normal bodily or mental process equally well as a
person of the same age and sex whose physical condition is
normal... The availability of artificial aids should be
taken into account in considering whether and for how long
the loss of faculty would result in disability.
Disablement - this is the overall effect of the relevant
disabilities, ie the overall inability to perform the normal
activities of life - the loss of health, strength and power
to enjoy a normal life."
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Many AMPs considered the new requirements an unnecessary and wasteful
exercise at the end of which they would be making the same assessment
as before. Some found the distinctions between 'disability' and
'disablement' either particularly difficult to grasp or just
troublesome:
"The new BI 118 forms are terrible, very difficult. All
they seem to do is split hairs. I don't think they will
affect my assessments though." (AMP, Region #1)
"I hate the new forms. It's really a nonsense to try to
distinguish between relevant loss of faculty, disablement
and disability." (AMP, Region #3)
This hostility was not universal however:
"The new form is particularly clear if you follow it
through, it is very logical; although I didn't think that
when I first saw one." (AMP, Region #1)
One Regional Medical Officer reported that a number of 'old-timers',
who had been making disablement benefit assessments since the 1950s or
even earlier, had decided to retire rather than grapple with the
changes (he seemed not too displeased by this outcome). One younger
AMP was more stoical though perhaps a little cynical,
"You have to become a master of the synonym when you are
asked the same thing two or three times, but we will get
used to it in time. " (AMP, Region #2)
The other change that has been incorporated into the revised BI 118 is
a more rigorous approach to the claimant's other conditions which
affect his or her disablement. There are three types, called, in the
jargon of medical adjudication, '0 (pre)', '0 (post)', and 'C. '0
(pre)' conditions are those that, as well as the relevant loss of
faculty, are another effective cause of the recorded disability, If
such a condition is present its contribution to the total percentage
disablement must be assessed and deducted from the final assessment.
If the condition arose after the accident, it is recorded as an '0
(post)' condition and its contribution to disablement assessed as for
- 178 -
'0 (pre)' conditions (it may make no difference to disablement in
which case no offset is made). The ' C' conditions are those which are
not effective causes of the disability but which produce disabilities
quite distinct and separate from those arising from an accident.
However, the disability that 1C' conditions produce may interact with
the relevant disability to make it even more disabling than it would
otherwise have been. Examples might be the loss, due to damage to the
nerves of the forearm, of sensation in the fingers of a blind man who
as a result could not read Braille. Or deafness in a blind person who
would have relied on his hearing to warn him of dangers such as
approaching traffic.
The new arrangements will clearly make greater demands on AMPs to have
regard to the legal content and impact of their deliberations.
Previously not much thought would even have been given to loss of
faculty; an injury would merely have been noted and a percentage
figure attached and any offsets deducted. The problem was stated by
one Regional Office Medical Officer:
"Whether there has been any 'loss of faculty' means nothing
in medical terms; it is a legal term, and doctors do not
very often think legally." (Medical Officer, Region #2)
His view would seem to be shared by some of the AMPs themselves:
"I don't feel as though I'm doing anything particularly
legal in nature. I don't know enough about the law to feel
like a lawyer. " (AMP, Region #3)
If AMPs are to fulfil the task of medical adjudication satisfactorily,
however, the full legal significance of their deliberations should
perhaps be made clear and unequivocal.
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4 - Organisational effects
The organisational environment within which adjudication officers and
disablement benefit clerks must operate can clearly influence the
practice of decision-making. The procedures for processing claims are
clearly laid down in the Adjudication Procedure (AP) Code which is
prepared by DHSS HQ and used in each local office. However, the
deployment and arrangement of staff throughout the office and within
the CB side depend more on local demands and pressures. This section
analyses some of the main pressures on the adjudication officer which
derive from the organisational environment (rather than, say, the
details of the legislation or from the claimants themselves). As
noted earlier, within the London South Region, disablement benefit
adjudication is semi-centralised in only three Benefit Offices (BOs)
rather than incorporated into the work of an integrated local office
(ILO).
<a) The view from the top
For managers of local offices disablement benefit is something of a
backwater. They are usually more concerned with the administration of
supplementary benefit since, for most claimants, the benefit is their
principal source of income. This is reflected in how managers view
their role:
"I would say that what is expected of us is to get the
payments out and clear the callers; as accurately as
possible obviously." (Manager, Office #9)
"In general terms our objective is to pay claimants the
right amount of benefit to which they are entitled; to pay
it promptly and accurately." (Manager, Office #12)
This general approach was echoed by the CB HEOs whose responsibilities
within the local office include the administration of retirement
pensions and sickness benefits which again may form the core of a
claimant's income.
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"My job, as I see it, is to make sure that people get their
money on time; getting money out accurately and quickly -
that's it," (HEO, Office #8)
"The main goal has got to be to pay state benefits correctly
and on time, I don't think the claimants are interested in
anything other than that. They expect us to pay them what
they are entitled to, all they are entitled to, when they
are entitled to it - and that has got to be the ultimate aim
of the office." (HEO, Office #2)
The similar responses of managers and HEOs display a clear commitment
to disbursing benefits quickly and accurately. The burden of
accomplishing this objective, however, falls on the front-line staff.
(b) The effect at the bottom
The concern of managers and HEOs with speed of throughput was felt by
the adjudication officers, although in the administration of
disablement benefit they did not always agree that it should be their
priority also. The main reason for this was that the benefit was
rarely seen to be a claimant's sole source of income, and hence they
considered it justifiable to spend longer collecting as much of the
required information as possible in order to reach a correct decision.
The pressure for a fast throughput remained, however, the most
important influence on the quality of decision-making.
"This Department seems to want quantity and quality and I do
not think it's possible to get both, so somewhere along the
line you've got to compromise one or the other or both. I
think it tends to be possibly both. You don't always have
the time to devote to the more involved cases. "
(Adjudication Officer, Office #13)
"Your HEO expects you not to have any delay on cases or have
many appeals - get things done as quickly as possible and as
thoroughly as possible, because he will carry the can as
well as you if things aren't up to scratch." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #3)
Responses often revealed the existence of a potential conflict between
speed of decision-making and accuracy, although this was felt less in
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the London South offices. Whilst it was generally recognised that
these were both legitimate objectives there was no general agreement
about which should prevail.
"...accuracy comes first, if you are making an award either
on disablement benefit or SHA then a lot of money is
involved and so it is always uppermost in my mind that it
has got to be accurate." (Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
"I've always gone for the quantity, basing that on the
safeguard that you always try to ensure that the major
points of any case are covered. I've always tried to take
the approach that if we can get a claimant a giro, providing
that we do all we can to ensure that it is the correct
amount paid at the correct time, then we are reasonably
discharging our responsibility to the claimants. "
(Adjudication Officer, Office #13)
"... you try for the best quality you can but quantity has
to come first... I think the percentage of errors is a lot
higher than it used to be purely because of the amount of
work." (Adjudication Officer, Office #7)
The intrusion of errors was not the only reason cited for the loss of
accuracy; some adjudication officers felt that the quality of the
evidence on which they had to adjudicate could also be adversely
affected; as one adjudication officer commented:
"I would say that quality is more important to me than
quantity, definitely, but whether you can always give it
that priority when quantity is a desired management
pressure, I wouldn't like to say. Probably, though, quality
would suffer a little bit." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #9)
The pressure to maintain a fast throughput of cases is an important
influence on the approach of adjudication officers to information
collection. However, there were additional pressures on the
adjudication officer in offices where the post included supervisory
responsibilities
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(c) Supervisory adjudication officer or adjudicatory supervisor?
A recent organisational change within the CB side of the local office
has been to incorporate the roles of adjudication officer and
supervisor which had previously been kept separate. The reasons for
this change are primarily organisational. The amount of adjudication
work in local offices had fallen with the introduction of statutory
sick pay (and the concomitant restriction in the scope of sickness
benefit) and in many offices there was not sufficient adjudication
work left to justify a full-time adjudication officer. But the two
roles are not particularly easy bedfellows since they require
different skills and attributes which a single person cannot always
supply.
"... because of the nature of the work you must have
patience, the ability to weigh things up and be unbiased,
and a tenacity to follow a case through fully. For a
supervisor, however, you need to get on with people, to be
able to motivate them - and lots of people cannot do it."
(HEO, Office #5)
Apart from the personal qualities needed for both roles, there was
also an inherent clash between the type of work that each generated:
"... for adjudication you need a bit of peace and quiet,
there is nothing worse than trying to write an appeal or do
a difficult decision when there are people coming to you all
the time wanting girocheques authorised, or advice on a
phone call, or a counter query. They are definitely two
different types of jobs; they don't mix well."
(Adjudication Officer, Office #2)
Very few adjudication officers felt that both roles could be carried
out satisfactorily at the same time, and that as a consequence both
suffered, although opinions were mixed on which fared the worse.
"I don't think it is an ideal situation by any means and I
don't really like it. As a section supervisor trying to
adjudicate you've got to contend with a lot of noise,
constant interruptions, and you are continually changing
between supervisory work and adjudication." (ex-
Adjudication Officer, Office #9)
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"There have been some occasions when I've sent a decision to
the typists and when it has come back I've thought 'what the
hell did I do that for?' It may be something simple like a
wrong date which is purely because you have been interrupted
and your train of thought has been broken." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #2)
"I don't spend enough time on supervision because I don't
have enough time to deal with seven clerical officers and a
medical boarding clerk. Because of the volume of work and
the need to get adjudication right there isn't the time to
do the supervision work." (Adjudication Officer, Office #7)
Like the pressure of having to process claims quickly, one of the
results of combining supervisory and adjudication work was to force
adjudication officers to curtail enquiries earlier than they would
have liked in order to make a decision. Again it is the information
collection stage of the decision-making process which is compromised.
(d) Disablement benefit as poor relation
Although the experience of this study has generally been to the
contrary, it was admitted on more than one occasion that disablement
benefit, as something of a backwater amongst benefits, was not often
allocated the more proficient of the staff in the local office.
Indeed the tendency was rather to use disablement benefit as something
of a dumping ground, when necessary, especially for clerical staff who
could not perhaps cope with the tougher pressures generated by short-
term benefits (particularly sickness benefit) but could be trusted
with the more sedate pace of disablement benefit.
"Disablement benefit needs serious-minded staff and there
are LOIs on sickness benefit who I wouldn't put on it. On
the other hand I put my better LOIIs on short-term benefits.
A lot of my disablement benefit clerks don't cope as well
with the pressures of short-term benefits but do a very
adequate job on disablement benefit." (Manager, Office #8)
The impression gained in the local offices visited more than bears out
this manager's final comment.
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<e) Experience versus career development
Another recent organisational trend has been to include the new
adjudication officer/supervisor role in the normal career development
of staff on the Executive Officer grade. The reasons for this, as
explained by one manager, were mainly that promotion prospects within
the DHSS were not particularly good for EOs and that hence civil
service promotion boards were demanding that applicants to the HEO
grade demonstrate wide experience of social security administration.
And since an HEO post is primarily managerial, management experience
at EO level was now virtually sine qua non. So, remaining in a
predominately adjudicatory post for much more than 2 or years was
seen as potentially detrimental to an official's career. A common
policy within the local office was therefore to appoint adjudication
officers for no longer than this before transferring them to other
duties, despite the acknowledgement that to become fully effective
takes in the order of twelve months (in most adjudication officers'
estimate) and that experience was invaluable.
"It's amazing how you become used to the adjudication
process once you actually start; it does begin to grow on
you. I'm certainly making better decisions than a year ago;
experience is the best teacher." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #5)
This brief survey of the pressures on adjudication officers reveals
that the inherent difficulties in decision-making (of collecting
information and applying the legislation) can be compounded and
exacerbated by a range of factors stemming from the organisational
environment in which the adjudication officer works. How important it
is to negate these pressures will be revealed by the extent to which
they affect the satisfaction of the accuracy and fairness demands of
administrative justice. Part III attempts such an assessment.
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Part III - THE DEMANDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
1 - Administrative Justice and Lay Adjudication
(a) Accuracy
The Official View
The official monitoring system of the DHSS, carried out on behalf of
the CAO is still in its relative infancy. When the fieldwork was
being carried out in early and mid-1986 one of the offices visited had
not yet received a visit from either a Southampton or a Regional
monitoring team. For the other twelve offices, it was possible to
obtain copies of the latest reports, which this section draws upon.
In addition, it is possible to give a national picture of the stand¬
ards of adjudication from the first two annual reports of the CAO
(DHSS, 1985e and 1986c). Each report includes, inter alia, an
analysis of the 'adjudication comments' raised on industrial disable¬
ment benefit and special hardship allowance. However, there are
important differences between the two reports. Both include an
analysis of industrial accident and SHA decisions, but decisions on
prescribed diseases cases are only analysed in the earlier report, and
on industrial disablement benefit itself only in the latter. Also,
the category of 'decision not justified on the evidence' under the
reasons for comment has been divided into two categories in the
1985/86 report, viz. 'sufficient evidence but wrong finding of fact'
and 'incorrect law applied or law applied incorrectly'). Tables 5.5
and 5.6 reproduce the relevant extracts.*315
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TABLE 5. 5 - OCAO analysis of industrial injuries decisions, 1984/85
Industrial Prescribed
accidents SHA diseases
number of decisions examined 1138 664 183
Question for adjudication officer not decided 01 2
Insufficient evidence on which to decide 40 31 9
Decision not justified on the evidence 3 43 1
Record of decision inaccurate 4 7 23
Other reasons 04 1
TOTALS 47 86 36
Comments per 100 decisions examined'®' 4 13 20
Source: First Annual Report of the CAO (DHSS, 1985e, p.68)
(a) this is not strictly a percentage error rate since more than one
comment can be raised on a single case
TABLE 5. 6 - OCAO analysis of industrial injuries decisions, 1985/86
Industrial Disablement
accidents SHA benefit
number of decisions examined 887 354 251
Question for adjudication officer not decided 11 2 1
Insufficient evidence on which to decide 27 34 5
Sufficient evidence but wrong finding of fact 4 22 4
Incorrect law or law applied incorrectly 6 34 13
Record of decision inaccurate 3 21 19
Other reasons 4 17 3
TOTALS 55 130 45
Comments per 100 decisions examined'®' 6 37 17
Source: Second Annual Report of the CAO (DHSS, 1986c, p.84)
(a) this is not strictly a percentage error rate since more than one
comment can be raised on a single case
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A 'record of decision inaccurate' comment is raised when the
adjudication officer fails either to record the correct coding of the
decision in the casepapers, or to use the correct 'model decision'.
As such, errors under this heading cannot necessarily be considered to
be 'inaccurate' in the sense that they offend against Mashaw's
definition of accuracy, ie,
. . the correspondence of the substantive outcome of an
adjudication with the true facts of the claimant's situation
and with an appropriate application of the relevant legal
rules to those facts." <1974, p. 774)
Rather, such errors can be viewed as technical deficiencies<3:2> in the
adjudication process. The figures in tables 5.5 and 5.5 for 'comments
per 100 decisions' would more appropriately reflect Mashaw's notion of
accuracy if comments for 'record of decision inaccurate' were omitted.
The revised figures would therefore be as follows.
TABLE 5. 7 - Analysis of comments raised on industrial injuries












number of decisions examined 1138 887 664 354 183 261
Total comments 43 52 79 109 13 26
Comments per 100 decisions 4 6 12 31 7 10
(Comments per 100 decisions (4) (6) (13) (37) (20) (17)
from Tables 5. 5 and 5. 6)
For industrial accidents the picture presented has deteriorated
slightly but remains good whichever way it is viewed (industrial
accident adjudication is even singled out in the CAO's first report as
one of the "better areas of adjudication" (DHSS, 1985e, para.29,
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p.51)). On prescribed diseases the bulk of the comments are due to an
1 inaccurate record of the decision'. As table 5. 7 shows, when the
comments of substance are considered alone, only 13 comments (and not
36) would have been registered, and a comment rate of around 7 per 100
would have resulted, a far healthier picture than the 20 per 100 that
table 5.5 suggests. So, prescribed diseases decision-making can also
be considered to be in a satisfactory state. Special hardship
allowance decision-making is more worrying; in 1984/85 nearly all the
comments (74 of 86) were due to problems in the evidence and exactly
half were raised because the adjudication officer's decision was not
justified on the evidence, arguably the most serious category. Whilst
74 comments of substance only translates into a comment rate of 12 per
100 for that year, the second CAO report present a marked deterioi—
ation. Even when 'technical deficiencies' are excluded nearly one
third of all SHA decisions were faulty. The first verdict on
industrial disablement benefit decision-making (in the report for
1985/86) is also a cause for concern. Although the comments of
substance only related to 10 out of 100 cases, exactly half of these
(13 out of 26) related to a faulty application of the decision
criteria, which contrasts with the predominance of evidential problems
on industrial accidents and SHA. The verdict that seems to emerge
from the CAO's report might be 'very good' for industrial accidents
and prescribed diseases, 'passable' for industrial disablement
benefit, and 'worrying' for special hardship allowance.
Table 5. 8 gives an analysis, similar to that in tables 5. 5 and 5. 6
above, of the comments raised by the Regional monitoring teams on
industrial accidents and disablement benefit decisions for the offices
visited in this study. The total figures have been broken down to
show the differences between the London South Region (L(S) in Table
5.8), which has the three centralised offices and the Scotland and
North East (S/NE) Regions where adjudication on industrial injuries
is carried out in integrated local offices.
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TABLE 5.8 - Analysis of industrial accidents, disablement benefit, and
special hardship allowance in local offices
accidents disablement SHA
benefit
S/NE L(S) TOT S/NE L(S) TOT S/NE L(S) TOT




on which to decide
Sufficient evidence but
applied incorrectly





























Source: compiled from monitoring reports from each office (1986)
TABLE 5. 9 - Summary of table 5. 8
quest ions comments comment rate per
considered 100 decisions
London South 93 7 8
Scotland & NE 59 24 40
TOTAL 152 31 20
Tables 5.5 to 5.9 prompt several observations and raise some
questions. Firstly, the overall comment rates for industrial
- 190 -
accidents and special hardship allowance are somewhat higher than in
the CAO reports*333 but this hides the starkly different picture
presented by London South in comparison with the other regions; on
accidents London South scored zero, and Scotland and the North East
17, whilst the corresponding figures for special hardship allowance
are 17 and 75 respectively. The disablement benefit rates were even
further apart at 0 and 75 respectively, That the large (in terms of
workload) offices perform better is clear, and the hypothesis suggests
itself that offices with bigger caseloads generally perform better.
In order to test this further, firstly, the comment rate for each
office was calculated from the monitoring reports, and the offices
ranked in order of proficiency. Secondly the offices were ranked in
order of workload (as calculated for table 5,4), A rank coefficient
correlation test was then performed. The results of this exercise are
as follows:
TABLE 5. 10 - Local office workloads and comment rates**3
Workload Comment rates
cases rank questions comments rate rank
Cowdenbeath 561 7 28 2 7. 1 3
Edinburgh (N) 155 11 21 8 38. 1 11
Glasgow (City) 57 12 27 9 33. 3 9
Perth 179 10 27 7 25. 9 7
Dewsbury 459 8 16 4 25. 0 6
Doncaster (W) 1621 4 30 5 16. 7 5
Rotherham (S) 1294 5 25 7 28. 0 8
Wallsend 356 9 16 9 56. 3 12
York 584 6 16 6 37. 5 10
Aldershot 4175 1 46 4 8. 7 4
Broadstairs 3291 2 46 3 6. 5 2
Hastings 2172 3 45 2 4. 4 1
(a) a report for Dundee (East) was not available for this analysis
The rank correlation coefficient calculated*3-"-3 wa s 0. 7 showing a
strong correlation between size of workload and st andards of
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adjudication. Although the calculation is based on a small number of
pairs <12) the result is sufficiently high to add support to the
hypothesis that bigger caseloads promote greater accuracy.
Since there have been only two CAO reports and each office had
received at most only one visit from a Regional monitoring team a
comparison over time is difficult. Nevertheless, what evidence there
is, supported by the general view at all levels of the DHSS, suggests
that standards are declining. This was implicit in the comments of
adjudication officers concerning current difficulties of adjudicating
under the pressures of high workloads and supervisory demands, and
more explicitly stated by members of the monitoring teams:
"Standards are falling. Adjudication is a quiet,
contemplative, considerative activity, but with the
increases in workload, not of adjudication but of
supervision, there is a loss of expertise coupled with less
time for the job. Plus, there has been a cascade of altered
regulations and instructions; everything is so fine-tuned
that you've only to have a Commissioner sneeze and the
effect is widespread." (Monitoring team member, Region #3)
That accuracy has been demonstrably falling must be a major concern of
those interested in the promotion of administrative justice. However,
we need to question whether the picture is quite as bad as that
suggested by the results from the monitoring system. This requires a
consideration of how accuracy is defined.
The problem of defining accuracy
As mentioned in the section on decision-making in practice, the main
difficulties for adjudication officers are concerned not with the
interpretation of the law (though these do arise occasionally), but
with the evidence, particularly when it is incomplete, unsupported or
contradictory in some way. In most cases problems do not occur, but
when they do there is a burden on adjudication officers to be as
rigorous in their pursuit of the 'true facts' as possible since their
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decisions will either commit often very large sums of public money, o-r
alternatively deny claimants compensation for an injury or illness
which may make a considerable difference to their standards of living,
possibly for life.
The fundamental task for the adjudication officer, therefore, is to
establish, in Mashaw's words, 'the true facts of the claimant's
situation'. For a decision to be considered accurate the true facts
must be established and then the law must be applied correctly, The
figures in the CAO's report for 'insufficient evidence ... etc' are
perhaps reassuring for the most part (although not so much for special
hardship allowance) but doubt is cast upon them by table 5.8 compiled
from Regional monitoring teams reports. The comments of adjudication
officers quoted earlier regarding the necessity to decide cases on
less than adequate information is another indicator of the difficulty
of establishing the 'true facts'. And further concern is raised by
implication in the responses of some adjudication officers when asked
how they dealt with complaints from claimants about their decisions,
and letters of appeal.
"Sometimes when you are preparing an appeal, your decision,
which may have seemed sound at the time, you might begin to
wonder at, quite often because they have given some
information in the appeal that they didn't think to tell you
at the appropriate time, which may have made all the
difference," (Adjudication Officer, Office #7)
Similarly, new evidence may emerge at an appeal hearing itself,
despite the earlier efforts of the adjudication officer:
"Sometimes on special hardship allowance new earnings
information is put forward. I remember a case where I had
checked earnings thoroughly, and even sent an inspector to
the man's work but still new information appeared later."
(Adjudication Officer, Office #3)
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When there is doubt remaining over the true facts of the case, or the
adjudication officer decides to curtail enquiries, then he is left
with having to decide the case on what evidence is available. In this
he must accept what 'on the balance of probabilities" '3S1 would be the
case, but how he perceives this balance will depend on what weight he
attaches to each piece of the evidence. At the end of the process it
is quite possible that an adjudication officer will decide one way
whilst on another occasion he might decide differently, but both would
be ' correct' .
Despite the difficulties of defining accuracy, elements of the
organisation are designed to promote it. How they do this and how
well they do will be discussed in the following sections on training,
the advice network, the monitoring arrangements, and the tribunal
system.
Training
The experience of training amongst the adjudication officers
interviewed varied widely, mainly as a function of how long they had
been carrying out adjudication duties; the more venerable of the
respondents could barely remember what training they had received
initially, whilst for the newer recruits their recent training
remained fresh in the memory,
The training received by new adjudication officers in 1986 would
follow one of two patterns, both of which had a large common element.
For adjudication officers who had been promoted from the clerical
grades (ie below Executive Officer grade), basic training would have
been carried out probably several years earlier within the office and
would have comprised work on self-instruction packages'361 and
spending time with an experienced adjudication officer. The time
spent on these activities was not fixed but typically lasted for about
four weeks, depending on the exigencies of the office (one
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adjudication officer had only one week 'sitting in' before she was
unavoidably, due to sickness, thrust into the role of adjudication
officer for long term benefits). For the direct entrant to the Civil
Service EO grade there was a formal, structured 19 weeks training (the
first 13 of which were the same as for new clerical officers) after
which they could be expected to assume any EO job within the office
(ie adjudication officer, supervisor, or inspector). The common
element to training takes place after the adjudication officer had
some direct experience of adjudication work. This is the Initial
Adjudication Course (IAC) undertaken at one of the DHSS's Training
Centres around the country. The 'lead' centre is Nottingham where
staff are responsible for preparing the course material for the other
centres.
The content of the IAC is, as it is intended to be, basic. The main
objective is to teach the technique of adjudication rather than the
detailed content of social security legislation. The first part of
the course therefore tackles what adjudication is and how it should be
approached. Trainees are taught that there are three stages to
adjudication: examining the evidence, establishing the facts, and
applying the law to the facts, <37>
Trainees were given guided tours of the Brown Books (bound volumes of
all current statute law), the Insurance Officer's Guide, and Neligan's
Digest of Commissioners' Decisions. Training sessions alternated
between talks from training officers and practical exercises, later
sessions being devoted to common adjudication problems, such as
reviewing decisions, and deciding late claims and overpayment cases.
A final optional session dealt with industrial accidents. Throughout,
the independence of the adjudication officer was emphasised and the
essentially individual character of decision-making acknowledged. If
two adjudication officers reached opposite conclusions in the practice
exercises neither was criticised for being wrong; rather it was
pointed out that it was to be expected that adjudication officers
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giving different weights to the evidence may arrive at different
definitions of the facts of a case and hence differing decisions when
the law was applied.
The ethos of the training was very much to inculcate the right
approach to adjudication in new adjudication officers. As the' head of
the Nottingham Training Centre explained:
"Our objectives are to impart a certain amount of knowledge,
but more to show the trainees how to adjudicate, such that
even when the law has been changed they can adapt themselves
whilst using the same basic principles and techniques.
Admittedly, we are not dealing with the practical problems
of being an adjudication officer/supervisor in the local
office environment, such as time pressure in particular."
Adjudication officers in local offices who had had recent experience
of this style of training were generally at least satisfied with it or
even more complimentary; none was condemnatory:
"... the course was very good. Overall I think I have been
adequately trained, but we don't get enough training on
changes that come in," (Adjudication Officer, Office #7)
"... the initial course was the best training course I've
ever been on. But most of what I've learned has been from
others in the office." (Adjudication Officer, Office #12)
The consensus amongst a small sample of adjudication officers taking
part in the IAC was favourable. Criticisms ranged from the timing of
the course, ie it should come much earlier in the adjudication
officer's career (and preferably right at the start), and the lack of
attention given to the problems for adjudication caused by workload
and organisational pressures. Perceived weaknesses in the overall
training system included the ad hoc arrangements for keeping
adjudication officers abreast of developments and the reliance that
this places on the HEO in the local office who may not be as au fait
with adjudication as his adjudication officers.
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Advice
The policy of 'devolution' within the DHSS (ie pushing respons¬
ibilities down to local level to counteract the bureaucratic tendency
of decisions 'floating up' the organisation), coupled with the
inception of the OCAO with its prevailing philosophy of independent
adjudication, have had a marked effect on the structure and practice
of giving advice to adjudication officers. In essence, the current
formal arrangements are administered under the auspices of the OCAO
and comprise the Insurance Officers' Guide as the initial source of
general advice, the HEO/AO to advise on specific difficulties, and
finally, where these fail to resolve a specific problem, Southampton
itself. Previously, each Regional office had its own team of advisers
with the RAO (or RIO as it was previously called) section who
performed the role that HEOs are now expected to undertake. Running
parallel to this formal structure, adjudication officers adopt a
variety of informal techniques to secure advice on difficult cases,
For virtually all adjudication officers, faced with a difficult case,
the first source of assistance tried was the IOG. As its name implies
it is a guide on the interpretation of statute and case-law. It is
prepared and kept up-to-date by OCAO, although in practice its status
with adjudication officers varied. For some it was treated almost as
a code of instructions (such as the Adjudication Procedure code which
deals with the physical processing of benefits) whilst others appear
to have a somewhat cavalier approach to it.
"For me it is very powerful; I wouldn't ordinarily, or even
ever, go against the advice in IOG." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #11)
"You tend to follow it as much as you can; it is very
helpful and one of the better codes," (Adjudication
Officer, Office #12)
"Sometimes you might conveniently forget to look at a
certain paragraph that doesn't suit you; the IOG sometimes
makes things unnecessarily complicated." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #8)
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"As one of our Senior Medical Officers once said 'if you
can't live with the answer don't ask the question'. I
suppose I must have conveniently forgotten the IOG advice on
some occasions." (Adjudication Officer, Office #4)
Although HEOs were the next formal tier of advice, adjudication
officers frequently ignored them,
"It's difficult to go to an HEO for advice when they haven't
had as much experience as you have. We tend to ask each
other rather than go to the HEO, which I suppose we
shouldn't but it is our habit." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #12)
So, if difficulties with a case were not resolved by the IOG, adjudi¬
cation officers tended to consult colleagues from within their office
(either practising or former adjudication officers), or from another
office, or occasionally from the Regional Office where the reduced RAO
section might still house officers who had previously been engaged as
advisers.
". . . after having discussed such a case with the other
AOs I would probably go through the formal channels, but
it is rare that I do that. The HEO has only been here
six months and so that is why I'm probably reluctant to
refer things to her." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #11)
Where the HEO had been an experienced adjudication officer, and
particularly with disablement benefit, the adjudication officer, as
customer, was far more satisfied. Whilst the use of colleagues'
experience was a natural and officially tolerated practice, the
continued unofficial use of RAO personnel was not viewed so favourably
(or at least was not meant to be). The use of RAO by adjudication
officers depended very much on how requests for help were received by
the Regional office staff. The loss of the Regional advice function
was not a particularly popular policy decision with the Regions and
there was still an undercurrent of feeling that it should be
reinstated. To this effect some RAO officers quietly welcomed the
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occasional enquiry, a situation which in more than one Regional Office
was condoned by the Principal Adjudication Officer himself. As one
RAO officer explained:
"I would say that we still get enquiries from over half the
local offices in this Region, but only via phone calls. So,
we still give advice as we used to . . , it's all known by the
higher-ups." (RAO officer, Region #2)
The practice was far less common in London South where the concen¬
tration of adjudication officers in the three Benefit Offices
maintained a sufficient fund of expertise which could be drawn upon to
deal with most problems. But in other offices the loss of the RAO
advice role was often missed, by adjudication officers and HEOs alike.
"Now you tend to make decisions yourself which I think is
right, but if you do tend to go off on the wrong track
through inexperience you might never find out, or at least
not for a long time." (HEO, Office #8)
"RIO definitely did a good job. And I also believe that you
can* t beat the personal contact that you build up with a
regional service." (ex-Adjudication Officer, Office #3)
In the spirit of making local offices more responsible for their
decisions the initial advice that was disseminated from Southampton
was that it was only the exceptional and difficult case that should be
referred to them, and that, in such cases, a request for advice should
be made in writing giving all the details of the case. The effect of
such an edict was to isolate OCAO from the adjudication officer and to
encourage the use of alternative sources of advice. The intention was
to curtail what was seen as the previous misuse of RAO expertise by
some adjudication officers who were prone to refer cases which they
should have been able to resolve at the local level, but who preferred
to transfer the burden of responsibility if they could. Many early
experiences of using OCAO therefore were less than satisfactory.
However, recent efforts had been made by OCAO staff, by encouraging
the submission of more cases, to bridge the gap that such an approach
created.
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"They are quite helpful and have speeded up their delivery
considerably; you. do at least get the law in black and
white." (Adjudication Officer, Office #12)
"They're usually pretty good. But it is one of the things
about adjudication that nobody ever tells you the answer;
they will argue the points for you and possibly advise you
but it is always passed back to the individual because of
our independence." (Adjudication Officer, Office #4)
Removing the RAO advice function may prove to have been short-sighted.
The RAO sections had built up a fund of expertise through the regular
submission of problem cases and frequent telephone enquiries; they
were able to identify general areas of difficulty and pick out
individual offices where adjudication might be weak. They were also a
source of reassurance and confidence for the individual adjudication
officer where they could confirm his feeling about a case or suggest
looking in a particular section of the IOG.
"It was always reassuring to know that if there was a little
problem - you might have made up your mind what to do but
just needed a bit of confirmation - then you could pick up
the phone and ask if they could help; and the answer was
always yes." (Adjudication Officer, Office #10)
That standards of adjudication were generally seen to be falling was
noted earlier. From the responses of the givers and receivers of
advice within the decision-making system it is likely that poorer
advice mechanisms are a contributory factor in this decline.
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Monitoring
The results of the monitoring system as an official measure of
standards of adjudication have been presented earlier in this section.
The other objective of the system, though, is to assist in maintaining
and improving standards*3®*.
The current monitoring arrangements are recent in origin, dating from
1984 and comprise the HE0/A0 at the first level, and the 0CA0 and
Regional monitoring teams at the second. The lynchpin of the
monitoring system, like the advice arrangements, is the HE0/A0, whose
weekly and monthly checks are intended to identify problems quickly so
that action to remedy them can be taken immediately. The Regional
monitoring teams, in contrast, will only visit an office every two
years (although there are arrangements for a more frequent return
visit to an office considered to be unsatisfactory). The comparative
importance of the HEO and the Regional monitoring team was noted by
one Regional Office employee:
"Standards depend a lot on the HEOs; where there has been
time for them to gain expertise or where the HEO himself has
a background as adjudication officer, that certainly seems
to show in the performance of their own adjudication
officers. The HEO can spot weaknesses and sort them out
without waiting for us to descend." (RAO Officer,
Region #1)
Regional teams are required to submit a copy of their report to
Southampton to assist the CAO in preparing his annual report, and
hence use a standard format for their reports. However, they have
also developed slightly different techniques in order to provide as
much assistance to local offices as they can without transgressing the
boundaries of 'advice' or 'training' which lie outwith their
legitimate educative role. The monitoring teams in two of the Regions
give the offices an overall assessment of either very good, good,
fair, or unsatisfactory. In the other Region a satisfactory/
unsatisfactory grading was given on each element of the work assessed
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(for example, appeals preparation, pensions decision-making, accident
decisions, etc). Each team, having completed its report, held a
meeting or meetings with local office staff and management to discuss
its contents and any further action that might be taken. In two
Regions the monitoring team checks were conducted by calling cases in
to the Regional Office, whereas in the other Region it was felt
important that the local office staff had as much access to Regional
officials as possible in order to build some kind of rapport between
them and to enhance their educative function. Hence, a monitoring
team would be present in a local office for two weeks whilst the
checks were carried out.
As explained earlier, minor technical deficiencies are recorded as
'comments' as well as more substantive shortcomings. A frequent
criticism of the Regional monitoring teams, therefore, was that they
indulged in 'nit-picking', a term which recurred in offices throughout
the country with remarkable regularity.
"This last visit was aggravating because they really did
nit-pick on the most tiny points that nothing really useful
came out of it. I think they were just justifying their
existence." (Adjudication Officer, Office #8)
"We have just had a visit and we thought that they were a
little bit hard, a little bit nit-picking; it is all very
well being able to sit down with half a dozen cases and find
mistakes, but when you are trying to do them when the phones
are ringing and you're surrounded by five or six staff it's
not so easy." (Adjudication Officer, Office #10)
As with advice-giving it was important for adjudication officers to
feel confident that the monitoring team members were competent to
carry out their task; if they felt better qualified than the monitors
then it became difficult for adjudication officers to respect the
advice given. This was a criticism that also applied to the HEO on
occasions.
"The trouble with having a lot of experience of adjudication
is that the people who come from Region haven't got the
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depth of background that I have which may make them a little
reluctant to criticise me, and certainly gets me huffy when
they do. But the flaw in the system is monitoring by the
local HEO/AO who is even less experienced." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #12)
The loss of the advice function was seen as contributing to the
reduction of the expertise of the monitoring teams.
"Their problem is that they are losing touch with day-to-day
things now that no cases are put to them for advice.
Looking at more cases might help." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #6)
Irritation also arose from the narrow approach to adjudication taken
by the teams, which ignored other pressures on adjudication officers.
"You may spend what you consider to be enough time on a case
to come to a well-reasoned decision but RAO will come along
and say you should have made more enquiries; even though you
might have come to the same decision, at least you would
have had more to back it up; but you have got to find a cut¬
off point. This is probably the cause of any conflict
between RAO and the local office, we just don't have the
time to carry it through as far as they think we ought to."
(Adjudication Officer, Office #7)
Despite these criticisms, monitoring per se was considered to be a
justified and potentially worthwhile exercise, particularly for newer
staff rather than the old hands.
"We are monitored closely throughout the process and I think
that that is right, after all you can't rely on claimants
appealing to point out bad decision-making, they have the
right of appeal but they won't always exercise it. "
(Adjudication Officer, Office #13)
"After a change in the office, like an influx of new
adjudication officers, things begin to slide a little bit or
you may be following a procedure that is not strictly
correct and they will put you straight." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #4)
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Overall though, the influence of the monitoring system was not
perceived to be very great. This was principally due to the long
periods between visits combined with the present practice of moving
staff around the office at roughly the same intervals. One
adjudication officer summed up the problem thus:
"Suppose you have a new adjudication officer on disablement
benefit, by the time they see any of his work he may well
have got into bad habits or misunderstood something
important, so that for the first however many months he may
be doing something daft. You may reply that there is also
HEO monitoring within the office but he may be new as well.
And with the number of decisions that are made in two years
combined with the small percentage that the monitoring teams
check I really don't see how they can expect to get any
realistic idea of how good, bad or indifferent you are."
(Adjudication Officer, Office #5)
The problem was recognised at Regional level also:
"I would have to say that overall I don't think we are
making much of a contribution to improving standards. Not
because of any deficiencies on the part of the staff here,
but because the current arrangements of visiting every two
years for a short time mean that we can do little to
influence adjudication standards. The best we can hope for
is to impart to the HEO the things he should be looking for
in his regular monitoring, and hope he carries forward the
message." (Monitoring team member, Region #3)
The monitoring system, therefore, seems unable to fulfil its
admittedly secondary role of helping to maintain and improve standards
of adjudication. Its primary function of providing an assessment of
adjudication standards does seem to be satisfied but, for the local
office, it can only provide a 'snapshot' assessment; if a monitoring
team had visited six months earlier or later it could well have
recorded a different picture since standards inevitably tend to follow
a cyclical pattern of improvement and decline as adjudication officers
gain in expertise only to be replaced by comparatively raw recruits.
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Social Security Appeal Tribunals
The positive contribution of the social security appeal structure to
the achievement of accuracy is twofold. Firstly, there is the direct
effect of the SSAT altering a decision that it finds was incorrect in
some way. Secondly, there is an indirect effect on first-tier
administration. This effect is not, as one might have expected, that
adjudication officers are influenced in their future decision-making
by the decisions of SSATs, but rather, that the prospect of an appeal
encourages a more thorough examination of a case before any decision
is taken. The reasons for this were mainly to avoid having to spend
time and effort preparing and presenting an appeal.
"... if I'm not sure in my own mind that it's right and have
to explain the decision at a tribunal then you've had it.
And an appeal takes an awful lot of time; I try to avoid
them like the plague." (Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
For some adjudication officers the way of avoiding appeals was to be
as certain as possible that the decision was correct, rather than
tailoring their judgements according to an assessment of how a
tribunal might react to the case.
"If I am making a decision that I have had to weigh up I
tend to think: if the claimant appeals can I support it? I
get to the stage where I think I'm going to disallow this
and I say 'all right, if he appeals what is my defence?'.
But I'm not just making a particular decision to avoid an
appeal, I wouldn't do that." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #1)
However, there is also a negative indirect influence on decision¬
making. Some adjudication officers would prefer to err on the side of
the claimant, by making an award in a borderline case even though they
considered that a disallowance was warranted, if they thought that the
SSAT would also err on his side. This was particularly the case on
special hardship allowance appeals where alternative earnings figures
were often presented at the appeal hearing.
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. . we know what they are going to decide on some cases
like comparison of earnings, they are going to allow the
appeal especially if a representative gives alternative
figures. So, if we have any doubts we do err on the side of
the claimant, especially if we think a tribunal will give it
to them anyway." (Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
Another influence acting on adjudication officers which might lead
them to avoid making disallowances on marginal cases was the cost of
appeals, in both money and time.
., cost-effectiveness is another relevant factor, you
think, is it worth disallowing a claimant for a couple of
days if he is likely to appeal and hence cost the DHSS
hundreds of pounds and the adjudication officer hours of
time regardless of the result." (Adjudication Officer,
Office #13)
A more rigorous approach was preferred by other adjudication officers.
". . . if you think a disallowance is the right decision and
you can justify it even though it is possible that an SSAT
might decide otherwise, then you should do it; giving the
claimant the benefit of the doubt doesn't really come into
it, the case should be decided on the facts." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #3)
The indirect influence of SSATs therefore pulls in two directions.
Firstly, it encourages adjudication officers to scrutinise their own
decisions more closely (especially on borderline cases) and to seek
further evidence, or refer for advice in order that the decision is
more firmly grounded and not dependent on subjective judgements.
Secondly, it encourages taking the easy option in hard cases, ie
allowing a claim where perhaps it is not justified, (since claimants
awarded a benefit generally do not appeal), and there is only a slim
possibility that the case will be scrutinised as part of a monitoring
check. It is ironic that those who adopt the more rigorous approach
(being the one which promotes accuracy) may cause themselves more
work, have more of their decisions overturned by SSATs, and hence




Of all the thirty plus social security benefits, disablement benefit
and special hardship allowance are probably the most vulnerable to
delays caused by factors outside the control of the DHSS. On every
claim there will be at least one enquiry to an existing or previous
employer, and in the case of some prescribed diseases (for example,
occupational deafness) the total can easily run into double figures.
In addition, it will frequently be necessary to contact witnesses on
industrial accident cases. Furthermore, once the accident decision
has been made or the prescription test satisfied for a prescribed
disease, then a medical report from an AMP or medical board is
essential. It may also be necessary to seek additional information
from hospital casenotes or consultants (indeed on prescribed diseases
confirmation of the disease or injury is always sought from a
recognised authority).
Much time in the decision-making process is therefore spent waiting
for replies to enquiries, or for routine medical reports to appear.
The response from employers is subject to enormous variations; in
firms where there is an occupational health department and an
efficient accident recording system, replies can be by return of post
such that an accident decision can possibly be made within a week of
receiving the initial BI 95 claim form from the claimant. But where a
firm has no connection with the claimant or with the claim (for
example, in special hardship allowance cases where wage levels of a
suitable alternative employment are being sought) long delays (or no
reply at all) are a common experience. Disablement benefit clerks who
oversee the collection of information have a routine procedure for
bringing cases forward on a weekly basis to check for outstanding
replies, and of sending reminders after a suitable time has elapsed
(usually a week). If two such reminders do not prompt any response
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then the clerk may make some alternative attempt (where one exists) or
refer the case to his supervisor (in practice often the adjudication
officer) to advise on further action.
The whole procedure usually takes months; on one case discussed with
an adjudication officer the comment was made:
"How long did this one take? Five and a half months?
That's normal for a straightforward prescribed disease
case." (Adjudication Officer, Office #9)
No official measure of promptness (for example, 'clearance times') is
made by the DHSS and it is clear then that any meaningful form of
'performance indicator' based on the time taken to clear a case would
be virtually impossible to construct. Nevertheless, there seems
little reason to believe that cases are delayed deliberately; it would
certainly not be in the interest of adjudication officers, nor the
local office, to delay matters. Backlogs of work and the potential
for complaints from claimants (and the time required investigating and
replying to them) are sufficient disincentives to adjudication
officers, HEOs, and managers to ensure that as much time as is
considered necessary for a satisfactory conclusion to a case is
actually expended. If dangers exist in the lack of formal measures of
promptness they lie in the tendency to cut short investigations in
order to clear a case, as the observations by adjudication officers on
the conflict (actual and potential) between speed and accuracy,
discussed earlier, indicate.
Impartiality
Disablement benefit decision-making relies heavily on the quality of
the evidence upon which the adjudication officer has to base a
decision. In the two distinct phases of, firstly, the collection of
information and secondly, deciding the facts from the evidence, there
is scope for bias and prejudice to intrude. The official response to
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this possibility is the advice to the adjudication officer in the IOG
that he or she refrains from personal contact with the claimant and
makes his decision on the papers alone. The other source of possible
bias is the organisation of the DHSS, which the independent character
and structure of adjudication are intended to counteract.
Adjudication officers were asked a series of questions about whether
they felt the advice in the IOG was sound or problematical, and what
their ' independence' meant to them in practice. As the quotations
below will show there was a wide range of responses; whilst also
apparent was the occasional confusion between physical separation from
the claimant and independence from the DHSS.
"... if you haven't seen the claimant then you cannot be
adversely affected by him, or vice versa. I think it is
better for there to be a degree of separation so that you
are only dealing with the facts of the case and not the
personalities involved." (Adjudication Officer, Office #4)
"It revolves around this independence, you don't want it to
appear that the adjudication officer is so closely connected
with the Department. Also you don't want personalities to
come into it if you can possibly avoid it." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #1)
Other adjudication officers thought the IOG advice more a hindrance
than a help,
"... there may be something that comes out in a conversation
that could be very relevant, but the claimants do not know
the rules and regulations and so don't know what is relevant
to us and what isn't. I've always thought that more contact
with the public would give us more of an opportunity to
explain what it is we want from them and what it is we are
trying to achieve." (Adjudication Officer, Office #12)
"Sometimes a claimant will phone up and ask to speak to the
adjudication officer who made the decision but strictly
speaking we shouldn't. I like to speak to the claimant and
I feel stupid telling the claimant that he can't. It's most
peculiar and unnecessarily and only alienates the claimants
from us." (Adjudication Officer, Office #6)
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Since it is considered legitimate for supervisors, but not for
adjudication officers, to see claimants to explain what is happening
with a claim or to answer any other queries, difficulties are
experienced by officials who combine both roles.
. . you get the stupid situation of having to go down to
the counter as supervisor, which I will do if necessary, and
saying that it is not up to me, it's the adjudication
officer who deals with it and he's not allowed to get
involved with the public, while you know all the while that
it's you who is going to make the decision - you feel
stupid." (Adjudication Officer, Office #8)
Another reason why adjudication officers tried to avoid contact with
claimants was that they felt that their role of amicus curiae at any
future tribunal hearing would be jeopardised by seeing the claimant,
whether to elicit information or to explain a decision.
"I can hardly appear independent if I'm in the DHSS office
collecting the information at the counter." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #3)
Most adjudication officers recognised that it is. possible for bias to
creep in to decision-making and that the risk is greater if there has
been face-to-face contact with the claimant since it is inevitable
that some form of personal opinion about him will be formed. Hence,
in offices where there was more than one adjudication officer, it was
the practice to hand over the decision to another adjudication officer
if the claimant had been seen.
Bias and prejudice do not only threaten the adjudication officer,
however. The disablement benefit clerk who performs the essential
function of gathering information at interviews is also vulnerable.
One admitted that it was possible to take down evidence and present it
in a way favourable to the claimant. Alternatively, he could relay
some other response to the adjudication officer in the way that a
claimant's statement was written, notwithstanding that the claimant is
asked to read and sign the submission.
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"It is always possible, for example, to put down two
suggestions for 'suitable alternative employment' but put
more emphasis on one of them." (Disablement benefit clerk,
Office #2)
Adjudication officers had different experiences and notions of the
importance of the independence of the adjudication function from the
DHSS and its other concerns. Many felt their official independence to
be very important:
"I think it is very important to be independent of the
Department as it might make you fairer to the claimant and
that's the main thing, being fair to the claimant."
(Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
"Oh yes, it's very important. If anyone tries to influence
us we take no notice and just do what we want to do,"
(Adjudication Officer, Office #13)
The bulk of the criticism about so-called independence centred around
the actual and potential pressure from management (at HEO and office
manager level) on their general approach to decision-making or to
individual cases.
"If the manager came in and said he wanted something done in
a particular way, it would take a lot to go against him and
do it another way, but I have not been in that position.
But I have been in disagreement with the HEO and I suppose
it is at the back of your mind whether it is better to give
the decision that is wanted, if you see what I mean. "
(Adjudication Officer, Office #3)
Some adjudication officers were concerned that by standing up to such
pressure they were possibly harming their future careers.
"It is nice to be able to say - Look, I'm an adjudication
officer, I must give due time and due consideration to any
decision on a claim and although you are my manager I'm not
prepared to accept any interference from you whilst doing
that job. Now whether that does your career any good I
don't know." (Adjudication Officer, Office #13)
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"... if you made a decision that your senior officer didn't
agree - well, you probably wouldn't be an adjudication
officer for much longer." (Adjudication Officer, Office #2)
The concern with management pressure was real though rarely grounded
in personal experience. However, the comment of one manager suggested
that such concern was not necessarily misplaced.
"I can't go and say to the adjudication officer 'that
decision is wrong, change it'; theoretically anyway I've got
to say 'I don't think that decision is right because of A,
B, and C; don't you think you should have a look at it
again'. But the adjudication officer will usually change
his decision anyway; theoretically, he could say 'no, I
don't want to change that decision, I think I'm right'.
But they know that they shouldn't be causing ripples for the
office or problems for the manager, because if they cause
problems for the manager, then, OK, they can get away with
it on the adjudication side because they can fall back on
their independence, but their judgement will be called into
question and so forth when it comes to promotion."
(Manager, Office #3)
Bias and prejudice can never be eliminated from decision-making. For
most adjudication officers it seems that they arise more by necessity
(ie being obliged to see the claimant either in a supervisory capacity
or as the most effective means of collecting the requisite inform¬
ation). There seemed to be some confusion over what an independent
status demanded; some took it as requiring physical separation from
the claimant, which is not the case (after all, the SSAT is not
considered biased because it holds face-to-face hearings). It is
clear that the adjudication officers' desire for good quality evidence
has to be balanced against the need to detach themselves from
claimants and any personal impressions that may have been formed about
them from whatever source.
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Participation
The analysis of the decision-making process in chapter 2 suggested
that the participation of the claimant would be most appropriate and
make the greatest contribution to accuracy where there were evidential
problems (ie box <2) and box (4) problems of figure 2.8; see p. 71).
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the adjudication officer's
greater problems in deciding disablement benefit claims lie with the
evidence rather than the interpretation of the law. It might be
expected, therefore, that the claimant finds a greater role to play in
the routine administration of disablement benefit than with other
benefits. As far as this study allows a comparison, this indeed
appears to be the case.
Whenever there was some doubt relating to the evidence either on an
industrial accident, a prescription test for a prescribed disease, or
on the lay elements of special hardship allowance, the adjudication
officer in the local office was almost invariably prepared to call the
claimant into the office for a personal interview. Difficulties arose
in the London South Region, however, since, except for a few local
claimants, it was impractical to invite claimants to one of the three
Benefit Offices; instead, where a personal interview was deemed
necessary the claimant was asked into their nearest office where a
clerk would conduct the interview and elicit information according to
a brief prepared by the relevant Benefit Office.
Participation, however, cannot really be considered to be pursued per
se, as an inherently desirable feature of the decision-making process.
Rather, involving the claimant has two purposes; firstly, as mentioned
above to collect information, and, secondly to take the opportunity of
telling the claimant about his claim, particularly when a disallowance
or a less than full award of special hardship allowance looks likely.
Whilst the claimant can always request an interview, the vast majority
are instigated by the adjudication officer who, through the
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disablement benefit clerk, will in effect retain control over the
encounter, the claimant having to respond to a series of questions
whose relevance or importance he or she may not grasp.
The interview takes place primarily for the benefit of the
adjudication officer who is concerned with gathering information on
which to adjudicate. This will occasionally involve weighing
incomplete or contradictory evidence, but it is rare that the claimant
will be aware of this, and so will rarely be in a position to respond
to the evidence of others knowing that it is prejudicial to the claim;
the interview will be carried out in a spirit of seeking more
information, clarifying details etc, rather than as a quasi-judicial
exercise where evidence is openly available to be scrutinised and
refuted if necessary. Where the claimant is given this opportunity,
it is only on the personal initiative of the adjudication officer
through the disablement benefit clerk. And here only an explanation
of the difficulty the adjudication officer is faced with will be
given, rather than giving the claimant an opportunity to reply to any
adverse evidence (which will only be made available should he or she
appeal).
The conclusion that must be drawn, therefore, is that while
disablement benefit and special hardship allowance decision-making
allow a certain degree of involvement of the claimant, participation,
in the wider sense adopted by this thesis, is not well-served.
Accountability
Communication with the claimant is the responsibility of the Secretary
of State not individual adjudication officers. If adjudication
officers wish to contact the claimant for any reason they instruct the
Secretary of State's representative in the local office (the
disablement benefit clerk) on what is required. By far the most cost-
effective method of communication on a mass scale is the use of pro-
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forma letters and forms which the DHSS uses in abundance, both to seek
information from claimants and to inform them of the outcome of their
claims. For claimants receiving everything that they claim there is
probably little of interest in a formal notification, bar the amount
of benefit to be paid, but for unsuccessful claimants, knowing the
reasons for the failure of their claims is essential if an effective
appeal is to be made. Whether the forms used by the DHSS achieve this
purpose is often doubted by those having to issue them. Many felt
that they can be too legalistic, steeped in jargon, and lacking any
real explanation of decisions, even though improvements had been
evident in recent years.
"The claimants are generally unaware of what factors have
been considered in reaching a decision, even appeal
decisions." (Adjudication Officer, Office #4)
"The attitude used to be: 'if you ask, we'll tell you', but
its not like that now - its much more open. We're dealing
with people with very different intellectual backgrounds,
it's difficult to strike the right balance in forms and
letters. Someone might think a form is condescending and
someone else not understand a word of it. Communicating
adjudication decisions is difficult because they have to
mention so much legal jargon." (HEO, Office #6)
A minority dissented, however:
"If every time you asked for a piece of information you've
got to tell them what it is in connection with exactly, and
every time you make a decision you've got to explain the
reasons behind it it would be totally time-consuming and
impossible. (ex-Adjudication Officer, Office #9)
The policy of the DHSS until very recently has been that claimants
should be given a formal notice of adjudication officer's decisions
quoting the relevant legislation under which the decisions were made,
and informing them of their appeal rights. Recent changes have sought
to make the contents of such letters more comprehensible to the public
rather than to provide them with the reasons for decisions.
Nevertheless, the desirability of giving reasons is recognised at all
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levels of the regional organisation, not only per se, but also (and
perhaps primarily) because a claimant with a reasoned explanation for
a decision is thought to be less likely to appeal against the
decision, a situation which, as was explained earlier, the
adjudication officer tries to avoid if at all possible.
"... if I think a case has been confusing, I call people in
. . . you get the decision letter through the post with all
this 'Social Security Act' and they don't understand it, but
where somebody actually sits down and says ' to get this
benefit this has to happen' and you explain it they are more
likely to accept the disallowance ... It's time-consuming
but no more than spending three hours writing an appeal and
three hours at a tribunal . . . you may spend 25 minutes but
you save six hours." (Adjudication Officer, Office #9)
The recognition of the desirability of giving reasons manifests itself
in different ways, mostly in the individual actions of adjudication
officers and in the use of local forms (prepared either by and for the
use of one local office only, or on a regional basis for all local
offices). Local forms and letters were most prominent in special
hardship allowance cases where an appeal frequently arose because of a
dispute over the earnings figures used in the calculation. They were
popular with adjudication officers:
"I think here we do supplement decision letters with letters
of explanation. I wouldn't say that the majority of
disallowed claimants get an explanation, but if I think the
claimant might think we had got it wrong then I would write
out. We haven't been trained to do it and I think that the
adjudication officers vary a lot... I always tell the
disablement benefit clerks to call claimants in to explain
disallowances where I feel that the claimant has not
understood what has been going on, especially on SHA
cases..." (Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
Whilst such letters may be effective, <333 their use was frowned upon
by the CAO in his first report:
"The use in several offices of locally produced stencils on
which adjudication officers gave their decisions contributed
significantly to the high number of comments. Some stencils
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containing errors or omissions were used over a large number
of cases and comment sheets were therefore raised on each
case. " (DHSS, 1985e, para. 21, p. 50)
Most adjudication officers were aware of the long delays that can
result with disablement benefit claims although only a few took it
upon themselves to offer the claimant any explanations:
"They don't get anywhere near enough explanation. As far as
I know there is nothing that is sent out to them to explain
that processing can take weeks, and maybe months, and not to
be surprised to hear nothing for a while." (Adjudication
Officer, Office #12)
"People can put in a claim and hear nothing for months, and
paradoxically it is the straightforward cases which suffer
more; if there are problems the claimant would normally have
been contacted about them. (Adjudication Officer,
Office #3)
Disablement benefit clerks, being faced with claimants in interviews
were even more aware of the need to explain what was happening with
the claim,
"... I explain things all the time. For example, in special
hardship allowance, I definitely tell them that the medical
board has found them fit for light work and that because the
benefit is based on a comparison of earnings I need to know
what they might be capable of." (Disablement benefit clerk,
Office #1)
As with participation, the attention paid to accountability in
disablement benefit decision-making results primarily from other
motives, in particular gathering more information and, more
importantly, avoiding appeals. That there is a concern with limiting
the number of appeals is emphasised by the response of adjudication
officers to receiving a letter of appeal from the claimant, when the
opportunity is sometimes taken to offer a letter of explanation before
processing the appeal in the hope that the appeal will be dropped.
This practice is not wholly cynical however, there is also a genuine
feeling that some appeals are made because the claimant does not fully
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understand why it has been made (partly because of the poor communi¬
cations from the DHSS in the first instance):
"On a clear-cut decision we will try to put them off with a
letter of explanation rather than wasting their time, and
ours, and incurring a lot of expense for everybody, by going
to an appeal that they have got no hope of winning. "
(Adjudication Officer, Office #11)
The desire to avoid appeals clearly results in some claimants
receiving more explanation than they otherwise would have done. But
there are also dangers inherent in this approach. The claimant is in
a particularly weak position, lacking knowledge of the law and of
decision-making procedures, and he is vulnerable to a seemingly
authoritative refutation of his case which may dissuade him from
continuing an appeal which he may nevertheless have won. Adjudication
officers may be convinced that their decision is right, but they can
only be sure in relation to the evidence that they have before them;
and as has been shown earlier it is not infrequent for additional
information to come to light during the appeals process. So, some
doubt must remain on even prima facie, clear cut cases. The desire to
avoid appeals, therefore, can interfere with seeking the 'true facts'
of the case.
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(2) Administrative justice and medical adjudication
(a) Accuracy
The CAO, under whose aegis lay decisions are monitored, has no
jurisdiction over medical adjudication. Furthermore, there is no
comparable monitoring system by which standards can be measured. In a
sense this has not been particularly necessary since the Regional
Office Medical Officers (MOs), until very recently, used to operate a
full scrutiny of all cases both before and after they were seen by a
medical board.
The ' pre-board scrutiny', as it is called, entails each case being
seen by an MO to ensure that any additional information that would
assist the board could be acquired before the board actually sat. This
avoided a possible delay later if the board decided to adjourn whilst
further information was sought, and also contributed to accuracy by
ensuring that the board had as many of the 'true facts' as possible
before it when making a decision. Medical Officers most frequently
requested a summary of the claimant's hospital casenotes (HCNs), a
consultant's report, or an X-ray examination.
Pre-board scrutiny is time-consuming and in a large number of
straightforward cases not necessary at all. As a result, pre-board
scrutiny is no longer carried out on all cases, but is restricted to a
narrow range of cases where HCNs or consultants' reports are almost
invariably necessary. This typically occurs when the AMP (usually a
GP or ex-GP) cannot be expected to have the requisite specialist
knowledge to decide a claim, for example, on eye or ear injuries, or
neurological damage caused by head injuries. One Medical Officer
explained how the cost of pre-board scrutiny had been cut by the
recent changes, but also noted that there had been a price to pay.
"It would be impossible to justify pre-board scrutiny of a
cut finger; but until you have actually seen the file you
cannot be sure that it is 1ust a cut finger. It is said that
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medical boards are perfectly capable of calling for any
further information they need; this is sometimes the case
but sometimes they do not call for further information when
we think it would have allowed them to make a more accurate
and fair assessment. It is much better to get the relevance
and the assessment fixed at the first board. It is
something I feel very strongly about because we end up with
bad decisions; it is not fair to the claimant. The claimant
may get 20% from one board and nothing from the next, he may
be told that his condition is due totally to his accident
and then that it is not relevant at all; this leads to
appeals. I would like to see a far higher proportion of
cases pre-boarded so that we get it right at the first board
which makes all the subsequent boards easy. " (Medical
Officer, Region #1)
The 'post-board scrutiny' is intended as a check on the decisions of
AMPs and boards to ensure that they are reasonably based on the
evidence and to identify any simple errors that might have been made.
The Adjudication Regulations 1984 allow the decision of a medical
board to be referred back when there has been an obvious clerical or
technical error (such as quoting a wrong date, or transcribing left
leg as right leg), but do not sanction any disagreement with the
percentage assessment being raised, except as a Secretary of State
reference to the MAT. tAO> Again, a system of 100% scrutiny used to
operate, but this has been reduced recently to 10%. <A1J A Medical
Officer explained the purpose of the check.
"I'm looking for harmful information first of all because
that is the only thing I can send back in my own right.
I'm also looking for correctness in the actual completion of
the form; if the form is so incorrectly completed that the
decision could not be promulgated then I would draw the
attention of the Medical Boarding Section EO to this - it
may be a small thing like a missing date - and it is up to
him whether this is something that can be returned or not.
The other thing that I am looking at, considering the case
as a whole, is whether the decision is fair to the claimant
and fair to the Secretary of State. By seeing thousands of
cases over the years one gets to some sort of appreciation
of what is a fair award for a given disability and if it is
outrageously outside what the evidence in the file says,
either in the claimant's favour or against the claimant."
(Medical Officer, Region #2)
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Rather than being unpopular with AMPs, post-board scrutiny was seen as
useful.
"They only do spot checks now; it's not really enough. 100%
checking used to give you confidence that the occasional bad
decision was picked up. " (AMP, Region #2)
Another cost-cutting measure which has coincided with the reductions
in pre- and post-board scrutiny has been widespread use of a single
AMP to replace the two-doctor boards on injury assessments (prescribed
disease cases are still seen by two doctors). Reaction to this change
has been mixed; some doctors welcomed it because they preferred
working alone (either out of a natural bent, or because of a lack of
faith in some of their professional colleagues), and thought they
could deal with cases more quickly. But the majority saw the two-
doctor board as having marked advantages over working alone; the
clerical work was easier (one doctor could complete the examination
notes on the BI 118 medical report form whilst the other carried out
the physical examination), they were able to discuss the percentage
assessment which led to more balanced decisions, and, therefore, the
claimant could be more satisfied that justice was being done.
"I'm not suggesting that one doctor boards are giving
grossly wrong decisions, but I do feel that with two doctors
better decisions usually emerged." (AMP, Region #1)
A Senior Medical Officer had no doubt of the effect of these changes:
"... standards have all gone down because single-doctor
boards are not giving cases due consideration. When I say
that the standard is falling I mean that they will cut
corners such as not adjourning for further information when
they clearly should." (SMO, Region #1)
Most doctors did not consider that their own decision-making behaviour
had altered, although one recognised the danger and thought that an
occasional two-doctor board would be useful:
- 221 -
"A two-doctor board might serve as a form of quality
control; I mean that I could gauge whether, as a single
doctor board, I was slipping into a more or less generous
style. " (AMP, Region #3)
Training
Training for AMPs does not adhere to a strict pattern but tends to be
tailored to what the Regional Senior Medical Officer perceives as
necessary for each individual. An initial meeting or two will be held
during which the Industrial Injuries scheme and the duties of the AMP
are explained (plus the details of any other benefits that he may also
be reporting on, for example attendance allowance or mobility
allowance) and he will be given guidance documents, most importantly
the Industrial Injuries Handbook (DHSS, 1986a). The new recruit will
then join an experienced boarding doctor as the second member of a
two-doctor board. After a time he or she will act as Chairman with a
Regional MO as the subordinate member. When the MO judges that the
new AMP is competent to act as a single-doctor board, he or she will
be allocated cases accordingly by the Regional Office Medical Boarding
Sect ion.
Most doctors, both AMPs and DHSS MOs, felt that direct experience was
the most effective form of training, and allowed the AMP to gain in
competence quickly. In contrast, relying on them to undertake a
certain amount of self-instruction (which is. required of the lay
adjudication officer) was considered impractical. As with adjudi¬
cation officers, it was felt that not every doctor could fulfil the
role of AMP satisfactorily, although once appointed the new AMP was,
in practice, difficult to remove.
"I think the only way you can train a medical boarding
doctor is actually physically doing it, filling in the forms
as you go along, explaining after you have seen the claimant
why you do a certain thing. My only concern in that respect
is that if you take on a doctor as an AMP you take him on
full-time, as it were, without any probationary period.
Once you have got him you are stuck with him, good, bad or
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indifferent. Perhaps there should be a period of say three
months or so many sessions after which a decision could be
taken about the suitability of the doctor for this kind of
work. " (SMO, Region #2)
Remedial training was often felt to be necessary for less than
satisfactory AMPs but it was only one of a number of tactics adopted
to deal with him. One SMO explained his arsenal:
"The question is what can we do when we pick up mistakes.
The only thing we can do legally is to refer the case to an
MAT. If we find a doctor who is making the same daft
mistake time after time, we can take completed cases back to
discuss with him or we can constitute two doctor boards for
him to sit on with a full-time MO as the other doctor. This
is a fairly good way of approaching the problem.
You can cut down his sessions but there is a limit to that
because of the workload, and in any case what do you say
when they ring up to complain that they are not getting
boards any more. In brief, there is really no carrot and no
stick, all we can do is to try to cajole and persuade. I
would love to be able to say, without any ill feeling, to a
few of them that this kind of work is clearly not their cup
of tea and that we ought to part company. There are about
5-10% of these people who I would just like to get rid of.
It is very difficult in general to change anybody's attitude
and in most of these cases it is a matter of attitude; if
the chap does not really care, if his attitude to the whole
process is ' this is a cushy way of earning £50 in an
afternoon' it is not easy to persuade him to put in more
commitment and to think more about what he is doing. " (SMO,
Region #3)
Clearly, practising GPs cannot be expected to devote as much time to
training as the captive novice adjudication officer. But one of the
dangers in the relatively informal arrangements that exist at present
is that the importance of the essentially legal character of much of
what they are expected to perform is lost.
Advice
Coincident with changes in the advice arrangements on the lay side,
there have been developments on medical adjudication which have
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revealed that the somewhat ad hoc arrangements of the past have
contravened the principle of independent adjudication.
The discovery of the unacceptable practice of Regional Office Medical
Officers referring mobility allowance cases back to AMPs or medical
board chairmen in order to get a decision changed (see chapter 6), has
led the DHSS to instruct MOs not to have any form of contact with AMPs
about individual cases regardless of the benefit involved. Prior to
this MOs were often called upon by AMPs to advise on difficult cases
(in much the same way that the RAO Section advised adjudication
officers in local offices). The situation now is that, apart from the
Industrial Injuries Handbook the AMP has nowhere to turn to for
advice, except perhaps to his peers. Nevertheless, not many felt very
inconvenienced and most relied more on their own experience to deal
with difficult cases.
"We see each other when we are in the boarding centre. We
do discuss cases; if problems arise with particularly
difficult cases we discuss them, it is very helpful." (AMP,
Region #2)
'I've opened the II Handbook only on rare occasions - five
times in 40 years. There were no problems getting help when
there was a Medical Officer on site, but now if I'm stuck
I'll ring the Regional Office, or I'll pop in and ask -
we're not supposed to do this, by the way. But we must not
talk specifically about individual cases, only in general or
hypothetical terms. It's a damned nonsense; two heads are
always better than one." (AMP, Region #3)
One Regional Office Medical Officer felt that his role was now
extremely limited.
"I am not allowed to advise specifically on a case but I can
comment in broad terms, although this is not very common.
An AMP may ring up and I will reply in 'general' terms,
which is somewhat of an artificial distinction. And of
course he can ask for more evidence, HCNs, X-ray reports etc
which we will get for him; we just act as medical clerks
really." (Medical Officer, Region #1)
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The recent changes clearly upset many DHSS MOs with their implication
that they were only acting as agents of DHSS policy. One SMO summed
up his feelings:
"Officially they should not come to us, and when AMPs do
ring us we have to tell them we cannot help. But there are
ways of bending things; you could treat the question as a
kind of hypothetical case when we half know that it isn't,
and so discuss things in general terms. We do not quibble
with their status as statutory authorities, we never have,
and we do not argue with the fact that some permanent staff
in the past who have now retired went beyond the limits to
the extent of telling boarding doctors that they will change
this assessment or that period of award. We recognise that
this was wrong, but we, and I think I can speak for all SMOs
collectively, cannot see why the lawyers are so adamant that
we cannot give these people reasonable advice. It would
save so much money apart from everything else. But as
things stand, all I can do is to have as many as possible of
my MOs sit in on two doctor boards and hope some of the
correct practices rub off." (SMO, Region #2)
As with training, the arrangements for advice giving to AMPs are
poorly developed when compared with the lay side. The DHSS edict to
its Regional medical staff to refrain from advising on individual
cases, certainly stopped a practice in which bias could have intruded,
but there have been no replacement facilities with the resulting
confusion and frustration amongst DHSS doctors and the independent
AMPs.
Monitoring
Whereas the lay monitoring system is intended to furnish the CAO with
the raw material for his annual report, the monitoring that is carried
out on medical adjudication serves no such purpose, but is geared to
improving standards. Even with the reduced 1 in 10 scrutiny, MOs are
still concerned with identifying the weak AMP and taking what limited
action is open to them. The importance of making a good first
assessment was always recognised.
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"If an AMP makes consistent errors, ie decisions which do
not follow from the evidence, he will be spoken to. If one
of them is in the habit of making a complete porridge of
things one has to try to get him to change because an MAT
case costs several hundreds of pounds; there is a cost that
comes into this." (Medical Officer, Region #1)
One SMO thought the emphasis of monitoring was misplaced, however.
"I may have got it wrong but there seems to be an assumption
in the Department that everybody is going to get everything
wrong unless they are very closely supervised and have their
wrists slapped pretty frequently. I do not think that this
is right, it should be more of an educational process.
After all you are paying quite a lot of money to fairly
highly educated people and the assumption should be that
they are going to get it right, you should not be fault-
picking as such, and probably under lay side influence we
have adopted their attitude." (SMO, Region #2)
But for most AMPs, whilst they were aware of the post-board scrutiny,
there was little awareness that this constituted a formal monitoring
of their standards of work.
One feature of medical monitoring is its low profile compared with lay
monitoring. It would probably be an exaggeration to suggest that
monitoring by DHSS MOs is covert since, most AMPs were clearly aware
of post-board scrutiny, but there is no formal reporting back of
standards to individual AMPs or to medical boards comparable to a
Regional monitoring team report. Rather, the results of post-board
scrutiny are used to identify poor AMPs in order that some remedial
action can be taken. This difference in approach would seem to derive
from the attitude of DHSS MOs to their professional colleagues, as
revealed in the quotation above from a Senior Medical Officer, ie that
professionals exercising their specialist knowledge should not be
subject to the same kind of scrutiny as 'untrained' clerical staff
administering a set of statutory legal rules. That AMPs are also
operating a system of statutory legal rules seems to have been
conveniently overlooked.
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Although the monitoring of medical decisions is carried out by
Departmental officials, not an independent agency comparable to OCAO,
and despite the recent replacement of 100% post-board scrutiny by a 1
in 10 check, Medical Officers were confident that the current
arrangements allow them to identify and take action on unsatisfactory
individuals, even if they lack the ultimate sanction of removing them
from the panel of approved AMPs.
Medical Appeal Tribunals
Whereas the spectre of an SSAT hearing often prompted the lay
adjudication officer to take a more rigorous approach to decision¬
making on individual cases, there was little evidence of an equivalent
effect on the medical side. AMPs seemed little affected by the
anticipated response of an MAT to their assessments, nor (and here
they resembled adjudication officers) were they much influenced by
overturned decisions, although some found MAT findings useful. Of the
16 interviewed only two thought that were affected in advance.
"One does try to think in terms of how an MAT might decide a
case. Getting the results is very useful. I remember a
recent case where the MAT took a different view to me which
I will remember in future." (AMP, Region #1)
"I1 11 try to avoid an MAT if possible since they are so
expensive... I'm sure their decisions are lodged in my
subconscious." (AMP, Region #1)
For others, MATs were either of passing interest only, or virtually
negligible;
"We don't regard MAT results as precedents - they give such
a wide variety of decisions. They don't influence us. "
(AMP, Region #3)
I get a bundle of cases months and months after I've seen
the case when I've forgotten all about them; they're of
academic interest only. " (AMP, Region #2)
"You can't take any notice of them; sometimes the results
are a complete laugh." (AMP, Region #1)
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There are several reasons why appeal tribunals should have such
disparate effects on initial decision-makers. Firstly, the nature of
the decision required of AMPs is different from that demanded of
adjudication officers. For the latter, most decisions are black or
white (for example, either a claimant suffered an industrial accident
or he did not; or, either a claimant has worked in a prescribed
occupation or he has not), but for AMPs the most common decision is at
what percentage level a claimant's disablement should be assessed.
So, in practice, they have a choice, not from only two possible
decisions, but from a range. AMPs fully expect, therefore, that
there will be a degree of variability between themselves (and with
MATs) without there necessarily being any inconsistency in their
decisions. That a colleague, or an MAT, chooses to award a slightly
different percentage figure, therefore, tells them little about their
own standards. Furthermore, some AMPs expressed a suspicion that MATs
who awarded 1 or 2 X above their own assessment, or extended the
period of a provisional award by a few months, were really just
offering a convenient sop to the claimant, rather than venturing any
criticism of the original decision.
Promoting accuracy - a summary
Whilst less rigidly defined, the structural features of medical
adjudication which tend to promote accuracy could be argued to be as
effective as for lay adjudication, but their strengths and weaknesses
tend to be in different areas. The structure of training is
reasonable and sufficiently under the control of MOs to ensure that
AMPs reach an adequate level of competence before commencing their
solo careers even if some seem to lack a full appreciation and
understanding of the legal nature of much adjudication. The advice
system has been severely weakened, however, without any compensatory
developments. Monitoring, despite its recent retrenchment, can still
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identify weak AMPs and prompt remedial, educative action. The appeals
structure appears largely irrelevant to standards but, as it was never
intended to contribute to them, this cannot be taken as criticism of
the present arrangements.
Particular problems arise from recruitment policy, however. One SMO
has already been quoted as saying that it is difficult to remove a
doctor from the boarding panel, and a Medical Officer that he laments
the lack of a 'probationary period' for new AMPs. The result is that
in some areas where recruitment is difficult, unsatisfactory doctors
can remain on the panel, and unlike the local office they cannot
subsequently be found a niche elsewhere in the system.
(b) Fairness
Like elements of the lay decision-making process, medical adjudication
relies on evidence from outside sources (mostly hospital casenotes and
consultants' reports) which makes promptness a difficult concept to
put into practice. The AMP himself has no control whatsoever over the
process (except where he requests further information) but merely sees
cases when instructed by the Regional Office Medical Boarding Section.
Bias and prejudice can find expression in the assessments of AMPs give
since there is usually an element of choice in what percentage figure
to award (except the scheduled assessments) or what offsets or greater
disablements are relevant. Whilst adjudication officers can remain
separate from claimants, there is no question of AMPs similarly
keeping their distance such that any interaction between them may
colour AMPs' judgements.
On the medical side, there is little meaningful participation by
claimants in the decision-making process. In practice, claimants are
subject to a series of questions from which the AMP will complete the
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'claimant's statement' on the BI 118 but apart from that a medical
examination will proceed anonymously. No indication of the AMP's
assessment is given until the claimant receives the official notifi¬
cation of the decision later. One doctor saw this as inadequate,
"I go to some lengths to explain the implications of the
examination, although I never mention percentage
assessments. For example, on a second board after a
provisional award I would explain that the examination might
lead to an increase or a fall in benefit. Claimants should
know what is happening to avoid the possibility that they
may feel they were 'being done' by the system." (AMP,
Region #1)
The medical assessment is received on a standard form which compared
with adjudication officer decision letters is relatively informative,
giving the AMP's assessment of the claimant's condition and any pre-
and post-conditions which affect the percentage figure awarded. But
there was doubt about whether this was adequate
"It would be very difficult to explain to a lay person why
they were assessed, say, at 5% for a lower back injury. It
might be easier to put it in words on a form; for example,
'5% is awarded on the basis that he was only off work for
three weeks after the accident, there are no neurological
signs, and physical examination shows only minimal
limitations of movement', something like that. I think that
would be entirely reasonable, and far more useful from the
claimant's point of view than worrying about the relevant
loss of faculty. I do not see why you cannot give these
people a simple, straightforward explanation in non-
legalistic terms, they pay into a scheme to cover them
against injury at work and so should be entitled to know why
they have been awarded so much money." (Medical Officer,
Region #2)
The difficulty of giving a meaningful explanation of an assessment
mentioned above, results from the artificiality of a scale of
percentage points assigned to various disabilities. To say that a
person who has lost a thumb is 30% disabled, or a person having had
both legs amputated is 100% disabled, is meaningless in any medical
sense; the quantification of disablement is only a necessary legal
- 230 -
construct. The prescribed assessments in Schedule 2 at least provide
a comprehensible explanation of a particular assessment where relevant
(ie 'you have lost a thumb, therefore you are assessed at 30% because
that is the law'), but for other disabilities (for example, those
resulting from back injuries) such an explanation is not available.
Nevertheless, this should not prevent a greater level of explanation,
such as that suggested by the Medical Officer quoted above, being
possible. At present, however, accountability to the claimant is as
poorly served on the medical questions as it is on the lay questions.
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Part IV - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter has used the theoretical approach developed in chapter 2
to analyse empirically decision-making on initial claims for
industrial disablement benefit (and one of its additions, special
hardship allowance). The aim of this concluding section is to review
briefly the conclusions reached and to identify possible ways in which
the decision-making system for industrial disablement benefit could be
developed to promote the satisfaction of the demands of administrative
justice.
1 - The lay decision-makers
(a) The complex task of routine decision-making
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated clearly that to call the
activity of front-line officials 'routine decision-making' diguises
the complexity of the task that confronts them. Industrial disable¬
ment benefit itself is a complex benefit. It can be claimed following
an industrial accident or by contracting from one of over fifty
prescribed conditions. When it has been awarded the claimant is
entitled to claim a number of additional benefits. An analysis of
disablement benefit decision-making, therefore, requires a series of
separate analyses involving the various elements of the legislation
and their related evidential requirements.
For some questions (for example, on industrial accidents) the policy
space at the centre of the decision-making doughnut has been reduced
as the accumulated case-law and legislative amendments since the
inception of the Industrial Injuries scheme have added further layers
of decision criteria within which the adjudication officer has to make
decisions. For some other questions (for example, on the more recent
additions to the list of prescribed diseases, such as occupational
deafness), the policy space remains comparatively large, and is the
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source of considerable problems for decision-makers. However, whilst
the interpretation of the law remains problematic in some areas, the
most difficulties for adjudication officers arise from the evidential
requirements of the legislation, since there is often no definitive
statement of what constitutes the evidence or where its limits lie,
Using the diagrammatic representation of the decision-making process
introduced in chapter 2 (reproduced below), much of the activity on
disablement benefit claims takes place within box (2), whilst box <3>
problems arise occasionally. Decision-making within box (4) is not
common but presents the adjudication officer with considerable
difficulties , as for example on the occupational deafness condition



















Using the doughnut metaphor, what is happening within the policy space
in the hole in the centre is that the choice between a number of
possible decisions (which frequently reduces to a two-way yes/no
choice) is made not by reference to an extraneous set of decision
criteria but by the technique of ' balancing probabilities' with the
constraint that ultimately it is for the claimant to prove his or her
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case; ie the adjudication officer is asking whether on the evidence
presented the claimant 'on the balance of probabilities' satisfies the
statutory criteria. The collection of the evidence is therefore
identified as a crucial and sometimes decisive stage in the process,
thus placing a large measure of responsibility (and concomitant power
and influence) upon the information gatherers, principally the
adjudication officer and the disablement benefit clerk, and (perhaps
unwittingly) on the information providers. As the law becomes more
clear-cut then whosoever decides the information on which a decision
is made, becomes the de facto decision-maker regardless of whom
appends their signature to the final decision as the legal decision¬
maker.
The decision-making procedures for industrial disablement benefit and
special hardship allowance are an aggregate of a series of decisions
taken by various actors applying the appropriate decision criteria to
the relevant evidence. And because each stage in the process, ie each
sub-decision, affects the next stage it is as important that the
demands of administrative justice are satisfied at each stage. But as
the analysis of decision-making has shown, the various elements of
administrative justice assume a greater or lesser importance according
to where the difficulties or imprecision lies, For example, it was
argued that where there are evidential problems then participation
becomes more important as a means of ensuring that the 'true facts of
the case' emerge. The validity of this is demonstrated by the fact
that the SSAT, in which participation is an integral part of its modus
operandi, is a more effective forum for eliciting information.
<b) Administrative justice and industrial disablement benefit
The results of the monitoring system presented in Part III suggests
that standards of decision-making on industrial accidents and SHA
claims have declined between the publication of the first two OCAO
reports, and that decision-making on industrial disablement benefit is
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similarly in need of improvement. However, it was also noted that the
OCAO method of "raising adjudication comments', which are then
aggregated to give an overall picture of a local office's performance,
is not entirely satisfactory as an accurate reflection of standards of
adjudication. Furthermore, the manner of their presentation can often
alienate those very officers whom the reports are intended to inspire
to higher standards. There is clearly room for greater sophistication
in the measurement and reporting of the accuracy of adjudication and
lay questions.
Notwithstanding these reservations about the measurement of accuracy,
there are several features of the local office decision-making and
managerial arrangements that militate against the achievement of high
quality decision-making. The demands of the combined adjudication
officer/supervisor role clearly hinder the concentration required for
the contemplative task of adjudication. There are also tensions
created between the need to remain impartial, which requires
separation from the claimant, and the need to supervise and assist
clerical staff in their dealings with the public. The role of HEO/EO
is fraught with problems, although on occasions an officer with the
right background can fulfil the requirements of the post admirably.
To be able to advise and check the work of adjudication officers HEOs
need to be as good adjudicators themselves. This rarely occurs, and
is likely to become rarer as HEOs lose, or fail to acquire, up-to-date
experience of continually evolving legislation. The experience
necessary for the adjudication officer to perform adequately is also
frequently lost as staff on the EO grade are subject to the seemingly
ubiquitous practice of staff rotation every two or two-and-a-half
years. These difficulties could be tackled in a number of ways.
Adjudication officers could be modelled on the erstwhile insurance
officers, who had no managerial responsibilities but remained in their
posts long enough to accumulate and make full use of adjudication
experience. Alternatively the 'AO' part of the HEO/AO's remit could
be strengthened, by, for example, reducing the number of their
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management tasks, increasing day-to-day involvement with decision¬
making, and providing more frequent training. Adjudication could be
further strengthened by the reintroduction of the advice function into
the Regional Office to provide support for HEOs and adjudication
officers. The importance of good and freely available advice is
emphasised by the comparatively better performance of the London South
Benefit Offices and the larger local offices (such as Doncaster) who
have been able to compensate for the disappearance of Regional Office
advice by turning to the fund of knowledge within each office which
has built up as a result of the large disablement benefit workload and
the number of adjudication officers in close proximity.
The administrative justice demands of participation and accountability
are very patchily served in both the formal decision-making arrange¬
ments and the day-to-day practice of local office staff. How much the
claimant is involved in decision-making and how much information he is
given about the process and the decision itself, is dependent on the
interest and diligence of individual staff, rather than acknowledged
as a desirable aspect of their work. A requirement, therefore, that
adjudication officers provide claimants with reasons for their
activities and decisions could be the driving force behind greater
participation, a greater guarantee of impartiality and hence a greater
likelihood that an accurate decision emerges from the process. If
this necessitates greater contact with the claimant then this should
be tolerated, since the requirement to account fully for decisions
should counteract any possible intrusion of bias or prejudice.
A peculiar feature of disablement benefit decision-making that, as far
as is known, does not occur for any other benefit (except sickness
benefit), is the mix of local offices and the centralised benefit
offices. There is a current debate within the DHSS (following a
recommendation of Oglesby (1983)) about whether the range of benefits
for disabled people should be administered from Regional Disablement
Centres rather than local offices, which make the London South
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arrangements of particular interest and relevance. <A33 From an
administrative justice perspective there seems a strong case for some
form of centralisation; the Benefit Offices return by far the lowest
comment rates and because there are few competing benefits within the
office (bar sickness benefit) and because cover is always available
for absent adjudication officers, processing can be quicker. Further¬
more, impartiality can be maintained due to the remoteness of the
offices from most claimants. The one drawback, however, is that this
remoteness and the lack of personal contact with claimants, hamper
participation and accountability, which have been identified as being
of particular importance in ensuring that the maximum amount of good
quality evidence is available for the adjudication officer. And where
evidence requirements are perhaps most difficult, on special hardship
allowance calculations, it is not surprising to find that the benefit
offices record their highest level of comments (see table 5.8).
2 - The medical decision-makers
Considerable efforts have been devoted over the past five years to the
rationalisation of lay adjudication (especially with the introduction
of OCAO and OPSSAT). The current arrangements for decision-making by
medical practitioners has developed from a similarly loose basis (ie
somewhat laissez-faire mixture of Departmental and independent
functions) but are the result of two, rather different stimuli.
Firstly, as a response by the DHSS to the recognition of certain legal
deficiencies in the decision-making process (ie in the relationship
between relevant loss of faculty, disability and disablement, and the
illegal practice of Regional Office Medical Officers referring cases
back to medical board chairmen). And secondly, in response to
Departmental cost-cutting measures such as the reductions in pre- and
post-board scrutiny, and the introduction of single-doctor boards.
The outcome of this avalanche of changes is that medical adjudication
is in something of a mess. The confusion and difficulties experienced
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by AMPs by the greater demands for a more legalistic mode of thinking
required in the revised BI 118 forms may be expected to subside as
experience is gained. However, the confused state of the advice and
monitoring function of Departmental medical officers is likely to
endure. A possible response to deal with these difficulties is the
establishment of a medical equivalent of the CAO's organisation. A
'Medical CAO' could have similar functions of providing advice and
guidance on medical questions (although his advice need not be
restricted to medical practitioners, since adjudication officers also
require medical guidance occasionally), and a responsibility for
monitoring standards of decision-making. The obvious people to carry
out these duties are the existing Regional Office Medical Officers who
could be transferred to the establishment (though not necessarily
physically) of the Medical CAO in order to maintain a comparable
independence to the Southampton personnel. One immediate task of the
Medical CAO might be to review the recent changes in pre- and post-
board scrutiny to ensure that the new arrangements are adequate for
monitoring purposes and for the maintenance and improvement of
standards of decision-making. A similar review could also be made of
the effect on standards of the introduction of single-doctor boards.
3 - Conclusion
The social security system is not a slave to administrative justice.
As a branch of the state's apparatus it must perform a variety of
different roles which may not necessarily be compatible at any one
time. Social security in particular is an economic and social tool
which the government can wield in order to pursue its own particular
vision of social order. But for individual claimants such broad
issues are far from their everyday concerns with their rights to be
provided with every available assistance from a state service. And it
is in this respect that administrative justice can serve as both a
means of checking that the administrative agency is fulfilling its
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responsibilities to the individual and of providing a prescriptive
framework for future improvements.
This study of industrial disablement benefit decision-making has
presented a picture of a system beset with anomalies and in a state of
general decline. Such a conclusion arises not only from an analysis
of the available documentary data but also, and perhaps more
tellingly, from the experiences of those who have a responsibility for
operating the system.
However, the analytical framework of administrative justice utilised
in this chapter has not only provided a diagnosis of the problems of
the system but has also enabled an agenda for reform to emerge. Some
of these recommendations may have a wider applicability for other
social security benefits, whilst others are more specific to
industrial disablement benefit decision-making. Following a
comparable analysis of mobility allowance decision-making in
chapter 6, therefore, the concluding chapter will present a brief
review of the policy ideas arising from the two empirical studies and
suggest where reforms would be most effective in the pursuit of
administrative justice.
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CHAPTER 6 - MOBILITY ALLOWANCE
Part I - BACKGROUND
1 - The Origins of Mobility Allowance
The mobility allowance was introduced in s. 37A of the Social Security
Act 1975 (inserted by s. 22 of the Social Security Pensions Act 1975)
and came into payment on 1st January 1976, Prior to 1975 assistance
for people with restricted mobility had been mainly through the
provision of invalid tricycles (or 'trikes' as they were more commonly
known) or, for a minority, a small car. The introduction of this new
benefit marked a distinct shift in policy away from help in kind to
the provision of cash.
The origins of mobility assistance for the disabled can be traced back
to 1921 and the introduction by the British Red Cross of motorised
bath chairs for ex-servicemen disabled in the First World War. These
single-seat, three-wheeler machines evolved into the familiar trike of
the post-Second World War period. Help for the civilian disabled,
however, was not available until 1948 when the relevant provisions of
the NHS Act 1946 were implemented. Under the Act the trike became
available to any claimant having one of the following three
disabilities: (i) loss of both legs; (ii) defects in the locomotor
system or heart and lungs which, to all intents and purposes, render
him unable to walk, and (iii) a less severe disability than in (ii)
but which made it impossible for him to travel to and from work (Ogus
and Barendt, p. 181). Also in 1946 a Royal Warrant empowered the
Minister of Health to defray the costs of a car incurred by ex-
servicemen who were severely disabled. In 1960, it was announced that
most war pensioners (and not only those severely disabled) could opt
for a car, either for themselves to drive or for another, nominated
person. Again following in the slipstream of the war disabled, this
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facility was extended in 1964 to disabled civilians who could satisfy
fairly narrow eligibility criteria (the claimant, who had to be
capable of driving, had to be living with a relative who was either
eligible himself for a trike or was blind, or had to be in sole charge
of a young child for a substantial part of the day).
Concurrent with the developments in the 1960s was the growth of a
vociferous and increasingly influential lobby on behalf of disabled
drivers and also, importantly, of disabled people unable to drive (and
hence ineligible for a trike or car). Pressure groups campaigned to
extend provision of vehicles to more groups of disabled drivers and
non-drivers, and for claimants to be provided with cars rather than
trikes (Large, 1977). It was argued that trikes were unreliable and
dangerous; furthermore, they could not carry a passenger, and they
could not be driven by some groups of disabled people (especially
children) who were as much in need of assistance with transport
difficulties as the actual beneficiaries. Partly as a result of this
pressure, the vehicle service was under almost constant review by the
Ministry of Health (and after 1966, the DHSS) from the mid-60s to the
early 70s, culminating in the appointment of an independent inquiry
(under the chairmanship of Baroness Sharp) in 1972.
Lady Sharp's report (DHSS, 1974a) acknowledged and endorsed the
criticisms of the trike, as dangerous, unreliable and lacking
passenger facilities, and of the vehicle scheme as unfairly
discriminating against non-drivers. The proposed solution, however,
ran contrary to the tide of opinion coming from the disability lobby;
as Large writes:
"...all the organisations which submitted evidence to [Lady
Sharp] asked basically for a cash solution to the mobility
problem." (1977, p. 198)
Despite the overwhelming support for cash rather than kind (seen as
the only feasible method of introducing parity of treatment for
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drivers and non-drivers), the Sharp Report proposed the abolition of
the trike and its replacement, when economically feasible, by a small
car, whilst the option of a cash allowance in place of a vehicle would
be subject to tighter eligibility criteria. These proposals proved
unpopular with the incoming Labour Government; the provision of cars
to all trike owners would have been prohibitively expensive and the
eligibility criteria suggested in the report (based on the need for a
car to maintain or obtain employment) were seen as socially divisive
(at a time of rapidly rising unemployment) and would also have
disentitled some 13,500 existing beneficiaries (Brown, 1984, p.266).
The Government's response was to reject the Sharp Report recommend¬
ations and instead opt for a cash allowance to replace the invalid
tricycle. With this political decision taken, the problem become more
of a technical exercise: to devise a new benefit to replace the
existing trike scheme which would be fair to all disabled people with
walking difficulties, regardless of their age or ability to drive a
vehicle. The task, under Ministerial surveillance, was entrusted to a
small group of DHSS civil servants.
Within this group an early decision had to be taken on which groups of
disabled people should be included in the new scheme in addition to
the physically handicapped, who remained the main target population.
Consideration was given to mentally handicapped, mentally ill and
blind people with mobility problems, but none of these groups was
eventually included. The reasons for this were partly because of the
high costs involved and partly because a physical test of walking
difficulty kept more closely to the eligibility criteria of the trike
scheme, which was considered desirable since many of the first
recipients of mobility allowance would be trike owners who were
'blanketted in', ie not required to satisfy the new criteria.
Furthermore, it was considered that the blind, mentally handicapped,
etc. who could probably walk but only with assistance, would be more
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appropriate client groups for the recently introduced attendance
allowance.
Like the trike scheme, mobility allowance was intended to assist those
with walking difficulties as well as those totally unable to walk.
The problem, therefore, was to define in legislative terms a test
which would include this target group, numerically far larger than
those who could not walk at all. The form of words decided upon was
'virtually unable to walk' (Social Security Act 1975 s. 37A(1)) which
was intended to bring within the scheme those people who could only
move about a little. In order that this would be seen as a fair test
a requirement was included that walking ability should be assessed out
of doors since it was not increased mobility within the home (where
household fixtures and furniture make getting about that much easier)
that was the desired objective but, according to the Minister for the
Disabled at the time, "to get out and about, to be physically in the
community as well as members of it" (quoted in Brown, 1984, p. 266).
The 'virtually unable to walk' test, as will be seen later, has
assumed a dominating importance in the administration of mobility
allowance.
The provisions of the mobility allowance scheme are the product of
developments stretching back over 50 years before its introduction in
1975. Those designing the scheme did not have carte blanche but were
constrained by what had gone before and by the all-pervasive concern
of Governments to limit the costs of the social security system. The
result of these shaping forces is evident in the detail of the primary
and secondary legislation which govern the administration of mobility
allowance. This legislation is the subject of the next section.
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2 - The Legislation
The eligibility criteria for mobility allowance are comparatively few
and, on the face of it, fairly clear and comprehensible; the problems
they raise will only emerge as the detail of the administration of the
benefit is analysed.
Section 37A(1) of the Social Security Act 1975 sets out the
fundamental test of eligibility:
"...a person who satisfies prescribed conditions as to
residence or presence in Great Britain shall be entitled
to a mobility allowance for any period throughout which
he is suffering from physical disablement such that he
is either unable to walk or virtually unable to do so. "
The Act itself did not give any indication of how 'virtually unable to
walk' was to be interpreted but the position became clearer with the
publication of the Mobility Allowance Regulations 1975 (SI 1975/1573),
(subsequently amended by SI 1979/172). Regulation 3(1) now reads:
"A person shall only be treated ... as suffering from
physical disablement such that he is either unable to walk
or virtually unable to do so, if his physical condition as a
whole is such that, without having regard to circumstances
peculiar to that person as to place of residence or as to
place of, or nature of, employment -
(a) he is unable to walk; or
(b) his ability to walk out of doors is so limited, as
regards the distance over which or the speed at which
or the length of time for which or the manner in which
he can make progress on foot without severe
discomfort, that he is virtually unable to walk; or
(c) the exertion required to walk would constitute a
danger to his life or would lead to a serious
deterioration in his health."
Regulation 3(2) adds the qualification that a claimant's ability to
walk should only be assessed taking into account any artificial aid or
prosthesis which a claimant does, or could, use (such as an artificial
leg, walking stick or frame, etc.). Notwithstanding regulation 3(2),
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a claimant has four means of satisfying s. 37A(1) by fulfilling (a),
(b) or either condition of (c) in regulation 3(1).
Section 37A<2) of the Act seeks to exclude from the scheme people
suffering from short-term disabilities or incapacities (such as a
broken leg or sprained ankle) for whom the benefit was never intended,
and those people who, though immobile, could not under any circum¬
stances make use of a cash allowance. Thus s. 37A(2) reads:
"... a person qualifies for the allowance only if -
(a) his inability or virtual inability to walk is likely
to persist for at least 12 months from the time when a
claim for the allowance is received by the Secretary
of State; and
(b) during most of that period his condition will be such
as permits him from time to time to benefit from
enhanced facilities for locomotion."
The residence and presence conditions referred to in s.37A(1) are
prescribed more specifically in regulation 2 of the Mobility Allowance
Regulations. Regulation 2(1) requires that in general a claimant must
show:
(a) that he is ordinarily resident in Great Britain; and
(b) that he is present in Great Britain; and
(c) that he has been present in Great Britain for a period
of, or periods amounting to an aggregate to, no less
than 52 weeks in the [previous] 18 months ..."
Regulation 2(3) provides some exceptions to these requirements for,
inter alia, servicemen and their families, workers on the continental
shelf and those temporarily absent from the country.
Section 37A(5) contains a number of age criteria that the claimant
must satisfy to qualify; it reads:
"No person shall be entitled to a mobility allowance -
(a) in respect of a period in which he is under the age of
5 or over the age of 75
(aa) in respect of a period in which he is over the age of
65 but under the age of 75 unless either -
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(i) he had been entitled to a mobility allowance in
respect of a period ending immediately before the
date on which he attained the age of 65; or
(ii) he would have been so entitled but for paragraph
(b) below and a claim for the allowance by or in
respect of him is made before the date on which
he attained the age of 66;
(b) except in prescribed cases, for any week before that
in which a claim for the allowance by or in respect of
him is received by the Secretary of State."
The age constraints are primarily cost-cutting provisions. Some just¬
ification may be offered for the lower age limit of 5 since it could
be argued that it is reasonable for parents to take responsibility for
the transport costs incurred by small children up to school age
regardless of their physical capabilities. But no such rationale can
be offered for the upper age restrictions; disqualifying new claimants
over 65 and stopping the benefit at 75 can only act to the
disadvantage of old people with mobility problems. c15
The walking criteria, the 12-month duration test and the requirement
that mobility allowance benefit the claimant are all deemed medical
questions. <z:> For an initial claim they are referred to an Examining
Medical Practitioner (EMP) for a medical report, and should a claimant
be disallowed on one of these grounds he may appeal to a Medical Board
and thence to a Medical Appeal Tribunal (MAT). The age and the
residence and presence conditions are questions for the lay author¬
ities to decide, ie the adjudication officer and, on appeal, the
Social Security Appeal Tribunal (SSAT).
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3 - Some Illustrative Statistics
The number of mobility allowance recipients has grown steadily since
the benefit was introduced in 1976. At the planning stage it was
estimated that the probable number of beneficiaries would be in the
order of 100,000, in addition to the 50,000 already benefiting from
the vehicle scheme (Brown, 1984, p.268). Wary of the administrative
difficulties of introducing the benefit for all age groups at once
(and no doubt mindful of the costs involved) the decision was taken to
phase in the benefit by age groups over the period 1976 to 1979.
Nevertheless, by the time that the scheme was implemented fully the
100,000 expected ceiling had already been passed, and at the end of
1986 recipients exceeded 400,000. Table 6.1 demonstrates this
inexorable rise in the number of mobility allowance recipients.














Source: Social Security Statistics and Mobility Allowance Unit-
internal records
There are few published statistics on mobility allowance; the annual
Social Security Statistics gives only six tables of figures, three
relate to appeal rates, one to the value of the benefit since its
inception, one to the cumulative number of beneficiaries (see
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Table 6. 1), and the last to the Vehicle Scheme. However, the Mobility
Allowance Unit (MAU) itself collects a variety of statistics relating
to the benefit which have been made available for this research. The
remaining tables in this section are either taken directly from these
internal records or computed from them.
The overall success rate of mobility allowance claimants has been
calculated using the figures of awards made, cancellations (ie those
no longer in receipt of the benefit for whatever reason) and
disallowances (ie unsuccessful claims which fail to satisfy one of the
eligibility criteria).
TABLE 6. 2 - Success and failure rates of mobility allowance claimants,
1976-1986
SuccessesJ (%) Failures'1 b 3 (%)
1976 34972 70. 3 14782 29. 7
1977 28689 64. 9 15502 35. 1
1978 21728 59. 5 14806 40. 6
1979 40633 66. 1 20868 33. 9
1980 54571 68. 3 25301 31. 7
1981 38717 66. 7 19367 33. 3
1982 56486 66. 3 28673 33. 7
1983 55324 59. 9 37096 40. 1
1984 62015 63. 9 35056 36. 1
1985 79170 61. 1 50345 38. 9
1986 84739 58. 3 60676 41. 7
Source: Mobility Allowance Unit internal records (1987)
(a) Successes = current awards + cancellations
(b) Failures = disallowances
Successful claimants by definition fulfil all the eligibility criteria
discussed in the previous section; unsuccessful claimants however need
only to fail to satisfy one of them for their claim to be rejected.
Table 6. 3 overleaf gives an analysis of disallowances by the reason
for failure; the categories are 'age' (ie failure to satisfy s.37A(5)
of the Social Security Act 1975), 'residence and presence' (s.37A(1)
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and regulation 2 of the Mobility Allowance Regulations 1975),
'walking' (s.37A and regulation 3(1)), 'no benefit' (s.37AC2)(b)), and
'duration' (s. 37A (2) (a)).
TABLE 6. 3 - Number of disallowances per year by reason for
disallowance*1976-1986
age residence/ walking no benefit duration
presence
1976 4890 41 9735 42 74
1977 4732 28 10603 73 66
1978 4501 23 10157 48 77
1979 2038 38 18542 90 160
1980 (b) 23 26369 126 185
1981 390 5 18763 72 137
1982 744 61 27686 11 171
1983 1128 56 35656 15 241
1984 1348 54 32984 (b) 231
1985 9271 154 40075 58 381
1986 13941 125 45485 223 354
Source: Mobility Allowance Unit internal records (1987)
(a) Calculated from the cumulative totals for the year end.
(b) Using the method noted in (a) the figures for 'age' in 1980 and
'no benefit' in 1984 are negative. No explanation for this
discrepancy can be suggested except administrative error.
These figures translated into percentages of the total disallowances
for each year are revealing (Table 6.4 overleaf).
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TABLE 6. 4 - Disallowances as a percentage of total disallowances,
1976-86













0. 3 65. 9
0. 2 68. 4
0. 2 68. 7
0. 2 88. 9
0. 1 (b)
0. 03 96. 9
0. 2 96. 6
0. 2 96. 1
0. 2 94. 1
0. 3 79. 6
0. 2 75. 0
0. 3 0. 5
0. 5 0. 4
0. 3 0. 5
0. 4 0. 8
0. 5 0. 7
0. 4 0. 7
0. 04 0. 6
0. 04 0. 6
(a) 0. 7
0. 1 0. 8
0. 4 0. 6
Source: Mobility Allowance Unit internal records (1987)
(a) see note (b) to Table 6. 3
(b) Calculated in the normal way this figure would be 104.2% which is
clearly nonsense. It is the result of the discrepancy in the
'age' figure noted above.
In the early years, 1976 to 1978, there would probably have been a
large number of claimants falling foul of the phasing arrangements
which could well have been confusing to many of the older claimants,
and this is reflected in the high percentage of disallowances on age
grounds during these years. Thereafter the overwhelming importance of
the walking criteria is clearly apparent even allowing for the
increase in the numbers rejected on the age criteria in 1985 and
1986. <3> Disallowances because of a failure to satisfy the residence
and presence, the likely benefit, and the duration of disability
conditions have remained at a constant, barely significant level
throughout. The figures in Table 6.4, despite the odd discrepancy,
indicate the importance of the walking test in the assessment of a
claimant's entitlement to mobility allowance, an importance which will
be reflected in the analysis of first tier decision-making later in
the chapter.
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4 - The Mobility Allowance Unit
The DHSS Mobility Allowance Unit at the North Fylde Central Office
(NFCO) processes all mobility allowance claims made throughout Great
Britain. In mid-1986 the Unit employed around 375 staff organised
into a number of sections, each dealing with specialised tasks. The
sections of the most relevance for this study are the Claims and
Payments, and Lay Scrutiny sections, and the mobility allowance
medical branch known as M7.
The Claims and Payments section employed around 300 staff mostly in
the clerical grades. About '10% of staff were in the Executive Officer
(E0) grade employed as supervisors or adjudication officers. This
section deals with the mechanics of processing the 4,000 claims that
the Unit receives per week, and with the adjudication of all claims.
All mobility allowance claimants will receive a medical examination
and a walking test carried out by an Examining Medical Practitioner
(EMP). The Lay Scrutiny section checks all EMP medical reports for
initial claims, and assesses the opinion of the EMP as to whether the
medical criteria for mobility allowance are satisfied. It is a small
section of only some 10 staff.
The medical branch, M7, is part of the DHSS Chief Medical Officer's
organisation, not a section of the Mobility Allowance Unit itself.
Its Principal Medical Officer (PMO) and his staff of Medical Officers
specialise in the medical aspects of mobility allowance and, inter
alia, advise, when requested, the lay personnel of the Unit. They
also train and oversee the work of the EOs of Lay Scrutiny.
The remainder of the Unit comprises a number of small, specialist
sections. The Reviews section deals with claims that may be subject
to the review arrangements for social security benefits. It also
investigates information supplied by third parties, and in this
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respect acts as the fraud section of the Unit. The sixty staff of the
appeals section process the 500-600 appeals that are submitted to the
Unit every week. The Homes and Motability section processes multiple
claims from old people's homes and hospitals, and administers the
charity, Motability, which provides preferential loans for mobility
allowance recipients who wish to purchase a car. There is also a
small general administrative section oversees the management of the
Unit, ie it issues procedures and instructions, carries out management
checks and budgetary control, collects statistics etc.
The responsibility for advising the Unit on lay matters lies with the
Principal Adjudication Officer (PAO) section, which serves the same
purpose for NFCO that the Office of the Chief Adjudication Officer
(OCAO) serves for the local offices, ie it functions as an external
(and expert) source of advice and guidance. In this case, however,
PAO acts as an extra tier of advice since OCAO can also be consulted
when necessary. The section also carries out adjudication monitoring
checks on behalf of the Chief Adjudication Officer in the same way in
which Regional monitoring teams deputise for the Southampton teams.
The Mobility Allowance Unit, in the words of its Head, is "a mass
processing system" and is growing larger as the rising number of
claims shows no sign of levelling off. Mobility allowance is one of
the cheapest benefits to administer: the administrative cost as a
percentage of benefit expenditure in 1984-5 was only 2)6% (compared
with 8)6% for unemployment benefit and 11)6% for supplementary benefit),
and the average weekly administrative cost per beneficiary was 50p
(cf. £2.50 for unemployment benefit, and £3.05 for supplementary
benefit). <s>
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Part II - THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MOBILITY ALLOWANCE DECISION¬
MAKING
1 - The Formal Arrangements
As mentioned earlier, the mobility allowance eligibility criteria are
of two types, lay and medical, which are considered within distinct
decision-making structures (although, as will be seen later, these can
and do overlap).
Throughout the social security system lay questions are allocated to
either the independent statutory authorities or the Secretary of State
to decide; medical questions, however, are decided in a number of
ways. In some cases medical practitioners will decide the question on
the basis of their own examination, and their decisions will be
accorded the status of legally binding decisions, ie they are
adjudicating upon the medical questions (such practitioners are now
referred to as Adjudicating Medical Practitioners (AMPs).
Alternatively, the decision may be made on the basis of a medical
report supplied by a doctor to a lay or medically-qualified official
of the DHSS. Such doctors may be GPs or consultants who might supply
an occasional ad hoc report, or they may be specially trained and
retained to furnish reports on a regular basis. In this role they are
not adjudicating; since they are not deciding whether legislative
criteria are being met their reports will be of an advisory nature
only. Mobility allowance employs a slightly unusual combination of
approaches.
An Examining Medical Practitioner (EMP), specially trained, sends a
medical report which includes an opinion of whether the mobility
allowance legislation is satisfied. The report is advisory only but
EMPs have to, in forming their opinions, go through the process of
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adjudication even though in a formal sense this is reserved for the
adjudication officer. <7>
Each Region recruits and maintains a panel of doctors, usually active
or retired GPs, to act as EMPs. They are trained to make mobility
allowance assessments by Medical Officers from the Regional Office.
Initially, their reports were scrutinised by the Medical Officers of
M7 at NFCO and a recommendation of the appropriate decision passed to
an adjudication officer who, as the independent statutory authority,
would make the final, legal decision on the claim. This task is now
undertaken, under M7 supervision, by the Lay Scrutiny section. The
decisions on the lay questions concerning age and residence and
presence are taken by the adjudication officer alone.
If a claimant is disallowed for failure to satisfy one of the lay
questions he can appeal in the normal way to a SSAT and thence, on a
point of law, to the Social Security Commissioner. On the medical
questions, however, an appeal against an adjudication officer's
decision is not heard in the first instance by an MAT but by a Medical
Board comprising two doctors appointed by the Regional Medical
Officer; only if a further appeal is made will the case be heard by an
MAT. On these medical questions the MAT is the final arbiter; the
Commissioner will only hear cases from aggrieved claimants on a point
of law. The medical appeals hierarchy for mobility allowance is
unusual, having in effect two levels of appeal; for other benefits,
appeal is to the MAT directly. <s>
Whilst it is unusual, the system has several advantanges; for the DHSS
the two-man Medical Board is considerably cheaper than an MAT
consisting of three more highly-qualified members (whose fees are
higher), and for the claimant there is an extra opportunity of getting
the decision of an adjudication officer reversed. The effectiveness
of the Boards in restricting the need to convene an MAT can be
demonstrated by comparing their respective workloads.
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TABLE 6. 5 - Cases referred to Medical Boards and MATs, 1980-1985
referred to referred







Source: Mobility Allowance Unit internal records (1986)
A disadvantage of this arrangement for claimants is that they are not
afforded the same rights (to see casepapers, to be represented etc.)
before a board as they are before an MAT.
(a) The Claiming Process
A claim for mobility allowance is made on the prescribed form (the
MY1). At the Mobility Allowance Unit the claim is checked by a
clerical officer of the Claims and Payments section to ensure that it
has been completed fully. The age and residence and presence
conditions are then considered using the information provided by the
claimant. If either of these conditions is not satisfied the claim is
rejected and the claimant notified, but as Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show,
this is rare. In the vast majority of cases the next step is to
obtain a report from an EMP.
The medical examination and walking test<3> are arranged via the
appropriate Regional Office, whose Medical Boarding section will
arrange for the claimant either to attend an EMP at his or her surgery
or a Medical Boarding Centre, or where necessary, for the EMP to visit
the claimant at home. The medical report form (the MY22) is completed
and returned via the Regional Office to the Mobility Allowance Unit.
Here, the Lay Scrutiny section will examine the reports. Problem
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cases are referred to the Medical Officers in M7 for advice, *10>
otherwise an Executive Officer will consider whether or not the
medical conditions are satisfied by the claimant, and append his or
her own assessment.
The adjudication officer will eventually receive all the papers with a
recommendation from Lay Scrutiny (endorsed where appropriate by M7) to
allow or disallow the claim, or a suggestion that the case should be
be referred to a Medical Board. Accordingly the claimant will receive
notification of the result of his claim or notice that he will be
required to attend before a Board. The claiming process can be
represented in the diagram overleaf.
- 256 -
FIGURE 6. 1 - The mobility allowance decision-making process
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2 - Decision-making in practice - the medical questions
As mentioned earlier, the medical questions (ie whether the claimant
is unable or virtually unable to walk, whether the physical condition
causing walking difficulties will last at least 12 months, and whether
the claimant can benefit from enhanced facilities for locomotion) are
decided by lay adjudication officers on the basis of the medical
report form MY22 (vetted by Lay Scrutiny and possibly M7) provided by
an EMP. This section will draw upon the empirical data obtained
during visits to 16 EMPs in 5 different locations in Scotland and
England'115 and to the Mobility Allowance Unit to examine how the
medical questions are decided in practice.
(a) The medical examination
The raw material, and usually the only material, of mobility allowance
decision-making is the report of the EMP. Its four parts are designed
to elicit all the information necessary for the medical questions to
be answered, and its format dictates how the medical examination is
performed. Part 1, completed in the Mobility Allowance Unit, simply
records relevant personal details of the claimant. Part 2, which is
completed by the EMP, gives an opportunity to claimants to make a
statement about their medical history and an assessment of their
walking ability. Part 3 comprises the clinical findings of the EMP
and a record of the claimant's performance in the walking test. Part
4 requires the EMP to express an opinion on whether or not the
statutory conditions are satisfied.
Of these four parts, it is part 3 which assumes the most significance
in the decision-making of EMPs and, later, of the staff of Lay
Scrutiny. The questions in this part pertaining to walking are
clearly derived from the Mobility Allowance Regulations (particularly
regulation 3(1)(b) and (c)) which seek to clarify how 'virtual
inability' to walk should be assessed. They require information on
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distance covered, speed, manner of walking, gait, balance, time taken,
and the extent of any assistance required. The responses of EMPs
displayed a large degree of consensus about how a walking test should
be conducted. <125
"We always say that we would like to see them outside
because that it is what we are expected to do, but we are
not asking them to do that if they feel unable to. If they
are able, I ask them to walk the length of the car park, so
by the time they have walked the corridor and up and down
the stairs, it is at least 100 yards." (EMP, Region #2)
"I get claimants to walk along the corridor, that's about 45
yards, up the flight of stairs at the end, and back again.
That's a good 100 yards." <EMP, Region #3)
"If I'm at my surgery or making a visit, I always ask them
to walk 100 yards outside, on the level ground. At the
Boarding Centre, there's a set route of 120 yards along the
corridors, there's no real need to go outside, " (EMP,
Region #1)
These responses are from EMPs in three different parts of the country
and illustrate that 100 yards is widely adopted as an appropriate
distance for the walking test. The reason for this was simply that in
making their assessment of a claimant's walking ability, the
Department advises EMPs that 100 yards is an appropriate distance to
consider.
"There isn't a distance laid down, but the advice from the
Ministry is round about 100 yards on the flat." (EMP,
Region #2)
How the 100 yards criterion emerged will be discussed in Part III. It
is a crude guideline but one which has clearly registered with the
vast majority of EMPs,
"... we all recognise 100 yards." (EMP, Region #3)
"100 yards is not in the legislation but it is. in our
heads." (EMP, Region #1)
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Although 14 of the 15 EMPs who responded made reference to the 100
yards test they did not necessarily adhere to it in practice. The
distance was treated more as a useful first step in the assessment of
walking ability. If claimants can walk, say, only 20 or 30 yards
before they are forced to abandon the attempt they are usually
considered virtually unable to walk without any further investigation
being considered necessary. Those reaching 150, or 200, yards and
beyond, however, will only be considered virtually unable to walk if
one of the more qualitative factors mentioned in regulation 3(1)(b)
indicates that the quality of walking is sufficiently poor to offset
the distance that can be managed. EMPs were clear that distance was
not the only consideration in their assessment.
"It's not just distance, it's the method and action of
walking, and the effect of walking on pain and
breathlessness. You have to put all these things together
to make up your mind. " (EMP, Region #3)
For example, if the speed of walking is particularly slow or the
claimant has to make numerous stops before continuing or if his or her
gait renders progress difficult (as it does for conditions such as
spina bifida) then regardless of the distance covered the claimant may
still qualify. Similarly, if walking can only be achieved in severe
discomfort, the claimant may still be classed as virtually unable to
walk.
Although there was a degree of conformity about the appropriate length
for a walking test, there was a surprising, and disturbing, lack of
agreement about where it should be conducted. The legislation (in
regulation 3(1)(b) of the Mobility Allowance Regulations) clearly
states that it is the claimant's 'ability to walk out of doors' which
is at issue in deciding 'virtually unable to walk'. Only a few EMPs
were clear about what was required of them,
"... you must take them outside, that is essential." (EMP,
Region #1)
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"Yes, I always give an outdoor walking test; I go out with
them in all sorts of conditions. " (EMP, Region #3)
Several more would attempt an outdoor test, but if there were any
problems, readily reverted to indoor tests (see, for example, the
quotation on p. 258).
"I prefer to go outside, but many of the claimants live in
high rise flats, so I get them to walk around the room and
use any stairs." (EMP, Region #1)
Outdoor walking tests were most frequently dispensed with when the EMP
examined the claimant at a Medical Boarding Centre.
"We always use the same standard run at this Centre - along
the corridor, up the stairs and back, which is about 120
yards." (EMP, Region #2)
"There* s no need to go outside here; we have good long
corridors which serve our purpose adequately. " (EMP,
Region #2)
This tendency to conduct tests indoors not only introduces a lack of
consistency in the treatment of claimants but also offends against the
intention of the legislation. The wording of the regulation
(according to one informant closely involved with the drafting of the
Regulations) was a deliberate attempt to differentiate between
people's ability to manoeuvre themselves around the familiar territory
of their own homes, which may be relatively easy with the confidence
that is derived from an intimate knowledge of one's immediate
surroundings, such as where safe handholds are available, and the
ability to get about out of doors where such assistance is unlikely to
be available and consequently where confidence may be lacking.
Although not at all representative of the whole sample, one EMP's
comment indicated a disturbingly poor grasp of the mobility allowance
legislation and its intentions.
"This Boarding Centre is a good place for carrying out
walking tests; the corridors are long enough so we don't
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have to go outdoors, and there are plenty of handholds to
hang on to. " (EMP, Region #3)
Part 4 of the medical report asks the EMP, in language taken almost
word for word from the legislation, to give an opinion of whether or
not the medical criteria are satisfied. The EMP is not being asked to
adjudicate in the formal sense of making a legally valid decision on a
claim, but in effect he is doing nothing different had he, and not the
adjudication officer at the Mobility Allowance Unit, been the
independent statutory authority. And the point is further reinforced
by the fact that, at the first level of appeal, the Medical Board
doctors, who are the independent statutory authority, 'are almost
invariably EMPs as well and must address exactly the same questions in
deciding a claim as the EMP does in forming an opinion. The process
that the EMP goes through in completing part 4 is therefore impossible
to distinguish from adjudication in anything but name.
The claimant who is totally unable to walk (and hence satisfies
s. 37AC1) immediately) is, thankfully, a comparatively rare individual.
Far more numerous are the claimants who can attempt a walking test and
must therefore aim to qualify under the 'virtually unable to walk'
condition. Regulation 3(1)(b) clearly intends that the test for
satisfying this condition should be based on both a quantitative and
qualitative assessment of walking ability but, beyond that, the
primary and secondary legislation is of little help to EMPs in forming
their opinions.
Usually an overall picture of the claimant's walking ability can be
formed when part 3 has been completed. However, this does not
necessarily ease the problem of deciding whether the virtually unable
to walk condition is satisfied. Most EMPs professed to having some,
occasionally considerable, difficulty with the phrase.
"One claimant said in his statement that he could walk only
fifty yards or so before he had to stop. When I went
outside to watch him, he walked down the street and stopped
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at the road for some traffic, but not for any other reason.
He then went on and crossed the road by the island and down
the other side of the road, a total of about 175 yards,
which he did without stopping except to wait for traffic.
Well, that obviously is not 'virtually unable to walk' . If
he had stopped every 20 or 25 yards, then had to go on
slowly, and then slower and slower, even if he could only
manage 100 yards, you would have to think very carefully
about whether he was 'virtually unable to walk' or not. It
is a very difficult decision to make, and I find that it
doesn't get any easier." (EMP, Region #1)
". . . it is almost like saying how long is a piece of string;
but I think it is down to clinical experience. 'Virtually
unable to walk' defies definition; what is needed is
clinical judgement. " (EMP, Region #3)
"We have extreme difficulty interpreting 'virtually unable
to walk'. You can't define 'virtually' so it is left to
personal interpretation. " (EMP, Region #2)
The following precis of a typical case further illustrates the
problem.
Case #1 - A common problem of 'virtually unable to walk'
On her walking test a 55-year old woman walked 'normally' (for a
55-year old) for about 70 yards before rapidly becoming breath¬
less (she was a chronic bronchitic). Progress then became
'laboured' and by the time she had completed the 120-yard
standard run, she needed to rest for about five minutes before
she felt able to exert herself further. The problem for the EMP
was whether her ability to walk 120 yards excluded her or whether
the manner of her progress over the final 50 yards was of a
sufficiently poor quality to bring her within the meaning of
'virtually unable to walk'. The EMP also thought that had she
walked at a slower pace initially she could have walked longer
and further.
Nevertheless, the unwritten 100 yards rule does inject a degree of
uniformity of treatment in initial assessments. c13> And this is
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extended to the Medical Boards since, as noted earlier, almost
invariably (and this study found only one exception) a Medical Board
member also acts as an EMP, though not on the same cases.
In contrast to the problems caused by ' virtually unable to walk' the
'duration' and 'likely benefit' conditions are relatively straight¬
forward. Making an assessment of the likely length of time that a
claimant's illness or disability will continue is very little, if at
all, different from the routine medical practice of making a prognosis
of the likely development of the claimant's illness or disease.
"... deciding how long someone's incapacity will last ic
pretty straightforward, routine medical judgement." (EMP,
Region #2)
Nevertheless, the assessment is important since mobility allowance is
only payable during the time that the medical conditions are
satisfied. (For example, if a claimant regains the ability to walk
after a hip replacement operation he or she will cease to be eligible
for the benefit.) The adjudication officer therefore can make an
award for any length of time over 12 months up to age 75.
Deciding whether a claimant can benefit from 'enhanced facilities for
locomotion' rarely presents any problem. The occasional difficulty
does arise with severely mentally handicapped persons who have little
awareness of their surroundings; but even here there is usually a
presumption that a change in surroundings once in a while can only
enhance the admittedly poor quality of life that such patients
endure. c1
"... practically everyone could benefit if they received the
benefit, it's only a problem for some extremely severely
mentally handicapped patients who have absolutely no idea of
where they are or what is going on." (EMP, Region #1)
In completing the MY22 medical report form, EMPs are operating on two
distinct levels. They are firstly acting purely as medical
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practitioners using the techniques and practices of medical decision¬
making about diagnosis and prognosis that are derived from a
profession-based decision-making system (they are of course not
required to consider a professional response to the claimant's
condition). This process of diagnosis provides part of the evidence
upon which a claim for mobility allowance will be decided. Secondly,
they are acting as quasi-adjudicators in applying the decision
criteria of the mobility allowance legislation to the evidence they
have collected in order to provide their opinions in part 4 of the
medical report. And on the 'duration' question the two roles are
combined since their diagnoses and prognoses as medical practitioners
effectively determine the answer to the question (for example, if a
claimant's heart condition is expected to incapacitate him or her for
two or three years, then the application of the statutory decision
criteria in s. 37A(2)(a) of the 1975 Act is a formality).
(b) Lay Scrutiny
As mentioned earlier, the Lay Scrutiny section is a recent
innovation*1S> relieving the Medical Officers in M7 of the task of
checking and scrutinising the medical reports from EMPs. In effect,
they are offering the adjudication officer (who will make the final,
legal decision on a claim) a second opinion regarding the medical
questions. *ie> In the first eight months for which figures were
available (ie to May 1986) over 73,000 first claims were processed.
The common practice amongst the Lay Scrutiny Executive Officers (EOs)
was to read and digest the record of the claimant's statement and the
clinical findings (including the walking test), ie parts 2 and 3 of
the MY22. Without reading the EMP's opinion, they came to their own
assessment of whether the claimant was virtually unable to walk and,
where appropriate, the length of the award. The consideration of the
' virtually unable to walk' test was similar to that of the EMPs.
Distance (100 yards) was again mentioned as an important indicator but
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the overall picture built up by the information in parts 2 and 3
determined their assessment. As one remarked,
"You consider the claimant's statement, the physical
diagnosis - especially any abnormal conditions - the
claimant's age, and then distance, speed, and time taken for
walking, plus any remarks concerning the gait and balance of
the claimant and any pain experienced; you get the feel of
it as you go along. Coming to a decision is really
intuition based on facts." (Lay Scrutiny EO)
However, giving an opinion on whether the 'duration' condition was
satisfied, and deciding the length of award was difficult for lay
scrutineers who were being asked in effect to comment where they are
not competent. In practice, the EO is supplied with a guidance
document prepared by M7 giving a list of the commoner disabilities and
illnesses which impair walking ability, and a suggestion of how long
such an impairment can generally be expected to continue. The
introductory paragraph to the document reads:
I
"These notes are intended as a GUIDE for lay scrutineers on
the period for which the medical conditions for mobility
allowance are likely to be satisfied. They must not be used
as authoritative instructions and each case must be treated
on its individual merits. "
However, without medical training it is difficult to see how Lay
Scrutiny can form an opinion on these questions other than that
suggested by the guidance despite this insistence from M7 that the EO
is free to judge for himself.
"There's nothing much for us to do here - we just go along
with the doctor's prognosis and trust his knowledge. " (Lay
Scrutiny EO)
"The only problem on 'duration' is when someone is on a
waiting list for, say, a replacement hip. Eventually
they'll improve but only after the operation. So it's
difficult to judge how long payment should last." (Lay
Scrutiny EO)
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Having made his or her assessment the EO can compare it with the
opinion of the EMP. Four outcomes are possible. If the two opinions
agree, either to allow or disallow, then the case is referred to the
adjudication officer with that recommendation. If the EMP advises
disallowance but Lay Scrutiny disagree then the case is referred to M7
for their assessment; if M7 endorse the Lay Scrutiny interpretation
then a recommendation goes forward to the adjudication officer to
allow the claim and to ignore the opinion of the EMP. If, on the
other hand, Lay Scrutiny see disallowance as the correct decision
contrary to the EMP's report then, with M7's endorsement, the case is
referred to a Medical Board to make the initial decision. *175
Similarly, if Lay Scrutiny think the EMP assessment of the length of
award is inappropriate they will consult M7, after which a recommend¬
ation will go forward to the adjudication officer for a longer award
or the case will be referred to a Medical Board if a shorter award is
considered more accurate. In the first eight months 2,378 claims
<3.3% of those received) were referred to a Medical Board.
The introduction of lay scrutiny has so far proved successful. EMP
medical reports are processed more quickly and more cheaply, and the
standards of decision-making (according to the Senior Medical Officer
who heads M7 and who monitors Lay Scrutiny assessments) are as good
as, and possibly even better than the part-time Medical Officers used
to achieve. Unfortunately, although Lay Scrutiny was considered a
success, there were also its critics,
"I wouldn't want to do this for long. It's monotonous work
and very narrow. I'm afraid that Lay Scrutiny is menial,
tiresome and boring. " (Lay Scrutiny EO)
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3 - Dec!sion-making in practice - the lay questions
Adjudication officers, despite their formal, legal responsibility for
making decisions on mobility allowance claims play only a minor role
in practice. Of the eligibility criteria, they consider the age of
the claimant and the residence and presence conditions (but not
necessarily in all cases). The age conditions are so clear cut that
they virtually never cause difficulty.
As with much of social security policy there is an intention that
mobility allowance should only benefit those who live in Great
Britain. There are, therefore, provisions common to many benefits
which utilise the concepts of 'residence' and 'presence'. The first
of these is sometimes qualified slightly (as it is with mobility
allowance) by using the term 'ordinarily resident' to imply some
continuity of residence. Since these common provisions exist, case-
law from one benefit has been considered to apply equally to all
benefits. Hence, of all the mobility allowance eligibility criteria
' residence and presence' is the most developed by case-law. The
problems that arise, therefore, are more frequently due to the
evidence (it may be incomplete or contradictory in some way) than with
difficulties in the interpretation of the law.
"Problems do arise occasionally with claims from immigrants
where it is not clear exactly where they have been living in
the past eighteen months. Getting the information can be
difficult but you have to persevere." (Adjudication
Of ficer)
The residence and presence conditions are not considered initially by
an adjudication officer but by the clerical officer who first received
the claim. A decision will be based primarily on the information
provided by the claimant on the initial claim form. In the vast
majority of cases there is no difficulty in deciding in the claimant's
favour and rejection on this ground is rare. (Table 6.4 shows that
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failure to satisfy the residence and presence conditions accounts for
only 0. 2% of disallowances or roughly 1 in 2000 claims. )
When there is any indication that regulation 2(1) may not be fulfilled
the case is referred to the adjudication officer who will usually seek
information from the claimant on his or her whereabouts over the
preceding 18 months and an indication as to future residence plans.
The question is largely one of fact and degree; the law is clear but
the evidence may need clarification; when that is done the decision
becomes simpler.
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Part III - THE DEMANDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
One of the ways in which mobility allowance differs from industrial
disablement benefit decision-making is that, at the level of the
initial decision, no medical adjudication, comparable to AMPs making
legally binding decisions, takes place. Instead, decisions on the
medical questions arise jointly out of medical advice, lay opinion and
finally, lay adjudication. Because of this unusual arrangement, and
because the satisfaction of the medical conditions is the most
difficult hurdle for claimants to overcome, analyses of the demands of
administrative justice will combine discussion of the contribution of
both medical and lay officials.
1 - Accuracy
(a) The Official Verdict
Included in the first Annual Report of the Chief Adjudication Officer
(DHSS, 1985e) is a summary of the results of the monitoring system for
mobility allowance decision-making. Standards are assessed using the
usual technique of recording an 'adjudication comment' when some
deficiency in the adjudication process is discovered. Table 6.6
overleaf is an extract from this summary and shows the number of
'comments' raised in relation to the main eligibility criteria for
mobility allowance.
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TABLE 6.6 - OCAO analysis of mobility allowance adjudication decisions
Age Medical*"' Residence
Conditions & Presence
Number of cases examined 9 58 30
Insufficient evidence on which to
consider the questions 0 1 0
If sufficient evidence this did not
justify decision 0 1 1
Wrong model decision used 0 1 0
Decision incomplete 0 3 0
Comments per 100 decisions examined*1*' 0 10 3
Source: First Annual Report of the CA0 (DHSS, 1985e, p.105)
(a) Unfortunately the CAO report does not differentiate between the
medical criteria (virtually unable to walk, duration, and likely
benefit) but subsumes them under the heading 'medical
conditions' .
(b) this is not strictly a percentage error rate since more than one
comment can be raised on a single case.
The full analyses in the OCAO report includes the number of adjudi¬
cation comments on, for example, decisions about late claims and
reviewed decisions and give an overall error rate of 9 per 100
decisions examined. Unfortunately, the second OCAO report (DHSS,
1986c) does not include a comparable analysis to that in Table 6. 6
above, but does give an overall error rate for all decisions of 7 per
100 decisions examined.
The picture to emerge from Table 6.6 is that the standard of
adjudication on initial decisions is very high. Furthermore, if we
exclude what have been argued (see chapter 5, p. 187) to be ' technical
deficiencies (ie 'wrong model decision used' and 'decision
incomplete') the aggregated error rate for the main eligibility
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criteria falls to only 3 per 100. Nevertheless, it is possible to
examine more closely the decision-making process using the analysis
suggested in Figure 2.8 (see chapter 2, p. 71), ie the relationship
between the evidence and the decision criteria, and to suggest that,
despite the satisfactory picture painted by the CAO report, there are
elements within the mobility allowance administrative structure that
render accurate decision-making problematic. I will therefore examine
the 'evidence' side of the decision-making equation first and follow
with a similar treatment of the decision criteria.
(b) An Alternative Analysis
The evidence for the age criteria comprises the statement by the
claimant in the MY1 claim form which is checked against National
Insurance records held at the Newcastle Central Office. It is as
straightforward as decision-making can possibly be; notwithstanding
the rare discrepancy, deciding the age question falls almost entirely
within box <1> of Figure 2.8. The residence and presence conditions
may demand additional information to that on the MY1 but again the
question to be decided is primarily one of fact and degree, The
evidence for the medical questions, in contrast, is almost entirely
medical in character (even allowing that a lay person could probably
supply some of it) and a matter of routine for a doctor, ie the
clinical data and the description of walking ability require no
specialised knowledge of social security legislation; the doctor
merely gives answers to specific questions on the MY22 medical report
form for which medical knowledge is in part essential. In most cases
therefore, there is little likelihood that the evidence requirements
of the medical questions will prove problematic. Unlike industrial
disablement benefit there is very little likelihood of the evidence
being incomplete or there being contradictory information to consider.
Exceptions to this might be if a claimant supplied the adjudication
officer with a statement from his or her own GP with which the EMP
report does not concur, or where the claimant's statement (in part 2
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of the MY22) contradicts the clinical findings. But such cases are
not common.
The only reservation expressed by EMPs about the quality of the
information that they collected related to the reliability of the
walking test as an indicator of general ability to walk. As one
explained,
"There's no doubt that with some conditions, such as
arthritis, patients can have 'good' and 'bad' days. Its
sometimes difficult to know the true extent of a claimant's
ability, but on the other hand, you've got to accept what
you see." (EMP, Region #2)
On the medical questions, therefore, problems fall mainly within box
(3); problems within box (2) (and therefore also box (4)) rarely
arise.
Turning to the decision criteria the position is similar for most of
the questions to be decided, ie all but two are relatively straight¬
forward. The age criteria are the clearest; there can be no
misunderstanding as to their meaning. The residence and presence
conditions do require the adjudication officer to know what is meant
by the terms 'ordinarily resident' and 'presence' but there is now a
large body of case-law which has clarified these terms to a great
extent. Of the medical questions the ' 12 month' rule and the
'duration' condition are also relatively straightforward requiring
from the EMP only the routine medical practice of forming a prognosis,
ie in predicting the course of a claimant's illness or disability he
will come to an assessment of how long the condition will last. So,
as mentioned earlier, in giving the evidence to answer these questions
the EMP is in effect also providing the answer, Of the other medical
criteria consideration of whether walking might damage the claimant's
health and the 'likely benefit' condition is reasonably straight¬
forward for a medical practitioner to answer. Assessing how a patient
might benefit from a particular course of treatment (or whether its
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effect will be detrimental) is an integral part of medical decision¬
making, extending this to considering if a patient would benefit from
increased increased mobility is not a difficult step. However, the
final medical conditions relate to walking ability and raise several
problems.
Firstly, not all those with walking difficulties will be considered
eligible for mobility allowance. There is one important qualification
in s. 37A(1) of the 1975 Act (and reiterated in regulation 3 of the
Mobility Allowance Regulations 1975) that inability or virtual
inability to walk must be due to a physical disablement. This
provides a separate hurdle to be overcome but it is generally a point
of law rather than of fact; the medical evidence for deciding the
question will be the diagnosis of the claimant's condition that
affects walking ability (which the EMP is required to answer
specifically in part 3 of the medical report), and as such will be a
matter of routine medical practice for the EMP. The problem arises in
a small, but increasing, number of cases involving mental handicap and
mental illness where there may be an underlying physical cause to the
disability. The paradigm example here is Downs Syndrome or mongolism,
a condition which is caused by a genetic defect but which manifests
itself as a mental handicap. (Hence, the position arises where a
Downs Syndrome child, though physically capable of putting one foot in
front the other, may frequently refuse to do so.) The question
therefore arose of whether Downs Syndrome was a mental condition or
whether a genetic defect was the ultimate physical cause of the
disability. Subsequently regulation 3 was amended by the Mobility
Allowance Amendment Regulations (SI 1979 No. 172) such that claimant's
'physical condition as a whole' should be considered in the virtually
unable to walk test. Ogus and Barendt (1982, p.183) speculate that,
"It may have been the intention, by employing this wording,
to admit cases, such as mongolism, where a mental blockage,
itself the result of a physical condition, inhibits walking,
but the matter must remain in doubt until an authoritative
ruling is received from the Commissioner."
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As yet there has been no such authoritative statement, but the current
practice is that Downs Syndrome cases are not disallowed under
s.37AC1) on this ground alone. Some conditions however clearly fall
outside the scope of s.37A(l), for example agoraphobia. c 135 What has
happened in effect is that where the statute law, as it frequently
does, leaves an area of indecision (the 'hole in the doughnut') and
case-law has failed (so far) to fill it, then other decision criteria
have been adopted by necessity in order that individual decisions can
be made. In this instance the decision criteria are derived primarily
from non-adjudicatory staff of the DHSS (ie the medical and policy
branches); EMPs and adjudication officers (and Lay Scrutiny EOs) have
needed advice on how to deal with these cases and in the absence of
any emanating from the CAO (or rather his predecessors) have accepted
the interpretation (which is in essence a policy decision) of their
superiors within the organisational hierarchy.
The phrase which causes most problems for the adjudicating authorities
is the interpretation of the phrase 'virtually unable to walk'. The
problem is perhaps a little unusual in that the legislation, and
especially regulation 3, is quite clear about what factors are to be
considered, ie distance, length of time, speed, and manner of walking.
However, these have not been elaborated further by case-law. That
case-law is very scarce (and not very helpful) in relation to
'virtually unable to walk' is partly because it is specified as a
medical question and therefore for the medical authorities to decide,
ie the MAT is in practice the final arbiter of these questions; the
legislation will only allow a further appeal on a point of law.
Commissioner's decisions R(M) 1/78 and R(M) 1/83 both included a
consideration of 'virtually unable to walk'. In R(M) 1/83 the
claimant's counsel attempted to introduce some degree of
quantification of the phrase arguing,
"... the expression 'virtually unable to walk' is ambiguous.
The regulations did not state the amount or quality of a
person's ability to walk."
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Counsel further argued that the regulations should be understood to
mean:
. . an ability to walk id mile, or something of that order,
to enable a person to walk to the shops or to a bus stop and
so carry on a normal life." (para. 9)
But the Commissioner was not persuaded:
"I shall not attempt a comprehensive definition of the words
in the regulation as I consider it undesirable to do so.
Whether a person is 1 unable to walk' must always be a
question of fact and degree." (para. 10)
"Further, I agree with the meaning given to 1 virtually
unable to walk' in ... R(M) 1/78 as unable to walk to any
appreciable extent or practically unable to walk. " (para.
12)
Despite these attempts it is hard to see how the phrase 'virtually
unable to walk' is clarified in any way; walking 'to an appreciable
extent' or being 'practically unable to walk' are merely restatements
of the original ambiguous term. In R(M) 1/83 counsel was trying
(unsuccessfully) to ensure that environmental factors (shopping, for
instance) were included in the assessment of walking ability. A
similar attempt was the subject of a series of Commissioner's
decisions which considered whether the purpose of walking should be
relevant. Following two decisions'1which decided that an inability
to get from one place to a desired destination should be a consider¬
ation, a Tribunal of Commissioners reversed this interpretation
arguing that to consider whether the claimant could orientate herself
spatially was adding a further test to the regulations and, therefore,
could not be taken into account (an interpretation later upheld by the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords). <20>
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The troubled history of 'virtually unable to walk' continued in 1986
with the publication of the Commissioner's decision, R(M) 3/86, which
concerned a child with severe behavioural problems (see Logie, 1987).
A Tribunal of Commissioners ruled that brain damage at birth was a
physical disability and that, therefore, the child's behaviour fell
within the scope of regulation 3(1) of the 1975 Mobility Allowance
Regulations. However, in referring the case to an MAT for re-hearing,
they emphasised that care should be taken to distinguish between a
claimant who cannot walk and one who will not walk, since making a
conscious decision to stop walking should not be construed as
'virtually unable to walk'.
To use the doughnut metaphor once more there is a large space
contained within the outer rings of the legislation which case-law is
only slowly filling. The resulting 'policy space' however has been
narrowed but primarily by Departmental officials not by elements of
the independent adjudication structure. The reasons for this are
largely to do with the particular decision-making arrangements of
mobility allowance since 1976. A little more history is therefore
necessary.
(c) The emergence of 'non-legal' decision criteria
Mobility allowance decision-making relies heavily on the medical
report of the EMP. That this report is entirely advisory and the EMP
not part of the formal adjudication structure has important
consequences. As a principle it is accepted by the DHSS that the
independent statutory authorities must be allowed to make their
decisions free from outside influences, especially from the Department
itself, in order to maintain impartiality. Hence, the Department will
not advise them on the interpretation of legislation. However, the
principle does not apply in theory to the EMP whom the DHSS is free to
advise in the same way that it is free to advise any party supplying
information in connection with a social security claim. Before the
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implementation of mobility allowance in 1976 there was an expectation
within the DHSS that EMPs would immediately require advice on how to
interpret 'virtually unable to walk'. Hence, before the first
enquiries arrived the Chief Medical Officer at the time was prepared
with some guidance. It is from this advice that the unofficial 100
yards test emerged, in effect quantifying one aspect of the Mobility
Allowance Regulations. The choice of 100 yards was by no means
arbitrary. One of the eligibility criteria for qualifying for an
invalid carriage under the old vehicle scheme was based on an
assessment of the claimant's walking ability over 100 yards, and so
since existing vehicle drivers would be automatically entitled to the
new mobility allowance without having to satisfy the new conditions,
it was thought equitable that new claimants should only have to
satisfy a comparable, not harsher, test. It was a crucial decision
which has had a fundamental influence on how the 'virtually unable to
walk' has since been viewed at the front line. Experienced EMPs
recount how the 'advice' gradually spread from NFCO Medical Officers,
in response to enquiries from individual EMPs and Medical Officers in
Regional Offices, to the rest of the EMPs by word of mouth.
From the responses of the EMPs cited earlier, it seems that the status
of the 100 yards criterion hovers uneasily between 'guidance' and
'instruction', even though it is also clear that other factors, such
as speed and manner of walking, are actively considered. The 100
yards criterion has effectively filled a large part of the 'policy
space' left by the legislation. And because the 'virtually unable to
walk' condition is a medical question this unwritten rule has become
virtually immune to challenge outside the structure of medical
adjudication. Certainly within this structure, the claimant can
appeal against the opinion of the EMP (though legally the decision of
the adjudication officer) to the Medical Board, but since the Boards
consist of doctors who are almost invariably EMPs as well, the 100
yards rule is influential at this level also. This level of
consistency could be seen as an advantage of the present arrangements,
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but it is only a fortuitous result of policy decisions chiefly
concerned with the speedy and cheap processing of appeals. And there
the consistency ends, since the final arbiters of medical questions,
Medical Appeal Tribunals, comprise individuals unconnected with the
rest of the mobility allowance decision-making structure. <22:>
A further doubt regarding the level of accuracy implied in the OCAO
report arises from a small-scale study designed to quantify the
walking ability (in terms of distance and time) of mobility allowance
recipients (Hunter, 1986). The conclusion was drawn that:
"The wide scatter of results confirms the variability of
assessments... It is impossible to set a limiting value for
any parameter but the likelihood of an applicant being
successful increases as distance, time and speed decreases."
The 'wide scatter of results' mentioned refers to the distances that
recipients could walk; some could manage as far as 900 metres (about
three-quarters of a mile) whilst others failed at around 10 metres.
Speed of walking varied between 1. 2 metres per second (about 2!6 miles
per hour) and less than 0.1 metres per second. (Walking speed for a
normal adult is between 3 and 4 miles per hour.) Surprising though it
is that someone who can walk three-quarters of a mile can qualify for
mobility allowance, more interesting is the median value for distance
covered: 120 metres, indicating that over a half of the sample could
walk over the 100 yards that serves as the reference point (and
frequently the cut-off point ) for most EMPs in their deliberations of
'virtually unable to walk' .
This discussion of 'accuracy' in relation to 'virtually unable to
walk' has, so far, attempted to show how the concept of accuracy is
difficult to apply to a part of the legislation that leaves a large
'policy space' . As experience has shown the legislative decision
criteria make it very difficult to come to any decision at all except
perhaps where the word 'virtually' is applied in a common sense way to
people who can only manage a few steps. What has made decision-making
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possible in the vast majority of claims where this is not the case is
the adoption of decision criteria based on a quantified idea of
distance.
(d) Promoting accuracy in the decision-making system
In chapter 3, four elements of the decision-making system were noted
which contribute directly or indirectly to the promotion of accuracy
in decision-making; training, advice, monitoring, and the appeals
hierarchy. This section will examine their contribution in practice.
Training
Training for new EMPs is undertaken by the appropriate Regional
Office, often simultaneously with industrial disablement benefit
training, since most medical practitioners recruited as AMPs also
agree to carry out mobility allowance assessments. Each EMP receives
a copy of the DHSS publication 'Notes for Medical Practitioners',
which gives guidance on each of the medical questions that need to be
addressed and provides advice on the completion of the medical report
form. In addition, the Senior Medical Officer or one of his staff
will visit the new EMP to explain the legislation and what is required
during the medical examination of the claimant. After that, and in
contrast to the practice of 'sitting in' with an experienced AMP on
industrial disablement benefit boards, the EMP is on his or her own
and will be sent claimants to assess by the Regional Office Medical
Boarding section. The 'Notes for Medical Practitioners' discuss
'virtually unable to walk' but do not refer to the 100 yards
criterion. <23> Training can only be described as minimal with no
particular mention of the legal nature of decisions that are required
in giving an opinion of whether or not the statutory conditions are
satisfied. Since they are not independent statutory authorities the
training they do receive cannot be considered comparable to that
undertaken by adjudication officers.
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The Lay Scrutiny EOs are trained by the Medical Officers of M7 and,
therefore, assess claims and recommend decisions according to the
tuition and the guidance notes received from Departmental officials.
The guidance material attempts to lay great stress on the independent
nature of lay scrutiny, but much of the contents leave very little
room for the lay official to advise the adjudication officer in any
other way than the guidance directs. It also mentions the 100 yards
criterion and notes that 1 normal' walking should be considered as 3-4
miles per hour, or 100 yards covered in 1-1)6 minutes.
Training for all NFC0 adjudication officers was undertaken by officers
of the PA0 section who held general courses (comparable to the Initial
Adjudication Course at Nottingham) supplemented by more specific
instruction on the relevant benefit. However, although adjudication
officers are the ultimate legal decision-makers on both the lay and
medical questions, they receive no training on how to adjudicate on
the medical questions. Furthermore, the Insurance Officer's Guide
provides no assistance to the adjudication officer who has to decide
if the medical questions are satisfied; there is not a single
reference to the 'virtually unable to walk' test. One of the PA0
staff involved in training recognised the paradox of a lay decision on
a medical question,
"We are responsible for training adjudication officers but
'virtually unable to walk' is a medical question, we are not
really competent to advise on its interpretation. Any
problems are referred to M7 here. But there's no doubt that
we should be able to advise on all lay decisions. " (HE0,
PAO section)
Whilst the adjudication officer receives virtually no training on the
medical questions, the training of EMPs and Lay Scrutiny EOs is geared
not only to the legislative requirements but to the additional
decision criteria (especially the 100 yards test) that originated as
Departmental policy. Although these decision criteria have no
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statutory basis there was no doubt that they had been fully
assimilated by EMPs and Lay Scrutiny EOs alike.
Advice
As was explained earlier, the PAO section at NFCO provides an
additional tier of advice (between OCAO and the HEO) within the formal
advice arrangements of the adjudication system. However, these
arrangements are patchy in their effect. On the lay questions (age
and residence and presence), the IOG provides ample advice accumulated
over many years, but provides none on the medical questions. However,
since the adjudication officer is little more than a rubber stamp on
the medical questions, this anomaly has never manifested itself as a
problem for adjudication officers themselves or the PAO section.
"PAO are always good when we need to go to them but I can't
recall ever asking about 'virtually unable to walk" or any
of the other medical questions. If there is anything I'm
not quite happy with, I refer the case to the medical
branch." (Adjudication Officer)
"If we are asked for advice on the medical aspects of
mobility allowance the practice is to go to M7 for help -
they're the experts." (Adjudication Officer)
As mentioned earlier, the advisers to the Lay Scrutiny staff are the
Medical Officers of M7. The arrangement was satisfactory from both
ends.
"The Medical Officers in M7 deal with mobility allowance all
the time so we always rely on their advice. " (Lay Scrutiny
EO)
"What has surprised and impressed us is how Lay Scrutiny
have become proficient at knowing which cases need advice."
(Senior Medical Officer, M7)
As EMPs, medical practitioners are experiencing the same frustration
with the withdrawal of advice by Regional Office Medical Officers as
they do as AMPs on industrial disablement benefit assessments. Advice
- 282 -
is still sought and given, however, albeit on an informal basis or in
relation to 'general questions' rather than individual cases.
The result of this has been that the main contributors to the
consideration of the medical questions, ie the EMP and, since 1984,
the Lay Scrutiny EO, have been advised not by external, independent
sources but, if at all, by NFCO Medical Officers in M7, ie Depart¬
mental officials. As a consequence the Departmental view of the
interpretation of the legislation, which is first transmitted via
training, is reinforced and perpetuated.
Monitoring
The monitoring system is intended as both a check on, and an indirect
promoter of, accuracy. The formal system comprises checks by the PAO
section (on behalf of the CAO) on the decisions of adjudication
officers, but is primarily concerned with lay issues. On the medical
questions PAO have deferred to the greater expertise of the Medical
officers of M7, who until recently, vetted and advised on all EMP
reports. However, with the introduction of lay scrutiny, M7 now see
only one in ten of these (after Lay Scrutiny have added their opinion)
as a routine check on both the standards of the reports and the
efficiency of the lay scrutineers. So, once again, because of the low
level of involvement of the adjudication officer, monitoring, which is
normally considered to be a task for an independent body, is carried
out in practice by Departmental officials. Hence, the standards they
are judging decisions against are the very standards they instigate
and perpetuate. Monitoring of lay decisions follows the normal format
as described in chapter 3. Whilst the lay questions are subject to
the full force of independent monitoring system the more important
medical questions escape any real independent assessment. So not only
is there no independent advice on how to interpret the difficult parts
of the law (especially virtually unable to walk), but no independent
check on the interpretation that is adopted.
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Paradoxically, however, it appears that the medical monitoring of Lay
Scrutiny by M7 is a far more effective indirect promoter of accuracy
(or consistency) than the lay monitoring of adjudication officers by
the PAO section. There appear to be several possible reasons for
this. Firstly, the formal system within NFCO has attracted a
reputation with NFCO staff for 'nit-picking' (just as Regional
monitoring teams have with adjudication officers in local offices).
Hence their reports are similarly devalued in the eyes of the
adjudication officers. On the other hand, there is a far more relaxed
and informal relationship between Lay Scrutiny and M7. Trivial errors
may be noted but they will not be used as a formal statistical
reflection of the lay scrutineers' standards of work. And, where more
substantial deficiencies are apparent, there are no obstacles created
by an 'independent' status (which may hamper PAO) to M7 correcting
them quickly and informally. Hence, while the contribution of the
formal monitoring system to accuracy is limited, the internal
administrative monitoring of medical decision-making is far more
ef f ective.
The Tribunal System
The final contributor to accuracy, again in an indirect way, is the
appeals hierarchy, For the adjudication officers in the Mobility
Allowance Unit the effect of SSAT hearings mirrored that found in the
local offices. Tribunal cases, whether heard by an MAT or an SSAT,
were seen as unique entities in that each case would have a particular
set of circumstances on which a decision must be based; any dispute
would primarily be about the evidence; how the tribunal viewed and
weighed that evidence was of little general relevance to future
decision-making. Only if some general principle of law was discussed
might there be some relevance for cases in the future. However, when
an adjudication officer was considering a borderline case where the
evidence available did not point to one particular decision, the
prospect of a possible appeal had an effect even though it would not
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be the adjudication officer himself or herself who would be required
to present a case before a tribunal.
"I think to myself: if I disallow it, how is it going to
look at a tribunal, am I going to be able to write a
convincing submission?" (Adjudication Officer)
"We like to think we make good decisions here<2-*J so we try
to be thorough before making a decision. I wouldn't want to
give a presenting officer a doubtful case to present at an
appeal." (Adjudication Officer)
The effect of this questioning was not so much that awards were made
where the adjudication officer was leaning towards disallowance but
that an attempt was made to gather more evidence or clarify existing
evidence, or that an approach was made to the HEO or the FAO section
for advice (or a referral to OCAO considered) if this had not already
been done. So, the mere existence of the appeals hierarchy was enough
to ensure that difficult cases were studied and considered more fully
than the more straightforward ones. From the closer scrutiny that
such cases receive, the inference may be made that eventual decisions
are likely to be better, or at least more firmly grounded.
The discussion of accuracy and mobility allowance decision-making has
revealed that the concept is hard to tie down when the existing scope
of the legislation and its associated case-law still leaves a large
'policy space' from which decisions must emerge. The prime example
here is the medical condition 'virtually unable to walk', where non-
legal decision criteria have rushed in to fill the space. The
elements of the decision-making system that might be thought of as
promoting accuracy, therefore, at the present only promote a
consistent approach, rather than necessarily an accurate one.
However, accuracy is only one of the demands of administrative
justice; the next section will explore how promptness, impartiality,





It was noted in chapter 3 that the only statutory reference to how
much time should be taken in dealing with a social security claim is
that the adjudication officer should dispose of the case within 15
days of receiving the casepapers. However, it was argued that this
requirement was rendered virtually impotent since it made no mention
of the time that the case was elsewhere other than with the adjudi¬
cation officer. Probably nowhere else within the social security
system is this better illustrated than by the mobility allowance
scheme, since the adjudication officer only receives the case after it
has spent weeks with the Regional Office, the EMP and with Lay
Scrutiny (and possibly M7). Of far more relevance is the clearance
time between the Department receiving the claim and the notification
to the claimant of the final decision.
In 1983, the DHSS published a report which, inter alia, examined the
administration of mobility allowance, and particularly the time taken
to process claims (Oglesby, 1983). In the first quarter of 1982 it
was found that the average clearance time for mobility allowance was
nineteen weeks. A year later it was down to sixteen, upon which
Oglesby commented:
"...there has been some improvement. My impression is that
the improvement is continuing, but the times are still too
long. " (p. 1)
Oglesby recommended (1983, p.59) that a target clearance time of 6-7
weeks could be achieved by a series of administrative changes designed
to reduce the periods that casepapers spent in transit between various
parts of the organisation, and by streamlining the procedures for
obtaining and checking the MY22 medical report. Such an approach
accords well with the treatment of promptness in chapter 2 where it
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was argued that the term is not readily amenable to conversion into
absolute criteria but should instead address the minimisation if not
the elimination of the time that a case is lying idle, ie having no
action taken upon it. Mobility allowance decision-making is
particularly suitable for such a treatment since it mainly relies on
evidence gathered from sources within the influence or control of the
DHSS. (This contrasts with industrial disablement benefit where large
sections of the evidence may be supplied by outsiders such as
employers, workmates, hospitals, GPs, etc.) In the large majority of
cases, the claim form completed by the claimant and the medical report
from the EMP are sufficient to allow a decision to be made. In this
context an average clearance time ot 16 weeks, the 1083 figure,
appears to be extraordinarily long. But since the stages in the
process were under the control of the DHSS then, Oglesby concluded,
internal administrative changes would be sufficient to improve
matters. He recommended, inter alia, that
- the claimant's own GP should in most cases supply the MY22
- medical advice on every claim should be replaced by wholly
lay awarding, with medical advice being available on
request
- Regional Offices should take over the administration of
mobility allowance
- better staff complementing to match workload should
accompany any other changes
Some of the recommendations have been implemented; in particular Lay
Scrutiny is now permanently established, and staff numbers are
increased to reflect workload on a quarterly basis rather than
annually as before. Other recommendations such as the switch to
Regional Office processing and the greater use of GPs have been the
subject of internal studies but have been rejected. But, apart from
the specific changes, it is clear from staff at the Mobility Allowance
Unit that the Oglesby report provided a much needed stimulus to
improve the administration of mobility allowance which was otherwise
lacking.
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The overall result has confirmed Oglesby's impression that the
improvement he noted between 1982 and 1983 would continue; in the
summer of 1986 average clearance times had been reduced to eight
weeks, still short of Oglesby's target but a striking improvement from
1982.
What Oglesby provided, and what is usually lacking on a routine basis,
was an independent analysis and assessment of clearance times.
Without such scrutiny there is the danger that clearance times will
creep upwards, since one way in which the DHSS can conserve
administrative resources is to limit the number of staff in the
Mobility Allowance Unit. However, the gap temporarily filled by
Oglesby remains unfilled on a permanent basis; the monitoring that is
carried out is concerned with standards of adjudication only, and not
with the time taken to process cases fully, a claim taking a year to
process would not attract a 'comment' on that ground alone. It is an
unfortunate omission.
The conclusion to be drawn is that promptness remains an elusive
notion; eight weeks clearance time now sounds impressive but would not
be if claimants had to rely on mobility allowance as the basis of
their weekly income. More constant, public scrutiny of clearance
times would help to ensure that 'promptness' is interpreted reasonably
by the DHSS and not sacrificed to the expediency of saving staff
costs.
(b) Impartiality
In chapter 3, it was argued that prejudice or bias in decision-making
originated from two main sources, the decision-maker and the DHSS.
However, it will be clear from the discussion of mobility allowance so
far that the adjudication officer (to whom the advice in the IOG to
refrain from contact with the claimant is directed), is only really
considering evidence and applying law for the lay questions; for the
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medical questions he or she is little more than a rubber stamp. On
the medical questions it would be more appropriate to apply the demand
of impartiality to the EMP and the Lay Scrutiny EO, and perhaps also
the Medical Officer in M7 when advising on individual cases. Since M7
is also the ultimate source of advice for both (directly for Lay
Scrutiny, and indirectly through its influence on training for EMPs),
the impartiality of its Medical Officers should also be examined.
Bias can only really flourish where the law allows choices to be made.
The adjudication officer deciding the lay questions has essentially no
room for manoeuvre on the age question and only a limited scope on the
residence and presence conditions where case-law has developed
sufficiently to limit the 'policy space' within the statutory
framework. However, in cases where residence and presence are not
easily decided (and such cases most frequently apply to immigrants or
individuals with families living abroad), the adjudication officer
will often have to weigh conflicting evidence or assess incomplete
evidence, ie a decision will be made according to how the adjudication
officer assesses the weight of each piece of evidence in relation to
the rest. This defines the marginal territory where the personal
predilictions of the adjudication officer, whether in relation to the
law itself, a general class of claimants (for example, immigrants), or
an individual claimant can be decisive.
"I suppose I could let my prejudices interfere with my
adjudication, if, for example, I just disallowed an
immigrant's claim on residence and presence without making
sure that he had got all his facts straight, which is what I
do in practice. If I was colour prejudiced it could come
through in that way. But it doesn't happen like that. "
(Adjudication Officer)
"If there's any bias, it's towards claimants who can't walk.
We like to think that we give them every chance to make a
successful claim. I think that's the general attitude
here." (Adjudication Officer)
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The possibility of bias towards an individual claimant arising from
contact with the adjudication officer is virtually eliminated because
of the geographic isolation of the Mobility Allowance Unit; personal
contact between the two parties is rare. Nevertheless, although bias
and prejudice can find little space in which to intrude on the lay
questions, what scope does exist can go relatively unchecked, in that
the monitoring system is unlikely to detect it. On the medical
questions, Lay Scrutiny is in a similar position to the adjudication
officer on the lay questions, the Lay Scrutiny EOs have the evidence
before them and fairly detailed criteria (compared with the
legislation) on which to form an assessment. Furthermore, they will
never see the claimant.
The position of EMPs is very different. They are probably the most
important actors in the whole decision-making process since they
provide the evidence on which the outcome of a claim will depend, and
also give opinions on whether this satisfies the legislative criteria.
Furthermore, their part in the process is carried out mostly in direct
contact with the claimant. The EMP, therefore, is in the position of
knowing what evidence will satisfy the criteria and also supplying
that evidence. So, if an EMP did harbour any prejudices (of the kind
listed earlier in relation to the adjudication officer) there is scope
for them to find expression during the recording of the medical exam¬
ination or the walking test, and afterwards when giving an opinion.
For the single EMP completing the medical report, professional
integrity and the lack of any previous contact with the claimant are
relied upon as a guard against the intrusion of bias. C2S:> An
assessment of whether such a reliance is effective or not is
difficult. However, the impression gained from the interviews
conducted was that, in general, the medical examination and the
walking test are carried out in a impartial, clinical fashion, much as
the doctor would perform at his surgery or in a hospital when
investigating a medical problem. This is encouraged by the medical
report form which sets specific questions for the EMP to answer; the
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only way to entertain any prejudice, either to assist the claimant in
getting the benefit or to hinder him in some way, would be for the EMP
to weight his answers in a certain way (or make a deliberately false
statement), which is very difficult when mostly factual answers are
required (although some of the qualitative answers requiring more of a
descriptive than quantified content could possibly be slanted).
In conclusion it seems that the relative simplicity and clarity of the
evidence requirements of mobility allowance decision-making and the
use of medical practitioners to collect it, allow very little scope
for bias on the part of the Lay Scrutiny EOs or the EMPs to affect
consideration of the medical questions. However, as was argued in
relation to the lay questions, what scope there is may go undetected
under the present decision-making arrangements. How this might be
changed will be considered in the discussion which forms the final
part of this chapter.
Any influence by the DHSS on decision-making, as explained in
chapter 3, is on the whole not considered conducive to fairness; hence
the advent of the independent adjudication system. However, the
decision-making arrangements for mobility allowance clearly allow
great scope for Departmental officials to influence the substance of
decisions (on both a mass and an individual level) through the
involvement of M7 in training, advising, and monitoring on the medical
questions. And as has been shown it has been the Department that has
led the way in refining the interpretation of 'virtually unable to
walk', particularly with the introduction of the 100 yards criterion.
Such a weakness in an independent adjudication structure is not
necessarily a criticism of the DHSS but of a structure of medical
adjudication in general which lacks independent advice and monitoring
systems to assist those having to grapple with with sometimes
difficult interpretations of statute and case-law particularly when
they are not an independent statutory authority.
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(c) Participation
Participation, as a demand of administrative justice, is difficult to
assess; like promptness one must appeal to some general notion of
reasonableness in order to decide whether the demand is satisfied. In
relation to social security decision-making, chapter 3 argued that
since the final decision depends greatly on the evidence on which it
is based, then there is ample scope within the information collection
stage of the decision-making process for the claimant to participate.
This would improve the chances that all information relevant to a
claim is collected, and therefore considered by the adjudication
of ficer.
However, in relation to mobility allowance, little opportunity appears
to be afforded the claimant in practice. On the lay questions the
claimant is required to respond to specific questions on the initial
claim form; on the age this is no problem, but in relation to the
residence and presence conditions the claimant has to answer 'Yes' or
'No' to three or four questions which include phrases such as
'normally live' and 'have you lived...' which will have a common-sense
meaning to the claimant but are also imbued with legal significance.
The following case-note illustrates the problem.
Case #2 - A problem of lack of understanding of the residence and
presence conditions
A renewal claim from an Asian man already in receipt of mobility
allowance revealed that there was a discrepancy on his initial
claim regarding his whereabouts over the previous year or so.
The second claim indicated that although he had answered Yes to
the question 'have you lived in Britain over the past 18 months',
he had in fact been in Pakistan for some of that time. A long
exchange of correspondence revealed that the man arrived in
Britain in 1968 but made occasional but lengthy visits to his
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family in Pakistan. He had answered Yes to the initial question
because he considered himself a permanent resident in this
country (a not unnatural supposition). The confusion had
resulted in an overpayment which the unfortunate claimant was
required to repay.
The adjudication officer on this case commented,
"This misunderstanding wouldn't have happened if we'd been
able to see the man when he first put in a claim. Trying to
get a clear idea of people's movements over 18 months is
sometimes difficult so we just accept the statement on the
claim form. And on this case there's been a tremendous
number of letters sent trying to find out the true picture.
One interview with me could have done the job. "
(Adjudication Officer)
In connection with the medical questions, claimants can make a
statement in part 2 of the medical report regarding their own
assessment of their health and walking ability. However, in practice
the EMP completes the statement and reads it back to the claimant, who
is asked to sign it as a true statement. The EMP is guided in what to
ask by the preamble to part 2 of the medical report, which reads as
follows:
"Please ask the claimant to tell you about their [sic]
medical history and details of walking ability including
distance, time taken and the degree of stress or pain
caused. Ask them to give details of recent hospital
attendances, the consultant's name and the name and address
of the hospital. Write down as nearly as possible the
claimant's own words. Please read over to the claimant what
you have written. Ask them to agree or amend the statement
and sign and date it."
For the EMP, this stage is considered to be as routine as taking a
medical history from a patient, but for the claimant it is the only
opportunity of presenting his or her version of events. However, EMPs
admitted that it is not presented in this way, but merely as part of
the list of questions that a claimant will have to answer. It is
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doubtful whether the claimant realises how important the statement
might be.
"We don't really explain anything to the claimant except
that we've got to complete this form, which will involve a
few questions and a short walk." (EMP, Region #2))
Also it can be very difficult for claimants, without prior thought,
and in what may be a stressful situation, to give any accurate
assessment of their own walking ability in terms of distance, speed
etc. , which may in any case be subject to wide variation depending on
the physical condition of the claimant at different times (as
mentioned earlier, claimants can have 'good' and 'bad' days).
After part 2 has been completed, claimants have very little to
contribute other than to subject themselves to a medical examination
and the walking test; they are not told of the EMP's findings nor
given an opportunity to comment upon them.
Although it was suggested that participation is difficult to assess it
is possible to identify how it might be improved (at least in relation
to the medical questions). This is important, not only because
participation is an inherent demand of administrative justice and
should be enhanced whenever practicable, but because it may lead to an
improvement in the quality of the evidence in the sense of providing a
fuller picture of the claimant's walking ability than the results of a
single, brief test. This may lead to the decision-making process
becoming more difficult if confusing or contradictory evidence
results, but at present the EMP's observations alone are taken to
represent the 'true facts' of the case, which (without at all
impugning the integrity of the EMP) may not necessarily be so.
If claimants were given the opportunity to participate more by greater
involvement in the completion of part 2 of the medical report, or by
being allowed to comment on the findings of the walking test, there
might be more confidence that the 'true facts' would emerge and hence
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a more accurate decision result. This might be achieved by taking a
claimant's statement after the test as well as before. <::2e, This would
also provide a safeguard against any possible (though unlikely) bias
or prejudice on the part of the EMP.
Participation, therefore, receives little attention in mobility
allowance decision-making, either as a desirable feature of intrinsic
merit (which administrative justice would demand), or as an aid to the
promotion of accuracy, or as a guard against bias.
(d) Accountability
The essence of accountability is the giving of reasons, not only for
final decisions, but also for sub-decisions and for the conduct of
enquiry (ie why certain information is collected and what use will be
made of it).
Mobility allowance is a relatively simple benefit; even when broken
down into the separate questions to be answered the resultant list is
not lengthy and many elements are reasonably straightforward. As a
result the information leaflet that a prospective claimant will
receive is able to include a brief and clear explanation of the
conditions that the claimant will have to satisfy. It also notes the
factors that the adjudication officer will consider in making a
decision about ability to walk (distance, speed, time, gait, etc.).
But having received this initial information, claimants are unlikely
to learn anything more about how their claims are decided. For the
claimant who is successful this will not perhaps be of any great
interest or importance, but for the disallowed claimant, knowing why
the claim was rejected, ie explaining the link between the evidence,
the decision criteria and the decision, is essential, since it is
difficult to mount an effective appeal against a decision, or even
know what to base an appeal on, if no explanation is given.
- 295 -
In practice the unsuccessful claimant will receive one of two pro-
forma letters, one relating to the lay questions, and the other to the
medical questions. Both letters quote the relevant legislation under
which the claim is disallowed. This may be sufficient to leave the
claimant with a clear idea of why the decision was reached (for
example, on the age conditions) but particularly on the medical
questions the claimant will have little idea of why the adjudication
officer considered that a particular requirement was not met,
As Tables 6. 3 and 6. 4 have shown, most disallowances are on the
walking criteria, ie the claimant is judged not to be virtually unable
to walk. But apart from stating this fact the decision letter does
not enlighten the claimant further. And it is likely that the
adjudication officer who made the formal decision would be hard
pressed to supply an explanation since he is presented only with the
opinions (not reasoned opinions) of the EMP and the Lay Scrutiny EO.
"I'm convinced that most claimants have no idea why they
haven't got the benefit. If I was told that I wasn't
'virtually unable to walk' I'd want to know why, but they
don't ask." (Adjudication Officer)
"On age, and residence and presence, there must be a lot of
appeals just based on ignorance, because there's no real
explanation in our decision letters. I think this is why we
lose so few appeals." (Adjudication. Officer)
Of course, in practice what the EMP and lay scrutineer are doing is
applying their knowledge of the legislation and the advice they have
received on its interpretation, and in particular using the 100 yards
criteria as a necessary aid in forming their opinion. For the
decision to be accountable to the claimant he or she would need to be
told of the findings of the walking test and how these and other
relevant clinical information combine with the legislation (and other
decision criteria) to produce the particular decision. This principle
could also be extended to the medical examination and walking test, ie
claimants should be told that they are being asked to walk 100 yards
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because the Department consider this a suitable distance for assessing
walking ability. However, some EMPs interviewed considered that this
was not advisable since knowledge of the 100 yards test might lead to
abuse or fraud; ie if claimants knew that if they were to walk 100
yards then their chances of qualifying would be small, then they would
be tempted in their own self-interest to come to a halt at 75 or even
better at 50 yards. Hence the 'true facts' of the claimant's
condition would not emerge.
Accountability in relation to the initial decision on a claim is not
encouraged by the formal requirements of the Adjudication Regulations.
Regulation 33 requires that adjudicating medical authorities record
their findings of fact in relation to a case and, where there is
dissent from one member, the reasons for that dissent. However, this
only has relevance for the Medical Board (since the EMP is not an
adjudicating medical authority) which rarely sits on initial decisions
and, when the Board is unanimous, which it almost invariably is, no
reasons need be recorded. This contrasts with the duty placed upon
Medical Appeal Tribunals (by regulation 34) to record, and communicate
to the claimant,
"... a statement of the reasons for their decision,
including their findings on all questions of fact material
to that decision."
The importance of this practice has been emphasised by a Tribunal of
Commissioners in R(M) 1/83:
"Although in many cases a medical appeal tribunal can state
their findings very briefly, they must deal with any
specific contention addressed to them which they reject. In
particular reasons must be given where the tribunal reached
a conclusion different from that reached by the medical
board. An unsuccessful claimant should be able to see on
which of the various possible grounds his claim has failed. "
In conclusion it appears that accountability in the sense adopted here
is not well-served by the present decision-making arrangements at the
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front line in respect of the condition -(walking) that accounts for the
vast majority of mobility allowance disallowances. It is difficult to
see why the duty imposed upon Medical Appeal Tribunals to give reasons
for decisions is not equally applicable to at least the Medical Board
as the first level of appeal and the adjudication officer as the
initial decision-maker. More explanation is not only desirable per
se, however, it can act as Robson argues (see chapter 2, p. 60) as a
contributor to greater accuracy. And if the requirement for greater
explanation was extended to awards as well as disallowances, the
monitoring system would be in a better position to identify unsound
decision-making.
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Part IV - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
An analysis of mobility allowance decision-making presents some useful
contrasts to decision-making on industrial disablement benefit (and
special hardship allowance). Firstly, the organisational arrangements
of the lay officials of the DHSS are separate, although the two
systems do meet in the Medical Boarding Centre in the shape of the
medical practitioners who act as both AMPs for industrial disablement
benefit and EMPs for mobility allowance. Secondly, as this chapter
has shown, decisions on mobility allowance depend more often on the
interpretation of the decision criteria than on the accumulation of
evidence. These contrasts will be discussed more fully in the final
chapter; the aim of this concluding section is to review the
conclusions reached about the administration of mobility allowance and
the insights that they offer regarding the theory and practice of the
independent adjudication system of social security administration.
1 - Mobility allowance and the adjudication system
The promise of the adjudication system, comprising as it does the
three tiers of independent statutory authorities, and the external
advice and monitoring agency of the CAO, is of high standards of
decision-making based solely on statute and case-law and free from the
influence of Departmental interests. However, to fulfil this promise,
there are certain conditions that must be met. Firstly, decision¬
making should be limited to the independent statutory authorities;
secondly, advice and monitoring should be restricted to the OCAO; and
thirdly, extraneous decision criteria should either be legitimated as
valid, or else excluded from the practice of decision-making.
However, as this analysis has revealed, these conditions are breached
several times in mobility allowance decision-making.
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Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the independent
adjudication system necessarily provides a guarantee that
administrative justice is achieved in practice. This scrutiny of
mobility allowance administration also reveals that whilst some
practices offend against the logic of independent adjudication they
can make a contribution to administrative justice.
(a) Will the real decision-makers please stand up
It is clear that decision-making on mobility allowance is not a
unitary exercise but comprises the collection of information and
application of decision criteria on a number of separate 'sub-
decisions' . For some sub-decisions the person supplying the evidence
is more important in the determination of the final decision than the
individual who formally applies the decision criteria to it. In
effect, the decision is made elsewhere than with the formal decision¬
maker, ie it is made by the ef fective decision-maker. As argued
earlier, anyone applying decision criteria to evidence is decision¬
making whether or not he has that formal role. If his decision is
then merely endorsed by another official not competent to make the
initial decision (ie without the requisite knowledge and experience to
assess the evidence) then he can also be considered the effective
decision-maker. Within the administration of mobility allowance there
are several decision-makers; the adjudication officer is the formal
decision-maker on all questions but the effective decision-maker on
only the lay questions; the EMP, the Lay Scrutiny EO, and occasionally
a Medical Officer in M7, are jointly the effective decision-makers on
the medical questions.
Identifying the real decision-makers within the system is important
because the full force of the advice and monitoring arrangements at
the level of the initial decision fall only upon the formal decision¬
maker, the adjudication officer. The activities of Lay Scrutiny and
the legion of EMPs lie outwith their sphere of influence.
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<b) The status of 'opinions' within an adjudication system.
One of the distinctive features of mobility allowance decision-making
is the giving of 'opinions' by EMPs about whether or not the statutory
provisions are satisfied. The question arises, therefore, of whether
an EMP opinion is to be considered part of the evidence on which to
base a claim or as a form of advice or guidance to the lay decision¬
maker in the Mobility Allowance Unit. Clearly an opinion cannot be
compared to a piece of factual information, such as the distance
walked by a claimant, or a diagnosis of his or her physical condition.
On the other hand, if it acts as advice or guidance the criticism can
be made that decision-makers should only be advised by independent
sources and not medical practitioners who are trained and supervised
by Departmental officials.
A possible response to this anomaly would be simply to omit the part
of the medical report which asks for an opinion, and allow the
adjudication officer to decide the case on the evidence of the
clinical findings and the walking test. c2S>;> What would be lost by
such a measure, however, would be the built-in checking mechanism that
the present arrangements provide, ie if the EMP and the lay
scrutineer, both of whom have been trained to be quasi-adjudicators,
agree on an assessment then some confidence can be expressed that, in
relation to the evidence, an accurate decision has been reached. At
the moment, whenever there is any disagreement between the EMP and the
EO that is potentially to the claimant's disadvantage, the present
arrangements allow referral to a Medical Board.
The practice of giving opinions is an example of the logic of
independent adjudication being undermined whilst administrative
justice is served nonetheless. The assessment of EMP opinions by Lay
Scrutiny EOs (who are not themselves independent statutory
authorities) is also contrary to the tenets of independent
adjudication. However, the redefinition of those officials as
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independent adjudication officers (a move under consideration within
the Mobility Allowance Unit) would remove this anomaly by bringing
their activities within the legitimate scrutiny of the Chief
Adjudication Officer.
(c) Advice and monitoring loopholes
The anomalous position of lay officials making decisions on medical
questions adds emphasis to the conclusion reached at the end of the
preceding chapter that the medical adjudication system would greatly
benefit from the introduction of a medical equivalent of the CAO. By
such a move the advice and monitoring function currently undertaken by
the Departmental Medical Officers of M7 could be assumed by an
external, independent agency. This agency would be free from the type
of influence from the DHSS which resulted in the adoption of the 100
yards criterion as an indicator of walking ability
<d) The Medical Board in no-man' s-land
The creation of OPSSAT in 1983 to oversee the administration of SSATs
and MATs left the Medical Boards in an administrative no-man's-land.
It is true that, before then, the Boards were in a similar anomalous
position being, at the same time, independent statutory authorities
and under the administrative direction of the DHSS. But this was also
true for tribunals. Part of the rationale behind the creation of
OPSSAT was to remove this anomaly. However, in the reorganisation of
tribunals, the logic of independent adjudication did not extend to the
Medical Board even though it is the first level of appeal for
claimants who are disallowed on the medical questions.
The Medical Board, post-OPSSAT, is therefore something of an
administrative chimera. It is an appeal body whose decisions carry
the same force as those of adjudication officers and MATs, but whose
members also serve in an advisory capacity on initial claims as EMPs.
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As EMPs, doctors can seek the advice of Departmental Medical Officers,
as members of a Board they are independent statutory authorities and
cannot, although the guidance they receive in the former capacity is
likely to have as much force as when they consider cases as a
Board. <30> The problem of the Medical Boards could be resolved either
by their assimilation within the OPSSAT structure, or by their
abolition.
2 - Conclusion
Some features of decision-making in practice, such as the existence of
the medical boards and the advice role of Departmental Medical
Officers, appear to have worked adequately since 1976, from which the
argument could be made that, if it works, then it should be left
alone. Against this position two general principles might be cited.
The first is that, in a legal rules-based system of decision-making
(such as mobility allowance), the task of filling policy spaces left
(perhaps deliberately) by the legislation should not be entrusted to
the implementing agency unless the law specifically directs that that
should be the case, but should be the responsibility of individuals
and bodies independent of the executive. Such a principle underpins
the evolution of OCAO from the previous offices of the Chief Insurance
Officer and the Chief Supplementary Benefits Officer, although the
principle of an independent advice structure has not been extended, as
yet, to medical adjudication nor to the second or subsequent levels of
the decision-making hierarchy. The second principle is expressed in
the familiar maxim 'justice should be seen to be done'. This, inter
alia, would demand changes in the composition, status and operation of
the Medical Boards as the first level of appeal, and the public
acknowledgment of the criteria by which walking ability will be
assessed.
The decision-making system of mobility allowance is, like that of
industrial disablement benefit, beset with anomalies. However, as
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this chapter has shown, not all of these are inimical to
administrative justice (such as the current practice of advice-
giving), whilst others (such as the position of the Lay Scrutiny
section) are under active review by the Mobility Allowance Unit.
A last conclusion of this chapter is to reinforce the claim made at
the end of chapter 5, that the framework presented in the theoretical
treatment of administrative justice presented in chapter 2 provides an
effective analytical tool for a critical evaluation of the
administration of a welfare service.
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CHAPTER 7 - ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: CHIMERA OR SUBSTANCE?
Part I - INTRODUCTION
In Bureaucratic Justice Mashaw (1983) sets himself the task of showing
that the search for an internal administrative law which holds the
promise of providing justice is not, as is frequently supposed, a
'doomed enterprise' (1983, p. 1) but a feasible possibility, albeit a
difficult and challenging one. An essential part of Mashaw's
'crusade', as he calls it, was to reorient discussion away from a
preoccupation with exleinal adminiotrative law (whirh is concerned
with the mechanisms through which individuals can obtain redress
against the decisions of state officials) and into the administrative
agency itself, since, as he explains,
"... it is here that 100 percent of bureaucratic implement¬
ation begins, and most of it ends." (1983, p. 4)
The preoccupation of administrative lawyers and social scientists with
external administrative law has also been mirrored in the UK (see
chapter 1) and has led to such pessimistic conclusions as those
provided by Frost and Howard (1977) in their study of representation
at social security tribunals,
"... social justice for the inarticulate and vulnerable
citizen in his dealings with bureaucracy may constitute no
more than a chimera ... a fair hearing is perhaps the most
that can be expected and the least that should be offered."
(1977, p. 73)
In his attempt to direct attention away from such narrow perspectives,
Mashaw argues in effect that a fair hearing is certainly not the most
that can be expected and more emphatically not the least that should
be offered. Mashaw was not the first to recognise the importance of
the 'front line'; for example, a study of the administration of
unemployment insurance benefits in Canada argued that judicial review
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should not be the decisive factor in administrative justice and that
concern should be focused on,
. . the achievement of justice at a stage well in advance
of the intervention of the courts, in other words, during
the administrative decision-making process." (Issalys &
Watkins, 1977, pp. 339-40)
Nevertheless, Mashaw's contribution has been much greater in his
attempt to provide a 'necessary beginning' (1983, p. 16) towards a
normative theory of administrative justice which has both descriptive
and evaluative power.
This thesis has attempted, in turn, to build upon this beginning by
examining the detail of Mashaw's theorising, identifying its many
strengths and occasional weaknesses, and suggesting an admittedly
derivative but nonetheless different approach to administrative
justice. Like Mashaw, the techniques I have adopted in this study
have been in part empirical and in part intuitive and analytic.
Whether the analysis presented here is convincing or not must rest on
whether it satisfies the demands upon normative theory articulated by
Kamenka (see chapter 1, pp. 14-15), ie that it contains internal
coherence and logical consistency, that its empirical claims are valid
and that its consequences and implications concur with our own
belief s.
The aim of this chapter is to review the coherence and consistency of
the theoretical treatment of administrative justice presented in
chapter 2 and to summarise the results of its practical application in
the empirical study of industrial disablement benefit and mobility
allowance. Part II concentrates on the analysis of social security
decision-making at the front line. The examination of industrial
disablement benefit and mobility allowance provides the opportunity of
comparing and contrasting lay and medical decision-making, and the
effects of two types of organisational arrangements, one based on a
network of over five hundred local offices (for industrial disablement
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benefit), and the other on a single, central agency (for mobility
allowance). A review of the conclusions drawn in chapters 5 and 6
will be followed by some suggestions of ways in which the concept of
administrative justice can contribute firstly, to improvements in the
overall decision-making system (ie how institutional changes could
promote the achievement of accuracy and fairness across all social
security benefits), and secondly, in the administration of industrial
disablement benefit and mobility allowance in particular.
Part III examines the theoretical treatment of administrative justice
and decision-making offered in the thesis, by questioning its validity
and robustness as theory, by identifying potential problems and
possible weaknesses, and by suggesting ways in which administrative
justice could be developed in the future. The thesis concludes a
brief consideration of the wider applicability of administrative
justice to public administration and beyond (ie in the relations
between individuals and private organisations), and the prospects for
administrative justice as the source of a normative framework for
assessing developments in social security policy and administration in
the future.
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Part II - THE VERDICT ON PRACTICE
1 - The Social Security Adjudication System
As formulated in this thesis, administrative justice provides a
normative set of criteria by which an administrative agency's
activities can be evaluated, but is not prescriptive in the sense that
it requires a certain type of decision-making system (ie particular
decision-making processes and organisational environments). The
adjudication arrangements of the social security system cannot,
therefore, be criticised per se but only by reference to their
propensity either to promote or to undermine the attainmont of
accuracy and fairness.
An early observation to emerge from scrutiny of the formal adjud¬
ication system (see chapter 3) is that it covers only part of the
total decision-making process, ie that part which requires the
application of statutory legal rules to the evidence presented to
adjudication officers. So, no matter how rigorous the process of
adjudication monitoring by teams from the Office of the Chief
Adjudication Officer (OCAO) or on their behalf by regional moitoring
teams, there remains a large part of decision-making that is outside
this form of external scrutiny. Important within this category are
the activities and decisions of the Secretary of State's represent¬
ative (who could be, inter alia, the clerical staff who routinely
assist in information collection, adjudication officers themselves or
members of the office management) and decision-making by medical
practitioners in their roles as adjudicators or as advisers. I will
return to the question of medical adjudicators later but for the
moment wish to concentrate on the adjudication officer/Secretary of
State dichotomy.
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(a) The Doublelife of the Adjudication Officer/Supervisor
The rationale for a decision-making system independent of the line
management function of the DHSS derives from the desire to avoid the
possibility of Ministers being held directly responsible, through the
actions of their officials, for individual decisions on social
security claims. The price that has to be paid for that convenience
is a loss of control over decisions in individual cases. Where a
choice of decision is presented to the adjudication officer, the
Secretary of State cannot intervene and impose his interpretation of
the decision criteria, although as the comment from one local office
manager clearly indicates (see chapter 5, p.211) this can occur in
practice. The Secretary of State must also relinquish control over
the development of the decision criteria to the Social Security
Commissioners and the higher courts. In some circumstances, however,
the Secretary of State has been prepared either to risk taking direct
responsibility for decisions by designating questions for himself and
not the independent statutory authorities, or by devising a hybrid
system of decision-making and review for certain questions. The
clearest example of the latter comes not from this empirical study but
from the Social Security Act 1986 which, inter alia, replaces the
Single Payment provisions of previous Supplementary Benefit
legislation by the cash-limited Social Fund. The significance of this
change is that previously single payment claims were decided by
adjudication officers in DHSS local offices, whereas from April 1988
they will be decided by 'social fund officers' who will be Secretary
of State representatives and not independent statutory authorities.
The protection afforded the individual by the Social Security Appeal
Tribunal system and the scrutiny of the 0CA0 has, at a stroke, been
removed; no longer will claimants have rights to single payments if
they satisfy certain statutory criteria, instead they will have their
claims considered using decision criteria formulated and controlled
the Secretary of State. If we are looking, therefore, for a reason
why some decisions are allocated to the Secretary of State and others
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to the independent statutory authorities, we need look no further than
this: political expediency. The replacement of single payments by the
Social Fund clearly illustrates the vulnerability of welfare rights
when they attract a Government's displeasure for some reason. When
the substantive outcomes of any legislative provisions have not met
the Government's approval in the past, a common response has been has
been to alter those provisions, ie change the rights afforded to
individuals. However, the introduction of the Social Fund demon¬
strates an alternative tactic, ie the replacement of claimants' legal
rights by the more easily-controlled Secretary of State policy.
Another feature of the adjudication system warranting close scrutiny
is the independent status of the statutory authorities, the
adjudication officer, Social Security Appeal Tribunal, and Social
Security Commissioners. The rationale behind this is partly the
desire, noted above, to protect the Secretary of State from becoming
embroiled in the minutiae of individual decisions, and partly to
demonstrate that the maxim 'justice being seen to be done' is put into
practice by removing any potential source of Departmental influence in
making decisions (thereby promoting impartiality). Whilst the Social
Security Commissioners have always been demonstrably independent from
the Department, the position of SSATs has not been so clear until the
creation of OPSSAT removed all Departmental involvement in the
tribunal system. However, a question that has been repeatedly raised
in this analysis, and which is applicable here, is why decision-making
at the front line does not appear to warrant the same concern as the
higher tiers of adjudication when the vast majority of cases are
disposed of at this level and decisions are just as much ' legal' as
those made by SSATs and the Social Security Commissioners. If
independence is valued so much at these levels, we must question
whether the independence of the adjudication officer receives
sufficient safeguard, in the extent to which he is protected from the
influence and the concerns of the DHSS. The responses of the
adjudication officers and others in chapters 5 and 6 clearly indicate
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that the amalgamation of adjudication officer and supervisor roles has
been generally detrimental to the pursuit of independent adjudication.
In the interests of greater independence, therefore, there is a case
for returning to earlier arrangements where adjudication was carried
out full-time by appropriately trained officers who were not subject
to the merry-go-round of staff rotation.
An independent adjudication system can be thought of as having an
internal logical force which is undermined by combining adjudication
officer and supervisor duties. Another example is the position of
medical boards and the Lay Scrutiny section within mobility allowance
decision-making. The medical boards operate as the first level of
review; if a claimant writes to the Mobility Allowance Unit to appeal
against a decision, then the case will be considered not by a Medical
Appeal Tribunal operating under the auspices of OPSSAT but by two
doctors acting as decision-makers in their own right <ie not as
advisory EMPs) although the claimant is given none of the
opportunities (for example, of seeing the papers submitted by the DHSS
or of being represented) that are afforded to tribunal appellants.
The position of the medical boards is clearly an anomaly, in response
or
to which they could either be abolished, assimilated within the
jurisdiction of OPSSAT. The problem of lay scrutiny is different in
that officials in the lay scrutiny section act supposedly as advisers,
not decision-makers. The independent adjudication system designates
the adjudication officer as the decision-maker on the lay (and some
medical) content of social security legislation (unless allocated to
the Secretary of State of course), but in mobility allowance decision¬
making the main effective decision-makers are the lay scrutineers;
they, not adjudication officers, are trained to examine EMP reports
and it is their recommendations to adjudication officers that are
scrutinised by the Mobility Allowance Unit medical officers in M7.
The formal decisions of adjudication officers are in contrast mere
rubber stamps for decisions taken outwith the adjudication system.
The remedy here, though, and one which is being favourably considered
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by the DHSS, is to designate lay scrutineers as full adjudication
officers and possibly extend their duties to cover decision-making on
the lay questions (such as residence and presence).
(b) Medical Adjudication
A further area of anomaly and confusion is the whole question of
medical adjudication. Although the distinctions between lay and
medical questions are clearly made in the legislation of social
security, the practice is much less clear. As explained in chapter 3,
medical practitioners fulfil a number of roles in social security
decision-making, as decision-makers, as advisers, and as providers of
information. The legislative distinction is important since whether a
question is designated lay or medical will determine whether an appeal
will lie to a Social Security Appeal Tribunal or a Medical Appeal
Tribunal. However, it does not necessarily follow that a medical
question will in the first instance be decided by a medical
practitioner. In mobility allowance administration the EMP furnishes
a report which comprises part medical diagnosis and part opinion on
whether the legislative criteria are satisfied; he does not make a
decision on the claim, this is the responsibility of the lay
adjudication officer who, as was noted above, in turn relies on the
recommendation of a lay scrutineer. As a decision made by a lay
official, therefore, the outcome of the decision-making process (and
the process itself) should fall to the lay monitoring bodies (in this
case the Mobility Allowance Unit PAO section) to scrutinise, and to
issue advice on. In practice, the medical questions are deemed
outwith the competence of the PAO section who in consequence do not
advise on, for example, 'virtually unable to walk' and 'duration'
questions. As a result, (as was seen in chapter 6) the 'policy space'
has been filled by decision criteria (principally the 100-yard rule)
that have remained hidden to OCAO, MATs and the Social Security
Commissioners.
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This example highlights the lack of and the need for some kind of
1 Medical CAO' (discussed in the conclusion to chapter 5, see p.237) to
perform an advice and monitoring function on the medical questions
whether they are decided by lay or by medical personnel.
A doctor working for the DHSS (in whatever capacity) is usually
required to perform a mixture of tasks, some of which will be
commonplace medical practice (such as taking histories, making
diagnoses of a claimant's condition, and giving a prognosis of its
likely course) whilst others will be distinctly medico-legal in
character; for example, where the legal decision criteria contained in
the legislation are also medical in nature (as in the percentage
assessment of disablement in industrial disablement benefit decision¬
making, or the 12-month rule in mobility allowance decision-making).
The perceptions of these decisions by EMPs and AMPs is, however,
markedly different from those of lay officials as the interview
responses of medical practitioners (in chapters 5 and 6) clearly show.
There is an argument, therefore, for amending the training of AMPs and
EMPs (and perhaps their selection also) so that the full legal
significance of their actions is realised, and that some of the more
cavalier approaches to medical adjudication which were evident in this
study are effectively countered and not allowed to undermine the
pursuit of accuracy and fairness.
The conclusion of this study is that the arrangements for medical
adjudication within the social security system are beset with
inconsistencies and anomalies. At present the system lacks most of
the features of the lay adjudication system; there is no comparable
training programme, nor comparable advice network or monitoring
arrangements to promote the achievement of consistently high quality
decision-making. Instead Departmental officials fulfil these roles, a
practice which can only attract the criticism that it undermines the
independence of statutory authorities (the adoption of the 100-yard
rule in mobility allowance decision-making amply illustrates this).
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If the problems of medical adjudication are to be resolved, then the
lay adjudication system could serve as a model (notwithstanding its
weakness identified earlier) for a re-designed medical adjudication
system. The logic behind the rationalisation of the tribunal system,
ie bringing lay and medical tribunals within a single Presidential
system under OPSSAT, could be extended to the first tier of decision¬
making by the introduction of a 'Medical CAO" , mentioned earlier, to
operate alongside the existing OCAO organisation.
(c) The Advice and Monitoring Network
Since 1984 the advice and monitoring functions for all social cocurit.y
benefits has been carried out by the Office of the Chief Adjudication
Officer, an important development in the pursuit of a uniform approach
to the administration of social security. Whilst it is the weaknesses
of the OCAO arrangements that I will dwell upon below, this criticism
is not intended to diminish or devalue their usefulness and potential
in the pursuit of administrative justice.
One criticism of OCAO is a limitation not of its own making, viz. its
narrow remit in monitoring the standards of adjudication only. Yet
this study has shown that the formal process of adjudication comprises
only part of the decision-making process. OCAO1s contribution would
be all the greater if it embraced the process of information collec¬
tion, the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State, and the
time taken to conclude a case. At present OCAO produces a report of
its team's comments but takes no part in any response or action
following its submission. There should be a duty on the DHSS to
rectify any errors of decision-making identified by monitoring teams,
and to report its actions back to the CAO. Responsibility for
initiating a review should not, in such cases, lie with the claimant;
an error should prompt an automatic review.
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The opinions of both adjudication staff and the monitoring teams
clearly indicate that the present definition of 'adjudication
comments' and the manner in which they are presented (ie by being
given equal weight in the overall calculation of the 'error rate')
undermine the effect that such reports should be expected to make. No
matter how insignificant or how serious the error, it is treated
equally in a monitoring report, for example, a comment reflecting a
clerical mistake such as quoting a wrong date, or the wrongful denial
of a substantial benefit would 'score' one comment each, and hence an
aggregate score of total comments would fail to indicate the
seriousness of failures in adjudication. 'Adjudication comments'
should, thcreforo, be categor:spH in such a way as to reflect the
differential importance of 'technical errors' and more substantive
mistakes. In this way the more serious misdemeanours will be given
due weight and therefore greater respect and authority afforded the
reports of OCAO and Regional monitoring teams. Consideration should
also be given to increasing the frequency of monitoring teams visiting
in the light of the unsatisfactory monitoring by many HEO/AOs who have
neither the training nor the experience to fulfil a monitoring role.
At the local office level the problems caused by the recent changes
under the 'devolution' policy of the DHSS are made clear in the
responses of adjudication officers, HEOs and regional office staff in
relation to industrial disablement benefit adjudication. The loss of
the advisory role at Regional level and the subsequent delegation of
this function to local office HEO/AOs has clearly led to a diminution
of the quality of advice available to the adjudication officer. This
contrasts with the experience in the Mobility Allowance Unit where the
PAO section has retained its advisory role and continues to provide a
fund of expertise that is rapidly being lost within the local office
network. It seems that the decision to give HEOs advisory (and
monitoring) duties was misguided in that it underestimated the demands
that this would place on them in trying to fulfil both adjudicatory
and management functions.
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The weaknesses of this aspect of the devolution policy are revealed in
both the local offices and the London South Benefit Offices. In the
former, as with their monitoring function, HEO/AOs frequently find
themselves not fully competent to answer the enquiries of their
adjudication officers, through lack of training, lack of experience of
a particular benefit, or lack of recent practical experience (for
example, as case-law develops). In the latter, HEO/AOs are more often
than not by-passed by adjudication officers who seek the help of their
more experienced adjudication officer colleagues. As a result HEOs
become increasingly inexperienced as problems and changes are not
brought to their notice. Although some offices visited functioned
well under the new arrangements, the reinstatement of RAO advice
sections could only lead to an overall improvement in the quality of
decision-making.
(d) The Tribunal System and the Front Line
The conclusions of the study on the appeal tribunal system are perhaps
surprising. The impact of SSATs was found to be not in their
decisions but in the prospect of an adjudication officer having to
explain his or her initial decision to a tribunal, particularly if the
adjudication officer was also a presenting officer. Their
contribution to administrative justice, therefore, appears to be
twofold; firstly in providing a means of redress for aggrieved
claimants, and secondly in promoting (indirectly) the pursuit of
accuracy by adjudication officers who would clearly prefer to make
their decisions (in this case denials of benefit) as soundly based as
possible rather than face the prospect of defending something less
certain before a triumvirate of tribunal members. And in the pursuit
of more soundly based decisions in marginal cases, adjudication
officers tend to pay greater attention to the need for their own
impartiality, for the participation of claimants, and for the
desirability of supplying them with more detailed explanations of
decisions.
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As this study has shown, however, this effect is not repeated on the
medical side; AMPs and EMPs are not even required to explain their
decisions on paper if an appeal is raised, let alone appear before an
MAT. The value of MATs as promoters of accuracy, therefore, is
extremely limited.
(e) Organisational Effects
The diverse organisational arrangements encountered in this study for
the administration of benefits have allowed a comparison between a
centrally-based administration (mobility allowance), a diffuse
organisation (industrial disablement benefit in Scotland and the North
East) and an intermediate semi-centralised structure (in London
South). Whilst making comparisons is a tempting exercise one rider
should be added in relation to mobility allowance decision-making,
namely, that although the paper work and final decision are centrally-
based, the individual does receive a more 'local' contact in visiting
the Medical Boarding Centre for completion of the MY22 form, and it is
here that the bulk of information collection begins and ends. The
criticisms of mobility allowance decision-making must therefore take
account of this 'local' element in a centralised service. And
similarly, because industrial disablement benefit decision-making is
concentrated within three Benefit Offices in London South, it does not
mean that the claimant necessarily has no contact with DHSS staff,
only that contact with the office where the decision is made is
rendered impractical for most claimants.
Figure 7. 1 overleaf gives a simplified summary of the findings of this
study on the administration of industrial disablement benefit and
mobility allowance.
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FIGURE 7. 1 - The relationship between organisation and administrative
justice
Accuracy Fairness
Prompt- Impart- Partici- Account-
ness iality pation ability
Mobility Allowance Unit +ve -ve +ve -ve -ve
IDE - Scotland and 0 +ve 0 +ve +ve
North East
IDB - London South +ve -ve +ve -ve -ve
Key: +ve = the current organisation generally makes a positive
contribution to the achievement of administrative justice
-ve = the current organisation generally makes a negative
contribution to the achievement of administrative justice
0 = the current organisational arrangements generally make
neither a positive nor negative contribution to the
achievement of administrative justice
The advantages and disadvantages of the Mobility Allowance Unit and
the London South arrangements are the same: the concentration of
decision-makers in one location (or only a few) creates a pool of
expertise that can be utilised by all and hence promotes more accurate
decision-making (see chapter 5, table 5.10), and the physical
separation of decision-makers from claimants reduces the possibility
of value judgements intruding as extraneous decision criteria and
affecting decisions. It should be noted, however, that at some points
in the process, bias and prejudice may still intrude; for example,
during medical examinations, since these are inevitably face-to-face,
and in the interviews between claimants and clerical staff of other
offices which are occasionally necessary in industrial disablement
benefit decision-making. Because information collection and decision¬
making are conducted on different sites there is inevitably a delay
built in to the process as case-files are moved from one location to
another. Further drawbacks occur in relation to participation and
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accountability, although for different reasons in relation to the two
benefits. On mobility allowance the fault is not due particularly to
the organisational arrangements (except on the few lay questions that
need to be considered, for example, age, or residence and presence)
but is attributable to the role of EMPs who conduct their examinations
with little or no regard for the desirability of ensuring that
claimants have been able to give all the information that might
support their claims, or for explaining why they are asking certain
questions and the exact nature and purpose of the walking test. In
contrast it is the relatively poor quality of interviews conducted in
local offices in London South away from the three Benefit Offices that
is detrimental to administrative justice. While local office staff
lose expertise on industrial disablement benefit as it becomes a lower
and lower priority for them, then the encounter between official and
claimant will eventually be reduced to one where neither side knows
the purpose and relevance of the series of routine and ad hoc
questions posed by the distant adjudication officer. In such
circumstances participation and accountability are bound to wither.
The strengths and weaknesses of local office processing of industrial
disablement benefit are somewhat different. Except in the offices
with large workloads, adjudication officers are usually working in
isolation although they can call upon the HEO/AO (acting in an
adjudicatory, not management, role) for assistance when necessary.
Although it would be unfair to conclude that this leads to poor
decision-making it is clear from chapter 5 that results from
monitoring exercises reveal that the greater the number of adjudi¬
cation officers working alongside each other then the fewer errors
that are detected. There is, however, an advantage in locally-based
administration in that the knowledge of local industries, labour
market conditions etc. that is accumulated in a local office can prove
valuable in resolving problems with the evidence germane to a claim.
And even where local knowledge does not supply the answers to
difficulties with the evidence, it may guide the adjudication officer
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(or the disablement benefit clerk) as to the most appropriate person
to approach for assistance. In effect, local office adjudication
officers are better placed to elicit the true facts of a case.
An area where local administration compares potentially unfavourably
with a more centralised structure is impartiality. Many adjudication
officers report that when they have occasional contact with claimants,
this may influence the way in which they treat a case. On the other
hand, many adjudication officers welcomed the opportunity of talking
to claimants face-to-face, since they felt it enhanced the chances of
getting at all the relevant information needed to make an accurate
decision. There is clearly a tension here between the need to elicit
the full facts of a case, which adjudication officers are probably
best placed to judge since they will be au fait with all the aspects
and nuances of the claim, and the need (and desire) not to become
personally involved with a claimant to the extent that judgement may
become clouded. In the SSAT setting this tension is resolved, or at
least ameliorated, by the presence of not one but three decision¬
makers, an option impractical at the front line. The attitude and
temperament of individual adjudication officers are important here
since clearly some found the tension difficult to resolve whilst
others coped without undue problems. If all adjudication officers
could be relied upon to maintain complete impartiality then the
problem would be eliminated, but as Robson noted (see chapter 2), this
would require something of an 'unnatural objectivity' which is hard to
achieve in practice. The alternative, and one which this study
concludes to be the most efficacious, is to approach the problem
indirectly and argue that an increase in accountability, in the giving
of reasons for decisions and explaining the decision-making process as
it progresses, would help adjudication officers identify (where it may
otherwise have been unconscious) where personal values have intruded
in the decision-making process and to ensure that their decisions (and
the way in which they reached them) are based soundly and solely on
the legislative decision criteria.
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As explained in chapter 2, accountability can be enhanced by the inc¬
reased participation of the claimant in that it provides the oppor¬
tunity for contacts with officials to be used to explain the progress
of a claim, what further information is required, and why it is
needed. It is here that adjudication officers in the local office is
better placed than those in the London South Benefit Offices or the
Mobility Allowance Unit since it easier for them to call claimants in
for an interview, or, on occasions, visit them or their place of work.
The experience of local office adjudication officers (and the
observations by Benefit Office adjudication officers that they
occasionally felt obliged to make decisions on less than satisfactory
information), leads to the conclusion that the advice in the Insurance
Officers' Guide, that adjudication officers should refrain from coming
into contact with claimants, should be rescinded in deference to the
need for full information, and to provide the opportunity of
explaining the decision-making process. Any potential loss of
impartiality should be effectively countered by the greater
participation of claimants and by better accountability to them .
The comparison between a dispersed administration and centralised
approaches demonstrates the many forms of bureaucratic enterprise
which can affect the achievement of administrative justice in
different ways. This study provides a qualitative endorsement of both
(or more strictly, all three) types of organisational arrangement
which were encountered. Subjecting each to the demands of
administrative justice reveals where they could be improved.
Whilst this section has dealt with the weaknesses of aspects of the
social security decision-making system that are general to a number of
benefits, the next section summarises how administrative justice could
be enhanced by detailed changes to the decision-making arrangements of
industrial disablement benefit and mobility allowance.
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2 - Industrial Disablement Benefit and Mobility Allowance Decision¬
making
(a) Industrial Disablement Benefit
A summary of the diverse conclusions to this thesis might be that the
DHSS, in its administration of social security benefits, should
improve the accuracy and fairness of its decision-making. The
practical pursuit of this objective could involve particular changes
that may complement each other. For example, I have suggested that,
since for the individual the substantive outcome of the decision¬
making will be his or her major concern, then the pursuit of accuracy
should be a priority. The accuracy of the decision, though, depends
on fulfilling adequately the two stages of the decision-making
process, the collection of information and the application of the
decision criteria. The enhancement of the quality of information can
be achieved by the greater participation of the claimant. Partici¬
pation in turn is enhanced by accountability since an understanding of
the process will enable the claimant to participate more effectively.
And in consequence decision-makers will be prompted to greater
impartiality by the necessity of having to explain their actions.
The interdependence of accuracy and fairness is particularly important
in industrial disablement benefit decision-making since many of its
problems stem from deficiencies in the evidence (which is often either
incomplete, inconsistent or contradictory) rather than the interpret¬
ation of the law. For example, constructing a complete and accurate
picture of the occurrence of an industrial accident, or compiling the
details of a claimant's previous working history for prescribed
disease adjudication, or the assessment of the previous potential
earnings of a claimant in a special hardship allowance case, all
present potentially difficult evidential problems. There are also, of
course, as chapter 5 showed, difficulties in the interpretation of
some industrial injuries legislation such as the meaning of 'out of
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and in the course of' employment (on industrial accident claims) or
'wholly or mainly in the vicinity of' prescribed machinery (on
occupational deafness claims), Here, greater accountability, in the
giving of reasons for the decision could, as Franks argues (see
chapter 2, p. 60) encourage more carefully thought out decision-making.
Other specific improvements in industrial disablement benefit
administration would flow from the discussion above about changes to
the whole social security system. For example, if the OCAO was
concerned with the time taken to process claims then the local offices
would be obliged to pay more attention to the avoidance of delays in
processing and greater efforts to secure the requisite information
from outside individuals and organisations. Similarly, the separation
of the adjudication officer and supervisor roles, and the re-
introduction of the Regional advice role would allow adjudication
officers greater time to devote to decision-making, and to be able to
draw on expert advice on difficult cases. Medical adjudication on
industrial disablement benefit, as for mobility allowance also,
requires the substantial restructuring outlined above.
(b) Mobility Allowance
The major criticism of mobility allowance decision-making is directed
not at the internal operation of the Mobility Allowance Unit but the
way in which a fundamental problem of the interpretation of the legal
phrase, 1 virtually unable to walk' , has been treated. The 'policy
space" created by this form of words, as explained in chapter 6, has
been filled by DHSS officials urging the use of 100-yards as a
criterion by which to judge claimants' walking ability. Whilst this
was an entirely practical response to a genuine difficulty, it is
disturbing that, firstly, it is treated so covertly, thereby denying
claimants any knowledge of one of the criteria by which they are being
assessed, and secondly, that it has proved immune to scrutiny by the
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higher levels of the decision-making system, most notably the Social
Security Commissioners.
Furthermore, although it is a development of part of the mobility
allowance legislation the Insurance Officer's Guide has nothing to say
on the subject. Since a claimant who proceeds on his walking test for
more than 100 yards is almost certain to be denied the benefit and
since he will be notified only that he has failed to satisfy
regulation 3(1)<b> of the Mobility Allowance Regulations 1975, it can
be said that the full reason for his failure will remain unknown to
the claimant, and hence accountability is poorly served. Accordingly,
the 100-yards criterion should be included in the I0G (and hence be
available to the public), and where applicable, reference to it should
be included in the explanation of any failure to satisfy 'virtually
unable to walk' criterion.
The anomaly of the mobility allowance medical boards as the first tier
of appeal has already been mentioned in the commentary on the medical
adjudication system. The aggrieved individual gains an advantage in
having access to what is in effect an extra tier of decision-making,
but is seriously disadvantaged by the denial of access to any of the
casepapers that the board will have before it, and to any represent¬
ation. To obtain these he must display commendable perseverance by
pursuing his claim (assuming that the medical board turns him down,
which happens in around 607» of cases) to an MAT. This anomaly could
be removed either by abolishing the medical boards or by assimilating
them with the tribunal system within OPSSAT and granting aggrieved
claimants the same rights afforded to SSAT and MAT appellants. If
this latter course were taken, however, another anomaly would be
created within the social security system (that of having, in effect,
two levels of MAT to hear mobility allowance appeals) which would be
difficult to justify unless the opportunity was extended to appellants
in cases involving other benefits.
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Mobility allowance decision-making relies almost entirely upon medical
information (very few claims fail on the lay conditions) which the
claimant has little opportunity to affect and which is very poorly
explained in the medical examination. The demands of participation
and accountability would require, therefore, an explanation of the
significance of the claimant's statement on the medical report form
and a greater role in its completion by the claimant, and a full
explanation of the significance of the various aspects of the medical
examination and walking test. Part 4 of the medical report where the
EMP gives his opinion as to whether or not the statutory requirements
are satisfied is a useful check on the accuracy of the Mobility
Allowance Unit assessment, but where the recommendation is tor
disallowance, then some explanation should be required of the EMP
which could form the basis of the reasons for disallowance eventually
communicated to the claimant.
The anomalous position of the Lay Scrutiny section in the Mobility
Allowance Unit was discussed earlier, and the suggestion made that lay
scrutineers should be designated adjudication officers and hence come
within the jurisdiction of the Chief Adjudication Officer.
This section has drawn together the implications for the social
security system in general, and for the administration of industrial
disablement benefit and mobility allowance in particular, which have
emerged from the application of an analytical framework based on
administrative justice. In such a way, it is hoped that the utility
of the framework has been demonstrated. The final section below
presents a summary of the contribution of the study to the theoretical
development of the concept of administrative justice.
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Part III - THE CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY
1 - The Validity of Administrative Justice
One of the reasons why Mashaw's 'Bureaucratic Justice' has been a
potent influence on the shape of this thesis is that it provides a
much needed definition of administrative justice which is very
persuasive, but which also invites critical examination. The analysis
have set out in chapter 2 is, in effect, an attempt to address a
persistent set of questions raised by Mashaw's own theorising, which
can perhaps best be summarised as follows: even if Mashaw's three
models of administrative justice are acceptable as coherent
theoretical constructs, how are we to make an assessment about the
right balance between them, and how can we make choices between the
desirable (and undesirable) elements of each; in short, are there any
fundamental criteria that we can use as a basis for comparison?
Framing the questions in this way, and failing to find an answer in
Mashaw, largely accounts for the way in which the theoretical analysis
is developed in this study. In contrast to Mashaw's attempt to
generate alternative conceptions or models of administrative justice I
have sought to show that administrative justice encompasses a set of
normative demands that can be considered as applicable in any
administrative setting, ie the demands of accuracy and fairness (in
its four elements of promptness, impartiality, participation and
accountability). An administrative agency, therefore, can be
evaluated against these demands, whether it is organised as a
bureaucracy or within some more flexible framework (such as in the
provision of medical services).
This approach avoids the problems of Mashaw's model-building outlined
in chapter 2. Firstly, by differentiating between different types of
decision criteria the lack of clarity in Mashaw's 'cognitive
techniques' is avoided. Essentially, I am positing one fundamental
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model of decision-making, ie the application of a set of decision
criteria to a body of evidence. The inevitable uncertainties in the
evidence give rise to problems of relevance and validity, whilst
unclear decision criteria demand the exercise of interpretation or
judgement. This generalised notion, therefore, embraces Mashaw's
separate categories of 'cognitive technique' and in particular
demonstrates the similarities between 'information processing' and
'contextual interpretation'. Secondly, Mashaw's problems of organi¬
sation or structure are avoided, since administrative justice, as
developed in this thesis, does not prescribe a particular organi¬
sational structure or the precise relationship between the admini¬
strative agency and individual citizens; for example, interpersonal
contact between officials and claimants or the independence of the
decision-maker are not associated with any particular organisational
structure. On this approach, it does not matter, for example, whether
mobility allowance claims are decided by a lay official sitting in
Blackpool on the basis of a medical report prepared by an EMP in
Reading or, to pick a hypothetical example, by a locally constituted
panel of doctors, social workers and DHSS officials - what is
important is that whatever organisation operates in practice, it
should be able to demonstrate that it produces accurate decisions and
produces them fairly. And thirdly, the legitimating values or primary
goals postulated by Mashaw are subsumed within a single, if lengthy,
objective. Administrative justice, it is argued, is satisfied if the
individual receives an accurate decision, promptly (ie without any
delay caused by the administrative agency), and impartially considered
by the decision-maker, and that during the process the individual has
been able to participate fully in providing information and being able
to comment upon other information affecting his or her claim, and has
had the process explained as the claim has progressed, and received an
adequate and comprehensible account of the reasons for the eventual
decision. This should be the challenge for all administrative
agencies regardless of whether they are allocating welfare benefits,
health care or deciding on a disputed claim.
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The analysis has also provided an alternative way of dealing with what
is seen by some as the problem of discretion, but which I have
preferred to call the inevitability of making choices. Administrative
justice, in other words, does not necessarily demand the confining,
structuring and checking of discretion (Davis, 1971) but rather that
where choices have been made, then it has also been made clear to the
individual why those choices have been made, and what evidence and
decision criteria they were based upon. Treating discretion in this
way, it is argued, is in effect acknowledging the inevitability of
discretion in decision-making whilst trying to ensure that extraneous
decision criteria (ie the informal decision criteria of value systems)
do not intrude into the valid and legitimate decision-making process.
The response to discretion, therefore, should be to analyse the series
of sub-decisions which contribute to the final decision, to identify
where problems with the evidence, or problems with the decision
criteria exist, and to stress the level and depth of explanation that
is required for each.
2 - Problems with Administrative Justice
(a) Administrative justice and 'efficiency'
One of the objections aimed at Mashaw's model of Bureaucratic
Rationality in chapter 2 was the unexplained appearance into its
defining characteristics of 'efficiency'. Whilst this criticism is
maintained, it must be acknowledged that Mashaw has made an important
attempt to inject an element of economic analysis into the treatment
of administrative justice. The attempt, however, is not entirely
successful: his argument appears to reduce to the contention that
bureaucracies comprised of officials make decisions more cheaply than
professionals or those involved in settling disputes, So, for
example, if one wanted to inject an element of interpersonal contact
into the bureaucratic decision-making process then costs would rise
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and hence efficiency fall. However, as was argued in chapter 2, even
at this level, and on Mashaw's own terms, the argument is not
convincing since, to pursue this example, whilst costs may indeed rise
through such a manoeuvre it might also be expected to lead to an
increase in the level of accuracy as face-to-face contact allows more
and relevant information to be supplied to the decision-maker. This
would enhance, not detract from, the achievement of the Bureaucratic
Rationality model of administrative justice which has accuracy as one
of its legitimating values.
The question prompted by Mashaw is nevertheless important and one
which remains to be tackled satisfactorily. The question is really
twofold; firstly, what, in the context of welfare administration, do
we mean by efficiency? and secondly, if we accept that efficiency is a
relative notion (ie we cannot say that one form of organisation is
efficient in an absolute sense, but only more or less efficient than
it has been in the past, or than some other organisation) what level
of efficiency can be taken as acceptable? The problem of defining
efficiency in a welfare setting is that the economists' approach of
relating output to costs is in itself problematic, as it can be
difficult to define exactly what 'output' is. (For example, how to
measure the output of health services has been a keenly debated issue
for many years.) However, the 'output' of the social security system
is perhaps easier to handle if we consider it as a satisfactorily
processed claim. This is the official approach; one indicator of
'efficiency' published by the Government in the annual White Paper on
Public Expenditure compares the cost of the administration of each
benefit with the expenditure on the appropriate benefit payments. It
is clearly a spurious measure as one example will demonstrate; if the
level of a benefit is increased by several pounds one year, it is
unlikely that any more effort will required to process a single case
since only the calculation of benefit will have changed; hence
although administrative costs will remain the same, expressed as a
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percentage of the (now increased) benefit expenditure they will appear
to have fallen.
That this thesis has not provided an answer to the problem of
efficiency needs a word of explanation. The reason primarily stems
from the consideration in chapter 2 of the question of to whom a
decision process should be acceptable (which was raised by Mashaw's
definition of administrative justice). Of the several possible
answers it was argued that the individual should be given paramountcy
and that from the perspective of the individual any organisational
features designed to contain costs but which actually or potentially
cause injustice (in the sense that the individual is denied a rightful
benefit or service) were to be considered unacceptable. If decisions
on social security claims are as important as Campbell argues (see
chapter 1, pp.10-11) then it would be no defence for an administrative
agency simply to plead costs as a reason for not meeting the demands
of administrative justice.
That administrative justice does not tackle the problem of costs,
however, is not necessarily a weakness. Rather, it should bring into
the open the question of the extent to which administrative justice
should be sacrificed to keep costs at a certain level, or how much the
government should devote to the administration of welfare systems. If
administrative justice as an analytical tool identifies deficiencies
in administrative agencies, then these agencies should be required to
account for those deficiencies at a level of explanation higher than
'it would cost too much to improve matters'.
<b) The qualitative nature of administrative justice
A further difficulty prompted by the theoretical treatment of admini¬
strative justice is that of making use of the criteria of accuracy,
promptness, impartiality, participation, and accountability in a
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practical sense. Again though, the difficulties inherent in turning
these criteria into quantifiable measures presents an essential
challenge to administrative agencies, to define and demonstrate them
in the particular context of their service provision. Depending on
the nature of the decision criteria, accuracy can be alternatively
easy or almost impossible to define; in a formalistic decision-making
process the correspondence of the decision to the facts of the case
could be taken as the basis for a working definition of accuracy.
More problematic is the purposive decision-making process where the
intended outcome (or purpose) of the process would be the true test of
whether the accuracy demand of administrative justice has been
satisfied. The problem with this approach can be illustrated using
the example of health care. A patient might receive the best of
treatment for his condition but still not be cured; in such a case, is
the welfare agency to be criticised for failing to provide justice for
the patient? Clearly this would be unreasonable and not particularly
helpful in the pursuit of improved decision-making. A better
indicator would be an assessment of whether the two stages of
purposive decision-making, described in chapter 2 in relation to a
professional knowledge based system as the 'diagnosis' and 'response'
stages, are carried out in accordance with the current state of
knowledge.
Promptness is comparatively easy to quantify although it must be
considered something of a flexible criterion. As explained in chapter
2 it may be appropriate to attach definite time limits to decision¬
making but frequently this is not possible. However, as the
discussion of the Oglesby scrutiny of mobility allowance shows
(chapter 6, pp.285-6), targets for improved processing times can be
effective in reducing the time taken to process claims and thus
contribute to greater promptness.
Impartiality, participation and accountability are essentially
qualitative criteria. One measure of ' impartiality' would be the
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demonstration that a decision on a claim was entirely the result of
applying the appropriate decision criteria to the evidence, ie that no
extraneous decision criteria intruded into the process. In this way
accuracy could serve as a proxy measure of impartiality, ie if
accuracy is confirmed then, by inference, the decision is based
soundly on the decision criteria and evidence, and hence impartiality
can be assumed,
It can be seen that accuracy, promptness and impartiality could be
monitored from within the organisation by a retrospective examination
of casepapers using a previously defined measure of accuracy and a
quantitative expression of appropriate time limits. However, an
assessment of levels of participation and accountability is not so
amenable to such internally-based scrutiny. Whilst, as this study has
demonstrated, it is possible to ascertain the views of officials on
how well participation and accountability are served by the current
organisational arrangements, no real sense can be gained from these of
how the claimant perceives his treatment. There is perhaps a need,
therefore, if administrative justice is to be taken seriously, for
some form of continuing consumer survey for welfare services (perhaps
along the lines of the Family Expenditure Survey or the General
Household Survey), which could address, inter alia, the issues of
participation and accountability and levels of satisfaction amongst
claimants.
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Part IV - FINAL COMMENTS: PURSUING THE SUBTLE ENTERPRISE
The treatment of administrative justice presented in this thesis
presents a series of challenges for welfare administration agencies; a
challenge to articulate what the concept (in its elements of accuracy
and fairness) means in their particular setting, and a challenge to
demonstrate how their internal operations meet these demands. Alter¬
natively, they should acknowledge where deficiencies exist, and either
remedy them or produce compelling arguments to explain why they should
be considered acceptable.
The challenge is not only relevant to current administrative
arrangements; prospective changes in administration should also be
able to meet the requirements of administrative justice. Proposed
legislative amendments or new provisions could be scrutinised in two
ways; firstly to identify where problems with evidence or with the
interpretation of the law are likely to occur, and secondly, to
identify what response would be necessary in institutional terms (for
the DHSS and also for the Office of the Chief Adjudication Officer and
the Office of the President of Social Security Appeal Tribunals) to
ensure that accuracy and fairness are not undermined. Furthermore,
any administrative rules that act as additional substantive decision
criteria should be subject to the same administrative justice
requirements as legislative provisions.
The theory and practice of administrative justice developed here has
focused on the front line of social security decision-making in a
conscious effort to demonstrate the importance of routine admini¬
stration. However, the demands of administrative justice are relevant
for all decision-making processes, whether they adopt case-law,
administrative rules, or professional knowledge as decision criteria
within a framework of statutory legal rules, and whether they are the
first or subsequent tiers of decision-making. Hence, the challenge to
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administrative agencies outlined above is also relevant for bodies as
the Social Security and Medical Appeal Tribunals.
Whilst this study has not probed the appeal tribunal system's
contribution to administrative justice, previous analyses indicate
that this tier of social security decision-making is relatively open
to investigation and evaluation. It is suggested, therefore, that
fruitful research could be carried out on tribunals using the
normative framework provided by administrative justice. The case for
such research is strengthened in appeal cases where new information is
presented, since in effect the tribunal is not scrutinising a previous
decision but having to make a fresh assessment, ie the decision they
come to in such a de novo hearing is akin to an initial decision, but
there are no safeguards such as a monitoring system to promote and
check accurate decision-making. Where the level of appeal is to a
tier of internal administrative review, however, research by outsiders
becomes reliant on the co-operation of the agency and therefore
potentially more difficult. The argument must, therefore, be that
where individuals are dependent on the decisions of welfare agencies,
then no matter what the particular decision criteria may be,
individuals should be afforded the same guarantee of administrative
justice as when the decision criteria are statutory legal rules.
A warning was sounded in the introductory chapter about the dangers of
claiming too much for a theoretical development that relies on related
empirical evidence. The conclusions drawn, therefore, acknowledge
that this treatment of administrative justice would need further
empirical testing in other areas of social security, and within other
welfare and regulatory organisations. What has been presented here
has been in effect, a 'special' theory of administrative justice; what
is needed is a general theory covering all instances of administrative
decision-making with which administrative justice relating to social
security would be compatible and consistent. The wider applicability
of administrative justice is prompted by a remark by Robson (1979) in
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his reassessment of his book Justice and Administrative Law (1928).
He noted that in the fifty years which had elapsed since the book was
published, administrative tribunals has stepped outside the narrow
limits of addressing disputes between private individuals and public
bodies and now were also concerned with individuals' disputes with
private persons and organisations (such as employers). This strongly
suggests that administrative justice should also be applicable in this
area of social life, and that, for example, the relationships between
individuals and banks, building societies, insurance companies etc.
could (and should) be evaluated according to the normative demands of
administrative justice. The point is reinforced in a welfare setting
by Titmuss1s cogent analysis (1976) of the 'social division of
welfare' where he argued that our traditional view of welfare which
focuses on public social services excludes other important mechanisms
through which our welfare is promoted, in particular 'fiscal' welfare
(such as the income tax system) and 'occupational' welfare (such as
occupational pensions, fringe benefits etc.). So, since significant
aspects of our welfare are delivered by private organisations then the
argument for extending the demands of administrative justice to the
private sector becomes compelling.
This wider relevance of administrative justice confirms that Mashaw's
'necessary beginning' (1983, p. 16) was indeed necessary. In this
thesis I have tried to build upon his ' beginning' in an analysis of
decision-making prompted by Mashaw's innovative and searching inquiry
into administrative justice. The analysis presented, it is argued,
meets Kamenka's criteria for valid and effective normative theory
(chapter 1, pp. 14-15); it has internal coherence and consistency and
can be a powerful empirical tool which, as chapters 5 and 6
demonstrate, is capable of generating a practical agenda for reform.
Reconciling 'administration' and 'justice' may be a subtle enterprise
but it is far from doomed and in the modern state such enterprise
is becoming ever more necessary.
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NOTES
Chapter 1 - Advancing the Front Line
(1) I am aware that in this thesis I am assuming an administrative
definition of 'social security', ie National Insurance benefits,
supplementary benefits and housing benefits, and acknowledge that
in doing so, there is a danger of further reinforcing the narrow
view of 'welfare' which only encompasses publicly provided
services and benefits and ignores the contribution to 'welfare'
from the fiscal system and from occupational sources (Titmuss,
1976; Sinfield, 1978).
The administrative approach to definitions of social security
also leads to confusion when comparative analyses are attempted
since definitions vary from country to country. The answer,
according to Sinfield (1985) is not to retine admiuinstrativo
definitions but to abandon them, and instead seek to answer
Townsend's challenge (1975) for a functionalist definition, ie
attempt to answer the questions 'what security and whose?' and
'why social?' (Sinfield, 1985, p. 2).
However, because this thesis is concerned specifically with the
administration of the DHSS in its handling of claims for benefit,
I will proceed with an administrative notion of social security
benef its.
(2) For example, in the Old Age Pensions Act 1908 and the National
Insurance Act 1911.
(3) Cmd 6404 (1942) Social Insurance and Allied Services. (the
Beveridge Report), HMSO. The other 'giants' which Beveridge
sought to banish were Ignorance, Disease, Idleness and Squalor.
(4) The figures quoted in this paragraph are taken from Cmnd 9519
"Reform of Social Security - Background Papers", Paper 5,
para. 5. 1.
(5) The most comprehensive pieces of empirical research on the
financial circumstances of social security recipients have been
Townsend's large-scale survey reported in Poverty in the UK
(1979), and Mack and Lansley's analysis of survey data collected
for the television series 'Breadline Britain' (in Poor Britain.
(1985)); see also Berthoud (1984). The impact of income
maintenance on poverty is explored in Beckerman (1980), and more
recently in Nolan (1986). In Dilnot et al (1984) and George and
Wilding (1984) the relationship between social security and work
incentives is examined.
(6) The large amount of research on SBATs in the 1970s is explained
by a combination of factors: the upsurge of interest from welfare
rights groups in the tribunal system, the involvement of
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researchers as representatives, the relative ease of access to
tribunals, and the general growth of academic research into
socio-legal issues (Adler, 1985).
(7) For other useful contributions to the study of social security
tribunals, see Farmer (1974), Adler & Bradley (1976), and
Fulbrook (1978).
(8) Adler further suggests that the academic discipline of sociology
has made little contribution to rendering this opacity a little
more pellucid; partly through its lack of opportunity (ie in the
training of social security officials, and because of the
dominance of the DHSS over research into its own activities), but
also partly through its own failings in not recognising the
significance of social security as a social institution, and in
alienating the discipline from government departments.
(9) Four small Review Teams were set up in 1984 to investigate
supplementary benefits, provisions for retirement, benefits for
children and young people, and housing benefit. The results were
published in a series of Green Papers in 1985 as The Reform of
Social Security (Cmnd. 9517-9520).
(10) However, it was felt, especially in the 1970s, that concentrating
welfare rights activity on appeals to tribunals, Social Security
Commissioners and the Courts - the "test-case strategy" - would
produce benefits for all claimants if the interpretation of
certain parts of the social security legislation could be
established in their favour (see, for example, Prosser, 1983).
Whether the results of such a strategy are worth the amounts of
time, effort and money that it requires is discussed in Harlow
and Rawlings, 1984, p.269ff.
(11) In 1985, of the 16.8 million social security claims, 74,500 were
heard and decided by an SSAT (Social Security Statistics 1986,
Tables 49. 01A and 50.04).
(12) Campbell's argument recalls the American case, Goldberg v Kelly
(397 US 254 (1970)) in which the Court ruled that recipients
threatened with the termination of certain public assistance
benefits were entitled to a full trial-type hearing (ie at which
oral evidence and cross-examination of witnesses was permitted,
and a decision made by a neutral adjudicator, who would provide a
written decision). However, the prinicple established in this
case has not been extended to all American welfare benefits
(Mashaw, 1974, p. 805).
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Chapter 2 - Administrative Justice and Welfare Decision-Making
(1) For an examination of welfare agencies based upon this duality,
see Cranston (1985).
(2) A useful exploration of administrative justice in a regulatory
context is Kagan's (1978) study of the implementation of the
Wages, Prices and Rents freeze order in the USA in the early
seventies. The questions which Kagan posed are also of concern
in a welfare context:
"Everyone agrees ... that agencies should proceed in an
honest and equitable manner. The debate is about how
the agencies should be constituted and controlled to
promote these ideals. It concerns the proper structure
of particlpaliun, fact-finding, and accountability in
the regulatory decision process." (p. 13)
(3) Robson (1928) was an important early treatment of administrative
justice; the Committee on Ministers' Powers, 1932 (the
Donoughmore Committee) and the Committee on Administrative
Tribunals and Enquiries, 1957 (the Franks Committee) were both
important influences on the shaping of the system of
administrative tribunals in this country.
(4) See, for example, Titmuss (1971), Lister (1974), Adler & Bradley
(1976), DHSS (1978), Supplementary Benefits Commission (1979),
Bull (1980), Walker (1983), Ham & Hill (1984).
(5) Jerry L. Mashaw is Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale University.
He has written widely on the administration of social security
in the USA. See, apart from Bureaucratic Justice. 'The
Management Side of Due Process' in 59, Cornell Law Review, 1974.
(6) See also the review of Bureaucratic Justice by Adler & Tweedie
(1985).
(7) It should be noted that in the USA social security system
'hearings' are not necessarily appeals. Hearings can refer to
some first tier decision-making mechanisms where, for example,
claimants are faced with having their benefit payments with¬
drawn; see also n. 12 to chapter 1.
(8) The models are offered as 'ideal types' in the sense that they
are abstract yet coherent formulations that contain an internal
logic to their structural features. They do not purport to
describe reality but to provide models which can be used to
analyse and understand observable patterns of behaviour. 'Ideal
types' as an analytical tool derive from Max Weber; see On the
Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949). Nicos Mouzelis, in
Organisation and Bureaucracy (1967), usefully discusses the
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concept, whilst an application of the technique in a social
welfare context can be found in M, Adler 'Financial Assistance
and the Social Worker's Use of Discretion' in N Newman (ed)
(1975).
(9) See Rogaly (1984).
(10) See, for example, Baldwin & Hawkins (1984).
(11) See chapter 1, pp.11-12.
(12) For example, see reviews by Liebman & Stewart (1983), Kagan
(1984), Verkuil (1984), Adler & Tweedie (1985), Stone (1984b),
Zucker (1985), Ogus (1987)
(13) This is not necessarily to concur with Dworkin (1977) that even
in 'hard cases' there should still be one right answer that can
be found within the law. There may still be uncertainty in
evidence and decision criteria which seem to defy resolution and
require adjudicators to make choices (or exercise their
discretion) between alternative decisions (Hart, 1961).
(14) 'Decision criteria' is rather an inelegant term but is
nevertheless useful as a means of describing collectively the
wide variety of factors that different decision-makers may use
in decision-making; they may be, for example, a written body of
rules, a set of precedents, a body of professional knowledge or
the individual preferences of a decision-maker.
(15) Here I wish to depart from Mashaw's characterisation of
'bureaucratic' rules, since not all administrative agencies will
necessarily be wholly or mainly 'bureaucratic' in nature. Also,
I wish to avoid the pejorative connotations that are sometimes
associated with the term 'bureaucracy' .
(16) In a useful discussion of the differences between 'principles',
'rules' and 'standards', Jowell (1973) advocates the definition
of a legal rule formulated by Roscoe Pound (in Jurisprudence
(1959), vol. 2). A legal rule is,
"... a legal precept attaching a definite legal
consequence to a definite statement of fact." (p.201)
This could also serve, mutatis mutandis, as a definition of an
administrative rule.
(17) Baldwin & Houghton's (1986) full typology divides administrative
rules into the following categories: procedural rules, intei—
pretive guides, instructions to officials, prescriptive/
evidential rules, commendatory rules, rules of practice,
management or operation, and consultative devices and admin¬
istrative pronouncements. Whilst not disputing the validity of
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these categories, it is worth noting that 'procedural rules',
unlike the other seven categories, do not constitute substantive
decision criteria, although, as has been argued, procedures can
have an indirect bearing on the outcomes of decision-making
processes (see chapter 1).
(18) This is an admittedly simplistic characterisation of profess¬
ional knowledge which leaves aside the critical argument that it
comprises not only a corpus of value-neutral propositions and
relationships (comparable to 'scientific' knowledge) but also an
element of socially-constructed knowledge which serves, inter
alia, to maintain the power of professional groups within
society; see, for example, Johnson (1972).
(19) Following Pound; see n, 16 above.
(20) In distinguishing between accuracy and fairness as elements of
administrative justice I am assuming that 'fairness' can be
treated as independent of, but nevertheless contributing to, the
concept of justice, As Dworkin explains:
"Most political philosophers ... take the intermediate
view that fairness and justice are to some degree
independent of one another, so that sometimes fair
institutions produce unjust decisions and unfair
institutions just ones." (1977, p. 177)
Why 'justice' is linked to decisions and 'fairness' to
institutions and not vice versa is not clear - it could be
argued that the two terms are interchangeable. Nevertheless,
inasmuch as 'justice' is frequently used in connection with
substantive outcomes and 'fairness' with procedures, I will also
follow this convention, whilst emphasising that one of the
attractions of the concept of administrative justice is its
potential of subsuming both substantive and procedural elements.
(21) This echoes the observation in the Franks Report that there is
not a single model that administrative tribunals should adhere
to; rather the criteria of 'openness, fairness and impartiality'
should be satisfied whatever the particular form a tribunal
might adopt.
(22) In his analysis of discretion Dworkin (1977, p.31) likens the
concept to the hole in the doughnut which only exists because of
the surrounding material; so, he says, with discretion, it is
only within the surrounding constraints of rules, policy etc
that discretion can operate; without reference to those
constraints the concept has no meaning.
(23) This characterisation of discretion within a welfare service
corresponds closely to Bull's (1980) typology. Administrative
rules are constructed under what he calls 'agency discretion',
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whilst administrative and professional discretion Bull subsumes
under 'officer discretion'. It must also be remembered that
these two types of discretion must be consistent with the legal
framework within which they operate, which it is the prerogative
of Parliament to dictate under what might be called their 1 legal
discretion'. Bull's typology is further discussed in Part V. 2
of this chapter.
(24) The discussion on discretion here is presented from a micro-
sociological perspective, ie concentrating on the impact of
discretion on individual decision-making. For discussions of
discretion in a wider context, see, for example, the essays in
Adler & Asquith (1981).
(25) See, for example, Titmuss (1971), Jowell (1973), Lister (1974),
Adler & Bradley (1976), Donnison (1977), Bull (1980), Adler &
Asquith (1981), Ham & Hill (1984), Goodin (1985), and Galligan
(1986a).
(26) Though influential Davis's was by no means the first treatment
of discretion, see Bradley (1974, pp. 37-38).
(27) The negative aspects of discretion were cited extensively in the
debates preceding the reform of Supplementary Benefit in 1980
(see, for example, Donnison (1982), Walker (1983), Harlow &
Rawlings (1984)). Partington (1980, quoted in Harlow & Rawlings
(1984, p. 588)) summarises the anti-discretion arguments in the
1970s as follows:
(i) it leads to inconsistent decision-making on the
part of officials and appeal tribunals;
(ii) it leads to arbitrary decision-making;
(iii) it leads to undesirable social control by
of ficials;
(iv) it diverts attention away from more fundamental
issues such as the adequacy of benefits;
(v) it encourages feelings of stigma in claimants;
(vi) it prevents claimants understanding how the
scheme works;
(vii) it leads to feelings of jealousy between
claimant s.
(28) There is ultimately a point, however, at which decisions become
final. On questions of fact the findings of SSATs and MATs are
not reviewable, whilst on points of law the Social Security
Commissioners are, in the vast majority of cases the final
arbiters, although, of course, cases can be pursued, with leave,
to the House of Lords as the highest court.
(29) The temptation to label certain types of public official as
holders of 'strong' or 'weak' discretion is not particularly
fruitful; in practice an official may have a wide scope for
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choice in one decision and very little on the next. Harlow and
Rawlings (1984) put the point with reference to judges:
"We should not assume that judicial discretion is
invariably 'strong' or 'weak' ... we have seen judges
using discretion in many different circumstances."
(p.317) (original emphasis)
(30) Adler & Asquith (1981) have drawn attention to the need for this
power relationship to be articulated in the context of wider
social, political and economic forces.
(31) Frank (1963) argues strongly that 'fact-finding' is a crucial
element in producing a decision and that uncertainties about
decisions are often wrongly attributed to problems with the
rules upon which they are based. Even the most honest of
witnesses cannot be relied upon; for example, his genuine
perceptions of events may not accord with reality (it is summon
after all for two eyewitnesses to an event to offer alternatives
accounts), his memory may be faulty or his account may be
unclear, confusing or give a totally wrong impression of what he
meant. Thus, Frank is led to the conclusion that 'facts are
guesses' .
(32) However, Street (1968) argues that welfare legislation does not
allow straightforward decision-making.
". . . decision-making is not . . . some mechanical
process; one cannot use a slot machine or even a
computer in order to obtain an answer." (p. 8)
(33) The point is echoed by Baldwin & Hawkins (1984) who are forceful
in their insistence that 'legal' considerations offer only a
part explanation of discretion:
"If ... attention is focused unduly on legal and
rational as opposed to other values, then a solid basis
for such studies is not offered. Our position is that
a proper appraisal of discretionary justice must
recognise the part played in decision-making by moral,
political, organisational, and economic values, in
addition to legal ones. " (pp. 579-580)
(34) In practice it is difficult to find examples of such a
conjunction since, as Hart (1961, p. 12) argues, there is always
a 'penumbra of uncertainty' in even the most innocent-seeming
provision. He cites the example of the requirement that wills
must be signed; this seems straightforward enough until one asks
what exactly constitutes 'signing' a will; can the signatory be
given any physical assistance, for example, or can initials
rather than a full name be acceptable?
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Chapter 4 - An Introduction to Social Security Decision-making
(1) The main exception is attendance allowance where decision-making
powers are vested in the Attendance Allowance Board
(2) The former Chief National Insurance Commissioner, Sir Robert
Micklethwait, has suggested the term 'extended three tier plus'
in an attempt to encompass the various elements of the
adjudication system within one phrase. He writes:
"... 'extended three tier plus' ... describes exactly what it
is: the three tiers consist of the insurance officer, the local
tribunal and the Commissioner; there are extensions into the
area of the medical appeal tribunal and the Attendance
Allowance Board; and the 'plus' represents the control of the
Commissioner by the courts." (1978, p. 17)
(3) Social Security Act 1975, s.98(l)
(4) The difference between a 'claim' and a 'question' is straight¬
forward; in some instances an adjudication officer must make a
final decision on a claim, ie whether the claimant is eligible or
ineligible for the benefit claimed and, where appropriate, what
the legitimate rate of payment is; in other cases the
adjudication officer is asked to decide a separate issue (or
'question') which may not be directly related to a claim. The
most relevant example of this is from the Industrial Injuries
scheme regarding an industrial accident where a claimant can ask
for a decision on whether an industrial accident has taken place
(as defined in the legislation) regardless of whether or not he
wishes to pursue a claim for Industrial Disablement Benefit (see
chapter 5).
(5) The arrangements for 'reporting' decisions are currently under
review by the Lord Chancellor's Deparment
(6) For a brief discussion on the roles of medical practitioners in
the social security system, see Burns (1981).
(7) Severe disablement allowance was introduced to replace the non-
contributory invalidity pension (abolished by the Health and
Social Security Act 1984, s. 11). It is designed to provide a
regular payment to disabled people who have been prevented from
building up National Insurance contributions which would have
entitled them to an invalidity pension. Disability is measured
according to the same assessment criteria that are used in the
Industrial Injuries scheme.
(8) Before the changes introduced by the HASSASSA Act 1983, a
'Medical Board' always comprised two doctors. Now two doctors
only sit when the conditions of Regulation 32 of the Adjudication
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Regulations (SI 1984/451) apply. Therefore, although strictly
speaking a 'Board' rarely sits, referring a claimant to an AMP
for a medical assessment is still called by officials and public
alike ' boarding' . Furthermore, since the DHSS still calls the
premises where examinations take place 'Medical Boarding
Centres', it is likely that this familiar usage will continue for
some time.
(9) HASSASSA Act, 1983, s. 25 and schedule 8.
(10) The 1 S' Manual and the Insurance Officer's Guide are to be
replaced by the single, multi-volume Adjudication Officers Guide
(AOG).
(11) PAO Sections are staffed by experts in the centrally-administered
benefits. However, they are not at present under the command of
0CA0, but remain part of the DHSS establishment. This somewhat
anomalous position is currently under review by the DIIGS and the
0CA0 with the possibility of PAO staff being transferred to the
control of Southampton.
(12) Presidential systems operate in connection with, inter alia,
Lands Tribunals, Mental Health Review Tribunals, Industrial
Tribunals, Immigration Tribunals, and VAT Tribunals.
(13) Constant attendance allowance and exceptionally severe disable¬
ment allowance are additions that can be claimed by recipients of
industrial disablement benefit.
(14) This is the figure for 1.7.84 (DHSS, 1984b)




North Fylde Central Office 4,289
Newcastle Central Office 10,070
Computer Centres 895
(Source: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1987-88 to 1989-90,
Cm 56-11, HMSO, 1987)
The figure for Headquarters is 4,254, but this includes staff
employed on health service business as well as social security
staff. The text uses the 1985 figures in order to allow
comparisons to be made with, inter alia, Department of Employment
staff engaged on social security duties, and local authority
staff on housing benefit administration.
(16) Previously, LOIs were designated 'Executive Officers' (EOs) but
the new grading, which attracts only a slightly higher salary, is
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intended to reflect the added pressures of working in a local
office and of being in contact with the public. The EO grade
still exists for staff carrying out duties of a similar degree of
difficulty and responsibility but lacking the stresses of the
local office; the adjudication officers in the Mobility Allowance
Unit at NFCO, for example, are graded EO. There is a similar
distinction made for clerical staff between the higher graded
Local Officer I (LOI) and a clerical officer.
(17) Supervisory duties will include, for example, the distribution of
work amongst clerical staff, ensuring a steady throughput of
cases, dealing with queries from staff and from the public, and
the checking and authorising of girocheque payments.
(18) Combining the roles of adjudication officer and supervisor has
been partly the result of the reduction in the amount of
adjudication work falling on the CB side following, for example,
the replacement of sickness benefit by statutory sick pay in
1982, and partly due to the conscious decision of the DHSS to
widen the experience of staff previously engaged on just one
activity.
(19) Family income supplement is to be replaced by 'family credit'
under the Social Security Act 1986.
(20) In R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex parte Moore
C1965] QB 456 at 486
(21) This applies especially to supplementary benefit and hence the
DHSS in practice works to a much shorter target time of 5 working
days for the processing of a claim.
Chapter 4 - Methodology
(1) Partington's broader definition is preferred to Campbell and
Wiles' early more limited formulation which tries to condense the
' socio-legal approach' as follows:
"... it deals with the actual operation of law and its effects
on people - with access to legal services, with the treatment
afforded to defendants in court, with welfare and poverty
issues." (1975, p. 549)
(2) See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the Franks Committee
recommendations.
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(3) Although Morton-Williams is referring to people, the same point
applies when the research is concerned more with types of social
situations than with the actors involved. For example, in their
study of attitudes towards dying, Glaser and Strauss <1968)
sampled, inter alia, situations where dying was expected and
usually quick (an Intensive Care ward), or unexpected and quick
(an Emergency department), or expected but slow (a cancer ward).
(4) The term is Glaser and Strauss's (1967) which they explain as
f ollows:
"The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different
groups pertinent to a category is the category's theoretical
saturation. Saturation means that no additional data are being
found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the
category. " (p. 61)
Chapter 5 - Industrial Disablement Benefit
(1) Social Security Act 1986, s,53.
(2) For an excellent short history of the development of the
Industrial Injuries scheme see Brown (1982), chapters 1-3.
(3) 'Social Insurance and Allied Services', (the Beveridge Report),
1943, Cmd 6404.
(4) This idea was derived from the War Pensions scheme which utilised
a system of percentage assessments for specific disabilities.
Decisions were taken by specially formulated medical boards.
(5) The appeals structure introduced in the 1946 Act is the familiar
one of today. The claimant could appeal against the decision of
an Insurance officer to a Local Appeal Tribunal and thence, on a
point of law, to the National Insurance Commissioner; or against
the decision of a medical board to a Medical Appeal Tribunal.
(6) The introduction of special hardship allowance was something of a
rushed exercise formulated at the eleventh hour to satisfy the
demands of the lobby in favour of an earnings-related element to
disablement benefit. It required a separate piece of
legislation, the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act
1948, s. 1 (see Ogus & Barendt, 1982, p. 298).
(7) Exceptionally severe disablement allowance was introduced by s. 6
of the National Insurance Act 1966, following the recommendations
of the McCorquodale Committee on the Assessment of Disablement,
1965, (Cmnd 2847).
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<8) 'Reform of the Industrial Injuries Scheme1, 1980, HMSO.
(9) For example, in the DHSS discussion document 'Industrial Injuries
Compensation', 1980,
(10) Whilst Beveridge acknowledged the desirability of assisting all
those with disabilities regardless of their cause, he
nevertheless advocated the retention of the 'industrial
preference'. The controversy surrounding this idea persists
today and is one focus of attack for pressure groups such as the
Disability Alliance and the Disablement Income Group who
advocate, inter alia, a general disability benefit to replace the
current collection of ad hoc benefits.
(11) Industrial Injury Benefit was abolished by the Social Security
and Housing Benefits Act 1982.
(12) Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation (Holman Gregory
Report), 1920, Cmd 816.
(13) Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases)
Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/967). The test for occupational
deafness used to be harsher, the claimant having to prove twentv
years experience in the prescribed occupation.
(14) For example, in the 1985 edition, apart from the two tables
showing the new rates of benefit, only four of the remaining
twelve had been updated from the 1984 edition.
(15) The 1984 edition of Social Security Statistics included for the
first time an analysis of industrial accidents and prescribed
diseases according to different industries. Figures are only
provided for 1980-1982 but nevertheless reveal some interesting
trends. The following is a sample of the 27 industries analysed:
Accidents Prescribed Diseases
1980 1981 1982 1980 1981 1982
Mining and Quarrying 14030 13500 12660 650 550 500
Shipbuilding and
marine engineering 1750 1070 1230 370 300 150
Textiles 1550 990 1090 250 140 100
Construct ion 6720 5680 5240 90 130 90
Source: Social Security Statistics 1987, Table 21.50 (Part 1)
There is a break in the series between 1982 and 1983 when a
revised system of industrial classification was introduced




1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
Extraction of minerals
ores and other fuels 4110 4120 4820 130 370 440
Metal goods, engineer—
ing, and vehicles 9570 10200 9980 420 1680 1860
Other manufacturing
industries 5270 5720 6680 260 340 370
Construction 4150 4650 5090 30 150 80
Source: Social Security Statistics 1987, Table 21.50 (Part 2)
(16) See D. Neligan, Social Security Case Law, Digest of
Commissioners' Decisions. DHSS
(17) In a recent revised version of the BI 100A, which incorporates
the BI 95 (which was not in use during the fieldwork stage of
this research), there is even less space.
(18) These figures are from the statistical year 1981/2 quoted by
Wikeley (1988, forthcoming). They are from Health and Safety
Statistics 1981/82, Health and Safety Executive, 1985, HMSO and
are the latest available figures due to the year long industrial
dispute involving DHSS computer operators in 1982.
(19) Industrial Injuries Advisory Council (1973), Report on
Occupational Deafness (Cmnd. 5461).
(20) Normal degenerative changes within the ear reduce the ability to
hear certain frequencies of sound. The damage caused by loud
noise often encountered in industry affects a different range of
frequencies, thus allowing audiometric tests to indicate the
underlying cause of a person's hearing loss.
(21) Regulation 2, Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed
Diseases) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/967). The original
prescription test required that exposure to noisy equipment
lasted for at least 20 years but this was relaxed in 1983 (SI
1983/1094).
(22) As one way of partly overcoming this problem one enterprising
adjudication officer had acquired a trade catalogue from the Coal
Board of percussive tools which he would show to claimants to
identify which tools they had worked with.
(23) Special hardship allowance is to be replaced by a 'reduced
earnings allowance' introduced by the Social Security Act 1986,
schedule 3.
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(24) In a sense this conflict is created artificially by a conflation
of a medical board's assessment under social security law and the
GP's response to his patients's clinical requirements. As a
result both parties may be right in their opinions, ie the GP
considers that the claimant/patient should not do any work in
order to facilitate his recovery, but the medical board considers
that his physical condition is such that he could physically do
some work, whether this is advisable for his health or not.
(25) The Regional Medical Service does not only provide this referee
service for social security administration, but also performs a
liaison function between the DHSS, the Prescription Pricing
Authority, Family Practitioner Committees, and GPs.
(25) There is a considerable amount of case-law on the question of
'regular occupation'; see Neligan's Digest, chapters 8-11.
(27) The length of an SHA award is not fixed in statute. The
Insurance Officer's Guide advises, however, that,
"...SHA should normally be awarded for 12 months, unless there
are factors which indicate an earlier reconsideration of the
case. . . " (para. 6362)
Occasionally, initial awards of two years may be made when ' it is
abundantly clear on strong medical evidence that the claimant
will not ... be able to resume his regular occupation . . . and the
difference between . . . earnings is, and is likely to remain,
appreciably in excess of the maximum rate of SHA. ' (para. 6364)
On renewal claims, awards may be made for up to six years (para.
6366). This most frequently occurs where the claimant is likely
never to work again, or if he has passed pensionable age.
(28) One clerk with long experience of interviewing claimants was more
enterprising; over the years she had maintained a small notebook
in which she kept a record of all the alternative occupations
that had been suggested to her by claimants and which she merely
showed to new claimants and asked them to pick out anything that
they felt they were capable of. The notebook's contents had
grown to a substantial size (over sixty alternative occupations
at last count) and usually proved effective without any further
intervention of the clerk.
(29) This practice has been roundly criticised by Street (1968, p.31)
"It is difficult to see why a report by someone who has never
seen a claimant, that he is suitable for a job that he has
never been offered, and a job of whose availability he is
totally unaware, and where there is no evidence that there are
any vacancies in the job, still less that the claimant could
successfully apply for one, can be regarded as cogent
evidence. "
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(30) The following examples are also taken from internal DHSS training






fracture of left femur
reduced movements of the left hip
impaired locomotion






musculo-skeletal injury to lumbar spine
reduced and painful movement of lumbar spine
impaired spinal function
unable to lift more than 20 lbs without pain
(31) A drawback of the current monitoring arrangements is the partial
random sampling of decisions in the selection of cases to be
scrutinised. Monitoring teams are meant to look at 100 cases, 50
from defined categories specified by the CA0, and 50 selected
randomly from the office record of adjudication decisions made,
the LT 51. Random selection is intended to provide the CAO with
a statistically valid sample for the whole country but it can
produce some strange effects at local level. For example, in one
of the offices visited, 16 accident decisions were selected,
whilst in another none were.
(32) Of the 'reasons for comment' two are what might be considered
purely technical deficiencies in the adjudication process arising
from administrative procedures. When making his final decision
(and each sub-decision also) the adjudication officer is in
effect free to choose only between a limited number of options
(for example, to allow or disallow, to pay the benefit from a
particular date, or for a specified period, etc). To ensure that
he keeps within this range, the DHSS (and more recently 0CA0)
maintain a file of all possible decisions on all benefits, called
the Adjudication Regulations (AR) Code. Each decision will have
its individual Code number and be in the form of a 'model
decision' giving a form of words which constitute a legally valid
statement of the outcome of the adjudication officer's
deliberations. The adjudication officer merely has to fill in
certain gaps left blank for entries pertinent to the individual
claim (such as name, date of commencement of award, amount of
benefit, etc). So, if an adjudication officer uses a wrong model
decision or quotes the wrong AR Code number in the case papers he
is considered to have made an error in the adjudication process
and the monitoring team will record a 'comment' of 'wrong model
decision used'. Similarly, if the adjudication officer makes a
mistake in filling in the appropriate spaces in a model decision
a 'comment' of 'decision incomplete' is recorded.
(33) In the second CAO report it is noted (without explanation) that
the assessments of accuracy reported by the Regional monitoring
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teams are consistently worse than those reported by the
Southampton teams. One adjudication officer, however, suspected
that Regional monitoring teams had become a little over—zealous
in their monitoring in order to demonstrate that the loss of
their advice role was a retrograde step.
". . . standards have dropped drastically as the last oversight
visit from RAO has shown. However, it may be that they are
coming on a little keener now that they know we can't come to
them for advice, and perhaps they are trying to show that they
are needed." (Adjudication Officer, Office #12)
(34) The rank correlation coefficient, r', is calculated using the
f ormula:
ntn2 - 1)
where d = the difference between the rankings of the same office
for workload and 'comment' rate; and
n = the number of offices (ie 12)
The result computed (0.7) indicates a strong correlation between
the two values used to rank the local offices (Rowntree, 1981).
(35) See Commissioners decisions R(I) 14/51 and R(I) 32/61.
(36) This would have been received from the Nottingham Training Centre
(NTC), which acts as a 'lead' centre for all DHSS training; the
staff there not only prepare self-instruction packages for local
office staff, but compile all course materials for the other
training centres throughout the country. As part of the field-
work for this study, I spent a week at NTC in the summer of 1986.
(37) A 'fact' is defined in one of the handouts as:
"... a circumstance or occurrence, peculiar to the individual
case, of which the truth has to be known, accepted or proved
to the satisfaction of the statutory authorities."
Deciding the facts from the evidence involves firstly categor¬
ising it according to whether it is 'direct', (ie indisputable),
'circumstantial' or 'hearsay'. The example given on the
distinctions between these was of a man falling off a ladder and
breaking his toe, claiming an industrial accident. If there were
several witnesses to the incident there is direct evidence that
it took place; if there are no witnesses but someone passing by
finds him prostrate at the foot of the ladder, there is
circumstantial evidence that an accident took place; but if the
man presents himself at a Casualty department of his local
hospital and reports that he hurt his foot falling from a ladder,
there is only hearsay evidence. Having categorised the evidence
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different weights should be attached to it before the facts are
decided. Greatest weight is given to direct evidence, medium
weight to circumstantial, and low weight to hearsay evidence.
(38) See para. 1.2 of the first report of the Chief Adjudication
Officer (DHSS 1985e).
(39) One office had produced its own series of letters which were as
much part of their routine as the 'official' pro-formas printed
by DHSS HQ. In another office, a letter which was regularly sent
out to special hardship allowance claimants whose level of
benefit was below the maximum rate, explained how the decision
was reached and what earnings figures were used in the calcula¬
tion, and asked for comments within seven days before the final,
official decision was taken. (This was considered so effective in
forestalling appeals that it was known as the 'the magic
letter' . )
(40) The Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984 (SI
1984/451), regulations 9 and 10 (now regulations 10 and 11 of the
Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1986 (SI 1986/2218)
with one minor amendment),
(41) However, because of the introduction of the new BI 118 forms,
discussed earlier, the three Regions visited were operating a
full check for a temporary period to ensure that the AMPs grasped
the significance of the changes that had been made.
(42) If a claimant appeals against his decision to an MAT he has the
right to see copies of all the official forms used in his case.
On medical report forms, however, an AMP can identify any
'harmful information' that he considers should not, in the
interests of the claimant's health, be released in the event of
an appeal. The Medical Officer will therefore try to ensure that
no such harmful information slips through by returning the report
for the doctor to reconsider. This is considered legitimate
since it does not interfere with the independence of the AMP or
medical board.
(43) See DHSS (1986) Feasibility of Regional/Area Centres for Social
Security Disability Benefits. Central Management Support report,
(unpublished).
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Chapter 6 - Mobility Allowance
(1) At the time of writing no beneficiaries had had their mobility
allowance terminated under the age 75 rule. This is because the
benefit was phased in over three years with the eldest claimants
being the last to be admitted to the scheme in 1979. It is
somewhat doubtful that the rule will be allowed to take effect
because of political unpopularity in taking away from very old
(and handicapped) people some £20+ from their weekly budget. A
possible response might be to freeze the level of award at 75 so
that it gradually decreases in value. Or the payment of mobility
allowance might be extended to age 80 or 85 (or beyond) but this
would only be postponing a difficult decision.
It might be thought that the 75 rule was always destined to be a
doomed element of the legislation and the question raised of how
it found its way into the Act in the first place. The answer,
according to one civil servant involved in drafting the rules of
the benefit, is that it was the only way of persuading the
Treasury that mobility allowance was financially feasible.
(2) The Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984, SI 1984/451,
regulation 53.
(3) The sudden rise in the number of disallowances on age grounds is
puzzling. One explanation is the cessation in 1985 of the 'brush-
off1 system operated by Mobility Allowance Unit clerical
officers. This system was an administrative convenience; to save
the effort of going through the formal adjudication process on
'over-age' claims. Claimants who were clearly ineligible because
they were too old were sent a letter by a clerical officer
(rather insensitively called a 'brush-off' letter) explaining
that because the legislation was so clear there was no point in
pursuing the claim and that they would take no further action
unless the claimant specifically wanted a formal decision. This
practice was identified by an OCAO inspection and stopped
immediately as a strictly illegal process. Now every claimant
receives a formal notification of the adjudication officer's
decision.
(4) The choice of a central unit rather than, say, the local office
or Regional Office was not difficult to make. Firstly, the
benefit was expected to be small scale (around 100,000) and hence
the load distributed throughout the local office network would
have been very small for each office restricting the accumulation
of expertise and experience. Secondly, the experience of the
comparatively new (since 1971) Attendance Allowance Unit served
as a precedent for the central administration of a benefit; and
furthermore, it was considered to be working successfully. And
thirdly, with a new benefit there was a desire to monitor its
administration very carefully, which could be achieved most
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easily in one office. The choice was therefore virtually self-
evident, no alternative proposal emerged as a serious contender.
(5) See 'The Government's Expenditure Plans 1987-88 to 1989-90',
Cm 56-11, HMSO, 1987
(6) The Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984,
regulation 30.
(7) Compared with many other social security benefits, mobility
allowance is relatively straightforward. The medical conditions
to be satisfied are few and consequently the assessment needed to
decide them is correspondingly short and simple. At one point
claimants' GPs were considered as possible suitable suppliers of
medical assessments since they would have an intimate knowledge
of a claimant's medical history and, therefore, be in the best
position to advise on walking ability. However', the experience
during the early years of the Attendance Allowance Board, who did
use GPs in such a way for attendance allowance assessments, was a
major influence in persuading the team to opt for an alternative
arrangement. The Board had problems with poor reports, long
delays, and simple refusal to cooperate from GPs.
(8) The origins of the two tier appeal structure of mobility
allowance appear to be in the initial intended arrangements for
deciding the medical questions. It was proposed at one time that
a Medical Board would consider a report from the claimant's GP
and make a decision based on the reported clinical findings (ie a
similar arrangement to attendance allowance where DHSS Medical
Officers, delegated by the Attendance Allowance Board, make
decisions based on a medical report supplied to them). But the
idea of using GPs was not adopted and the current, alternative
role for the Medical Boards was chosen.
(9) Regulation 54 of Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984
empowers adjudication officers to determine a medical question
without obtaining a fresh medical report if there is some other
evidence at their disposal that allows them to decide in the
claimant's favour. This may be evidence relating to a previous
claim for attendance allowance, sickness benefit, war disablement
or the vehicle scheme. In practice this power is not used;
claimants are referred automatically to an EMP.
(10) The Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984,
regulation 55(2) (c) allow that a case may be referred to a
Medical Board for an initial decision. M7 will advise whether or
not this is an appropriate course of action.
(11) EMPs were visited in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Balham, and
Reading.
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(12) One refused to give details of the walking test he used and was
clearly of the opinion that knowledge of EMPs' methods of testing
should not be widely known.
(13) The use of the 100 yard criterion has had an unintended side-
effect on the relevance of the legislation, in that the medical
questions concerning the dangers to the claimant's health from
walking (in regulation 3(1)(c)) have been rendered virtually
obsolete, ie if walking is likely to be a health risk then the
claimant is not usually fit enough to manage the standard 100
yards walking test. So, before these questions are even
considered the claimant is very likely to have qualified as being
virtually unable to walk and hence eligible for the benefit.
There are however exceptions to this general observation: for
example the angina sufferer who may be able to walk reasonably
well but is advised not to because of the risk of possible
fuiIher heart damage; hut even these numbers are declining since
as one baffled doctor told me, modern medical opinion is lending
towards the view that gentle exercise and not complete inactivity
is a more effective response to angina. Haemophiliacs are
another group who are advised not to walk far (because of the
danger of bleeding into the joints).
(14) In R(M) 2/83 the Commissioner considered, inter alia, an MAT's
finding that the claimant, a grossly mentally handicapped,
epileptic child, incapable of speech, with poor eyesight and
completely oblivious to personal danger, would not be able to
benefit from enhanced facilities for locomotion due to her mental
condition. The Commissioner concluded (in para. 11) that:
"...the requirement that the claimant's condition should enable
her form time to time to benefit from enhanced facilities for
locomotion merited a liberal interpretation involving mental
stimulation from being able to get out and about without the
claimant herself necessarily appreciating that she was deriving
mental benefit."
(15) The use of Lay Scrutiny in place of M7 Medical Officers was
adopted primarily in an attempt to speed up the decision-making
process by eliminating the physical movement of casepapers around
NFCO (the Mobility Allowance Unit and M7 occupy premises several
miles apart), and the inevitable delays that resulted from the
scrutiny being carried out by part-time doctors. (Lay Scrutiny
work continuously whilst the Medical Officers had to be booked on
an ad hoc sessional basis according to the level of work. ) And
it did not escape the notice of the Mobility Allowance Unit
management that EOs are considerably cheaper to employ than
medical practitioners.
(16) At the time the fieldwork was being carried out Lay Scrutiny were
receiving MY22s on all initial claims for mobility allowance
whilst M7 continued to scrutinise those for second and subsequent
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claims, although the intention was that Lay Scrutiny should
eventually do these also.
(17) The Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984,
regulation 55(2) (c).
(18) See R(M) 1/80. The ruling that 'hysterical' conditions do not
fall within the scope of 'physical disablement' was recently
upheld in the Court of Appeal (Harrison v Secretary of State for
Social Services, Independent, 18 May 1987).
(19) In R(M) 2/81 the claimant was successful, whilst in R(M) 1/83 the
claimant nevertheless failed,
(20) Lees v Secretary of State for Social Services C19851
2 All ER 203. See also Ogus and Barendt, 1985, cl4-15.
(21) In one case, an EMP told of how he was telephoned by a Medical
Officer at NFCO about a case he had judged virtually unable to
walk even though the claimant could manage a distance of 200
yards. He was ' reminded' that 100 yards was usually considered a
reasonable test.
(22) Consideration of decision-making by the MAT unfortunately lies
outside the practical limits of this study but two sources, one
above and one below the level of the tribunal, suggest that the
claimant will not be judged by exactly the same standards by the
MAT as by the EMP and the Medical Boards. One source is the EMPs
themselves who receive copies of cases decided by an MAT on which
they had supplied the medical report. The comment was made by a
number of EMPs that they were at a loss to understand some of
these decisions (which is not surprising if the tribunal was
working to a different set of decision criteria). The second
source is a Commissioner's decision, unreported, regarding a
claimant who was born a spastic and who still suffered from
spasticity of the leg muscles, in which the MAT findings are
quoted in part; the MAT had said:
"He walked a distance of 50 yards at a moderate or uniform pace
without any aid or support. He walked quite steadily and was
able to avoid objects put in his path. THere was no apparent
discomfort or distress."
Accordingly, the MAT dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the
claimant did not fulfil the requirements of the Mobility
Allowance Regulations. Despite the fact that the Commissioner
noted that the claimant's gait and speed were both unsteady (so
much so that he was often mistaken in public for a drunk), the
Commissioner decided that he could not intervene in the case as
this was a medical question on which the MAT was the final
authority unless an error of law had been made. This the
Commissioner decided was not the case and, since he considered
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that it was not an unreasonable decision for an MAT to reach, no
breach of natural justice had arisen either. Hence, the case was
dismissed as being outside the jurisdiction of the Commissioner.
Notwithstanding the fact that the claim had been rejected by an
adjudication officer and a Medical Board beforehand, the MAT
clearly had not applied the same test that the vast majority of
claimants are subject to in the course of their initial claims.
(23) However, one region in the study distributed a one-page photocopy
intended to elaborate or reassure on various points of detail;
unobtrusively, well-down the list is the note that the Department
usually considers 100 yards as a useful criterion for assessing
whether a claimant is virtually unable to walk.
(24) In 1984, at only 4% of appeals heard by SSATs was the claimant
successful, and for 1985 the figure had fallen to 37# The
comparable success rales for claimants at MATs were 727. and 477#
respectively (Social Security Statistics, 1985, p. 126).
(25) It was recognised by Oglesby that one of the objections to the
use of the claimant's own GP to complete the medical report,
which was one of his recommendations, was that he or she might be
biased in favour of his or her own patient. However Oglesby
considered that this would be offset by the advantages to be
gained from the GP's intimate knowledge of the claimant's medical
background.
(26) It is ironic, therefore, that the DHSS advice on 'virtually
unable to walk' goes far beyond the bounds envisaged by the
architects of the legislation who intended, according to one
source, that the phrase should bring within the scope of the
benefit those individuals who whilst not totally unable to walk
could only manage very small distances (ie just a few yards). In
the case of mobility allowance, there is no doubt that
Departmental influence has inadvertantly benefitted many
thousands of claimants who were never intended to qualify as
recipients.
(27) In the first eight months of the operation of Lay Scrutiny,
73,082 MY22s were scrutinised. Of these, 4,144 (5.77#) needed
further evidence. However, it is not clear how many of these
were simple oversights (for example, failure to answer one of the
questions) and how many were because the completed form still did
not allow an opinion to be formed.
(28) For example, the EMP could say that "I have recorded here that
you walked 80 yards in 2 minutes, stopping once for about 10
seconds. You then stopped because you became breathless and
tired. During the test you walked with a slight limp but your
balance remained good throughout....etc." The claimant could
then be asked if this was representative, ie whether this was a
'good' day or a 'bad' day, and whether he was still of the same
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opinion as to his own ability that he stated before the test.
This could be facilitated by a clearer format for the MY22 which
would give a comprehensible (to the claimant) summary and a
quantified (where possible) assessment of the walking test.
(29) Support for such a change could be adduced from the Oglesby
report which recommended that if GPs were to be the main
suppliers of medical reports then it would not be reasonable to
expect them to become sufficiently au fait with the law on
mobility allowance to be able to give an opinion as to whether
the legislative criteria are satisfied, they should instead just
furnish a medical report minus an opinion.
(30) Although the notion of independent adjudication proscribes any
involvement from Departmental officials in decision-making, it
was common practice until recently for medical board chairmen
occasionally to seek advice from Regional Medical Officers.
(This was most common where Medical Boarding Centres occupied the
same building as the Regional SMO and his staff and the seeking
of advice required no more effort than a walk down a corridor.)
In addition to this, M7 Medical Officers, as scrutineers, were
(at least until very recently) in the habit of contacting
individual Board chairmen where some mistake appeared to have
been made on the papers. This could often lead to the chairman
altering the original decision (which indeed was usually the
intention of M7 in the first place). This practice was well-
established but came to the notice of a Commissioner who sharply
condemned Departmental officials for intervening in the decision¬
making of one of the independent statutory authorities. The
result has been that DHSS MOs now have no contact with Medical
Board members qua members; however, they can still contact EMPs -
it is not surprising therefore to find a sense of bewilderment
amongst doctors who act in both capacities.
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APPENDIX - INTERVIEW SCHEDULES
A -Local Office adjudication officer
1. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS
2. ADJUDICATION
2. 1 What is adjudication; how does it differ from discretion
2.2 Is disablement benefit adjudication different from, say,
pensions adjudication
2.3 Is there any discretion in disablement benefit decision¬
making
2.4 How is adjudication different from Secretary of State
decision-making
2.5 What qualities are required of the adjudication officer
2.6 What qualities are required of the supervisor
2.7 Is there a conflict between the two roles
2.8 What are the adjudication officer's priorities
[PROMPT: suggest accuracy; speed]
2.9 Is there a trade-off between speed and accuracy
2.10 Is your local knowledge of any use to you in decision-making
2.11 What does being an independent statutory authority mean to
you
2. 12 Is your independence important to you
3. TRAINING
3. 1 What adjudication training have you received
3. 2 What is your opinion of your training
4. ADVICE
4. 1 If you have a problem with a case, what do you do
[PROMPT: explore use of people, IOG, Commissioner decisions]
4. 2 How do you view the loss of the Regional advice role
4,3 How important is the advice in the IOG; do you always follow
it
4. 4 What is your experience of OCAO as a source of advice
5. MONITORING
5. 1 How useful are monitoring team visits and reports
5.2 What long-term effect does the feedback from the monitoring
system have
5. 3 Does the monitoring system help to maintain and improve
standards of adjudication
6. APPEALS
6. 1 What action do you take on receipt of an appeal
6. 2 Do you review many decisions
6. 3 Is new evidence ever presented at an appeal hearing; how do
you react
6. 4 When making an initial decision on a claim, do you consider
how an appeal tribunal would view the case
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6.5 Do you 'defend' or 'advise' at a hearing
6. 6 How do you view the ' amicus curiae* role
6.7 Should adjudication officers also act as presenting officers
6. 8 How do you compare appeals prepared by you with those
prepared in other local offices that you may have to present
7. PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
7. 1 Do you think that appeals are sometimes made because the
claimant has not understood the reason for a decision
7.2 Do you think that claimants receive enough explanation about
their claims
7.3 What is your opinion of the written communications between
the local office and the claimant
7.4 Do you use any locally-produced forms; why
8. PROBLEM AREAS
8.1 Do industrial accidents present any particular difficulties
8.2 Do prescribed diseases present any particular difficulties
8.3 Do SHA cases present any particular difficulties
9. CENTRALISATION (London South adjudication officers)
9. 1 What do you see as the pros and cons of centralisation
9.2 Is there any effect on the standards of adjudication
9.3 Is there any effect on the standards of information
9.4 Does working in a centralised office have any effect on your
career
B - Local Office HEP
1. BACKGROUND
3. OFFICE ROLE
3. 1 What are you trying to achieve as HEO; what are your aims
and objectives; are these centrally, regionally or locally
determined; are there separate goals for each benefit
3.2 Do they conflict at all; is there a trade-off between speed
and accuracy
3.3 Do you set targets
3.4 How useful are performance indicators; how do you use them
within the office; are they used as 'league tables' between
of fices
3.6 What is your opinion of DHSS devolution policy
3.8 What is the impact of trade union activity in the office
3. 9 how has morale changed over, say, the last 5 years
3,10 how feasible is the combined HEO/AO role
4. ADJUDICATION
4.1 What is adjudication; how is it different from Secretary of
State decision-making
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4.2 What is discretion, [PROMPT: Is the proposed Social Fund a
viable compromise between discretion and adjudication]
4.6 Has the recent shift towards independence in social security
decision-making had much impact
4.7 What qualities are needed for adjudication work
4.8 Are they different from those needed for supervisory work
4.9 Do adjudication and supervision sit happily together; what
is the result of combining the two roles
4. 11 Is there an internal staffing policy, [PROMPT: where do the
best staff go; is there any kind of pecking order; where
does disablement benefit fit in
4.13 What effect does the appeals system have on the local office
4. 14 What effect on adjudication results from the policy of
moving EOs to new duties every two years or so
5. PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
5. 1 Is the local office a welfare agency or a payment agency
5.2 Do claimants get enough explanation of what ic happoning
with their claim and why certain decisions are made
5. 3 Do you have any way of assessing the degree of claimant
satisfaction with the service from your office
6. ' ADVICE CHANNELS
6. 1 What resources do you use in advising adjudication officers
[PROMPT: people, the IOG, Commissioner decisions etc]
6.2 What is your experience of using OCAO for advice
6. 3 How do you view the loss of the Regional advice role
6.4 How important is the IOG as a source of advice; do you
always comply with it
6.5 Are you an effective source of advice and guidance?
7. MONITORING
7. 1 How do you view the results of last monitoring team visit;
were there any differences between CB and Supp. Ben. If so,
how would you explain these
7. 2 Does the monitoring help to improve standards of adjud¬
ication; how do you view the emphasis on 'technical'
accuracy
9. CENTRALISATION (London South only)
9.1 What do you consider the pros and cons of centralised
of fices
9.2 Is there any effect on the standards of adjudication?
9.3 Is there any effect on the career prospects of adjudication
of ficers
9.4 Is there any variation in the standards or approaches of
different adjudication officers
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C - Local Office Manager
1. BACKGROUND
2. OFFICE PROFILE
2.1 Size of office; complement, CB/Supp. Ben split
2.2 Turnover
2.3 Geographical area served (especially for industrial
disablement benefit?)
2.4 Industrial profile of area served by the local office
2.5 Level of unemployment
2.6 Welfare rights activity
3. OFFICE ROLE
3. 1 What are you trying to achieve as Manager; what are your
aims and objectives; are these centrally, regionally or
locally determined; are there separate goals for each
benefit
3.2 Do they conflict at all; is there a trade-off between speed
and accuracy
3.3 Do you set targets
3.4 How useful are performance indicators; how do you use them
within the office; are they used as 'league tables' between
of fices
3.6 What is your opinion of DHSS devolution policy
3.8 What is the impact of trade union activity in the office
3. 9 how has morale changed over, say, the last 5 years
3. 10 how feasible is the combined HEO/AO role
3. 11 how important to you as Manager is fraud work
4. ADJUDICATION
4. 1 What is adjudication; how is it different from Secretary of
State decision-making
4.2 What is discretion, [PROMPT: Is the proposed Social Fund a
viable compromise between discretion and adjudication]
4. 3 How do you view the results of last monitoring team visit;
were there any differences between CB and Supp. Ben. If so,
how would you explain these
4.4 Does the monitoring help to improve standards of
adjudication; how do you view the emphasis on 'technical'
accuracy
4.6 Has the recent shift towards independence in social security
decision-making had much impact
4.7 What qualities are needed for adjudication work
4.8 Are they different from those needed for supervisory work
4.9 Do adjudication and supervision sit happily together; what
is the result of combining the two roles
4. 11 Do you have an internal staffing policy, [PROMPT: where do
the best staff go; is there any kind of pecking order; where
does disablement benefit fit in
4. 13 What effect does the appeals system have on the local office
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4. 14 What effect on adjudication results from the policy of
moving EOs to new duties every two years or so
5. PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
5.1 Is the local office a welfare agency or a payment agency
5.2 Do claimants get enough explanation of what is happening
with their claim and why certain decisions are made
5.3 Do you have any way of assessing the degree of claimant
satisfaction with the service from your office
9. CENTRALISATION (London South only)
9. 1 What do you consider the pros and cons of centralised
of fices
9.2 Is there any effect on the standards of adjudication
9.3 Is there any effect on the career prospects of adjudication
of ficers
9.4 Is there any variation in the standards or approaches of
different adjudication officers
D - Local Office Disablement Clerk
1. BACKGROUND
2. OFFICE ROLE
2. 1 What is the function of the disablement benefit clerk
2. 2 What part do you play in the determination of industrial
accident claims
2. 3 What part do you play in the determination of prescribed
diseases claims [PROMPT: explore role on occupational
deafness cases]
2. 4 What part do you play in the determination of SHA claims
[PROMPT: explore role in decisions on suitable alternative
employment, rates of benefit, re-assessment cases]
3. ADVICE
3. 1 Do you require advice very often
3.2 Where do you seek advice from
4. PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
4. 1 Do you explain to the claimant why you require certain
inf ormation
4. 2 Do you explain the basis of decisions to claimants
4.3 Would you say that the disablement benefit clerk can have
any influence on the final decision of the adjudication
of ficer
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E - Adjudicating Medical Authorities
1. BACKGROUND
2. TRAINING
2. 1 What adjudication training have you received
2. 2 What is your opinion of your training
3. DISABLEMENT BENEFIT ADJUDICATION
3. 1 What procedure do you follow when examining a claimant
3.2 Can you explain how you make a % assessment of disability
[PROMPT: ascertain use of schedule 2 assessments]
3.3 Are there any particular types of case that cause problems
3. 4 Can you explain how you make an SHA assessment
3. 5 How do you view the introduction of one-doctor boards
3.6 How do you view the introduction of the new BI 118 forms
4. MOBILITY ALLOWANCE ADJUDICATION
4. 1 What procedure do you follow when examining a claimant
4. 2 What do you ask claimants to attempt as a walking test
[PROMPT: if a distance is mentioned, eg 100 yards, ask why
this criterion is used]
4.3 How do you assess whether a claimant is 'virtually unable to
walk'
4. 4 How do you interpret this phrase
4. 5 How do you make decisions on the ' 12 month' rule
4.6 How do you make decisions on the 'able to benefit' rule
4. 7 How do you view mobility allowance as a response to people
with walking difficulties
4.8 How do you view the age cut-off points, ie 65 for
eligibility, 75 for receipt of benefit
5. ADVICE
5. 1 What do you do if you have a problem case
5.2 What sources of advice do you use [PROMPT: people,
documents]
5. 3 What use do you make of Commissioner decisions
5. 4 What is your reaction to the Lees case+
6. MONITORING
6. 1 Do you know what happens to your report after you submit it
to the Regional Office
6. 2 Are your reports checked at all
6.3 Do you receive any feedback from the Regional Office or NFCO
7. APPEALS
7. 1 What is your role if a claimant appeals against one of your
decisions
7.2 When making an initial decision on a claim, do you consider
how an appeal tribunal would view the case
7.3 Do you see the results from MATs; how do you use them
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8.' PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
8. 1 How much explanation do you give the claimant at the medical
examination
8. 2 Do you mention your % assessment
8.3 Does the claimant ever ask; how do you reply
8. 4 How would you compare the doctor/patient relationship with
that of the AMP/claimant
t See Chapter 6 on mobility allowance
F - Lay Regional Office Staff
1. BACKGROUND
2. ORGANISATION
2. 1 How many staff in the section
2.2 Briefly, what are there duties
2.3 Briefly, what are your duties
3. ADJUDICATION/MONITORING
3. 1 What is adjudication; how does it differ from discretion
3.2 How do you view current standards of adjudication
3.3 What factors can you identify which contribute to the
different standards produced by local offices
3.4 What are the most common adjudication deficiencies
3. 5 How do you view the system of bi-annual visits
3.6 What contribution does the Regional Office make to the
improvement of standards
3.7 How would you react to the criticism that you 'nit-pick'
3.8 After a visit to a local office what follow-up action is
taken
3.9 In looking at standards of adjudication is the time taken to
reach a decision of any relevance to your assessment
3. 10 If an adjudication officer decides a case 'on the balance of
probability' can anyone say that he is wrong
4. ADVICE
4. 1 What advice role do you have
4.2 How do you view the loss of the Regional advice function
4.3 In practice, do you still provide advice to local offices
5. TRAINING
5. 1 What is your involvement in adjudication training
9. CENTRALISATION (London South only)
9. 1 What do you see as the pros and cons of centralisation
9.2 Is there any effect on the standards of adjudication
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9.3 Is there any effect on the standards of information
9.4 Does working in a centralised office have any effect on your
career
G - Regional Office Medical Staff
1. BACKGROUND
2. ORGANISATION
2. 1 How many staff in the section
2. 2 Briefly, what are there duties
2.3 Briefly, what are your duties
2. 4 What is your relationship with HQ, NFCO, OCAO
3. ADJUDICATION
3. 1 How do you view the pros and cons of one and two-doctor
boards
3.2 How do you view the new BI 118 forms1''
3. 3 How do you view the changes in the use of the BI 401
referral form [PROMPT: what is being done/has been done
about checking old cases; refer to the Mobility Allowance
special exercise1"]
3.4 How do you view the changes in definition of relevant loss
of faculty, disability, and disablement11" [PROMPT: does
this mean that some previous decisions have been technically
illegal]
4. TRAINING
4. 1 What is your involvement in training new AMPs/EMPs
4.2 Is there a recruitment policy for AMPs/EMPs
5. ADVICE
5. 1 What advice role do you have
5.2 How important is the Industrial Injuries Handbook; do you
keep its use under review [PROMPT: mention how little it
is used in practice]
5. 3 How are Commissioner decisions communicated to AMPs
6. MONITORING
6. 1 How do you assess standards of AMPs; are you satisfied; what
action is taken to improve standards
6. 2 How do you view the reductions in pre- and post-board
scrutiny
7. APPEALS
7. 1 What is your role in the appeal system
7. 2 What use is made of MAT results
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9. MISCELLANEOUS
9. 1 How do you view the Oglesby notion of Regional Disablement
Centres
9. 1 How do you view the Oglesby idea of using a claimant's own
GP for medical reporting purposes
t See Chapter 6 on mobility allowance
tt See Chapter 5 on industrial disablement benefit
H - Mobility Allowance Unit Adjudication and Lay Scrutiny Staff
1. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS
2. ADJUDICATION
2. 1 What is adjudication; how does it differ from discretion
2.2 Is adjudication different from the Lay Scrutiny 'advisory'
function
2.3 Is there any discretion in mobility allowance decision¬
making
2.4 How is adjudication different from Secretary of State
decision-making
2.5 What qualities are required of the adjudication officer
2.6 What qualities are required of the supervisor
2.7 Is there a conflict between the two roles
2.8 What are the adjudication officer's priorities
[PROMPT: suggest accuracy; speed]
2.9 Is there a trade-off between speed and accuracy
2. 11 What does being an independent statutory authority mean to
you
2. 12 Is your independence important to you
2. 13 How do you assess whether a claimant is 'virtually unable to
walk'
2.14 How do you interpret this phrase
2. 15 How do you make decisions on the ' 12 month' rule
2.16 How do you make decisions on the 'able to benefit' rule
2. 17 What action do you take if you disagree with the medical
advice on a claim
3. TRAINING
3.1 What adjudication training have you received
3. 2 What is your opinion of your training
4. ADVICE
4. 1 If you have a problem with a case, what do you do
[PROMPT: explore use of people, IOG, Commissioner decisions]
4.3 How important is the advice in the IOG; do you always follow
it
4. 4 What is your experience of OCAO as a source of advice
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5. MONITORING
5.1 How useful are monitoring team visits and reports
5.2 What long-term effect does the feedback from the monitoring
system have
5.3 Does the monitoring system help to maintain and improve
standards of adjudication
6. APPEALS
6. 1 What action do you take on receipt of an appeal
6.2 Do you review many decisions
6. 4 When making an initial decision on a claim, do you consider
how an appeal tribunal would view the case
7. PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
7.2 Do you think that claimants receive enough explanation about
their claims
7.3 What is your opinion of the written communications between
the Mobility Allowance Unit and the claimant
9. CENTRALISATION
9. 1 What do you see as the pros and cons of centralisation
9.2 Is there any effect on the standards of adjudication
9.3 Is there any effect on the standards of information
9.4 Does working in a centralised office have any effect on your
career
I - Mobility Allowance Unit Appeals and Review Staff
1. BACKGROUND
2. APPEALS
2. 1 What action do you take on receipt of an appeal
2.2 Do you review many decisions
2.3 Is new evidence ever presented in a letter of appeal; how do
you react
J - Mobility Allowance Unit Managerial Staff
1. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS
2. OFFICE ROLE
2. 1 What are you trying to achieve in your post; what are your
aims and objectives
2.2 Do they conflict at all
2.3 Do you set targets
2.4 How useful are performance indicators; how do you utilise
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them within the office
2.8 What is the impact of trade union activity in the office
2. 9 How has morale changed over, say, the last 5 years
2. 11 Are Medical Boards an anomaly in the adjudication system
3. ADJUDICATION
3. 1 What is adjudication; how does it differ from discretion
3.2 Is mobility allowance adjudication different from, say,
attendance allowance adjudication
3. 3 Is there any discretion in mobility allowance decision¬
making
3.4 How is adjudication different from Secretary of State
decision-making
3.5 What qualities are required of the adjudication officer
3. 6 What qualities are required of the supervisor
3. 7 Is there a conflict between the two roles
3.8 What are the adjudication officer's priorities
[PROMPT: suggest accuracy; speed]
3.9 Is there a trade-off between speed and accuracy
3. 10 How do you view the introduction of Lay Scrutiny
5. MONITORING
5. 1 How useful are monitoring team visits and reports
5.2 What long-term effect does the feedback from the monitoring
system have
5.3 Does the monitoring system help to maintain and improve
standards of adjudication
7. PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
7.2 Do you think that claimants receive enough explanation about
their claims
7.3 What is your opinion of the written communications between
the Mobility Allowance Unit and the claimant
9. CENTRALISATION
9. 1 What do you see as the pros and cons of centralisation
9.2 Is there any effect on the standards of adjudication
9.3 Is there any effect on the standards of information
9.4 Does working in a centralised office have any effect on
careers of Mobility Allowance Unit staff
K - NFCO PAO Section
1. BACKGROUND
2. ORGANISATION
2. 1 How many staff in the section
2.2 Briefly, what are there duties
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2.3 Briefly, what are your duties
2. 4 What is your relationship with HQ, OCAO, ROs
3. FUNCTION
3. 1 What is the function of the PAO Section
3.2 How do you put these into effect
4. ADJUDICATION
4. 1 What is adjudication, discretion, Secretary of State
decision-making [PROMPT: use 'maybe' example from attendance
allowance]
4.2 Should the same evidence always produce the same decision:
in theory; in practice
5. MONITORING
5.1 Are the present arrangements effective in maintaining and
improving standards of adjudication; what does analysis of
last 12 months reveal about changing standards
5.5 In looking at standards of adjudication is the time taken to
reach a decision of any relevance to your assessment
5.8 If an adjudication officer decides a case 'on the balance of
probability' can anyone say that he is wrong
5.9 Is OCAO satisfied that the present sampling arrangements are
satisfactory, [PROMPT: adjudication covers a wide range of
questions from the simple to the highly complex, should not
more attention be paid to difficult areas rather than pursue
a rigid adherence to the demands of random sampling
techniques]
5. 10 How do you react to the criticism that you 'nit-pick'
5. 11 Does monitoring help to improve standards of adjudication
6. ADVICE
6.1 What advice do you give on the 'medical questions', ie
virtually unable to walk, the 12 months rule, the ability to
benefit rule
6.2 What advice do you give to the Lay Scrutiny section
L - NFCO Principal Medical Officer (M7 Branch)
1. BACKGROUND
2. ORGANISATION
2. 1 How many staff in the section
2.2 Briefly, what are there duties
2. 3 Briefly, what are your duties
2. 4 What is your relationship with HQ, OCAO, ROs
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3. ADJUDICATION
3. 1 How do you interpret 'virtually unable to walk'
3.2 Where did the 100 yards criterion originate from
3.2 How do EMPs know how to interpret 'virtually unable to walk'
3. 3 How do you view the introduction of lay scrutiny
3.4 How do you view the Oglesby notion of using the claimant's
own GP for completion of the MY22 form
4. TRAINING
4. 1 what is your training function
5. ADVICE
5. 1 What advice role do you have
5. 2 How important is the Mobility Allowance leaflet; do you keep
its use under review [PROMPT: mention how little it is
used in practice]
5. 3 How are Commissioner decisions communicated to* AMPs
6. MONITORING
6. 1 How do you assess standards of EMPs; are you satisfied; what
action is taken to improve standards
7. APPEALS
7. 1 What is the role of M7 in mobility allowance appeals
7.2 Could you explain the role of the Medical Board
7.3 How do you view their effectiveness
7.4 How would you react to the comment that Medical Boards are
an anomaly in the adjudication system
9. MISCELLANEOUS
9. 1 Why is there not a comparable monitoring/advice structure to
the lay side
9.2 What involvement.does M3 have in the production, design, and
improvement of official forms
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M - QCAO Lav Staff
1. BACKGROUND
2. INDEPENDENCE
2.1 What contact is maintained with DHSS HQ on
- policy
- interpretation of statute and case-law
- advice to AOs
- the annual report
2.2 Do the DHSS bring issues to the attention of OCAO, ie with
the (implicit or explicit) intention of influencing OCAO
behaviour
2.3 Could you cite any examples of DHSS attempts to influence
OCAO
2.4 Do you have any 'informal' contacts with HQ; why
2.5 How is a DHSS role in training adjudication officers
reconciled with independence
3. ADJUDICATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
3. 1 What is adjudication, discretion, Secretary of State
decision-making [PROMPT: use 'maybe' example from attendance
allowance]
3.2 Should the same evidence always produce the same decision:
in theory; in practice
4. SELECTION AND TRAINING
4. 1 How are OCAO staff selected
4.2 How are OCAO staff trained
5. MONITORING
5.1 Are the present arrangements effective in maintaining and
improving standards of adjudication; what does analysis of
last 12 months reveal about changing standards
5.2 What use is made of monitoring reports of local offices
submitted by Regional teams; is it only the statistics that
are used
5.3 Were any 'different adjudication practices' found (para 2.4
of 1985 OCAO Report refers) identified in local offices; how
did they affect standards
5.4 Are there any differences in (i) practices and (ii)
standards between (a) different Regional monitoring teams,
(eg in Scotland a 2-week visit is made, in the NE cases are
called in. Any comments) (b) Regional monitoring teams and
OCAO teams
5.5 In looking at standards of adjudication is the time taken to
reach a decision of any relevance to your assessment
5.6 Is the notion of an 'adjudication comment' now finalised;
how does OCAO ensure that it is used uniformly
5.7 Are there any plans to alter the categorisation of errors
that was adopted in the first report; was it useful to you,
to adjudication officers, and to the DHSS
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5.8 If an adjudication officer decides a case 'on the balance of
probability' can anyone say that he is wrong
5.9 Is OCAO satisfied that the present sampling arrangements are
satisfactory, [PROMPT: adjudication covers a wide range of
questions from the simple to the highly complex, should not
more attention be paid to difficult areas rather than pursue
a rigid adherence to the demands of random sampling
techniques]
6. ADVICE
6. 1 Who advises the advisers; are any external sources of help
used, [PROMPT: if solicitors are mentioned ask if they also
advise the DHSS; if so how is this reconciled with an
independent role]
6. 2 How is the quality of advice assessed, maintained and
improved
7. APPEALS TO THE COMMISSIONER
7. 1 What criteria are used in deciding whether to pursue a
Secretary of State reference to the Commissioner, [PROMPT:
if cost is mentioned what amount that is used; nb App 7,
para 109 of 1985 Report refers]
8. GENERAL/MISCELLANEOUS
8. 1 Why is there not a comparable monitoring/advice structure on
the medical side
8. 2 Is the role of the HE0/A0 a weakness in the structure of
adjudication
8. 3 What involvement does OCAO have with SSATs and MATs; isn't
OCAO only doing part of the job of keeping under review the
adjudication system, [PROMPT: Para 1.2 of 1985 report notes
that both first and second tier adjudication is the concern
of the CAO. Refer to the frequent comments from AOs that
SSATs often give strange/bad/poor decisions]
8.4 Official forms are important, what involvement does OCAO
have in their production, design, improvement. Are locally-
produced forms discouraged; is there a potential advice role
for OCAO here
9. MOBILITY ALLOWANCE
9. 1 What is the relationship between OCAO and Lay Scrutiny in
NFCO
10. SPECIFIC ISSUES
10. 1 Reviews: why do they cause so many problems
10.2 Occupational deafness: is too much expected of the non¬
technical adjudication officer
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N - OCAO Principal Medical Officer (M3 Branch)
1. BACKGROUND
2. ORGANISATION
2.1 How many staff in the section
2.2 Briefly, what are there duties
2.3 Briefly, what are your duties
2. 4 What is your relationship with HQ, NFCO, ROs
3. ADJUDICATION
3. 1 How do you view the pros and cons of one and two-doctor
boards
3.2 How do you view the new BI 118 forms'"''
3. 3 How do you view the changes in the use of the BI 401
referral form [PROMPT: what is being done/has been done
about checking old cases; refer to the mobility allowance
special exercise']
3.4 How do you view the changes in definition of relevant loss
of faculty, disability, and disablement'"' [PROMPT: does
this mean that some previous decisions have been technically
illegal]
4. TRAINING
4. 1 What is your training function
5. ADVICE
5. 1 What advice role do you have
5.2 How important is the Industrial Injuries Handbook; do you
keep its use under review [PROMPT: mention how little it
is used in practice]
5. 3 How are Commissioner decisions communicated to AMPs
6. MONITORING
6. 1 How do you assess standards of AMAs; are you satisfied; what
action is taken to improve standards
6. 2 How do you view the reductions in pre- and post-board
scrutiny
7. APPEALS TO THE COMMISSIONER
7. 1 What involvement do you have with Commissioner cases
8. INDEPENDENCE
8. 1 OCAO is independent of the DHSS; what is the position of M3
8.2 What contact is maintained with DHSS HQ on
- policy
- interpretation of statute and case-law
- advice to adjudication officers
- the annual report (what is the rationale for letting them
see a draft of the report)
8. 3 Do the DHSS bring issues to the attention of OCAO, ie with
the (implicit or explicit) intention of influencing OCAO
- 388 -
8.4 Could you cite any examples of DHSS attempts to influence
OCAO
8.5 Do you have any 'informal' contacts with HQ; why
9. MISCELLANEOUS
9. 1 Why is there not a comparable monitoring/advice structure to
the lay side
9. 2 What involvement does M3 have in the production, design, and
improvement of official forms
t see Chapter 6 on Mobility Allowance
ft see Chapter 5 on Industrial Injuries
0 - Nottingham Training Centre
1. BACKGROUND
2. THE COURSE
2. 1 what are the objectives of the course
2.2 what methods do you adopt
3. ADJUDICATION
What are your training objectives on the following:
3.1 'independence' and the adjudication officer's relationship
with the DHSS
3.2 the difference between the adjudication officer and
Secretary of State roles
3. 3 how to use the IOG
3. 4 how to treat the competing pressures of accuracy and speed
3.5 fraud prevention and detection
3.5 contact with claimants, and their representatives
3.7 giving explanations in case papers and to claimants
3.8 what a 'correct' decision means
3.9 how to handle unclear issues like 'good cause' etc
3. 10 the possibility of two opposite decisions both being
'correct'
3.11 the use of advice channels
3.12 the approach to appeals; how to treat SSAT decisions; the
'amicus curiae' role
